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Abstract. 
This thesis sets out to examine five separate arenas within the Angolan public sphere, 
and investigate their contribution to peace discourse. The five arenas are: the Angolan 
churches, private media, civil society organisations, community based material and 
traditional authority. The objective of this thesis is to highlight these discourses, and to 
investigate their importance to Angolans as arenas of peace engagement. These peace 
discourses have remained poorly developed or ignored within the Angolan literature. 
Collectively, these five discourses offer a perspective `from below' on peace and 
conflict in Angola, and are analysed within a Habermasian public sphere framework. 
The thesis argues that many Angolans have been critical of the various peace 
processes, seen as agreements between the militarised elements of Angolan society. 
The exclusion of national civic forces from these agreements, such as the churches and 
civil society, is regarded as a reason for the failure of the Bicesse and Lusaka peace 
agreements. The thesis sets out criticism of international mediation efforts, interpreted 
in some arenas as an obstacle in the search for peace, because economic interests were 
seen as taking priority. By focusing on oft excluded actors, an emphasis is placed on 
Angolan `agency' in favour of peace, demonstrating significant Angolan peace 
engagement throughout the years of conflict. The thesis also underlines the importance 
of addressing traditional and cultural issues in understanding the causes of the Angolan 
war, and in developing new approaches to building peace. Simultaneously, another 
finding concerns the fundamental role Angolan history has played in shaping the 
Angolan public sphere, and how this impacted negatively on the ability of Angolans to 
organise collectively and address peace issues. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction. 
This thesis analyses Angolan perspectives on peace from the signing of the Bicesse Peace 
Accords in May 1991 to the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, and situates these 
in relation to the Angolan public sphere. Setting out five national `peace narratives', those 
of the historical churches, the private media, civil society organisations, community-based 
organisations, and traditional authorities, the thesis explores how efforts to resolve the 
Angolan conflict were understood from within Angolan society during these years. These 
peace narratives are analysed within a Habermasian public sphere framework, particularly 
conducive to illustrating how historical events have crucially shaped the Angolan public 
sphere, and how this in turn has influenced the search for peace in Angola. The five peace 
narratives are quite different from each other and are diversely situated within the public 
sphere in terms of urban and rural contexts. 
A focus on Angolan perspectives and interpretations of how peace was pursued, and of the 
conflict that assailed the country, remains central throughout the thesis, revealing a 
concern with locating Angolan `agency' for peace (Mamdani 1995) within Angolan 
society. This focus on national perspectives goes further however, and specifically seeks 
to articulate a view `from below' within Angolan society. It is here that the significance 
and distinctive nature of this thesis lies, in focusing on the discourse of these five Angolan 
arenas. A view `from above' would have given preference to the perspectives of the 
Angolan government, UNITA (Uniäo Nacional Para Independencia Total de Angola, the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), and some of Angola's political 
parties. While these latter narratives are of great importance, they will be dealt with from 
the viewpoint of the arenas chosen for research. 
A brief explanation of the title, The Public Sphere and the Construction of Peace 
Narratives in Angola: from the Bicesse Accords to the death of Savimbi, provides further 
introduction of this thesis. Firstly, the term `Public Sphere' specifically refers to the 
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theoretical framework within which the research is set out. The framework, outlined fully 
in chapter two, is based on Jurgen Habermas's model of the public sphere. From an early 
stage of research it became clear that the nature of the Angolan public sphere was an 
important issue to address, a crucial point of entry into analysing Angolan peace 
narratives. The reason for this is that the narratives take place within a space that has a 
particular history which influences the ability of individuals and organisations to 
communicate and organise. As I will show in this thesis, the Angolan public sphere is not 
a `neutral' place, but has particular memories which have had consequences for peace. 
Secondly, the word `construction' suggests something being built over time. The 
perspectives on peace put forward by the Angolan organisations researched in the thesis 
have developed and evolved over many years, and have responded to the changing 
political and military reality of Angola. These are not static discourses. Rather they reflect 
the challenges and difficulties presented throughout the years under review, to articulate a 
viewpoint on peace. Thirdly, by `peace narrative' I am referring to the material presented 
in response to two research questions to be outlined below, concerning the analysis and 
activity of particular Angolan actors in relation to peace. Finally, the title indicates the 
time frame for the research focus on Angolan peace narratives, i. e. the period from the 
Bicesse peace Accords of 1991 to the death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, in 
February 2002. In exploring this arena of Angolan perspectives on peace, the thesis sets 
out to address a significant gap in the Angolan literature, where these perspectives are 
poorly developed. 
Two specific questions will be explored throughout this thesis: 
Q What perspectives and analysis emerged from within these five types of Angolan 
organisations regarding peace in the period under review? 
Q What did these organisations do to promote or further peace in the same period? 
In the context of this research, the responses identified to these two questions in the five 
separate arenas constitute a `peace narrative'. Other related questions develop this primary 
focus, such as: 
Q What did these organisations identify as the reasons for the conflict? 
Q What did they say about the war and how it was conducted? 
Q What did they say about peace and how it could have been achieved? 
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Q How was international mediation assessed? 
Q What peace initiatives, if any, were suggested or promoted, by these organisations? 
Q What do the peace narratives reveal about the nature of the Angolan public sphere? 
These research questions reflect a desire not only to understand what Angolans said about 
peace, but also what was concretely done to address issues of conflict' during a 
particularly destructive period of Angola's history. The internationally brokered Bicesse 
Accords initially brought sixteen years of civil war between the MPLA government 
(Movimento Popular de Libertacäo de Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola) and UNITA to an end, but UNITA's rejection of election results in September 
1992 ushered in Angola's most brutal period of warfare. The Lusaka Protocol of 
November 1994 again briefly ended this new military conflict, 2 but four years later 
Angola was again back at war making Angola "one of the worst conflict resolution 
failures of the 1990s" (LeBillon 2001: 59). Jonas Savimbi's death in combat in February 
2002, finally brought hostilities to an end and led to the signing of the Luena 
Memorandum of Understanding in April 2002.3 Against this cyclical background of peace 
and conflict, this thesis explores national perspectives within the public sphere on the key 
issue of peace. 
1. Structure. 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. This first chapter sets out the overall research 
objective and research questions for the thesis itself. Section one outlines the structure of 
the thesis, offering initial comment on each of the chapters. Section two deals with the 
research methodology and methods used in conducting this research. The third section 
presents an historical overview of the actual conflict, introducing the principal national 
and international actors in the Angolan conflict. Finally, section four looks at Angola's 
' Kibble (2002: 17) estimated that 1.5 million people were killed in the conflict from 1975. USAID (2002) 
calculated 4.3 million people were internally displaced and 465,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. 
2 The literature distinguishes between the violent expression of conflict, and conflict where no violence 
occurs (cf. International Alert 2001: 4). Throughout this thesis I will frequently use the word conflict as 
shorthand for violent or military conflict. 
3 Full title: Memorando de Entendimento do Luena Complementar ao Protocolo de Lusaka - Luena 
Memorandum of Understanding Complementary to the Lusaka Protocol, Jornal de Angola, April 23 2002. 
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three peace agreements: the 1991 Bicesse Accords, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, and the 
2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding. 
Chapter two sets out the theoretical framework for research, a Habermasian public sphere 
framework. Habermas's original work on the public sphere, first published in 1962, and 
translated from German to English in 1989, provides the foundation for this framework, 
but a later article written in 1992 in response to ongoing academic research on the public 
sphere, is also important to this research. In it Habermas revisited his earlier work and 
outlined areas where his understanding had developed, suggesting a need for certain 
modifications within his earlier articulation of the public sphere. This article confirmed the 
dynamic nature of the public sphere as a site for discourse and offered possibilities as to 
how Habermas could be used for research in an African context, a context radically 
different from the western societies of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
analysed by Habermas. The chapter presents a revised model of Habermas's public 
sphere, and highlights strengths and weaknesses of his research framework. 
Chapters three to seven deal with specific Angolan peace narratives. Collectively they 
illustrate that Angolans have been neither silent nor passive in relation to the conflicts that 
devastated and impoverished their country. Chapter three examines the narrative of the 
historical Christian churches, the most influential of the Angolan actors advocating peace 
examined in this thesis. Benedict Schubert's (2000) doctoral thesis on the Angolan 
churches, and Christine Messiant's (2000) introduction to his book, are important 
contributions towards understanding what the Angolan churches said about peace. 
Schubert's study concludes in 1991, where this thesis commences, though Messiant's 
work offers more recent reflection. Little has been written about the Angolan churches 
since the Bicesse Accords, which is surprising given that the churches have been at the 
forefront of the search for peace. Specific attention is given to the arguments put forward 
by the two main Protestant church organisations, AEA (Alianca Evangelica de Angola, 
Angolan Evangelical Alliance) and CICA (Conselho das Igrejas Cristds em Angola, 
Council of Christian Churches in Angola), and also the Catholic Church CEAST 
(Conferencia Episcopal de Angola e Sao Tome, Episcopal Conference of Angola and Sao 
Tome), during the years of conflict. A considerable body of literature emerged from 
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within the churches in the form of public statements, pastoral letters, conference reports, 
published speeches and interviews. The chapter examines the work of COIEPA (Comite 
Inter Eclesialpara a Paz em Angola, Inter Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola), the 
first ecumenical body formed by the three church organisations to work for peace in 
Angola. COIEPA has been influential, but the fact that it was established as late as 1999 
points to tensions between the churches in the search for peace. 
Chapter four examines the private media. It outlines the argument put forward by private 
publications that emerged and developed since the mid-1990s, and also looks at private 
broadcasting. Private media voices are a relatively new phenomenon in Angola, where the 
landscape has been dominated by the state controlled media. The private media has 
become an important vehicle for communication and public opinion but has faced 
challenges in relation to financial viability and operating costs. It also has had to deal with 
periodic government opposition, most noticeably after the country returned to war in 
1998. The chapter engages in analysis of the content of the various private newspapers, as 
well as looking at two Luanda based private radio stations. Attention is also paid to 
published cartoons which offer. an interesting perspective on Angolans' perceptions of the 
war. Chapters four to seven adopt a thematic approach to the research questions, whereas 
a chronological approach is followed in chapter three on the Angolan churches. 
The fifth chapter deals with the peace narrative of civil society organisations which, like 
the private media, are a relatively new type of actor within the Angola public sphere. 
Given the very wide range of organisations that comprise this arena, it was necessary to 
focus on a selected number. By applying the research questions, a set of themes emerged 
as significant in presenting the peace narrative of Angolan civil society organisations. 
These themes enabled the research to group organisations in a particular way. For 
example, we can speak of organisations that adopted a human rights approach to peace by 
promoting human rights education and awareness. Some have published brief documents 
or `think-tank' reflections, which outlined possible means of achieving peace. Others 
engaged in debate on the new Angolan constitution, which must be approved by the 
National Assembly before elections can be held. A women's organisation offered a unique 
gender perspective on how war affected Angolan women. Also, Angolan organisations 
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worked together to promote `capacity building for peace', an interesting sign of a 
maturing civil society at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
The sixth chapter takes this research into local communities where I examine peace 
narratives constructed at a community-based or grassroots level. The framing of the 
research questions within these local arenas generated material that interpreted peace at a 
relational level within one's immediate environment, emphasising the need to address 
local conflict to secure local peace. This arena has increased in importance since the death 
of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. The material looks firstly at local Christian 
communities and examines existing structures that promote peace and address conflict. 
The chapter draws on the experiences of other national peace agreements where it has 
been shown that violence frequently rises in periods of post-conflict, and that peace 
agreements rarely address issues of local violence. Material on the role played by 
traditional healers in demobilising former soldiers at the psychological, spiritual and 
emotional levels, is also presented. Traditionally these soldiers required purification 
before being readmitted to their communities, and were expected to undergo a process of 
demobilisation through participation in special rituals that goes deeper than anything 
undertaken in any of Angola's peace agreements. 
Chapter seven examines perspectives on peace put forward by Angolan traditional 
authorities, in other words the views of Angolan kings and queens, local chiefs and 
community elders. Traditional authorities had begun to reorganise in the late 1990s 
through the creation of an organisation promoting their interests. The chapter suggests a 
possible role for traditional knowledge within peace processes and argues that traditional 
dynamics in the conflict could possibly have been better understood and harnessed if a 
deeper appreciation of the importance of traditional knowledge had existed. Fieldwork 
interviews form a substantial part of the perspective from traditional authorities, plus a 
number of traditional authority conferences held around the time of Jonas Savimbi's death 
also proved informative. The chapter examines the Angolan ondjango or traditional 
village meeting place, which was also the site of conflict resolution within local 
communities. Particular attention is paid to the spatial dimensions of the ondjango, where 
I argue that appeals for dialogue and renewed negotiation to end the conflict call for the 
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restoration of a space where Angolans could talk about the problems that assailed them. 
Though the use of the ondjango has declined nationally, Angolans have been calling for 
the establishment of ondjango-like space as a mechanism to address national concerns. 
The final chapter draws together the principal strands that run through this thesis. It looks 
firstly at the contribution of the Habermasian theoretical framework to this research, 
dealing with its strengths and limitations. Secondly, the chapter sets out the principal 
themes emerging from within the five Angolan peace narratives and will argue that 
important resources exist within the arenas analysed that have been engaged in peace and 
reconciliation during the years of conflict, and can be built on in a time of post-conflict. 
2. Research Methodology and Sources. 
In addressing the research concerns regarding Angolan peace narratives, qualitative as 
distinct from quantitative research methodologies were employed. Qualitative 
methodologies refer "in the broadest sense to research that produces descriptive data - 
people's own written or spoken words and observable behaviour" (Taylor & Bogdan 
1998: 7). These methods facilitate the exploration of perspectives and attitudes, generally 
allowing "greater expression and insight" (Harrison 2000: 74) than quantitative methods. 
Harrison (2001: 74) outlines a fourfold division of qualitative data: interviews, 
observational research (including participant observation), documents and media 
resources. I propose to follow this outline in setting out the research methods used in this 
thesis, where all four types of data collection were used in the research undertaken. 
2.1. Interviews: 
Ethridge (1990: 192) makes the comment, that 
"[s]ometimes the easiest way to find out what people think or believe about 
politics is simply to interview them. -interviewing 
involves direct, personal, and 
usually extended contact with those whose attitudes, beliefs, or behaviour are the 
focus of research". 
Conducting interviews is generally considered better than carrying out surveys or 
questionnaires as ideas can be explored and responses probed, developed and clarified. 
Apart from difficulties with poor response rates from questionnaires, written responses tell 
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us nothing about tone of voice, facial expressions and hesitation, which can be important 
in assessing answers received (Bell 1999: 4). Ethridge (1990: 192) also points out that 
interviews usually "generate a much richer body of data" than survey methods, but are 
generally more time consuming 
The majority of interviews were conducted during two periods of research fieldwork in 
Angola from May to August 2000, and September to December 2001. Other interviews 
were held during conferences or meetings relating to Angola. 4 The primary objective in 
conducting interviews was to collect new information or data, but interviews were also 
relevant in the verification or `triangulation' of information already received, and in the 
validation or negation of personal impressions of events. 5 Harrison (2001: 168) defines 
`triangulation' as a "process by which two or more kinds of data from different sources are 
used to see if the information is corroborated". In the early stages of research, interviews 
tended to be `standardised' or `structured', in that I went through a specific set of prepared 
questions, but later they became more `unstandardised' or `unstructured' (Harrison 
(2001: 90-94), and were carried out with the assistance of an `aide memoire' (Walker 
1985: 4), a memorised list of questions to ask or issues to raise. 
Three types of interviews were conducted: individual interviews, group interviews, and 
resource group interviews, all of which played an important role in validating the 
information received. The issue of validation is more acute in qualitative methods because 
responses have to be interpreted and contextualised, whereas quantitative data is usually 
grounded in statistics that can be replicated if necessary. 
Firstly, a wide range of individual interviews were conducted with `key informants' such 
as prominent church figures, journalists, newspaper editors, radio directors and personnel 
from civil society organisations, and were an important part of the research process. 
4 For example, British Angola Forum meetings or conferences. Some interview material was also collected 
in France and Ireland where I interviewed individuals with first-hand knowledge of Angola. 
5 For example, I frequently asked interviewees whether they considered views and opinions expressed in 
newspaper articles to be representative of a wider constituency. This was also important regarding traditional 
peace making methods where little documented evidence is available. By conducting interviews with groups 
in both Dundo and Luanda it was possible to get a sense of the similarities of approach across different 
ethnic groups. 
'I 
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Nearly all interviews were conducted in Portuguese. Manheim (2002: 320-321) describes 
these as `elite interviews, 
"[il they have knowledge that, for the purposes of the given research project, 
requires that they be given individual treatment in an interview. Their elite status 
depends not on their role in society but on their access to information that can help 
answer a given research question". 
Interviewees preferred not to be recorded but readily gave permission for note taking. 
Most interviewees were willing to be quoted, but others were not. Taylor (1998: 96) states 
that "few legitimate research interests [are] served by publishing people's names", and 
recommends that anonymity be preserved, a point this research disagrees with, on the 
basis that the credibility of research is strengthened through the publication of names and 
an indication of who the person is that provided the information. For the most part in this 
thesis, it has not been necessary to preserve the anonymity of interviewees, but in a limited 
number of cases it was. In such circumstances I will give an indication of the status of the 
person providing the information. On the whole, I found interviewees forthcoming in their 
responses and supportive of the research concerns. Before starting a first interview, I took 
a few moments to explain the nature of my research and stated clearly that I was interested 
in material that was `public information' in some way, and not secret. I found this type of 
introduction put interviewees at ease, reassuring them that I was not involved in some 
covert study. 
Secondly, a considerable number of group interviews were conducted (i. e. two people or 
more). The majority of interviews with women, for example, were conducted as group 
interviews for reasons of cultural sensitivity. Frequently this involved some translation by 
one of the women of responses from one of Angola's national languages into Portuguese. 
Nearly all the interviews conducted with Angola's traditional authorities were group 
interviews. Interviews were usually arranged by prior appointment, and as a result, a 
number of the community elders participated in the meeting with the local chief. Some 
individual interviews turned into group interviews when the original interviewee invited 
someone else whom s/he felt had something to contribute. This happened on many 
occasions and may have been due to the interviewee not fully understanding the purpose 
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of my research and wishing to have support. 6 The nature of `group interviews' is rather 
different from individual interviews. The researcher needs to be able to moderate or 
facilitate such a group, ensure that everyone feels they can contribute, that no one person 
dominates the group, and also be able to manage interaction within the group (Taylor 
1998: 113-115). 
Thirdly, a `resource group' I formed during fieldwork in the town of Dundo (one of the 
fieldwork locations, outlined later) is important to highlight. I owe this group a particular 
debt of gratitude for its time and guidance during fieldwork. The group of three men and 
three women comprised of individuals I had previously known while resident in Angola 
from 1993 to 1998, whose opinion I respected and with whom I had good rapport. This 
group proved invaluable in helping to evaluate information and also assisted in arranging 
relevant interviews. 7 Members of the group sometimes accompanied me during interviews 
and assisted with translation into Portuguese. During fieldwork in 2001 the resource group 
was reconstituted and expanded for the purpose of a five-day workshop on `Peace 
Initiatives within Angolan Society'. The course content dealt with the themes of this 
research and was an important forum for feedback and the validation of research findings. 8 
Most of the twelve workshop participants were from the area and had been invited to 
attend, or had expressed an interest in hearing how my research had progressed since the 
previous year. 9 
In discussing the importance of interviews, it is appropriate to raise the issue of `oral 
testimony' in research. Lawrenson (1994: 250) argues that 
"combining oral testimony with other sources, [such as] documentary evidence, is 
a useful exercise in developing a sociological picture of the phenomena under 
investigation". 
On the same page he points out that "oral history has been neglected by both history and 
sociology", and it merits serious consideration. Throughout the five narratives, I attempt to 
6 Many of the interviews were set up by phone and I can appreciate how my request for an interview to 
discuss `peace related issues' may have sounded strange to some. 
7 As a general comment, I found it helpful when I was introduced to a potential interviewee or when the 
interview was arranged on my behalf by someone who knew the person I wished to meet. 
8 Workshop held in Dundo, Lunda Norte, October 1-5 2001. 
9 Seven of the participants were from the Dundo area, three from the south of Angola, one from Malauge, 
and one from Congo-Brazzaville, of whom seven were male, five female. 
I 
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ground my argument in documented sources, but I also want to recognise the valuable 
place of oral sources exercise within this research. The later chapters in particular exhibit a 
greater reliance on oral testimony. The credibility of the evidence is an issue, but this 
applies to all verbal testimony collected in interviews. I have attempted where possible, to 
address this by using a variety of sources pointing in the same direction, which allows an 
opinion to be generalised 
2.2. Observational Research. 
`Participant observation' is an important qualitative research method or `participant-as- 
observer' to use Burgess's (1984: 80) phrase, and played a key role in gathering material 
for this research. "When researchers actually become part of the events under study, they 
are engaging in participant observation" (Manheim 2002: 333). Participant observation 
allows researchers form their own opinion of what they see and hear, rather than solely 
relying on impressions of others, and to have greater confidence in the quality of their 
data. Manheim (2002: 33 1) refers to this kind of data as `soft' as it is subjective and can be 
challenged, noting that even "well-executed observations depend a great deal on skill, 
energy, and insight of the observer and may be difficult to reproduce". Qualitative 
research is sometimes portrayed as unrepresentative and atypical, especially when 
compared with the research results of quantitative methods where generalisations can be 
made with a higher degree of certainty (Marsh & Stoker 1995: 141). On the positive side, 
however, participant observation brings the researcher much closer to their area of study, 
exposing them to events and dynamics that would otherwise go unseen. 
Foster (1994: 82) states: "One of the questions always asked of participant observers is 
how they gained access to the social worlds people later read about". A great deal of the 
`access' this research enjoyed was provided by church organisations and by non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs) where I was personally known, especially in Dundo 
and the bairros of Luanda. In certain parts of Luanda it was necessary to be introduced to 
the group I was meeting. The access enabled me to form a personal opinion on what was 
taking place within communities in relation to promoting peace and to discuss this in the 
course of the interviews. 
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A form of participant observation that also took place relates to participation at a number 
of conferences and workshops during fieldwork. The most important of these was 
undoubtedly the July 2000 Pro Pace Peace Congress held in Luanda, dealt with in chapter 
three. Other workshops attended included a seminar on `Human Rights and the Mass 
Media', held in Luanda, 23-25 October 2001; the annual meeting of the national Catholic 
`Justice, Peace and Migrations Commission', in Luanda, October 30-November 1,2001; 
and a workshop for NGOs on `Lobbying and Advocacy', held in Luanda 20-23 November 
2001. Access here was frequently on the basis of an invitation by someone aware of my 
research interests, suggesting that participation might be of benefit to the research, which 
it invariably was. This also had the added advantage of bringing together relevant 
individuals and organisations engaged in promoting peace with whom it was possible to 
arrange follow-up interviews. 
2.3. Documents and media resources. 
I will deal here with document and media resources together, as many of the points I 
propose to make are relevant to both. A large number of documents were collected during 
the course of this research. Some such as NGO reports, church archival material - pastoral 
letters, conference reports, and end of year messages - were collected during fieldwork. 
Other documents were downloaded from the internet. 
Specifically in relation to the Angolan media, I have been in receipt of the Angolan 
private and state newspapers since 1999 and have built up a substantial archive of 
photocopied articles for the purposes of this research. These have been a valuable source 
of ongoing information on Angola, giving extensive coverage of Angolan political life as 
well as to civil society organisations and the churches. The Angolan print media is not as 
partisan as media institutions in other countries, but a certain caution is healthy in 
approaching the coverage given. The scope this research was able to give to the broadcast 
media was of necessity more limited, because it was only possible to tune in during 
periods in Luanda. Nonetheless, time was spent in the archives of Radio Ecclesia 
transcribing some of its programmes and taped copies were made of archived radio 
debates. These are highlighted at the end of the thesis, after the list of interviews 
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conducted for this research. This provided a broader basis upon which to investigate the 
peace narrative of the broadcast media. 
The above media sources were analysed by taking relevant articles and comment, which 
were incorporated thematically within the thesis. This form of `analysis of content' is 
much different to the `content analysis' cited in the literature, where for example Ethridge 
(2002: 223) writes: The process by which researchers convert the contents of documents 
into quantitative form is known as content analysis". This invariably deals with column 
inches dedicated to an issue or topic, whereas my concern was with the nature of the 
argument put forward in the media 
In summary, these are the qualitative research methods used during this research: 
interviews, participant observation, and analysis of document and media resources. The 
next section briefly outlines the two research locations where fieldwork was conducted. 
2.4. Research locations. 
The research questions were explored in two separate locations. The first was Luanda, 
Angola's capital city; the second Dundo and its hinterland in the north eastern province of 
Lunda Norte. The selection of Luanda as a research location was crucial because of its 
importance to Angola, and because it is frequently possible to gauge what is happening in 
other parts of the country from the capital. Personal knowledge and experience of Dundo 
were the main criteria behind its selection, but it also offered an interesting contrast to life 
in the capital city, given its distance from Luanda. From the early stages of research the 
selection of two locations was considered an essential part of the research process, in order 
to assess whether a particular peace narrative could best be considered national or local. 
For example, it became clear early on that the peace narrative of the private media, 
especially the print media, had limited reach beyond Luanda. Hence, a singular focus on 
Luanda as a research location would likely have resulted in an overstatement of the 
significance of the private media, given that rural communities had little or no access to 
that media. Furthermore, in the case of Angola's traditional authorities, an exclusive focus 
on Luanda would likely have resulted in an understatement of their significance, best 
approached and assessed within a provincial or rural context. 
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A brief description of both locations is appropriate. Accurate population figures for Dundo 
are unavailable but an estimate of approximately 100,000 people seems reasonable. Even 
though Dundo is an urban area, research material from the area has a certain `rural feel' as 
a population explosion took place there following the return to war in 1992, when people 
fled their villages and hurriedly built provisional homes in the bairros on the periphery of 
Dundo. For people in Dundo village life and the land are strong reference points, creating 
an `urban-rural' discourse. Though much of the surrounding countryside was effectively 
in UNITA hands during the war, the town itself remained in government control. The 
material covered in this thesis reflects activities which occurred within government 
controlled areas of the country. At no stage did UNITA forces occupy the research 
locations in the period under review. The province of Lunda Norte is best known for its 
rich alluvial diamond deposits to the south and east of Dundo. From colonial times to the 
mid-1990s, Dundo had been the administrative centre for mining activity in the region, but 
this has since changed. Insecurity and difficulty in reaching the mining areas of Nzaji and 
Lucapa from Dundo, led to the construction of new airports to directly service these areas 
from Luanda. Some fieldwork was also carried out in the town of Nzaji, 90kms from 
Dundo. 
Specific areas of the city of Luanda comprise the second research location. The capital has 
an estimated population of three million people and sprawls to cover a vast area. 
Researching such an area would be impossible, therefore it was necessary to delimit the 
area of inquiry. I did this by selecting the bairros of Prenda and Rocha Pinto near to the 
international airport, which straddle the old and new parts of the city. I knew these parts of 
the city well, and had access to them through local church structures. I also however, 
wanted to examine Luanda in a more general or non-geographical sense, in order to 
research the peace narratives of the churches, private media and civil society organisations 
in particular, and thereby investigate the city at a spatial level. Doing so involved 
conducting interviews with key informants in their places of work, at their residences, or 
in a place of mutual convenience. In this way, research in Luanda had a double focus: 
specifically on the bairros of Prenda and Rocha Pinto, and a spatial focus on a number of 
relevant Angolan organisations. 
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3. Historical Background. 
In providing background information relevant to the overall thesis, I will briefly outline 
the origins of the MPLA, FINA (Frente National de Liberta(äo de Angola, National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola), UNITA, and FLEC (Frentepara a Libertacäo do 
Enclave de Cabinda, Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda), and then look at 
attempts to unify or form a common front between these nationalist organisations. 
Thereafter I set out international involvement in the conflict, before dealing with Angolan 
peace agreements since 1991. This historical focus makes the fundamental point that 
division between Angola's nationalist parties predates the internationalisation of the 
conflict. While external factors were immensely important in fuelling the conflict, it was 
internal division that created the conditions wherein such a bloody civil war broke out. As 
Cramer (1995: 159) writes: 
"external intervention ... was 
inconceivable without the ruptures within Angolan 
society and between civil society and the state. Further, arguably this foreign 
involvement in the war was less important, and the internal divisions more 
important, to the sustenance of war in Angola than in Mozambique or Nicaragua. 
... 
In terms of understanding the roots of war the internal cleavages were more 
important in Angola; the resumption of war after the elections in 1992 and in the 
context diminished foreign involvement only confirms this". 
In a number of the peace narratives outlined later, this rupture emerges as an important 
theme. 
3.1. Principal national actors. 
The origins of the MPLA as a political party are dated to December 10,1956, founded as a 
result of the amalgamation of other political parties and organisations (Carreira 1996; Lara 
1998; Mabeko Tali 2001 a). The support base upon which the MPLA was built came from 
among the white, mestico and Ambundu1° communities in the Luanda area, thereby 
creating a multi-ethnic organisation (Marcum 1969: 16-22). Forms of political organisation 
were extremely difficult at this time because of the "profoundly repressive character of the 
Portuguese colonial system" (Mabeko Tali 2001 a: 54). Agostinho Neto, later to become 
Angola's first president, was one of many within the early MPLA leadership educated 
1° Marcum and others refer to the Kimbundu people here. In this thesis I follow Neto (2001 a: 30) in naming 
Angola's principal ethnic groups. She refers to the Ambundu people (who speak Kimbundu) and the 
Ovimbundu people (who speak Umbundu). 
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outside Angola, where they were introduced to anti-colonial thinking. Simpson (1989: 67) 
notes that for 
"the first five years of its existence the MPLA adopted peaceful methods of protest 
against colonial rule but the organisation was eventually forced into exile.... In 
1961 a policy of armed struggle was adopted, the first manifestation of which was 
an abortive uprising in Luanda by MPLA supporters". 
This uprising on February 4,1961 signals the beginning of the Angolan war of 
independence. 
The FNLA on the other hand originated among the Bakongo people of northern Angola. 
Originally founded as UPNA (Unido dos Povos do Norte de Angola, People's Union of 
the North of Angola) in July 1957, it later became UPA when the reference to `North' was 
dropped. UPA initially hoped to revive the ancient Congo kingdom (Schubert 2000: 68). In 
March 1962, the FNLA was formed after the amalgamation of UPA with PDA (Partido 
Democrätico de Angola, Angolan Democratic Party), another northern party (Marcum 
1969: 9). Holden Roberto, the leader and central figure within the FNLA was much 
influenced by political events within the former Belgian Congo, and enjoyed the support 
of President Mobutu Sese Seko when he came to power (Marcum 1991: 43-44). Roberto 
formed an Angolan government in exile known as GRAE (Governo Revoluciondrio de 
Angola no Exilio - Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile) in Kinshasa (Heimer 
1979: 29), which lobbied internationally for Angolan independence. Jonas Savimbi was a 
member of GRAE, serving as foreign minister. Pelisser & Wheeler (1971: 161) situate 
Angolan nationalism within "two main currents" at this time: 
"the modernists, subject to a definite Marxist influence; and the ethno-nationalists, 
who were far more powerful since they had a limited but secure tribal base in the 
ancient kingdom". 
The balance of power prior to independence lay with the FNLA, based on its superior 
military strength, and who were the most likely of the nationalist parties to assume control 
of the Angolan state from the Portuguese (Kapuscinski 1987). Simpson (1989: 200) gives a 
figure of 15,000 FNLA troops compared with the MPLA's 10,000 in January 1975,11 
figures that appear quite small when compared to the numbers under arms by the year 
2000. 
Simpson (1989: 200) quoting Wheeler (1980: 9). 
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UNITA was the last of the three major nationalist movements founded. Having accused 
Roberto of factionalism and regionalism, and no longer willing to work with him, Jonas 
Savimbi left GRAE in 1964, His departure however was not with an immediate view to 
forming UNITA. He had explored the possibility of cooperation with the MPLA during 
his time as GRAE foreign minister and these discussions continued (Marcum 1969: 134). 
March 13 1966, however, saw Savimbi form UNITA drawing support principally from 
among the Ovimbundu people of the central highlands, Angola's largest ethnic group. 
The formation of LNITA pushed ethnicity to the fore in a new way in Angolan politics, 
and reduced Holden Roberto's support base primarily to the Bakongo people in the north. 
These three nationalist movements were to negotiate independence from Portugal after the 
Lisbon coup of April 1974. Mention however must also be made of FLEC, the nationalist 
movement in the enclave of Cabinda. Since the death of Jonas Savimbi the question of 
Cabinda has come into sharper focus and received more attention than in previous years. 
Marcum (1969: 95) points to an initial consolidation of nationalism occurring in Cabinda 
in 1963, when the three Cabindan nationalist movements merged to form FLEC, 12 
representing the Fiot peoples of Cabinda. FLEC's political aims called for full 
independence or a degree of autonomy for the enclave. 13 FLEC played no part during the 
independence negotiations where the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA secured the status of 
"sole legitimate representatives of the Angolan people" (Marcum 1969: 255). The 
subsequent Alvor Accords of January 1975 proclaimed Cabinda as "an inalienable 
component part of Angola". Despite the continuation of conflict in the province since 
1975, neither the Bicesse Accords nor the Lusaka Protocol addressed in any way FLEC's 
issues with the Angolan state. In this thesis, I include material in relation to the Cabindan 
conflict insofar as it emerged within the research locations prior to Jonas Savimbi's death, 
as a component of responses to the research questions. It is therefore not a specific focus 
of this research, but runs as a subtext within the thesis. As I outline later, many argue that 
it is premature to speak of peace in Angola until this second conflict is resolved. 
12 The three were MLEC, Mouvement de Liberation de I'Enclave de Cabinda, CUANC - Comite d'Action 
d'Union Nationale des Cabindais, and Alliama - Alliance de Mayumbe. 
13 FLEC has since broken into three distinct groups: FLEC-R (Renewed), FLEC-FAC (Armed Forces of 
Cabinda) and FDC (Democratic Front of Cabinda), (Human Rights Watch 1999: 41). Human Rights Watch 
also refers to government negotiations with FLEC in 1995 and 1997 that broke 
down. 
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3.1.1. Nationalist rivalry and unity attempts. 
A notable feature of Angolan nationalism prior to independence is the failure of the 
nationalist organisations to unify against the common colonial enemy. Internal struggles 
seriously undermined and diminished their effectiveness in dealing with shared aspirations 
for independence (Cann 1997: 7). In fact, these struggles frequently resulted in the three 
independence movements turning their guns on each other, further weakening the 
nationalist campaign (Marcum 1978: 211). Wright (1997: 60) pinpoints one such attack as 
the moment that triggered the first civil war in 1975: 
"The Angolan war began in mid-February 1975 when the FNLA attacked MPLA 
forces near Luanda. The FINA was trying to gain political and military foothold in 
the capital and militarily overwhelm the MPLA". 
Control of Luanda was fundamental at the time because power was to be handed over on 
November 11,1975.1 underline this point here because, as will be seen especially in the 
chapter on the private media, this period in Angolan history continues to be a `live issue' 
in certain quarters, part of the peace and reconciliation agenda that needs to be revisited. 
All attempts made to unify the nationalist movements, or at least to create a common front 
against the Portuguese, failed. Marcum (1969: 253,263-267; 1978: 206) details a number 
of such efforts to promote unity between the MPLA and FNLA. For example, a pledge of 
cooperation was signed in Tunis on January 31 1960, but ignored by Holden Roberto. 
Two meetings held in the former Leopoldville in May 1962 also failed. A further meeting 
in August saw Agostinho Neto put forward three proposals to Roberto seeking: 
i) a rapid fusion of the two parties into a single movement; 
ii) close political and military collaboration; 
iii) a joint military command structure over all Angolan forces. 
These proposals were eventually lost amid accusations of racism and tribalism directed at 
Roberto and his government in exile. On this and other attempts to forge unity Marcum 
(1978: 206) writes: 
"[in general] a movement actively sought unity with one or both rivals when it was 
comparatively weak and in danger of eclipse or when it felt confident of turning an 
alliance to its own advantage. It purposely shunned unity when it perceived 
itself 
as strong enough to achieve ascendancy alone or was fearful of being subordinated 
or absorbed within an alliance". 
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Wright (1997: 14) identifies failures at the level of leadership as the reason behind the 
inability to unite or form a unified front, as "the organisation's leaderships were unwilling 
to compromise their power". Schubert (2000: 75) refers to the "personal rivalry" between 
the three nationalist leaders who "felt called and capable of occupying, alone, the 
leadership of the independence struggle". Both authors point to personality rather than 
ideology, as the reason for division between the parties. This failure to unite led to 
external alliances in bids to secure political power, or to destabilise the country when such 
power was not achieved. For Guimaräes (1998: 199), 
"the Angolan civil war was a domestic conflict for power which was 
internationalised with consciousness and purposefulness by the rival movements". 
Foreign intervention did not create the Angolan conflict, but rather exploited already 
existing mistrust and division between the parties. 
3.2. Principal international actors. 
With war breaking out in 1975 between Angola's nationalist parties in a desperate bid to 
gain control of Luanda prior to the Portuguese withdrawal in November, foreign powers 
became increasingly engaged in the conflict. As Portugal departed Angola, the former 
Soviet Union, the United States, Cuba, and South Africa progressively became more 
involved in Angola's internal affairs. The brief comments i make here on each of these 
international actors simply indicate the alignments occurring within Angola in the period. 
As early as 1962 the Soviet Union supported the MPLA in the nationalist struggle, 14 and 
provided important material assistance at the time of independence through the provision 
of weapons. The Soviet backing of the MPLA was important throughout the period of the 
first civil war. Even in 1990 "Soviet support to Angola was estimated at £430 million a 
year, together with around 1,000 technical staff and military advisers" (CIIR 1991: 19). 
However, as Shubin & Tokarev (2001: 608) point out, the "history of Soviet relations with 
the Angolan liberation movements and of the military involvement in [the] country ... still 
has to be written". Russia's present day interest in Angola is primarily economic with 
14 Marcum (1969: 252-253) comments on a Radio Lisbon broadcast on March 9 1962, alleging that the 
MPLA enjoyed the backing and financial resources of international communism. Ten days later the Soviet 
newspaper Pravda published an article praising the militant programme of the MPLA. 
20 
significant investments in the diamond industry, particularly the Catoca project, north of 
Saurimo in the province of Lunda Sul. 
Early US engagement in Angola was complicated by the fact that Portugal was a NATO 
ally with control of such strategic locations as the Azores islands, which the US did not 
want to jeopardise by overtly supporting the nationalist struggle. Nevertheless, economic 
assistance was provided to Holden Roberto from 1959, who was later placed on a CIA 
retainer of $10,000 annually (Wright 1997: 36). By 1974, with Portugal discussing the 
transition to independence with the three nationalist parties, the CIA had begun to ship 
large shipments of arms to the FNLA (Wright 1997: 57). 15 Post-independence involvement 
however, was severely curtailed when the US Congress passed the Clark Amendment in 
February 1976 which "specifically prohibited any assistance that might involve the United 
States more deeply in the Angolan war" ('Wright 1997: 67). This was to avoid another 
Vietnam situation developing. After the repeal of the amendment in July 1985, covert 
funding resumed to UNITA. 16 The US also has considerable economic interests in Angola, 
particularly in the oil sector, with Angola supplying 7% of US oil imports (Global Witness 
1998). 
South African involvement in supporting and arming UNITA during the first civil war was 
considerable. Mohanty (1992: 168) suggests that South Africa had three specific objectives 
in Angola: 
"first, it hoped to head off the establishment of a Marxist, militarily hostile 
government on the border of Namibia. ... [S]econdly, 
it hoped to destroy the base 
of operations in southern Angola of the South-West Africa People's Organization 
(SWAPO). ... [Thirdly], to protect 
its investment in the Cunene [hydroelectric] 
Dam ... along the 
border between Namibia and Angola". 17 
Prior to the withdrawal of Portugal in 1975, South African troops had invaded Angola and 
marched with UNITA to within 120 kms of Luanda in an attempt to defeat the MPLA. '8 
15 China also sent the FNLA instructors and arms in 1974 (Marcum 1978: 245-246). 
16 HRW (1999: 13-14) states that "U. S. covert aid totaled about U. S. $250 million between 1986 and 1991, 
making it the second largest U. S. covert programme, exceeded only by aid to the Afghan mujahedeen". 
17 Ekwe-Ekwe (1990: 102-104) states that the dam had been built largely by the South Africans during the 
last three years of Portuguese colonialism and was intended to generate power for the zinc, copper, uranium, 
and diamond mines in northern Namibia. 
IS Kapuscinski (1987) provides interesting detail of this period. 
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FNLA and Zairean troops from the north had come to within 20 kms of Luanda (Simpson 
1989: 206). The departure of South African troops from Angolan soil, finally came about 
after the signing of the New York treaty in 1988 which negotiated independence for 
Namibia and secured the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (Wright 1997: 145- 
156). The New York treaty led to the establishment of the United Nation's first mission to 
Angola known as UNAVEM, the United Nations Angolan Verification Mission, charged 
with the supervision of Cuban withdrawal (MacQueen 1998). 
The role of Cuba on the side of the MPLA in 1975 was crucial in repelling the South 
Africans from the south and the FNLA attack on Luanda from the north. Fidel Castro 
regarded Roberto's FNLA "as an American pawn", and from October 1966 Cuba had 
been providing military training and assistance to the MPLA (Marcum 1969: 225). About 
1500 Cuban advisers were in Angola prior to independence on November 11, with an 
additional 4,000 troops deployed days later. Within a month the figure had reached 10,000 
troops before peaking at 50,000. The arrival of Cuban troops quickly changed the military 
situation in Angola, enabling the MPLA to reorganise and push back the attacks on the 
capital. 
Following the resumption of hostilities in 1992, the conflict became even more 
internationalised. A key source detailing the extent of this internationalisation is the 
United Nations Fowler report of March 2000, dealing with the violation of UN sanctions 
against UNITA. Different packages of sanctions had been applied against UNITA after it 
returned to war in 1992, but these were initially ineffectual. 19 UN resolution 864 of 
September 1993 imposed an oil and arms embargo. Resolution 1127 of August 1997 
imposed travel restrictions on senior UNITA personnel, the closure of UNITA offices, and 
banned the provision of aircraft to UNITA. In June 1998, resolution 1173 froze UNITA's 
financial assets and forbade the sale of diamonds from Angola that did not carry a 
certificate of origin. Diamonds were the key source of revenue for UNITA, replacing the 
assistance formerly provided by the United States and South Africa (Human Rights Watch 
1999: 5, hereafter H12W). Malaquias (2001: 532) estimated that "[d]uring the 1990s, the 
19 See http: //www. un. org/News/ossa/sanction. htm#Angola for a full list of sanctions relating to Angola. 
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rebels have been able to sell diamonds worth more US $4 billion", finance which 
sustained the war. Given the extensive disregard for sanctions, the UN passed resolution 
1237 of May 1999 establishing a panel of experts to investigate the violation of sanctions. 
Known as the Fowler (2000) report, it lists a host of countries (and business interests) 
which provided support to UNITA in violation of sanctions. UNLTA had procured 
weapons from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burkina Faso, Congo- 
Brazzaville, Rwanda, South Africa, Togo, and Zambia. Military equipment had originated 
in Bulgaria, Belarus and the Russian Federation. Neighbouring countries - the DRC, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Zambia and Namibia - supplied various amounts of fuel, while Gabon 
and Uganda provided aircraft refuelling facilities. 20 Diamond transactions had been 
facilitated by some of the countries already mentioned. Morocco was cited for 
circumventing financial sanctions, and Portugal for keeping UNITA offices open. The 
Fowler report makes explicit the increased international dimension to the Angola conflict 
throughout the 1990s. 
4. Three Peace Agreements. 
The next three sub-sections focus on the peace agreements signed between the Angolan 
government and UNITA at Bicesse, Lusaka, 21 and finally Luena in April 2002. I outline 
the nature of these agreements and how each sought to end the Angolan conflict, treating 
them chronologically. 
4.1. The Bicesse Peace Accords. 
On 24-25 April 1990, the Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Jose Duräo 
Barroso brought together the Angolan government and UNITA to begin a process of 
negotiation that eventually led to the signing of the Bicesse Accords. The early 
negotiations were far from easy, but 
20 The report (paragraph 68) also commented on the supply of fuel to UNITA areas from within Angola, 
stating: "Credible and reliable reports also continue to be received of flows of petroleum products from 
Government controlled areas into I NITA controlled areas (though not necessarily to UNITA), however the 
Panel is not able to quantify these flows". 
21 At various points in this thesis I will use `Bicesse' and `Lusaka' as shorthand for the `Bicesse Accords' 
and `Lusaka Protocol', reflecting the way these agreements are referred to generally in Angola. 
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"a significant breakthrough came at the fourth round of talks, held in September 
1990, when the US and the Soviet Union became directly involved in negotiations for the first time" (Pycroft 1994: 248). 
Collectively known as the Troika, Portugal, United States and Soviet Union, were 
instrumental in brokering the agreement, signed near Lisbon on May 31,1991. Hodges 
(2001: 13) outlines its principal tenets: 
"The Accords provided a ceasefire, the quartering of UNITA troops, the formation 
of new unified armed forces, the demobilisation of surplus troops, the restoration 
of government administration in UNITA-controlled areas and multi-party 
parliamentary and presidential elections". 
The TROIKA also implemented a `Triple Zero Option' which meant that international 
military support to both sides would end once a cease-fire was in place and an election 
timetable agreed. In the parliamentary elections, the MPLA won an outright majority 
taking 53.7% of the vote, UNITA gained 34%, other smaller parties received 12%. 
Eduardo dos Santos polled 49.6% and Jonas Savimbi 40.1% in the presidential elections. 
As neither candidate gained an absolute majority, a second round of voting was required 
between the two leading candidates, but the renewed fighting prevented this from taking 
place. 
Margaret Anstee's (1996) account of her time as UN Special Representative for Angola, 
and head of the UNAVEM II mission is an important source in outlining why the Bicesse 
Accords failed. I highlight four reasons put forward by Anstee to explain the failure of the 
peace agreement. Firstly, Anstee was critical of the structure adopted during the 
negotiations which led to the peace agreement itself, in particular the lack of UN input 
into an agreement the UN was later called on to implement. Anstee (1996: 13) writes: 
"... the long negotiations had been mainly carried out by the three observer 
countries. There had also been some participation by the Organization of African 
Unity and African Heads of State, but virtually none by the United Nations. ... The 
United Nations had been represented only during the later stages, and then only at 
the military level, by the Deputy Military Adviser to the Secretary General, who 
acted as `a technical adviser on the cease-fire aspects'; there was no representation 
at the political level". 
Elsewhere Anstee (1996: 532) writes: "Many of the problems encountered in Angola were 
rooted in the nature of the Bicesse Accords, in the negotiation of which the UN played no 
role". This criticism was addressed during the Lusaka negotiations when Anstee's 
successor, Alioune Blondin Beye, chaired the actual peace talks. 
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Secondly, Anstee (1996: 11) questions the scope of the UN mandate itself, which proved 
too narrow when the peace accords went into crisis. The role allocated to the UN by the 
signatories of the Bicesse Accords was solely one of verification, as the Accords make 
clear: 
"Overall supervision of the cease-fire will be the responsibility of the Government 
of the People's Republic of Angolan and UNITA acting with the framework of the 
Joint Political-Military Commission. 
... The United Nations will be invited to send 22 monitors to support the Angolan parties, at the request of the Government". 
The nature of this mandate imposed significant limitations on the UN's ability to respond 
when the situation on the ground changed so drastically in late 1992 and mediation was 
required. For Anstee (I996: xii), the UN mandate in effect forced it to operate "with one 
hand tied behind its back". When new negotiations finally took place between UNITA and 
the Angolan government in Addis Ababa and later Abidjan, the UN sought an expanded 
role to include mediation and arbitration, in contrast to the restricted tasks of observation 
and verification (Anstee 1996: 462). Human Rights Watch (1999: 154) echoes Anstee on 
this point, describing UNAVEM II as 
"a text book example of the sort of peacekeeping operation that should not occur. 
It was powerless to intervene when it became evident early on that both sides 
failed to comply with the demobilization plan of the `self-implementing' Bicesse 
Accords". 
Thirdly, Anstee criticised the international financial commitment to securing peace in 
Angola. She quotes the assessment of one observer who described UNAVEM II as "a UN 
mission done on the cheap -a totally false economy on the part of the international 
community" (Anstee 1996: 223). The UN Security Council had wanted "a small 
manageable operation" (Anstee 1996: 32) but this was later expanded when the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 747 in 1992. Even so funding difficulties remained. 
Alluding to the numeration of the resolution, Anstee (1996: 38) commented that her task as 
Special Representative was similar to flying a 747 Jumbo "but provided with fuel 
sufficient only for a DC-3! " Vines (1997: 30) contrasts the under-funding of UNAVEM lI 
with the 1990 UN election-monitoring budget for Namibia: 
22 Bicesse Accords Cease-fire Agreement, section entitled Definition and General Principles, paragraph 4 
UAN (2001) contains a copy of the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol. 
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"At its peak, the number of UN personnel in Angola was about 1,000. By contrast, 
some 8,000 personnel were made available to monitor the Namibian elections in 1990, in a country whose population is only one-sixth of Angola's. The total 
budget of T NAVEM II from June 1991 to October 1992 was £118 million, 
compared with that of $480 million for the Namibian operation". 23 
The Namibian comparison makes clear the level of under-funding involved. 
Fourthly, management of the transition to democracy was problematic at a number of 
levels. For Anstee (1996: 534) "the `winner takes all' concept [was not] helpful in 
consolidating the smooth transition to democratic government". Efforts had been made to 
secure a role for the losers of the election during the Bicesse negotiations but "neither of 
the combatants wanted to hear of it; each was bent on nothing less than total victory" 
(Anstee 1996: 534). Opposition parties had in fact argued for a period of transition to 
normalise political life in the country before holding elections. 24 At the time UNITA was 
confident of electoral victory as were its US backers (Wright 1997: 159), and Savimbi was 
unwilling "to accept anything less than being head a state" (Howen 2001: 22). Smith 
(1992: 101) spoke of the "genuine incredulity in the IJNITA camp" after it had lost the 
elections. Hodges (2001: 14) also points to the insufficient time period prior to elections 
"considering the number and complexity of the tasks to be carried out, the distrust 
between the two parties and the logistical obstacles". In a country with such high levels of 
people displaced internally and across borders, sixteen months was too short a period of 
preparation (Kaure 1999: 60). Prior to the signing of the Bicesse Accords UNITA had 
originally wanted elections after 12 months, whereas the MPLA had argued for 36 
months, in order to make the necessary electoral preparations (Tvedten 1992: 111). 
Despite these criticisms of the Bicesse accords and the UN mandate, ultimate failure for 
the breakdown of the Bicesse accords has been attributed to the Angolan parties 
themselves. The then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali stated in January 1993 
that the fundamental cause for the breakdown of Bicesse had been: 
23 Times Literary Supplement, 5 September 1997, p. 30. 
24 In Jodo (1992). Paulino Pinto Jodo is leader of the political party CNDA (Convencdo Nacional 
Democrätica de Angola, National Democratic Convention of Angola), Luanda, and of the fourteen 
opposition parties collectively known as POC, (Partidos da Oposicäo Civil) the civil opposition parties. 
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"the failure, often deliberate, of both parties to implement in full the provisions of the Peace Accords relating to political, military and police matters or to make the 
necessary efforts to promote national reconciliation" (quoted in Anstee 1996: 375). 
During the period immediately after the resumption of war there was a tendency to 
apportion shared culpability to both sides in order to remain evenhanded, hoping that 
some accommodation could be reached to end the bloodshed. As this approach failed, a 
shift in emphasis occurred and the finger of blame was unequivocally pointed at UNITA 
for the resumption of war, in particular at Jonas Savimbi and his thirst for political power 
irrespective of the cost. In January 1999 Kofi Annan stated: 
"the root causes of this deeply regrettable state of affairs are well known. They lie 
in IJNITA's refusal to comply with basic provisions of the Lusaka Protocol which 
demanded that it demilitarise its forces and allow state administration to be 
extended throughout the national territory" (taken from ACSTA 2000). 
4.2. The Lusaka Protocol. 
As the new civil war raged on Anstee desperately sought to negotiate a cease-fire, but to 
no avail. Talks initially took place in Namibe, a coastal town in southern Angola, then in 
Addis Ababa, before completely breaking down in Abidjan. With the appointment of the 
new UN Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, new peace talks in Lusaka lasting 
over a year finally bore fruit in the November 1994 Lusaka Protocol. This protocol was 
"largely based on the Abidjan protocol on which [the sides] so nearly reached agreement a 
year and a half earlier" (Anstee, 1996: 543), but at that stage peace negotiations were 
secondary to events on the battlefield. 25 UNITA's initial gains saw it control an estimated 
70% of the countryside including many key urban areas such as Huambo and Uige. As the 
government reorganised militarily, having abandoned the `triple zero option', it managed 
to regain much territory including Angola's second city of Huambo in UNITA's heartland. 
With UNITA on the back-foot after losing Huambo, and government forces pressing 
onwards, the Lusaka protocol was signed much against the wishes of the resurgent 
Angolan military which felt it could defeat UNITA. 
25 The Abidjan peace talks came remarkably close to success. Pycroft (1994: 256) states that a "compromise 
was reached on 46 out of 47 of the clauses of the Abidjan protocol. The stumbling block was point 11, 
which called for the phased withdrawal of UNITA forces from areas they had occupied since the resumption 
of the war". UNITA wanted a settlement that reflected the balance of power at the time. 
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Hodges (2001: 15) again sets out the main elements of the Lusaka Protocol, stating that: 
`[it] built upon the Bicesse Accords, but introduced some important innovations, 
including provisions for power-sharing, the postponement of further elections until 
after the completion of the military tasks, the UN's direct responsibility for 
overseeing implementation of the peace process and the dispatch of a large UN 
peace-keeping force. UNAVEM III had 7,000 troops at its height". 
An `insider' account of the Lusaka negotiations is provided by Paul Hare (1998), the 
American representative during the talks. The importance of his work is somewhat 
diminished by the fact that it was published as Angola returned to war, and had been 
written on the assumption that the Lusaka Protocol had been successful, a "model of how 
peacekeeping operations should be carried out" (Hare 1998: xviii). One of Hare's 
(1998: xviii) major concerns had been to illustrate how "[b]reaking the cycle of violence 
and placing Angola on the path to peace required major external intervention", especially 
that of the UN and TROIKA. A most notable omission in Hare's work, identified by 
Kibble (1999), was the "complete absence [of Angolan people] from the book". This 
thesis will address dimensions of this omission. 
While the Lusaka Protocol sought to rectify failures within the Bicesse Accords, Human 
Rights Watch argues that a major weakness in its implementation was the UN tolerance of 
human rights abuses practiced by both sides, which fundamentally undermined the 
agreement and fostered a culture of impunity. 
"The failure of the Lusaka Peace Process was not only due to the bad faith of 
IJNJTA. The UN's strategy of refraining from disclosure of public action against 
violations of the accords, its lack of transparency, and its failure to implement U. N. 
embargos undermined any respect that UNITA or the government had to observe 
the Lusaka Protocol. With the collapse of the Lusaka peace process this strategy of 
see no evil, speak no evil appears to have backfired badly" (HRW 1999: 6). 
The Lusaka Protocol limped from one crisis to another from the time of its signing. Beye 
showed remarkable tolerance in his dealings with both sides, working tirelessly to foster 
trust and understanding. However, his untimely death in a plane crash in Abidjan on June 
26,1998, as he toured the region seeking support for the peace agreement, hastened the 
resumption of military conflict. Another period of war was initiated in December 1998 
when, at the opening of the fourth MPLA Congress (December 5-10,1998), "President 
dos Santos stated that the only path to lasting peace was the total isolation of Jonas 
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Savimbi and his movement" (HRW 1999: 28). 26 In the eyes of the Angolan government 
the STN had failed in disarming UNITA for a second time. Not only were United Nations' 
forces "the shields behind which Jonas Savimbi dug his diamonds and re-armed", 27 but the 
UN had "accept[ed] the fiction of a demobilised UNITA army" (Munslow 1999: 556). 
Apart from a small delegation of UN human rights officers, the UN was expelled from 
Angola. 
The causes of conflict had clearly shifted throughout the decade since the signing of the 
Bicesse Accords. Savimbi's insatiable thirst for political power was regarded as the reason 
for the return to war in 1992, but the struggle for control of natural resources, such as oil 
and diamonds, also became crucial. 28 State revenues from the oil sector were heavily 
invested in the military so as to resist and defeat the threat posed by UNITA. For its part 
UNITA sought to control large segments of the diamond trade to rearm and maintain its 
military strength. In many respects the struggle for, or to maintain political power, became 
indistinguishable from the struggle to control the financial benefits accruing from oil and 
diamonds. As Howen (2001: 20) writes: 
"Angola's vast mineral wealth was not one of the original causes of the conflict. 
Today, however, it appears to be one of its driving forces. The parties are fighting 
for control of a state apparatus that gives access to the huge income from oil and 
the opportunities this brings to exercise patronage". 
4.3. The Luena Memorandum of Understanding. 
The death of Jonas Savimbi on February 22,2002 transformed the political landscape of 
Angola and created new possibilities for peace. Events moved quickly in the weeks 
following his death. A cease-fire came into effect at midnight on March 13, part of a 
fifteen point peace plan announced by the government. 
29 This plan dealt with issues such 
26 Interviewees, resident in Huambo in late 1998, stated that the military confrontation was underway much 
earlier, from July or August that year. Military conflict had begun to look increasingly likely from May 1997 
(Africa Confidential, Vol. 38, No 24, May 12 1997). Conflict did break out in June 1997 when government 
forces attacked UNITA in Lunda Norte, retaking many of the diamond mines UNITA operated in the area, 
but fighting was short-lived (Africa Confidential, Vol. 38 Number 12, June 06 1997). 
27 Africa Confidential, Vol. 43, number 8, April 19 2002. 
28 Simon (2001: 511) describes the Angolan conflict as an "archetypal resource war" where "oil and diamond 
revenues are being monopolised by the very narrow political, military and economic elites". 
29 In Jornal de Angola, March 10 2002. See also Angola Peace Monitor, No. 7, Vol. VIII, April 9 2002. 
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as the demilitarisation of UNITA and its reconstitution as a legitimate political party, 30 a 
general amnesty in order to promote national reconciliation, the extension of state 
administration over the whole country, the approval of a new constitution and voter 
registration prior to holding elections, and the promotion of tolerance and forgiveness. On 
April 4 2002, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed in Luena between the 
governments' armed forces, known as FAA (Forcas Armadas Angolanas), and UNITA's 
military leadership. Mussagy Jeichande, who had been appointed representative and head 
of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) in July 2000, described the 
Memorandum as a benchmark in Angolan history. 31 The signing of the Memorandum led 
to over 105,000 UNITA troops with their families, making their way to one of 38 
quartering areas across the country. 
This chapter has introduced the research topic to be explored in this thesis, an arena of 
inquiry that gives priority to Angolan perspectives on peace from the Bicesse Accords to 
the death of Jonas Savimbi. I have set out the research questions that guide this thesis, and 
also outlined the qualitative research methods used in conducting the inquiry itself. The 
research questions will be operationalised in two Angolan locations which will enable 
wider appraisal on the nature of the five peace narratives selected for research. This 
chapter presented introductory background material of an historical nature on the Angolan 
conflict, presenting the principal national and international actors involved at different 
stages in the Angolan conflict, before concluding with a brief outline of the three peace 
agreements. Further detail will be provided on this material throughout the thesis. 
30 African Research Bulletin, Volume 39: 8, September 2002, p. 14966, reported that UNITA officially 
disbanded its army on August 2 2002. 
31 Mussagy Jeichande, speaking at the BAF (2002). 
Chapter 2. 
The Public Sphere: Habermas and Beyond. 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework within which later Angolan peace 
narratives will be analysed. This framework takes the model of public sphere developed 
by Jurgen Habermas (1989) as a starting point, and incorporates important revisions 
suggested by other authors, working within Habermas's model. Fraser (1992: 111) argued 
that while "the general idea of a public sphere is indispensable ... the specific form in 
which Habermas has elaborated this idea is not wholly satisfactory", suggesting that there 
is a need to critically interrogate Habermas's idea. An interesting feature of Habermas's 
(1992) later writing on the public sphere is that he recognised some of the historical 
inaccuracies in his original project, acknowledging that certain revision was in fact 
necessary. Unfortunately Habermas never undertook the task of reworking his public 
sphere framework, but agreed with some directions for revision suggested by other writers 
using his theoretical approach, which I examine later (Habermas 1992). This suggests 
therefore, that the `Habermasian public sphere' needs to be understood in two senses: in a 
narrow sense, to refer to Habermas's original work; and in a wider sense, to include 
ongoing research which engages with his theory. For the purpose of research, the 
theoretical framework outlined in this chapter adopts this wider understanding of the 
`Habermasian public sphere'. 
Habermas's The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was first published in 
German in 1962, and only translated into English in 1989. A number of descriptions of the 
public sphere help give an initial sense of what Habermas's analytical construct deals 
with, before setting out Habermas's own definition in a later section. Benhabib (1992: 85- 
86), for example, described the public sphere as a place of "political participation and the 
widest-reaching democratisation of decision-making processes". Participation and 
discourse were therefore the fundamental principles of the public sphere. Holub (1991: 3) 
suggested that "what attracted Habermas to the notion of a public sphere ... [was] 
its 
potential as a foundation for a critique of society based on democratic principles". For 
Fraser (1992: 110) the public sphere 
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"designates a theatre in modem societies in which political participation is enacted 
through the medium of talk. It is the space where citizens deliberate about their 
common affairs.... it is a site for the production and circulation of discourses". 
Finally, Habermas (1992: 447) himself places the public sphere within a "discourse- 
centred concept of democracy". These descriptions of the Habermasian public sphere as a 
`participatory discursive arena' raised the possibility that it might prove an appropriate 
analytical framework for addressing the research concerns of this thesis. The chapter 
explores this possibility and potential. 
Before proceeding further, I briefly set out the structure of this chapter. Section one details 
the specific public sphere outlined by Habermas, namely the `bourgeois' public sphere. 
The origin of the concept in western political philosophy raises an initial question 
concerning its appropriateness for research in a non-western context. Azarya (1994: 87) 
addresses this issue stating that terms such as civil society, bureaucracy, and democracy, 
are also western in conception, hence the origin of the public sphere does not in itself 
render it inappropriate as an analytical tool. Section two examines criticism and revision 
of Habermas's original public sphere construct and begins the task of exploring how the 
concept might be useful for investigation in Angola. These revisions enable the research to 
focus on the churches, the media and civil society organisations as actors within the public 
sphere. Because the literature on Angola frequently assesses these actors within a civil 
society framework, I have considered it important to contrast the respective frameworks of 
`civil society' and the `public sphere', which is undertaken in section three. The section 
contains a number of subsections which look at areas of similarity and difference between 
the two frameworks and also raises the question of the place of traditional authorities 
within a public sphere and civil society approach. Though the discourse of traditional 
authority figures exhibits many public sphere qualities, I conclude that traditional 
authorities belong outside a public sphere framework because of their political identities. I 
argue however, that the public sphere approach permits a valuable reading of the peace 
narrative of traditional authority, in a manner that a civil society framework does not 
facilitate. Section four returns to Habermas's original public sphere work and explores his 
notion of a `plebeian public sphere', referring to the `culture of the common people' 
(Haberman 1992: 427). Habermas did not subject this plebeian sphere to analysis but I 
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propose to briefly explore its potential for analysis of community based material, the 
remaining peace arena to be situated in relation to the public sphere. 
1. The Bourgeois Public Sphere. 
In tracing the origin of the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere one is dealing with 
political and economic developments within Britain, France and Germany in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Habermas (1989: 11) identified the emergence at 
the time of an "enclave within a society separating itself from the state" which engaged in 
public discourse to argue and defend its interests. Public meetings held in coffee shops and 
journalistic writing were examples of where this enclave became visible within society. 
London reportedly had three thousand coffee shops in the first decade of the eighteenth 
century and were a key location for well-to-do men and property owners to openly discuss 
issues relevant to them (Calhoun 1992: 12). From the very beginning those who gathered 
were "a reading public" (Habermas 1989: 23), thus explaining why journals exercised a 
key function within the early public sphere. The daily print media later became important 
in this regard. These written and discursive arenas of critical rationality were at the 
forefront of this emerging public sphere. 
It is relevant at the outset to put forward Habermas's (1989: 27) own definition of the 
public sphere: 
"The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private 
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated 
from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate 
over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly 
relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labour. The medium of this 
political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's 
public use of their reason". 
Two comments are relevant with regard to the definition. Firstly, the public sphere is 
located outside the realm of the state or government authorities. While references to 
`commodity exchange and social labour' are relevant to the specific context, the definition 
refers to a sphere where individuals came together to discuss and debate the rules that 
governed them. Secondly, the concern is with public discourse, with public rationality. 
Individuals used reason to discuss their concerns in a public way, and this could be 
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scrutinised by others. Such publicness or publicity was central to the public sphere, a key. 
to bring about social change and reform. As Habermas states: 
"Publicity was, according to its very idea, a principle of democracy not just 
because anyone could in principle announce, with equal opportunity, his personal 
inclinations, wishes, and convictions-opinions; it could only be realized in the 
measure that these personal opinions could evolve through the rational-critical 
debate of a public into public opinion" (Habermas 1989: 219). 
Calhoun (1992: 13) identifies four key features of the public sphere which further outline 
the Habermasian public sphere. Firstly, the public sphere was understood as a place of 
critical discourse where a person's status was put to one side. It represented a "kind of 
social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status 
altogether" (Habermas 1989: 36). The public sphere was therefore a place of idealised 
discourse. Secondly, rational discourse alone was to decide the strength of an argument, 
irrespective of the identity of the speaker. In theory, debate was won or lost on the basis of 
an individual's ability to argue and defend a point a view, not their public office or 
position in society. Thirdly, public sphere discourse focused on matters of public concern 
and involved the "problematisation of areas that until then had not been questioned" 
(Habermas 1989: 36). Such matters had previously been considered as belonging to the 
realm of the state or the church, but the public sphere challenged these boundaries. 
Finally, the public sphere sought to be inclusive and receptive to the participation of all, to 
remain open to new ideas. These four features will be revisited later in the chapter, where 
it will be examined if this idealised form of rational discourse reflected the reality of the 
time, or if in fact the public sphere was not based on certain exclusions. 
The question of whether there was one or more public spheres leads to different views 
within the literature. Calhoun (1992: 37) explains that some authors favour a notion of 
multiple, sometimes overlapping or contending public spheres, before expressing a 
preference for a singular notion: 
"[it appears] a loss simply to say that there are many public spheres, however, for 
that will leave us groping for a new term to describe the communicative 
relationships among them. It might be more productive rather to think of the public 
sphere as involving a field of discursive connections". 
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The confusion arises in part from Habermas's own references to multiple spheres, to the 
existence of bourgeois and plebeian spheres, thereby clearly suggesting two separate 
arenas. The question of single or multiple spheres appears unresolved overall within 
Habermas, but by introducing the terminology of `publics' within the public sphere Fraser 
(1992) suggests something of a compromise, and maintains the theoretical integrity of a 
single sphere. This research favours the notion of a single public sphere because the five 
`peace narratives' emerge from within a similar location, i. e. national peace perspectives 
`from below', and because of similarities between them. Fraser's `publics' facilitate 
differentiation between the Angolan perspectives presented, while underlining the 
similarity of the space from where they emerge. 
2. Habermas's public sphere: some revisions. ' 
Habermas came to regard his original public sphere work as in need of certain revision, 
stating that "[h]istorians have rightly complained of empirical pitfalls" (Habermas 
1992: 423). For example, Habermas (1992: 425) recognised that he could have introduced 
"greater internal differentiation" which his model of public sphere. He had in fact 
considered rewriting it, but on rereading it after almost a generation, concluded: 
"I was initially tempted to make changes, eliminate passages, and make 
emendations. Yet I became increasingly impressed with the impracticability of 
such a course of action" (Habermas 1992: 421). 
Rather than revise his earlier work Habermas left it untouched because his own academic 
interests had moved on. As a result we are left with an original piece of writing on the 
public sphere which Habermas later considered incomplete, but accepted subsequent 
research findings from other authors highlighting the need for some revision. In other 
words, the notion of the Habermasian public sphere becomes wider than the original text 
The public sphere literature uses both `revision' and `reconstruction' in describing academic engagement 
with Habermas's work. It is not always clear whether the words are used interchangeably. Dahlgren & 
Sparks (1991) for example, speaks of `reconstruction'. Fraser (1992: 111 & 113) too speaks of 
`reconstruction' in her analysis of Habermas before basing her account on `revisionist historiography'. I take 
the view that it is important to differentiate between the two words: reconstruction suggests something 
rebuilt or significantly altered; revision suggests remodeling or minor alteration, less extensive than 
reconstruction. 
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and includes the perspectives of other theorists who engaged Habermas's concept 
critically. 
Dahlgren and Sparks (1991: 2-3) have argued that it is important to engage in revision of 
Habermas in order to render his methodology "serviceable" to present day democracy: 
"To the extent that one is concerned about democracy, we need an understanding 
of the public sphere which is congruent with the emerging realities of today, and 
serviceable to both research and politics. This involves coming to terms with 
Habermas's analysis, incorporating it and modifying it within new intellectual and 
political horizons". 
In effecting such modification Dahlgren and Sparks believe it is imperative to retain 
Habermas's "critical dimension" but move beyond Habermas's own analysis. Garnham 
(1992: 359) states that criticism put forward of Habermas's model "do[es] not undermine 
the book's continuing claim to our attention as a fruitful starting point for work on 
contemporary issues". In fact, criticism has brought about the opposite, pointing to the 
validity and continued relevance of the initial concerns outlined by Habermas. Academic 
criticism and revision of his concept have drawn increased attention to the fundamental 
importance associated with the notion of the public sphere itself. 
With these introductory comments I proceed to examine three revisions within the public 
sphere literature, relevant to the later presentation of Angolan peace narratives. I provide 
some comment on the media in section 2.1, where the suggested revision argues that 
Habermas understood the media in too narrow a sense. Section 2.2 examines the role of 
the Churches which Habermas did not situate within the public sphere, pointing to an 
historical inaccuracy within the original articulation of the public sphere. Section 2.3 
explores forms of reasoning occurring within the public sphere. This is based on my own 
reading of Habermas, whom I believe insufficiently distinguishes between individual and 
representative forms of reasoning. On the basis of this, I propose an amendment to 
Habermas's definition of the public sphere itself which has consequences for the Angolan 
discourse examined in later chapters, and facilitates analysis of civil society organisations. 
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2.1. The Media. 
Habermas (1989: 181) regarded the media as "the public sphere's preeminent institution". 
He pointed out that the effectiveness of the public sphere is premised on the guarantee of a 
number of basic rights: "freedom of speech and opinion, freedom of association and 
assembly, and freedom of the press" (Habermas 1989: 227). Only when these rights were 
secured was the public sphere considered effective as an arena of rational-critical 
discourse. 
Despite the fundamental role which Habermas attributes to the media in the development 
of the public sphere, he progressively adopted a pessimistic view of what the media had 
become as it modernised, arguing that the world of radio and television promoted 
passivity rather than participation within the public sphere (Habermas 1989: 140). He 
identified a correlation between an expanding media and the decline of the bourgeois 
public sphere, stating that the "world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in 
appearance only" (Habermas 1989: 171). The public sphere of Habermas had always been 
a literary public, where written journalism and academic writing enjoyed a high profile. 
As the media developed and became more popular its critical edge was diminished rather 
than enhanced. One of the criticisms made of Habermas in this regard is that he 
"tends to judge the eighteenth century by Locke and Kant, the nineteenth century 
by Marx and Mill, and the twentieth century by the typical suburban television 
viewer" (Calhoun 1992: 33). 
On this same point Curran (1991: 46) writes: 
"Habermas's analysis - though stimulating and thought-provoking - is deeply 
flawed. It is based on contrasting a golden era that never existed with an equally 
misleading representation of present times as a dystopia. The contrast does not 
survive empirical historical scrutiny". 
In other words, Habermas did not compare like with like. 
Assessing Habermas's treatment of the media, Zaret (1992: 213-214) concluded that 
Habermas underestimated the capacity of printing in itself to generate and stimulate new 
opinion within the public sphere: 
"Equally neglected are the implications of the printing and scientific revolutions 
for new views on public reason that were incorporated in political appeals to a 
reasoning public. While Habermas refers implicitly to the printing revolution in his 
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discussion of the rise of a reading public, he regards it narrowly as a means for disseminating and sharing ideas and not as an independent causal factor that 
shaped new modes of thought" (emphasis added). 
With specific reference to Britain, Zaret (1992: 218) argued that it was "printing that 
brought Parliamentary debates on religion and politics into the streets, and printing also 
presented parliament with popular views on these topics". Printing therefore, was much 
more than simply a medium by which views could be exchanged and opinion generated or 
contradicted. In itself it shaped popular thinking and generated issues for political 
discourse. Zaret in effect, is calling attention to the important formative dimension of the 
media, which is not independent of its crucial informative function. 
The private print and broadcast media in Angola exhibit some of the features of the 
Habermasian public sphere. Of the five peace narratives presented it most closely 
resembles Habermas's concept, though the context is different. Many of the basic rights 
identified above by Habermas as necessary to secure the effectiveness of the public 
sphere, were highly contested in Angola throughout the 1990s. Attempts to promote and 
consolidate rights such as freedom of expression, the right of assembly and association, 
and to a free press, have been a significant feature of Angola's democratic development 
throughout the 1990s. However, against a background of military conflict, it has been 
difficult to assert these rights and there have been many setbacks. 2 
2.2. The Churches. 
The role of religion in the public sphere, and by extension the role of the churches as 
religious institutions, is also dealt with by Zaret. In doing so he directs our attention 
towards an omission within the public sphere, arguing that Habermas's 
"account glosses over the relevance of religion for the emergence of a public 
sphere in politics at a time when religious discourse was a, if not the, predominant 
means by which individuals defined and debated issues in this sphere" (Zaret, 
1992: 221). 
Habermas's (1989: 11) own justification is that the "status of the Church changed as a 
result of the Reformation; the anchoring in divine authority that it represented - that is, 
2 C. £ Amnesty International (2000) Angola, Freedom of Expression on Trial. 
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religion - became a private matter". Calhoun (1992: 35-36) adds to this by situating 
Habermas within the tradition of philosophers who imagined that 
"religion must decline as the enlightenment progresses. That secularisation is part 
and parcel of modernity and, closely linked to the rise of rational-critical discourse. 
goes unquestioned. This view contributes to Habermas's blind spot on the role of 
religion both as a central thematic topic in the early public sphere and as one of its 
enduring institutional bases". 
According to Zaret (1992: 221,223) theological developments within Protestantism after 
the Reformation 
"created a public sphere in religion that cultivated nearly the same critical, rational 
habits of thought that Habermas locates in the public spheres of politics and letters. 
... The crucial point is that conscience and opinion were both associated with 
public reason, whose use was thought to be accessible to the common lay person". 
Therefore, in terms of revising the Habermasian model of public sphere it is important that 
religion (the churches) is situated within the public sphere as an historical corrective. 3 This 
revision is quite important in facilitating later analysis of the Angolan churches which 
have played a fundamental role in safeguarding the Angolan public sphere particularly 
after 1977, when the public sphere was greatly reduced, but also in promoting critical 
debate on questions of peace and conflict in Angola since independence. 
A brief comment is relevant here on how civil society theory deals with the churches. It is 
customary in Africa at least to situate the churches within civil society. Gifford (1995: 8) 
argues that from the 
"perspective of civil society, it is obvious why churches are seen as so important to 
Africa's democratisation. In so many one-party states, the churches were the 
greatest single element of civil society". 
The prominent role played by the churches as political actors in the South African struggle 
against apartheid is a good example of this (Borer 1998). The emphasis on religious 
3 Habermas's later work places significant emphasis on religious discourse within the public sphere. Junker- 
Kenny (2003: 15) wrote: "In Glauben und Wissen Habermas (2001) shows an unprecedented openness to the 
value of religious contributions to the public sphere. They can challenge scientific and other ideological 
assumptions such as the `market' conception of the human person in which self-interest, competitiveness 
and choice are what seems to be left of the original concept of autonomy". Elsewhere Junker-Kenny 
(2003: 1) noted that "Habermas accords religious communities an important role in the pluralist public 
sphere". 
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institutions within African civil society appears greater than elsewhere. Guyer (1994: 224) 
notes: 
"the prominence of the church as an institution and particular church officials as 
personalities has been a marked feature of civil society in Africa and different from 
the secular vision of the classic civil society theorists, whose emphasis fell on 
voluntary societies". 
On the place of the churches within civil society, Kassimir (1998: 55) argues for their 
inclusion on the basis of what they do and how they engage generally within society. He 
argues against situating the Churches within civil society as part of an a priori 
designation. An examination of the history of many Churches frequently details support 
for oppressive and dictatorial regimes, indeed churches have worked against each other at 
key times. 4 The Catholic Church in Angola for example, was closely associated with the 
colonial power prior to independence, and had remained silent at a time when Portugal 
carried out a scorched earth policy against the nationalist movements which involved 
substantial loss of life and massive population displacement (Grenfell 1998; Schubert 
2000; Peclard 1998). After independence this changed and the Catholic Church adopted a 
more critical stance and can be regarded as a civil society actor 
From a theoretical perspective, both a civil society and an original public sphere 
framework have difficulties in dealing with the place of religion and with religious 
institutions, partly because of the shifting nature of these institutions. Based on the activity 
of the churches, it is possible to situate them within a civil society framework, or based on 
their possible location as a discursive participatory arena, they can be analysed within the 
public sphere. However, in the Angolan context, as I will illustrate in chapter three, it is 
particularly at the level of creating space for public discussion on peace that I identify a 
crucial role played by the churches, explaining why a public sphere approach is preferred. 
A civil society approach does not offer the same focus on spatial issues which this 
research considers fundamental in assessing perspectives on peace. 
4 As witnessed in apartheid South Africa, when the white Dutch Reform Churches aligned themselves with 
minority rule at a time when most other churches had adopted a critical stance. 
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2.3. Forms of Rational Discourse Within the Public Sphere. 
The differentiation between the private use of reason and the representative use is 
important within the Habermasian framework. It is clear from the public sphere definition 
outlined earlier that Habermas was concerned with private individuals exercising reason in 
a public arena. For example, Calhoun (1992: 1) summarises Habermas's theoretical project 
in a question: 
"What are the social conditions ... for a rational-critical debate about public issues 
conducted by private persons willing to let argument and not statuses determine 
decisions? " (Emphasis added). 
Habermas's (1989: 11) public sphere developed as an arena when private persons broke 
away from the "feudal powers, the Church, the prince, and the nobility", entities he 
described as "the carriers of the representative publicness". In Habermas's view this 
representative publicness differs from private individuals engaging in public discourse. 
The question arises however, whether public sphere discourse can be reduced to individual 
discourse? Was Habermas correct in doing so? The point is relevant to this research 
because the peace narratives outlined in later chapters are largely examples of 
representative discourse, not individual discourse. The narratives of the churches, civil 
society organisations, community based organisations and traditional authorities are, on 
the whole, not the discourses of individuals, even though they may be spoken or written 
by one person. The media discourse is clearly different in this regard, though journalistic 
writing that is obliged to strictly follow editorial policy is moving close to representative 
discourse. The peace narratives outlined later reflect collective approaches to the question 
of peace where individuals represent their organisations, communities, or specific groups 
to engage in critical debate and discourse. The distinction is important because 
Habermas's definition demands that private individuals conduct discourse, not their 
representatives. Though the content of what is communicated may be the same in both 
cases, we are theoretically dealing with two different discursive types: 
Interestingly, despite Habermas's emphasis on individual discourse as the basis of public 
sphere discourse, there are a number of examples within the Structural. Transformation of 
the Public Sphere where Habermas includes representative discourse within the public 
sphere. For example, he comments on "organised rival interests" (Habermas 1989: 210), 
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"group opinions" (Habermas 1989: 221), and "special-interest associations" (Habermas 
1989: 232) within the public sphere. The inclusion of these groups is based on a distinction 
Habermas makes between the representative publicness of feudal powers, Church, etc., 
and that of `organised rival interests'. Habermas (1992: 426) argues that the former was 
based on exclusion of individuals, where the people simply "functioned as a backdrop 
before which the ruling estates, nobility, church dignitaries, kings, etc. displayed 
themselves and their status". This is radically different to the representative publicness of 
the groups Habermas lists, where such domination does not occur and the people are part 
of communication occurring on the basis of previous participation. The inclusion of these 
groups is not immediately clear within his definition, because of the emphasis on 
individual discourse within the public sphere. It would seem that the representative 
discourse was in fact a significant feature of critical public discourse occurring at the time, 
that the public sphere contained individuals who spoke on behalf of associations, 
organisations, and interests groups. In other words, individuals were not speaking on their 
own behalf, hence a wider definition of the public sphere is called for, to make this 
dimension more explicit, and this has important consequences for this research. The 
following additions in italics to Habermas's (1989: 27) original definition would appear to 
resolve the issue: 
The public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people or 
civic representatives, come together as a public; they soon claimed the public 
sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage 
them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically 
privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. 
The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical 
precedent: people's private or representative public use of their reason. 
The inclusion of representative discourse within the public sphere is important for a 
number of other reasons. Firstly, it is not always possible to distinguish between 
individual or representative discourse. The speaker in question may not particularly wish 
to differentiate and may use the ambiguity effectively in putting forward a point of view. 
Secondly, in a political environment where individuals feel that freedom of expression is 
not fully guaranteed, where expressing views publicly could be dangerous or life 
threatening, it is to be expected that instances of individual discourse might be less than if 
such restrictions did not exist. In such circumstances individuals may choose to 
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communicate through various associations or organisations on the grounds that it is safer 
to do, rather than as individuals. Habermas's theoretical approach appears to presume a 
high degree of personal individuation, with individuals expected to speak on their own 
behalf to represent themselves. This emphasis on private individuals is quite central to 
Habermas, but for a variety of reasons, including personal security, individuals may 
choose to communicate in a different way. Thirdly, the inclusion of representative 
discourse expands the public sphere boundaries in relation to where public discursive 
arenas are identified and located. Crucially in terms of this research, this situates the 
representative discourse of civil society organisations within the public sphere for 
analytical purposes. 
This second section has set out three revisions to the Habermasian public sphere, each of 
which has critically engaged Habermas's original concept. Firstly, it was shown that a 
wider understanding of the media's role as a formative and informative medium is helpful. 
Secondly, the historical omission from the Habermasian public sphere of religion and the 
churches was addressed. Thirdly, it was argued that a wider definition of the public sphere 
was appropriate, based on the de facto participation of groups and associations within the 
Habermasian public sphere construct, illustrating that the public sphere was more than just 
the private use of reason. On the basis of this wider definition I argued that present day 
civil society organisations can be situated within the public sphere. These revisions have 
revised Habermas's theoretical framework and situated three of the five peace narratives 
this thesis addresses within this revised framework. The question of if, and how, African 
traditional authority can be situated within the public sphere will be addressed at the end 
of section three. The place of community-based organisations in relation to the public 
sphere will be explored in section four. 
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3. Interface of civil society and public sphere. 5 
Civil society theory has come to inform much political and social research on the African 
continent. By contrast, few employ the public sphere framework in African research, 
though there is evidence that this is changing (Berger 1998,2002, Dahlgren & Sparks 
1991; Monga 1996,1997). This section sets out to explore some of the key conceptual 
issues, including similarities and differences between the African based civil society 
literature and the public sphere model. Section 3.1 looks at both theories in relation to 
their understanding of the state. The private-public distinction, important in both theories, 
is explored in section 3.2. In section 3.3, I ask about the place of civil society theory and 
the public sphere in relation to democratic transition and consolidation. Section 3.4 
examines a dimension of the civil society literature which attempts to shift the definition 
of civil society away from `associational life', to a `spatial' concept similar to the public 
sphere. Finally in section 3.5,1 explore the institution of traditional authority within both 
theoretical approaches. 
3.1. Civil Society and Public Sphere in relation to the State. 
A fundamental premise upon which civil society theory is based is that it points to the 
activity of actors autonomous from the state. Bayart, one of the first Africanists to use the 
concept, was initially reticent to do so, but his definition clearly points to civil society as a 
sphere of activity separate from the state: 
"Though it is arguable that the concept of civil society is not applicable outside 
European history, l shall define it provisionally as `society in relation with the state 
... 
in so far as it is in confrontation with the state' or, more precisely, as the process 
by which society seeks to `breach' and counteract the simultaneous `totalisation' 
unleashed by the state" (Bayart 1986: 111). 
This separateness from the state has remained fundamental. Organisations therefore 
belonging to state structures, those part of political patronage or clientelistic networks, are 
understood not to belong to civil society. Azarya (1994: 94) writes: 
"not all associations are considered to be agents of civil society. An obvious 
precondition is that they should not be formed or controlled by the state; otherwise 
they would simply be agents of state hegemony and would undermine civil society 
5 Issues raised in section four of this chapter were presented as a conference paper entitled `The Public 
Sphere: a Useful Framework for Analysis? ' at the Leeds Post-Graduate Conference, June 25,2002. 
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rather than strengthen it. Although there is no disagreement on the necessity of 
autonomy from the state, in practice it is more difficult to determine the degree of 
state control over associations". 
Furthermore, as White (1994: 379) points out, civil society is also separate from the 
family: 
"[the] main idea which is common to most current uses of the term is that of an 
intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by 
organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the 
state and are formed voluntarily by members of the society to protect or extend 
their interests or values" (italics in original). 
Civil society is understood to be situated between the state and the family. The sort of civil 
society that comes into view from this description includes among others, non- 
governmental organisations, voluntary associations, human rights organisations, 
independent trade unions, and the private or independent media. 
Within this interface between civil society theory and the public sphere, some brief 
discussion is relevant here on Habermas's references to civil society. Habermas was 
engaging and refining the Enlightenment concept of civil society wherein a member of 
civil society was a citizen, a member of the state (Fine 1997: 8). Keane (1988: 35) reminds 
us, for example, that until 
"the eighteenth century, European political thinkers without exception used the 
term civil society to describe a type of political association which places its 
members under the influence of its laws and thereby ensure peaceful order and 
good government..... In this old European tradition, civil society was coterminous 
with the state". 
For Hegel the two arenas of state and civil society interpenetrated and were in conflict 
with each other on a range of economic and political issues (Baker 1998: 510). However, 
based on the Enlightenment understanding of civil society, Habermas (1989: 11) identified 
the emergence of an enclave within "society separating itself from the state", which he 
referred to as an "emerging public sphere of civil society" (Habermas 1989: 23). Locating 
this public sphere outside the functioning of the state created a specific category, radically 
different to the Enlightenment understanding of civil society. 
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The present day understanding of civil society which places `associational life' at the 
centre of civil society, shares this Habermasian distinction, that separates civil society 
activity from the realm of the state (Allen 1997: 3 1). Cohen and Arato (1992) trace the 
reemergence of the term `civil society' to the "struggles of the democratic oppositions in 
Eastern Europe against authoritarian socialist party-states", especially the rise of 
`Solidarity' in Poland, and other oppositional groups in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia (Cohen & Arato 1992: 15). From within this context, the present day usage of 
the concept has developed. Keane (1988: 1) writes: 
"After more than a century of neglect ... the old topic of civil society and the state is again becoming a vital theme in European politics and social theory. ... [i]t 
enjoyed a brief but remarkable career in Europe until the second half of the 
nineteenth century, when it fell (or was pushed) into obscurity and disappeared 
almost without trace". 
The modern usage has moved away from the classical understanding and is radically 
different to the term used in the Enlightenment. However, as stated above, it is based on a 
similar understanding to that found in Habermas, concerned with an arena or sphere that 
takes shape outside state activity. The contemporary understanding of civil society is 
premised on the identification of `associational life' outside the state, whereas Habermas's 
public sphere is premised on `the public use of reason' outside the state. As I will show in 
later chapters, this different emphasis in Habermas enables the research to engage 
Angolan peace narratives in a manner that facilitates greater understanding of the 
narratives themselves. 
Writing about African civil society, Chabal and Daloz (1999: 17-18) have questioned the 
possibility of successfully achieving a distinction between the state and civil society on the 
ground: 
"the dichotomy between state and society, which is substantially taken for granted 
in most current interpretations of African politics, does not reflect realities on the 
ground.... There is on the continent no genuine disconnection between a 
structurally differentiated state and a civil society composed of properly organised 
and politically distinct interest groups". 
They argue that the extent of interpenetration between the state and civil society on the 
continent blurs the conceptual distinction. Though in favour of the concept's usefulness in 
approaching African politics, the authors suggest that civil society should be used to 
designate "social networks distinct from the state and capable of transcending primordial 
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family, kin and communal ties" (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 12). An interesting feature of some 
civil society writing on Africa, which Chabal and Daloz illustrated here, and which I 
explore further later, is a tendency to propose new definitions of civil society when faced 
with particular difficulties in naming African dynamics, that civil society fails to analyse 
adequately, evidence of which we see here. It was precisely such a difficulty that led this 
research away from the initial selection of a civil society analytical framework, to explore 
an alternative research framework with a greater emphasis on space. 
The characterisation of the state within civil society and public sphere frameworks is also 
relevant to explore. I take civil society theory first, where a negative characterisation of 
the state strongly permeates the literature, which "tends to direct attention away from real 
or potential democratic qualities within the state itself' (Berger 2002: 26). Hartmann 
(1994: 220) illustrates this, stating: "[a]s our understanding and disillusionment of the state 
has become greater, our optimism and interest in civil society in Africa has grown. " In so 
many parts of Africa, the state is described as `weak' or `collapsed' and is clearly in crisis. 
The undemocratic and corrupt nature of many African states, coupled with their failure to 
secure the basic needs of their populations, has created widespread disenchantment and 
disillusionment with the state, in many respects justifying the negative characterisation. 
By contrast, the growth of civil society within African societies is seen as positive and its 
development encouraged. Diamond et al (1995: 26) have argued that civil society "has 
become the cutting edge of the effort to build a variable democratic order", clearly 
investing great expectation in the potential of civil society to transform the state. A 
paradox that will emerge later in this thesis in relation to this point, is that while Angola 
civil society has become more vocal and assertive over the period under review, power 
within the Angolan state became highly centralised in the hands of the president, not what 
one expects when civil society is developing. 
In a similar vein, the view has been expressed that the capacity to uphold democratic 
forms of government 
"is likely to depend more on the development of associational life and the further 
empowerment of civil society rather than on the action of the state and its 
agencies" (Adigun Agbage (1990), quoted in Chazan (1994: 255)). 
Beckman (1993: 23) interprets the civil society discourse essentially as an arena for state 
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delegitimation, where civil society 
"[is] substituted for the `nation' as the principal locus of legitimation.... The more `alien' the state can be made to appear the less legitimate is its pretense to 
represent the nation". 
Yet this dichotomy is also problematic and points to the need to investigate the arena of 
civil society itself, to scrutinise the objectives of the various representatives of civil 
society and their organisations, as it has been described an arena for recycled or displaced 
elites who have secured another forum from where to pursue political objectives (Chabal 
& Daloz 1999). Furthermore, this characterisation locates the possibility of reform and 
change within civil society, not within the state's ability to reform itself There is here a 
tendency to overstate the power of civil society to achieve its goals. Unlike the state, civil 
society does not enjoy executive power and must rely on the power of persuasion or of 
public opinion to exert pressure on government to attain its objectives. This is relevant to 
Angola, where analysis of the failure of civil society actors (including the churches) to end 
the war over-emphasised the power of civil society to influence the conflict and affect 
government policy (c. f. Messfant in chapter 3). 
To contrast the `civil society' characterisation of the state with the characterisation of the 
state in the public sphere is difficult, because of the limited use of public sphere 
framework in Africa. However, from the premises upon which the public sphere is built, 
namely rational discourse based upon democratic participation, there is nothing to suggest 
that the state would be viewed any differently within a public sphere perspective. Both 
frameworks would be critical of states which deny or impede basic rights such as 
`freedom of association' and `freedom of expression'. In terms of emphasis, a public 
sphere approach would envisage greater `freedom of expression' for citizens, given its 
discursive basis, while civil society would emphasise `freedom of association', because of 
its associational nature. 
3.2. The Public-Private Distinction. 
This section explores a further distinction within the civil society and public sphere 
literature where the basis upon which the private and public realms are differentiated 
within both theoretical frameworks is challenged. 
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As we have seen, the household or family are also placed beyond the scope of civil society 
(White 1994). The family is understood to possess an inward focus, whereas civil society 
actors are assumed to direct their attention outwards towards the collective or public good. 
Tripp (1998) who uses a civil society perspective in Africa, believes that a clear 
distinction between the public and private is only possible because of the gender-biased 
legacy accompanying civil society theory. The manner in which women participate in 
public life is directly affected by gendered practices in the home where heavy 
responsibility for housework and child rearing restricts women's political participation. 
She argues that the boundaries between public and private have been constructed 
culturally, socially, juridically and politically, thus the very nature of what is considered 
`the private sphere' must change for women to participate fully in public life. In effect, the 
private sphere itself needs to become politicised. 
"The sharp separation of public-private does not appreciate the centrality of the 
family to civil society and the public sphere. It neglects the close connection 
between private and public spheres. For example, family relations that prevent 
women from participating in associations and in politics have repercussions for the 
broader polity" (Tripp 1998: 84). 
Tripp (1998: 85) argues that what is required is an "expansion of political space in the 
notion of civil society [in order to] break from the gender-based legacy that `civil society' 
currently carries". Here again we see an author utilising a civil society framework in 
Africa, finding that the concept needs to be adapted in some way because it inadequately 
addresses realities on the ground. Interestingly, Tripp's argument is in favour of a wider 
notion of political space within civil. society. 
The theoretical bracketing of personal status was earlier cited as a characteristic of the 
public sphere (Calhoun 1992), as was the ideal that rational argument alone was the basis 
for resolving issues. During public discourse, the public sphere merely suspended but did 
not address existing social inequalities. Fraser (1992: 119) is of the opinion that such 
`bracketing' probably never took place, that debate "within the bourgeois public sphere 
was governed by protocols of style and decorum that were themselves correlates and 
markers of status inequality". She argues that these protocols functioned informally to 
marginalise women and members of the lower classes, and that it would have been more 
appropriate to unbracket status altogether, to problematise it in accordance with the ideal 
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of inclusiveness central to an understanding of the public sphere. Any theoretical 
bracketing of status most likely served the interests of the dominant group, providing a 
mask for the privileges of class and gender of participants in the public sphere. 
The claim that the public sphere was open to `all' appears rather like the 'all' of Athenian 
democracy, where women of all classes were excluded, as were men who owned no 
property. Such openness was based on the assumption that women were represented by 
their husbands or fathers. Habermas (1992: 427) acknowledged this weakness in his theory 
when he wrote: "the growing feminist literature has sensitized our awareness to the 
patriarchal character of the public sphere itself'. He went further however, and argued that 
the feminist critique of the public sphere needed to distinguish between how women and 
non-propertied men were excluded. His point is that on accession to property men were 
granted the right to participate, whereas propertied women were denied this right, thereby 
negating both the theoretical openness of the public sphere to all, and recourse to reason as 
sole arbitrator in the public sphere. In Habermas's (1992: 428) own words: 
"unlike the exclusion of underprivileged men, the exclusion of women has 
structuring significance.... Under the conditions of a class society, bourgeois 
democracy thus from its very inception contradicted essential premises of its self- 
understanding". 
As can be seen both frameworks have been challenged by the feminist literature, where 
instead of applying a strict distinction between public and private sphere the task is to 
problematise dimensions of the private sphere which prevent the participation of women 
in public political life. 
3.3. Promoting Democracy. 
The place of civil society and the public sphere within an overall approach to promoting 
democratic forms of government is important to explore. It will be seen in later chapters 
that the peace narratives of the churches and the media especially, make a fundamental 
connection between the promotion and consolidation of democracy itself and the 
furtherance of peace. For this reason I briefly examine the relationship of the two 
theoretical frameworks to democracy. As seen earlier, the public sphere for Habermas 
(1992: 447) was based on "discourse-centred concept of democracy" that sought to 
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promote democratic participation within decision making and political processes. 
Democratic processes were furthered through participation in the discursive arena of the 
public sphere. This section adds some further comment on the place of the public sphere 
within democratic theory, but will focus primarily on civil society within democratic 
promotion. 
Though civil society deals broadly with manifestations of associational life, Harbeson 
(1994: 4) makes the comment that "civil society is not simply synonymous with 
associational life", therefore not all forms of associational life are considered as civil 
society activity. Harbeson confines civil society activity to associations involved in 
furthering democratic processes. However, the dividing line between forms of association 
considered excluded or included is highly contested within the African civil society 
literature, where the reason for exclusion varies. The place of ethnic organisations is 
illustrative in this respect, excluded within most civil society accounts. For Diamond 
(1994: 6) ethnic organisations do not encompass "pluralism and diversity", a 
distinguishing feature of civil society activity and therefore placed outside civil society 
analysis. Rothchild and Lawson (1994: 255) point to the "absence of a social contract" 
among "ethnic self-determination movements". Azarya believes this exclusion is to keep 
kinship and primordial ties away from civil space as much as possible. He takes issue with 
this, because 
"trade unions, professional associations, and growers' co-operatives also defend 
very particular interests of specific sectors in society, no less than ethnic welfare 
associations or hometown organisations. It is not clear why the former would a 
priori be included in civil society and the latter would not" (Azarya 1994: 95). 
As a consequence, Kasfir (1998: 5) believes that by definition 
"much, probably most, public associational life is excluded from civil society and 
thus from any proper analysis of the impact of civil society on the struggle for 
democracy and its consolidation". 
The net effect is an exaggerated sense of the importance of organisations regarded as 
belonging to civil society, whereas ethnic organisations, which play a vital role Africa, are 
placed outside the civil society focus. 
Some expressions of associational life therefore, such as the above mentioned "ethnic 
welfare associations", are not considered within the ambit of the conventional notion of 
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civil society. Chazan's (1992: 7) comment that the "future of the civic realm on the 
continent is contingent on the capacity of individual organisations to strike deep social 
roots", seems blind to the presence of organisations with already existing deep roots 
across the continent. A relevant question that arises here is: what does civil society theory 
make visible and bring into focus? Sachikonye (1995) comments that while civil society 
would appear to be quite visible in many urban parts of Africa, it is quite sparse within 
rural areas. He states that "it has been questioned whether civil society in the conventional 
sense, exists in rural Africa" (Sachikonye 1995: 10). This raises a fundamental issue in the 
context of this research, regarding the peace narratives a civil society approach captures or 
`sees' in Angola. I argue later in this thesis that both a civil society and public sphere 
framework are strong when analysing the historical churches, private media and civil 
society organisations, but that the weakness of civil society theory becomes evident when 
attempting to assess informal, rural, transient arenas where structures are more difficult to 
identify. A public sphere approach interrogates these arenas more productively than a civil 
society framework, facilitating discussion of vital peace related material. 
This visibility issue is also relevant in another sense, in relation to particular forms of civil 
society created as a result of donor funding. Kasfir (1998: 134) writes: 
"organisations, whether new or old, are likely to make a political impact when 
resources of a completely different magnitude than that available from within the 
society are poured into them. In fact, for a time they may contribute to the 
appearance of a vigorous society. But donors rarely create autonomous 
organisations..... Unless the externally funded African organisations can develop 
effective social roots and local resources of their own, they will die on the vine as 
soon as their foreign patrons depart or lose interest". 
This issue is a real one for civil society across Africa where foreign finance plays a very 
important role and, as will be seen in chapter six, has influenced the direction and activity 
of civil society organisations. Tripp's (1998: 90) comment in relation to Uganda can be 
generalised for the continent: "civil society tends to become identified with the activities 
of organisations that are formal, registered, middle-class and urban based". Hearn 
(1997: 237) writing about Kenya, has suggested that in many cases we are dealing with an 
artificial or contrived civil society, with poor roots within society. These viewpoints raise 
serious doubts about the capability of civil society to further democratic development. 
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Kasfir (1998: 1) has observed that attempts to secure democracy in Africa have "come to 
depend quite substantially on civil society". He argued that the concept of civil society has 
been shaped to serve the goal of better governance, particularly democratic reform, rather 
than explored to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between social 
groupings, the associations that represent them, and the state. In other words, civil society 
has been invested with certain democratic expectations as seen in the following statement 
from Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1988: 26), for whom civil society "has become the 
cutting edge of the effort to build a variable democratic order". Harbeson (1994: 1-2) 
expresses a similar view: 
"civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate 
states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state- 
economy relationships and prevention of the kind of political decay that 
undermined new African governments a generation ago". 
Foley and Edwards (1996: 47) wonder whether any civil society is capable of all these 
tasks and question the actual link between civil society and democracy: 
"the civil society argument as it is commonly presented is partial at best and 
seriously misleading at worst. In many respects, it presupposes precisely the sort of 
political peace that it imagines civil society providing. Where emphasis is placed 
on the ability of civil society to oppose a tyrannical state, its ability to oppose a 
democratic one is either ignored outright or countered with qualifications that 
themselves undermine the power of the civil society argument generally". 
The literature clearly expresses doubts about the links between civil society and 
democracy, and asks that the suggested linkage be closely scrutinised. 
In relation to the place of the public sphere within democratic theory, it is not possible to 
pursue the issue in a similar way to that of civil society. The reason is that we are dealing 
with a spatial construct, rather than expressions of associational life. Habermas's 
understanding of the public sphere as a democratic discursive arena, a place of public 
scrutiny where individuals participated through talking, was outlined earlier. As Calhoun 
(1995: 33) argues, Habermas's approach is based on the belief that "all significant 
differences are ultimately resolvable - at least in principle - on the basis of rational 
discourse", revealing an understanding of democracy as a conflict resolution mechanism. 
The implication is that the promotion and consolidation of democratic processes provides 
society with structures to address conflict, by ensuring that spaces are created when 
communication and discussion can occur. This public sphere approach to democracy 
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reflects the concerns of Angolan actors outlined in this research, who argued that 
democratic institutions needed to be reformed in a particular direction, that of ensuring 
greater debate and participation. 
3.4. Conceiving of civil society as 'Space'. 
It was earlier pointed out that some researchers have experienced difficulties utilising the 
concept of civil society within Africa. The civil society approach appears not to capture 
dynamics or issues these researchers seek to name or identify. The concept seems best 
suited to achieving understanding of the activities of urban and formal organisations, 
leaving the researcher to struggle with a limited concept outside these areas. Faced with 
difficulties of this nature, this section examines a particular strand within the African 
based civil society literature, where theorists have attempted to shift the definition of civil 
society away from `associational life', in the direction of a `spatial' concept. 
I begin by looking at Callaghy (1987: 235) who has expressed doubt that civil society "can 
do much to elucidate important processes in contemporary Africa, can do more than label 
them vaguely". He describes civil society as a "metaphor masquerading as a player", 
suggesting that we are dealing with appearances, and argues that if the concept is used at 
all, it should be in a very restricted sense dealing with the consensus on "norms defining a 
civil sphere". Callaghy suggests that civil society should be conceived of as 
"a space or realm defined by newly constituted norms about what the state should 
not do and by the rules of politics in that space, including politics by nonstate 
actors" (Callaghy 1994: 235). 
Callaghy is arguing for a political space where politics is conducted according to certain 
norms. In a similar vein, Michael Walzer (1991: 293, quoted in Kasfir 1998: 4) writes: 
"In its broadest reach, civil society can be conceived as including all public 
political non-state activity occurring between government and family, the space of 
uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks - formed for 
sake of family, faith, interest and ideology - that fill this space". 
These are further examples of authors who utilised civil society as a concept within an 
African context and found shortcomings particularly in relation to the `spatial' reach of 
civil society. They suggest that without a wider spatial focus, civil society is of limited use 
for the purposes of research on the continent. 
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A particularly interesting example of this `spatial' issue is Celestin Monga, who has 
written about African political life, with special reference to the Cameroon. He proposed a 
redefinition of civil society where he imagined an arena which strongly echoed the 
definition of the public sphere, referring to "networks of communication and forums for 
discussion" before shifting to a Habermasian public sphere concept. I set out two 
quotations from Monga which illustrate this shift towards a spatial understanding of civil 
society. Firstly, Monga (1996: 148) writes: 
"African societies were able to generate their own networks of communication and 
forums for discussion within which it was possible to express collective fears and 
dreams. For me, the term `civil society' refers to those birthplaces where the 
ambitions of social groups created the means of generating additional freedom and 
justice" (emphasis added). 
Civil society as the birthplace of ambitions, where groups created the means of generating 
freedom and justice, and so on, appears somewhat vague, but the author is articulating the 
importance of communicative networks and forums where people can discuss issues of 
freedom and justice. The following year Monga was back in print, this time framing 
similar views with reference to Habermas's public sphere. He wrote: 
"Habermas has elaborated a concept of the public sphere that is useful for 
understanding what is occurring in Africa today, even though the application of his 
ideas to different historical and geographical settings is subject to debate. Indeed, 
if the emergence of public spaces where members of different social groups can 
freely discuss the issues of the day is the best evidence for democratic transition, 
then the boom in the number of places where people are talking deserves attention" 
(Monga 1997: 163). 
The importance of Monga to this research is that he has actually moved from a civil 
society framework to a public sphere framework to conduct analysis of events in Africa. 
He is one of the few authors to do so, but in a wider sense we have seen others moving in 
a similar direction, proposing spatial definitions or understandings of civil society. 
3.5. Theorising traditional authorities. 
Finally in this section, I explore traditional authorities in relation to both theoretical 
frameworks. We are dealing with a somewhat elusive category when theorising the place 
of traditional authorities, because of how this institution has been transformed since first 
colonial contacts. In effect this section is asking about the place of former clan leaders and 
former royal families who lost power, within the two theoretical frameworks. Particularly 
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in rural Angola, traditional authorities continue to exercise important leadership roles 
within their local communities, though in urban areas their role is virtually non-existent. 
Within the civil society literature, Guyer (1994) has argued for the inclusion of traditional 
authority or chieftaincy among the institutions of civil society in her analysis of Nigeria. 
The basis upon which she does so is by redefining civil society as follows: 
"those organisations created by nonstate interests within society to reach up to the 
state and by the state to reach down to society" (Guyer 1994: 216). 
The definition is suspect on a number of grounds, particularly given that organisations 
created by the state are excluded from civil society (Allen 1997: 3 1). In fact chieftaincy, 
appears to elude Guyer's definition in many respects because the institution predates the 
creation of the state and, in principle, is neither created by the state nor by nonstate 
interests. 6 Later in the article Guyer (1994: 217) appears to posit chieftaincy within civil 
society without arguing for its inclusion, because it is a `persistent organisation' : 
"focusing on the spatial reach of the persistent organisations that by any of the 
various definitions would qualify for inclusion in civil society may be a first step 
toward applying ethnographic methods to the larger problem of the political 
processes being sustained along the state-society interface" (emphasis added). 
The theoretical difficulties faced when trying to categorise traditional authorities within 
civil society are often not shared on the ground. Angolan traditional authorities have 
formed their own civic organisation which is a member of the Forum of Angolan NGOs 
(FONGA), but this however does not resolve the problem of whether to theoretically 
situate the institution of traditional authority within civil society. 
Given the limited utilisation of the public sphere model on the continent, it is hardly 
surprising that questions in relation to traditional authority appear not to have been 
explored. Detailed discussion on the institution of traditional authority will be left until 
chapter seven, but a number of theoretical strands can be presented here to put forward 
some initial argument. Firstly, in dealing with traditional authorities we are dealing with 
former royal families that have been stripped of political power by colonialism, 
missionary Christianity and the policies of the post-independent state, and are firmly 
6 This statement requires some qualification because many African governments have appointed chiefs for 
particular purposes and these stand alongside the hereditary chief. With time the distinction between the two 
becomes less clear. As will be seen in chapter seven, Angola exemplifies this. 
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located outside the realm of the state. Hence, locationally it would seem that traditional 
authorities currently occupy a similar terrain to civil society and public sphere actors. 
Secondly, it is possible to draw on Kassimir's (1998) argument regarding the inclusion of 
the churches within civil society based on the activity of the churches themselves through 
an empirical assessment, rather than an a priori designation. When one examines the 
important role traditional authority figures play in rural communities and the civic nature 
of their activity, particularly in the area of conflict resolution within the community, a case 
can be made for their consideration within civil society, and indeed the public sphere 
frameworks, based on their functioning outside the state. 
Thirdly, specifically in relation to a public sphere framework it is worth recalling that 
Habermas excluded the churches from the public sphere, because of the representative 
publicness these engaged in. This argument is also valid in relation to traditional authority 
historically, as these personalities formerly enjoyed executive power within their 
kingdoms. However, in charting the transformation of traditional authority in Angola, and 
bearing in mind that Habermas posited two types of representative publicness, it appears 
to me that we are also dealing with the transformation of representative publicness from 
one Habermasian sense to the other. In other words, that traditional authority itself has 
travelled a similar path to the churches: from the representative publicness of the medieval 
church, to the representative publicness of the churches as civil society actors. 
However, given these possible grounds upon which to support the inclusion of traditional 
authorities as public sphere or civil society actors, I argue against their inclusion because 
Angolan traditional authorities see themselves as political actors and aspire to political 
office. As will be shown in chapter seven, traditional authority requested that a second 
parliamentary chamber be established for traditional authority figures within the 
framework of a new constitution. Despite many of their civic qualities, their political 
aspirations theoretically situate them outside the public sphere and civil society. However, 
I will argue that significant dimensions of traditional authority activity and space can be 
analysed from a Habermasian perspective, in a particularly fruitful way. A Habermasian 
approach reveals important insights into the nature of traditional society, particularly the 
traditional discursive arena called the ondjango, where the community met and talked 
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under the authority of the chief. The importance of this arena can best be captured, in mý 
opinion, within a public sphere approach. 
4. A plebeian' public sphere? 
Previous sections of this chapter have incorporated key revisions which expanded 
Habermas's original public sphere concept. These revisions created the conditions 
whereby it was possible to situate the media, the churches, civil society organisations 
within a revised Habermasian framework, without `over-stretching' Habermas's model. 
Section three explored key areas of similarity and difference between a civil society and 
public sphere framework, before weighing up the possibility of also situating traditional 
authorities within the revised public sphere framework. While the Habermasian approach 
has much to offer and is helpful in analysing this traditional institution, I do not include it 
within a revised public sphere, because of its political orientation. 
It was also noted how some of the African based civil society literature struggled with the 
concept of civil society, engaging in efforts to redefine the concept along spatial lines. I 
find these efforts interesting and relevant to this research, and in this fourth section I take 
up this discussion on `space' again, this time to explore the spatial dimensions of 
Habermas's `plebeian public sphere', particularly with regard to how it might be useful in 
relation to this Angolan based research (and perhaps more widely in Africa). The concept 
I believe, offers a possible `spatial' research tool to facilitate understanding at the 
community-based level, the remaining peace arena of this thesis, which I have yet to 
situate with respect to the theoretical framework. 
While Habermas's (1989: 30) bourgeois public sphere was a phenomenon of the town or 
urban life, the `plebeian public sphere' was considered by Habermas (1992: 427) to be part 
of the "culture of the common people". In fact, Habermas (1992) later acknowledged the 
error of solely focusing on the bourgeois public sphere to the exclusion of the plebeian, in 
his original work. Garnharn (1992: 359) articulates the point in the following way: 
"[Habermas] neglects the importance of the contemporaneous development of a 
plebeian public sphere alongside and in opposition to the bourgeois public sphere, 
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a sphere built upon different institutional forms, e. g., trade unions, and with different values, e. g., solidarity rather than competitive individualism". 
It is on the basis of such analysis that Fraser (1992: 116) makes the observation "that the 
bourgeois public was never the public" (emphasis in original), but was one of a host of 
competing publics from the start, citing `nationalist', `popular peasant', `women's', and 
`working class publics', as examples, which carries the suggestion that there was never a 
single public sphere, highlighting an arena of greater complexity and diversity than 
Habermas had envisaged. 
It is interesting to read Haberrnas's response to this criticism. He explains that he had 
originally understood the plebeian public to be "a variant of the bourgeois public sphere 
that remained suppressed in the historical process" (Habermas 1992: 425). He reevaluated 
his position after reading E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class, 
and Mikhail Bakhtain's Rabelais and His World, both of which offered him a different 
perspective on political mobilisation within the rural lower classes and the urban workers, 
and exposed him to inner dynamics of plebeian culture. Habermas (1992: 427) writes: 
"This culture of the common people apparently was by no means only a backdrop, 
that is, a passive echo of the dominant culture; it was also the periodically 
recurring violent revolts of a counter-project to the hierarchical world of 
domination, with its official celebrations and everyday disciplines". 
The clear implications for research are that the `culture of the common people' or 
`plebeian public sphere', cannot be ignored and must be explored in seeking to identify 
public sphere discourse. It is here that I locate the community-based material of chapter 
six, but whether it is appropriate to situate the plebeian public sphere within the revised 
Habermasian public sphere framework is a question I address at the end of the chapter. 
We have seen how the coffee-house was an important location for bourgeois public sphere 
discourse. Stallybrass and White (1986: 80) make the point that particular sites generate 
particular discourses: 
"Patterns of discourse are regulated through the forms of corporate assembly in 
which they are produced. Alehouse, coffee-house, church, law court, library, 
drawing room of a country mansion: each place of assembly is a different site of 
intercourse requiring different manners and morals. Discursive space is never 
completely independent of social place and the formation of new kinds of speech 
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can be traced through the emergence of new public sites of discourse and the 
transformation of old ones" (quoted in Scott 1990: 122). 
The implication quite clearly is that the "manners and morals" of the coffee-shop yield a 
different discourse to the "manners and morals" of the alehouse, the church, a civil society 
or community based organisation, or traditional authority meeting place. As Scott 
(1990: 122) wrote, "[e]ach site, owing to the social position of its habitues, generated a 
distinctive culture and pattern of discourse". In other words, to expect or designate any 
one site as `the public sphere' is mistaken, that the public sphere is a wider construct, 
involving discourse emerging from different sites where public participation occurs. 
Therefore Habermas's public sphere is in effect one of the `publics' within a wider public 
sphere referring, as he clearly indicates in the title of his work, to the `bourgeois public 
sphere'. 
This wider construction of public sphere appears to lie behind a definition of the public 
sphere articulated by Seyla Benhabib (1992: 87): 
"The public sphere comes into existence whenever or wherever all affected by 
general social and political norms of action engage in a practical discourse, 
evaluating their validity. " 
Benhabib's definition, like the Habermasian, reflects an idealised form premised on the 
discursive participation of all, on the validity of that which governs people's lives. It is an 
arena where public, social and political life is scrutinised through talking. Once these 
`discursive' dynamics are in place we can speak of the public sphere in any particular 
setting, urban or rural. The emphases within the plebeian public sphere are different to 
those of the bourgeois public sphere, with a decreased role for the media (because of 
literary levels and prevailing poverty), with increased attention to informal communication 
processes where news is passed on by word of mouth, and an increased role for the 
churches (given their importance in Africa). Indeed culture and tradition are likely to play 
a greater role in the communicative processes of these plebeian arenas, and ritual playing 
an important part of the communicative process. 
Benhabib's (1992: 78) suggestion of a temporary or transient public sphere, which "comes 
into existence whenever and wherever" people engage in practical discourse is interesting 
and helpful in assessing community-based material. An image of the public sphere as 
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`emerging and receding' reflects realities on the ground, particularly in countries where 
`freedom of expression' and `freedom of association' are subject to constant or occasional 
government clampdowns, where the public sphere contracts and expands. Benhabib 
(1992: 78) uses the term `public space' to refer to spaces within and beyond institutions, 
"private dining rooms", "a field or a forest" can become public spaces if they are the 
object or location of an action in concert. ... they become sites of power, of common 
action through speech and persuasion". The reference to a "private dining room" is 
interesting, because as Bonnin (2000: 303-304) points out with reference to apartheid 
South Africa: 
"a white middle-class South African family would be likely to have experienced 
the household as a private space, while for a poorer black family, subjected to the 
invasions of the pass laws and the regulations of resettlement, privacy would have 
been less assured. The private space of the white household was frequently the 
public space of the black domestic worker's workplace, while for many women 
involved in informal sector activities the home was, and is, also their workplace". 
The comment further calls into question the public-private distinction made earlier. 
An important theoretical question emerges here in relation to the `plebeian public sphere', 
where I situate the community-based material. The question is: are we dealing with the 
Habermasian public sphere? Strictly speaking, in relation to Habermas's Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, the answer is negative, because Habermas does not 
engage these issues, focusing solely on the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere, 
while remaining silent on the nature of the plebeian public sphere. Had Habermas initially 
written this work after reading E. P. Thompson or Mikhail Bakhtain, it is possible that he 
would have taken a different approach and possibly included the bourgeois and plebeian 
within a more integrated public sphere. 
Furthermore, I have included within the Habermasian public sphere actors that can be 
situated there by effecting certain revisions to Habermas's earlier work. I distinguish these 
`revisions' from attempts to `reconstruct' his theory, which in my opinion, subject 
Habermas's project to more radical alterations, yielding categories that are not 
Habermasian. It is on this basis that I regard community-based material to be `beyond' 
what I consider `Habermasian', and therefore do not include it within the revised 
Habermasian public sphere. I do however intend to read community-based material 
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through Habermasian insights and concerns, particularly with regard to its publicness. It is 
for this reason that I have entitled this chapter `The Pubic Sphere: Habermas and Beyond', 
to suggest that the research framework within which the five Angolan peace narratives are 
to be examined belongs within Habermas's concerns, particularly those of the media, the 
churches and civil society. However, the dynamics of the "culture of the common people" 
or plebeian public sphere, and the political orientation of traditional authorities take us 
beyond the Habermasian model. The title also suggests that I wish to take Habermas 
`beyond' more familiar settings of inquiry, from a Western to an African setting; to 
examine the peace narratives of a people in a time of recurring and devastating military 
conflict; to examine public communication in urban and rural settings where history, 
culture, tradition and ritual, all play vital roles. The next five chapters, beginning with the 
Angolan churches, set out the peace narratives of these discursive arenas. 
Chapter 3. 
The Historical Churches: A Defining Narrative. 
In setting out Angolan perspectives on peace and interpretations of the military 
conflict, it is of crucial importance to examine the role played by the Angolan 
historical churches. Of the five peace narratives chosen, I deal firstly with the churches 
because of the extent of the analysis put forward, stretching back over a number of 
decades. The historical churches are important institutions in Angola with a "powerful 
influence among the people" (Birmingham 1999: 63). They see themselves as speaking 
on behalf of the Angolan people who paid the highest price for the various failures to 
resolve the conflict. The peace narrative of the churches is a national narrative, put 
forward by a group who lived with the "suffering people", and who had contacts on 
both sides of the conflict (Schubert 2000: 209-210). Furthermore, when examining the 
Christian churches, we are also dealing with the discourse of "the most legitimate and 
organised network for peace and change in a fractured Angola" (Howen 2001: 29). 
The word `church' embraces a wide reality in Angola, from the older better known 
churches to the newer African Independent Churches (AIC). 1 In order to delimit this 
arena and give priority to the churches who have been most visible and vocal in the 
search for peace, this chapter will focus on the main Protestant and Catholic `historical 
churches', thereby differentiating them from the new AIC's that have flourished in 
Angola over the past twenty years or so. This is in no way intended to treat these as 
less than the other established churches, but rather to focus the area of inquiry. Even so 
however, the category of `historical churches' remains quite wide, but by and large the 
peace narrative of these churches finds expression through three institutions: CICA2 
(Council of Christian Churches of Angola), AEA (Angolan Evangelical Alliance), and 
CEAST (Angolan Catholic Church). The first two are ecumenical organisations for the 
principal Protestant churches, and all three are widely known in Angola by these 
acronyms, which I will use. References to the `Angolan churches' throughout this 
1 The exact number of churches in Angola is unknown. A CICA (204Ic) newsletter referred to 87 
churches with state recognition, and a further 750 other churches. Viegas (1999) provides a brief outline 
of many Angolan churches. 
2 For example, the principal Protestant churches, the Methodist Church, Baptist Church and 
Congregationalist Church are part of CICA. 
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chapter is shorthand for these three organisations. Rather than treat the narratives of 
the Protestant and Catholic churches separately which the Angolan literature generally 
does, I will treat them collectively because of the significant similarities existing 
between their analyses. 
The following questions are addressed in this chapter: 
Li What did the churches identify as the causes of the confl ict? 
Q How did the churches view the conflict itself? 
Q How did the churches believe peace could be achieved`? 
Q Did the churches envision a role for themselves in resolving the conflict? 
Q Did the different churches work together in pursuit of peace? 
Q Has the churches' analysis changed over the period of conflict? If so, in 
what way? 
Q What role, if any, did the churches play in facilitating debate regarding 
peace, within the public sphere? 
The church-based literature in the form of pastoral letters, public statements, or 
speeches, conference documents and reports, and fieldwork interviews, form the basis 
upon which these questions will be addressed. In almost all instances we are dealing 
with `representative publicity' or `representative discourse', as outlined in the previous 
chapter, hence the importance of the addition to Habermas's definition. 
A number of important works have examined the role of the churches prior to the 
signing of the Bicesse Accords. The most significant of these is Schubert (2000), but 
others include Grenfell (1998), Henderson (1979,1990), and Peclard (1998). These 
have outlined the relationship between the nationalist parties and the three main 
Protestant churches, and the relationship of the colonial power to the Catholic Church. 
The three main Protestant churches - Methodist, Baptist and Congregationalist - were 
birthing places for the three main nationalist parties, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, 
respectively. The Catholic Church was seen as having collaborated with the 
Portuguese administration (Humbaraci & Muchnik 1974: 205). The situation was more 
complex than the representation of two homogenous blocks, as some of the Protestant 
churches were not involved in the independence struggle, while many Catholic 
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missionaries supported the MPLA, FNLA and GRAE (Mateus 1999). 3 This chapter 
will not explore these issues, seeking instead to bridge the gap in the literature since 
the Bicesse Accords. 4 
That the churches have played such a key role in Angola is rather ironic. After 
independence there were suggestions that the. churches should be outlawed 
(Birmingham 1999: 63), and Agostinho Neto thought the churches would have died out 
completely within fifty years (Schubert 2000: 139). It was thought that "Christianity in 
Africa would become ever less significant" after independence, but this has proved not 
to be the case (Gifford 1998: 21). John de Gruchy (1998: 57) points to the "considerable 
importance" of churches to democratic transition in "reducing conflict and building 
trust without which such transitions are unlikely to succeed". Earlier de Gruchy 
(1998: 49) argued that "in many places democratisation will not take place and cannot 
be sustained unless the churches give their critical support to the process". 
Churches or church institutions have played an important role in promoting peace and 
reconciliation in many places. Naidoo (2000) comments on the pivotal role played by 
the Sant'Egidio community in facilitating peace talks in Mozambique, which 
eventually led to the signing of a peace agreement in October 1992. The Carnegie 
Commission's Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997: 114) listed five factors which give 
religious leaders and institutions a comparative advantage in dealing with conflict 
situations from the grassroots level to the transnational level: 
"1) a clear message that resonates with their followers; 2) a long-standing and 
pervasive presence on the ground; 3) a well-developed infrastructure that often 
includes a sophisticated communications net-work connecting local, national, 
and international offices; 4) a legitimacy for speaking out on crisis issues; and 
5) a traditional orientation to peace and goodwill". 
Despite these advantages religious leaders and institutions have also played destructive 
roles in many conflicts and atrocities, such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Longman 
(2001: 164) comments that: 
3 Alexandre do Nascimento (later Cardinal of Luanda) was imprisoned with many other priests for 
supporting the MPLA. Fr. Manuel das Neves was accused of having been the organiser of the attack on 
the prison on February 4,1961, which initiated the war of independence (Mateus 1999: 19-41). 
4 The internet has also become a valuable source of information on Angolan church related activities. 
For example, the Diocese of Benguela website http: //huizen. dds. nU-mh2/po index. htm; `Pay Angola' 
http: //www pazangola org, Kairos htt?: //web. net/-iccaf/humanri hts/angolainfo/angola. htm, and 0 
Aposto/ado http: //www. apostoIado. info/ linked with Radio Ecclesia news. 
65 
"[i]n the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, many people inside and outside 
the country have struggled to comprehend the involvement of Rwanda's 
churches in the violence". 
As mentioned in chapter one, I propose to outline the peace narrative of the churches 
chronologically. This was considered preferable to a thematic approach, providing a 
better sense of what was being said over the period of time under review, and 
expanding the historical material outlined in the first chapter. A chronological 
approach also helped address the research question dealing with how the churches' 
analysis changed as the conflict went from one crisis to another. Only the church-based 
literature permits this approach, covering the entire research period. In structuring this 
chapter, I set out five separate periods which situate the churches' narrative within the 
political and military context of the time. Firstly, though outside the specific research 
period, I briefly examine material prior to the Bicesse Accords of May 1991 where 
many of the major themes evident in later church analysis can be located. Secondly, I 
deal with the period from Bicesse to the first multiparty and presidential elections held 
in September 1992. Thirdly, the second civil war from the post-election crisis to the 
signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. Fourthly, the period of `neither war 
nor peace' from the Lusaka Protocol to late-1998. Finally, I look at the period covering 
the third war from December 1998 to the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. 
1. Church Narratives prior to Bicesse. 
In situating the principal peace related themes of the churches prior to the 1991 
Bicesse accords, I take the Gbadolite Accords of June 22 1989, as a starting point. 
After a summit of eighteen regional heads of states in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (former Zaire), President Mobutu announced that a cease-fire had been 
brokered in Angola (Pycroft 1994: 247). The Gbadoiite Accords offered amnesty for 
UNITA soldiers, and the integration of UNITA into Angolan society and government. 
However, the agreement quickly broke down and hostilities resumed, with both sides 
having different interpretations of what was agreed. 
"The MPLA claimed that the Gbadolite accords made provision for UNITA 
members to be absorbed into MPLA structures, with Savimbi `retiring' 
from 
Angola. UNITA argued that the Gbadolite accords represented the first stage in 
negotiations towards a cease-fire, a new constitution, and multi-party elections. 
In UNITA's interpretation there would continue to be a powerful role for 
Savimbi" (Pycroft (1994: 247). 
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For Malaquias (1995: 241), the "[f]ailure of Gbadolite revolved around the question of 
who said what and when. [It was also] poorly planned prior to Mobutu's trip to the 
USA". Gbadolite is perhaps best remembered for providing the first hand-shake 
between President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi. At the time of Gbadolite, two 
important themes crystallised in the church literature that are relevant for later 
sections: commentary in favour of democratisation; and analysis of the causes of the 
war. The next two sub-sections examine these. 
1.1. Democratisation. 
In discussing what the churches said about democratisation it is necessary to situate 
this discourse within the political reality of the time, remembering that Angola was 
then a one-party Marxist-Leninist state. Church members were obliged to leave the 
MPLA or forced to publicly reject their religious belief (CICA 1984: 7). Government 
was sensitive to what it considered `political' comment emanating from the churches, 
though it accepted the `religious' nature of the churches' work. The boundaries 
between what is considered `political' and `religious' are quite different in the minds 
of both government and church leaders. The latter does not see a sharp dividing line 
between the two arenas, particularly when human welfare is considered in jeopardy. 
Government on the other hand, has frequently viewed comment of this nature as 
church intervention in politics and been critical of church statements. 
The churches warmly welcomed the Gbadolite Accords. AEA and CICA congratulated 
the Angolan President on securing peace for Angola and practicing a "politics of 
forgiveness". 5 CEAST6 understood that a time of democratic transition had begun, that 
such a transition was part of the process of national reconciliation: 
"the dialogue of reconciliation that had begun, was along democratic lines and 
ought to continue to build and consolidate peace" (CEAST 1989: 212). ' 
Later in 1989, with Gbadolite clearly a failure, CEAST reiterated that the path to peace 
and national reconciliation involved democratic reform: 
5 This letter to President dos Santos is referenced as AEA-CICA (1989). 
6 The CEAST documents from 1974 to 1998 were published in a single volume in 1998. In referencing 
CEAST statements of this period, I cite the year of the statement in question, followed by the page 
number in CEAST (1998), to enhance readability of the text. Hence, CEAST (1998: 212) becomes 
CEAST (1989: 212). 
7 The use of roman numerals indicates that the original Portuguese text is included for consultation at the 
end of this work (Portuguese Texts used in Thesis). I express my gratitude to Colm Reidy, a colleague, 
who has international experience in this field, for reviewing my translations. 
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"We need an authentic peace which changes Angola into a truly free and democratic country, where all her children have a place and a voice. This voice 
will only be genuinely heard in free elections. It is necessary to find ways to 
establish a just peace. ... For the present a cease-fire is needed.... The time for 
personal, direct, and frank dialogue has arrived, from one Angolan to another" (CEAST 1989: 214). " 
The same document also challenged the political leaders on both sides to stop 
sacrificing the children of Angola to their party interests. Pro-democracy statements of 
this nature illustrate how far the Catholic Church had shifted since its support of the 
colonial regime. 8 That it had come out so clearly in support of democracy reflects 
political changes occurring elsewhere at the time, especially as change swept across 
Eastern Europe. It is somewhat unusual however, to see such a supportive statement in 
favour of a particular political system. As de Gruchy (1998: 48) makes clear, 
"Christianity cannot be equated with any system of government, including democracy, 
but must remain critical of all social order" 
The MPLA government was quite irritated by the CEAST intervention. Two articles 
published in the state owned daily newspaper Jornal de Angola on November 30 1989, 
accused CEAST of obstructing the search for peace by adopting positions identical 
with those of the United States and UNITA. 9 The government response is one of a 
number of examples where CEAST was strongly rebuffed for the content of its 
pastoral letters. 
The views expressed by CEAST were representative of feelings within the churches 
generally, regarding what shape political change should take. The two Protestant 
ecumenical organisations AEA and CICA, also viewed democratic change as the surest 
way to secure peace, setting out their views in 1990 in a joint submission to the third 
MPLA national congress. 10 Advocating democratic principles the joint document read: 
"The peace and tranquility of the people depend on a commitment of openness 
to multiparty politics. ... 
Multi-party politics should not be a hypothesis yet to 
be proved, but an objective to be achieved within a determined period. The 
commitment to multiparty politics could determine peace, and this in turn bring 
about democracy" (AEA-CICA 1990). "' 
8 Hastings (1995: 40) notes the paradox here, especially within the Catholic Church which "clearly 
supports democracy in the state but clings to autocracy in the church". He argues that democracy "in the 
state can hardly convincingly be advocated by a church which refuses to practise anything comparable 
within its own life". 
4 These articles are published in CEAST (1998: 216-219). 
10 The MPLA had solicited such submissions from within society on the future direction of the country 
(AEA-CICA 1990). 
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The submission also commented that the promotion of democracy would positively 
shift the balance of power in favour of the people, in a manner not permitted in one- 
party states: 
"the governments of one party states maintain their power on the basis of 
corruption and a large military and security apparatus which defend the regime 
against the people it governs.... Until now, the government and the 
sovereignty of the Angolan nation have been confused with that of the [MPLA] 
Party.... Our peace, our development, the national unity for which all of us 
should be striving, are achieved through democracy". iv 
The pro-democracy position of AEA and CICA is slightly tempered by a viewpoint in 
the same document where the establishment of democracy was considered separate 
from the question of whether Marxist-Leninism should be abandoned, an issue the 
document stated required further reflection. However, the submission is interesting 
from the point of view of identifying criticism of the MPLA government emerging 
within the Protestant churches. This is especially relevant in the case of AEA which 
had seen political involvement as a betrayal of its Christian mission, and it was rare for 
either AEA or CICA during the post-independent period prior to Bicesse to make 
public pronouncements on peace (Schubert 2000: 157,207). Church-based public 
sphere discourse came primarily from CEAST during these years, which, through the 
Africanisation of its leadership, had significantly transformed itself from its 
`collaborator' image (Schubert 2000: 130). 
It would not be true to state that these statements mark the beginning of the churches' 
advocacy in favour of democratic change and multiparty democracy in Angola. An 
earlier call for democracy can be dated to an ecumenical document in June 1975 when 
the Christian bishops of Angola (six Catholic and one Methodist) issued a joint 
statement, calling for the establishment of "sincere dialogue and truly democratic 
processes" in the new Angolan state. 
" The document is evidence of the churches 
working together across the Catholic-Protestant divide, but significantly it seems to 
have been the only such initiative until COIEPA (Comite Inter Eclesial para a Paz em 
Angola, - joint AEA-CEAST-CICA ecumenical peace commission examined 
later) 
was founded nearly twenty-five years later. 
" Pastoral Message from the Bishops of the Christian Churches on Peace and Harmony, published in 
CEAST (1975: 390). 
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1.2. Causes of the war. 
Reasons for the conflict between the MPLA government and UNITA are also dealt 
with in the church based literature. In the case of the Protestant churches, a 1984 
document is especially relevant, where CICA outlined its understanding of the causes 
of the war at the time, 12 The document Churches Memorandum on Peace, Justice and 
Development in the Popular Republic of Angola, which I consider one of the most 
important in the church related literature, identifies two distinct levels or dimensions in 
the search for peace: an external/regional dimension, and an internal dimension. In 
commenting on how to build peace, the document also sets out CICA's understanding 
of the causes of the war. 
At the external/regional level, CICA (1984: 4-5) identified three issues which affected 
or sustained the war in Angola. Firstly, CICA argued that the apartheid system in 
South Africa needed dismantling so as to reduce regional tensions. For example, the 
South African Defense Forces (SADF) military campaign against SWAPO freedom 
fighters saw SADF make many incursions into southern Angola in pursuit of SWAPO, 
and created much instability. Secondly, CICA identified a need for compliance with 
UN resolution 435 on independence for Namibia. Prior to Namibian independence, 
South Africa and Angola shared a common border, which gave South Africa easy 
access to Angola in terms of border crossings and supply lines to UNITA. The signing 
of the 1988 New York Accords between South Africa, Angola, the United States, the 
former Soviet Union and Cuba, was significant in bringing about Namibian 
independence, thereby reducing the external military threat. Cuban troop withdrawal 
from Angola, overseen by UNAVEM I, was a significant factor in the granting of 
independence. Thirdly, CICA called for an end to the "politics of militarisation and 
destabilisation" promoted by neighbouring countries. As well as references to South 
Africa, one can read here criticism of the. former Zaire, used by the US government as 
a supply line for UNITA. 
External factors alone were not sufficient in explaining the causes of conflict. CICA 
(1984: 5) argued that the problem was internal and ultimately needed an internal 
12 The document is entitled Memorando das Igrejas sobre Paz, Justica e Desenvolvimento na R. P. A. 
CICA replaced an earlier church organisation referred to CAIE (Conselho Angolapo de Igrejas 
Evangelicas), and strictly speaking should be referenced as CAIE (1984). For readability purposes I 
refer to the document as CICA (1984) in the text. It is listed in the bibliography as CICA-CAIE (1984). 
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solution: "it is necessary to regard a lack of unity as the determining factor slowing 
down the search for peace, for justice and develoment". ' CICA addresses this `lack of 
unity' and these internal divisions from a number of perspectives. It points to the 
"divide and conquer" policies utilised by the colonial administration, which fomented 
racial and tribal conflict between Angola's ethnic groups. CICA is especially critical of 
the way in which evangelisation was conducted by foreign missionaries which 
reinforced ethnic and tribal differences. It explains that Baptists worked among the 
Bakongo, Methodists among the Ambundu, Presbyterians and Congregationalists 
among the Ovimbundu, Lutherans among the Kwanhama, and Pentecostals and 
Evangelicals among other ethnic groups. Because of missionary methodologies, 
historical differences between ethnic groups became religious differences and 
subsequently political differences, when the nationalist parties emerged from within 
these ethnic-religious identities. CICA argues that colonialism was able to exploit 
these identities in a way that enabled it maintain its hold on power, appearing to 
suggest that mission Christianity reconstructed historical differences in a particularly 
divisive way, that ultimately had disastrous consequences for the country. 
Internal divisions created what CICA considered "a monster", when the 1975 
government of transition was formed. This monster brought 
"a tragedy never before experienced, because our Nation lost more people 
during the 1975 confrontations than were lost in the first war of national 
liberation" (CICA 1984: 6). v' 
The document argued that "until the beginning of 1976, obstacles to national unity 
were much more tribal and opportunistic, than ideological". "" Of particular note here is 
that CICA is naming `tribalism' as a cause of the war, pointing to a time before 
political ideologies differentiated the political parties. Working for peace required 
addressing these underlying problems and necessitated: 
"redoubling efforts in the struggle for unity of the churches and of the Angolan 
nation, fighting vigorously against any form of division which presents 
itself 
among [the churches] and within Angolan society". 
The document concluded: 
"Once again we wish to underline that the basis problem lies in a `lack of 
unity' and not in the lack of political reconciliation between the two political 
powers, whose political ideologies are totally opposed. ... 
We believe that the 
real solution lies in our capacity to preserve our identity as Angolans" 
(CICA 
1984: 11). ""' 
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Some seven years later, just weeks prior to the signing of the Bicesse Accords, CE AST 
expressed similar views to those of CICA on the causes of the conflict, again 
highlighting a lack of unity manifest in tribalism. According to CEAST (1991: 250- 
25 1) some ethnic groups considered themselves superior to others: 
"Our country's greatest problem which affects everything else, is a lack of unity. A 
unity based on truth and justice, and anchored in love. -Therefore it is important to examine what divides us, not so as to open old wounds, but to eradicate the 
seeds of discord. Tribal differences ... 
have degenerated into a motive for mutual 
rejection, for disrespect, and the division of tribes into superior and inferior. This is 
serious. It compromises the future and the nation's very existence, opening doors 
for others to exploit.... Division and fratricidal hatred represent a most serious 
betrayal of the Nation". ix 
Though CEAST did not spell out these mutual ethnic perceptions, it was stressing that 
`tribal differences' could be exploited by others in a destructive way unless, the `seeds 
of discord' were somehow examined and healed. Echoing CICA, CEAST argued prior 
to Bicesse that the causes of conflict were internal, that internal divisions had led to the 
creation of external alliances. Collectively the churches believed that democratic 
processes would help in addressing these underlying issues. 
2. Bicesse Accords to 1992 elections. 
The sixteen months from the signing of the Bicesse Accords in May 1991 to the 
holding of national elections in September 1992, are referred to in Angola as the `mini- 
paz' or mini-peace. The end of the war came as a relief to the Angolan people who 
could travel and visit family members they had been unable to see for many years. In 
exploring this brief period, I wish to treat four key themes addressed by the churches. I 
examine comment made regarding democratisation; the media; the need for greater 
voter education; and finally, military considerations. 
2.1. Democratisation. 
The change from a one-party state to multiparty democracy was welcomed 
by the 
churches, who believed that national reconciliation had been advanced. 
For the 
churches, the introduction of multiparty democracy afforded Angola an opportunity 
to 
begin again, to place peaceful discussion and political debate at the centre of political 
life, leaving military conflict in the past. There was a hope that the years of war 
had 
taught Angola a lesson about the futility of war, and the need to pursue peaceful 
means. For AEA (1991: 2) the change to multiparty democracy required 
the involvemnt 
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of every Angolan to promote "the pacification and reconciliation of the whole Angolan 
family". " The task of `pacification', sometimes expressed as `pacification of the 
spirits', is one that has emerged after each of Angola's peace agreements, with 
government calling on the churches to assist in pacifying the nation, to lance the boil 
of hatred caused by war. The issue of `pacification' is important to address, but one I 
leave until chapter six for discussion in a wider context. 
For all the churches, multi-party democracy was understood and presented as the new 
arena for the peaceful resolution of conflict. As a new form of dialogue, democracy 
replaced the dialogue of weapons. A statement from AEA (1992) just prior to the 
holding of elections illustrates this view: 
"In a democracy, free speech should promote peace and the well being of 
society: access to power is gained through voting, not force or violence. 
Weapons must yield to dialogue; a dialogue which reveals wisdom, a dialogue 
based on debate over socio-economic progress. A dialogue which directs 
people towards development and respect for the dignity of others". " 
CEAST (1991: 289) addressed the key post-election role opposition parties would have 
in building a healthy democracy and encouraged those defeated electorally, to embrace 
this role. It underlined the importance of an effective opposition in ensuring better 
governance within the Angolan state. For CICA (1992b), multi-party democracy was a 
form of permanent dialogue based on the "peaceful coexistence of political parties". 
Quite clearly the churches viewed multiparty democracy as a discursive arena, where 
peaceful politics ensured development and national progress. 
However, the churches had concerns that this view was not shared by the political 
parties. CICA expressed a sense of foreboding about the elections and the period 
afterwards speaking of a "dark cloud" that created anxiety, particularly as 
demobilisation had not been completed. It presented the elections as a means towards 
greater democratisation and pacification, not an end in themselves: 
"[Elections] are a door for a new era which we want to be of justice, peace, and 
freedom, for the happiness of all. These elections are the first and we do not 
wish them to be the last" (CICA 1992b). '"' 
The churches had real concerns about the post-election period. AEA (1992) 
commented on the disquiet felt by those who wondered what would happen "if one of 
the signatories of the Accords, or the two, were to lose the elections? " CEAST 
(1992: 289) spoke of the need for political parties and candidates "to know how to win. 
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to know how to lose, and to accept the result", ""' calling on the parties to exercise 
"democratic wisdom". AEA (1992) encouraged the political contestants to adopt a 
"civic posture" after the elections. 
It is worth developing here a comment made by CEAST two weeks after the signing of 
the Bicesse Accords which expresses a concern that has appeared frequently within 
Angolan society generally. CEAST questioned the exclusion from the political process 
of those who had not been involved in the armed conflict, of those who had struggled 
for peaceful resolution of the war: 
"[May we not be led into thinking that] only those who carried weapons 
deserve political rights, thereby marginalising those who suffered as a 
consequence of those weapons, as well as those who without recourse to 
violence fought for peace and democracy. Such a dangerous temptation could 
lead to new forms of unjust discrimination" (CEAST 1991: 266). "v 
This theme is an important one within many of the narratives covered in this thesis. 
From the Alvor Accords in 1975, to the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements, and more 
recently the Luena Accords, only those who have engaged in military struggle have 
secured a seat at the negotiating table. The voices and opinions of those who adopted 
non-military means to pursue their objectives, have not been considered during crucial 
moments of negotiation concerning Angola's future. Within the Habermasian 
framework, the criticism clearly relates to the exclusion of public sphere discourse 
from the wider political arena, denied access to give `opinion' on what shape Angola's 
future might take. 
Much of the public communication from the churches during these sixteen months 
after the Bicesse Accords reveals serious reservations about the extent of political 
commitment to the democratic process. The churches hoped these misgivings would be 
unfounded, that Angola could move forward and build a lasting peace, but as can be 
seen from these statements there was a sense that all was not well in Angola at the 
time. 
2.2. Role of the media. 
A particular concern of the churches in the build up to the 1992 elections, was the 
content and tone of the media, particularly state controlled media and UNITA's 
Vorgan. With the exception of LAC, which began broadcasting a few days before 
voting, private media institutions did not exist in Angola prior to elections. 
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On numerous occasions the churches called for the modification of language used in 
the media. Both sides continued to broadcast propaganda against each other beyond the 
signing of the Bicesse Accords, which led CEAST (1991: 265) to request that the 
media also observe the Bicesse Accords! The churches were conscious of the power of 
the media in relation to opinion formation, but also as a power to foster peace and 
reconciliation. 13 AEA (1991) expressed concern at the "language of intolerance in the 
mass media: instead of educating citizens about harmony, it feeds the tension and 
hatred which still exists". " For CEAST (1992: 272): 
"The provocative language that the two major parties continue to use in the 
media does not convince listeners they are seeking peace. Once more we appeal 
to those responsible for information to eliminate all aggressive and provocative 
content from their communication. Seek the unity of the people, not their 
division". "' 
In June CEAST (1992: 281) again requested moderation this time ominously stating, "it 
was exactly similar language to this that was heard before war broke out in 1975". x"' 
Though the government and UNITA were on cease-fire, their media institutions 
remained on a 'war-footing. 
2.3. Military issues. 
It is also relevant to examine military issues, given that Angola returned to war soon 
after the elections. I am specifically concerned with reflection on demobilisation, 
reintegration of former military personnel, and references to rearmament. CICA 
(1992b) clearly linked demilitarisation and democratisation, stating: 
"The destiny of this country and its people depends on the success of the 
present democratisation process, where the corner stone is military 
demobilisation, the formation of a single army, and the holding of free and fair 
elections". ""' 
How well was this process going? 
In October 1991, CEAST (1991: 269) raised concerns about demobilised troops still in 
possession of their weapons. The extended length of time demobilised troops were 
staying in the quartering areas led to increased insecurity for nearby local populations, 
sentiments we also hear echoed elsewhere in the wake of Jonas Savimbi's death. 
14 The 
formation of a single national army remained problematic, resolved only two days 
13 Barnett (1998: 553) highlights a further crucial role exercised by the media in Africa in terms of 
"extending processes of democratic participation". 
14 International Crisis Group (2003). 
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before elections through an official declaration that demobilisation had occurred 
(Anstee 1996: 67). When war broke out in late October 1992, CEAST (1992: 293) 
named this formal solution as a major factor in permitting a return to war. As became 
painfully obvious, UNITA. had not demobilised in compliance with the Bicesse 
Accords, but had rearmed and hidden its army in the bush away from international 
observers. 
The reluctance of local populations to return to their villages fearing that war would 
resume, was highlighted in March 1992. Their fear, according to CEAST (1992: 273), 
was based on accusations that both sides were hiding weapons "lead[ing] one to 
believe that their owners will use them if they don't win the elections''. "" Further 
disquiet was expressed in June 1992 about information regarding the secret movement 
of military equipment (CEAST 1992: 281). No details were set out about these 
movements but CEAST asked why this was occurring if neither side was preparing to 
launch an attack? Here we see the churches voicing popular opinion regarding 
difficulties within the peace process. Local people were far from convinced that war 
was a thing of the past for UNITA, and could see that military preparations were 
ongoing while the democratic option was pursued. 
2.4. Voter education. 
Given that Angola has only once held parliamentary and presidential elections, it is 
worth exploring comment from the churches in relation to voter education. The issue is 
important because elections are due to be held again most likely in 2004 and, despite 
the fact the 92% of the 4.86 million registered voters cast their vote at the last' 
elections, between 10-12% of the votes were either spoiled votes or blank ballot 
papers, which "only confirm fled] the failure of voter education" (Maier 1996: 75). 
Clearly there are important lessons to be learned for future electoral planners. 
AEA (1992: 2) commented on the length of time democratic transitions take, and 
pointed to the need for political education among the population: - 
"Democracy does not end with a simple act of voting, sometimes-. manipulated 
or worse still bought. Democratising a country is a long and exhaustive 
process. It necessarily involves education of the population at all levels of 
national life". " 
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The extent to which voter education appeared to have been absent from the electoral 
campaign can be gauged three months prior to the elections. 
"Much is said about the democratic elections in September, but the people do 
not know what they are for. And they cannot know why, while they haven't 
been informed about electoral law, the manifestos and political programmes of 
the diverse parties. Three months from the elections it is time everything was 
published and made available to the electorate. These need to know soon who 
they should choose... and they also need to know how the parties intend to 
govern. A liking for this or that candidate is not enough, it is necessary to know 
their political ideals with regard to governing" (CEAST 1992: 283). "x" 
Six weeks before the elections the situation was not much improved: 
"The forthcoming elections will only be free if there is informed choice. And 
there will only be informed choice if the electorate know the parties 
sufficiently, their programmes and candidates, so as to compare one with the 
other, and choose between them which one seems best" (LEAST 1992: 286). "" 
The document continued: 
"the general norm for a candidate or a party to be electable is the guarantee that 
they offer us of dedicated service to the common good and respect for human 
rights" """, ' 
Based on these comments from the churches, it is quite clear that voter education was 
not given the priority it required, and with approximately half a million blank or 
spoiled votes the issue is one that will need much greater effort and commitment the 
next time around. 
3. From 1992 elections to Lusaka Protocol. 
After the September 1992 elections, Angola was thrown once again into the chaos of 
war. The alarming extent to which UNITA had not demilitarised in accordance with 
the Bicesse Accords became shockingly evident as it quickly took control of an 
estimated seventy percent of the country (Rothchild 1997: 135). In the context of this 
new and bloody conflict, I examine four aspects of the churches' discourse during the 
period, looking at: encouragement to accept democratic processes; the devastation 
caused by war; underlying factors in the new conflict; and the media. I rely 
substantially on documents from CEAST, as few AEA or CICA documents exist for 
the immediate post-election period. 
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3.1. Acceptance of democratic processes. 
Initial disquiet after the elections centred on accusations of fraud that were not upheld 
by the international community, which declared the elections free and fair (c. f. Anstee 
1996: 235-236). The first accusations of fraud were made by a number of the new 
political parties, and later by UNITA. ' 5 With Angola on the brink of war in 1992, 
CEAST encouraged the pursuit of legal mechanisms to resolve these fraud allegations. 
It reminded the parties that a second round of the presidential elections was still 
required as no candidate had achieved the required fifty-percent to guarantee election 
in the first ballot. It advocated a return to the spirit and the letter of the Bicesse 
Accords to overcome the political crisis and safeguard the "miracle of peace" (CEAST 
1992: 292). Peace was too valuable a prize to let slip and democratic processes should 
be accepted. These appeals were to no avail. 
According to AEA (1994) and CICA (1992c) the only way out of the conflict was 
through dialogue, tolerance and forgiveness. Dialogue did take place at a number of 
locations. The first meeting was at Narnibe, a southern Angolan coastal town, where 
hopes were high that a cease-fire could be secured (CEAST 1992: 198). Failure resulted 
in talks being moved to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, where CEAST (1993: 303) 
asked the parties to "negotiate with their eyes fixed, not on their own Party interests, 
but the suffering of the people". "" Still without a cease-fire, the talks were transferred 
to Abidjan in the Ivory Coast but without success. The Abidjan failure saw the 
departure of Margaret Anstee as UN Special Representative, and marked the end of 
peace negotiations until the process was resumed in Lusaka under the new Special 
Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye. 
The desperation and anger of the churches at the failure of the Abidjan talks was 
palpable. CEAST (1993: 311) wrote: 
"Abidjan was a hope that turned to despair. The alleged reasons for its failure, 
even with the best will in the world, do not make sense to us. ... 
We had hoped 
that serious political will would inspire the imagination of the negotiators to 
find a solution to the impasse. But it did not happen. And the people continue 
condemned to death with hunger, exile, and all sorts of torment inflicted on 
them by the war". " 
15 This point is not strongly made in the literature. In an interview with Paulino Pinto Joäo, (party leader 
of CNDA, and leader of POC, a coalition of fourteen political parties) he stated that the 
first accusation 
of fraud was made by the FNLA on October 2,1992. On October 5, he was spokesperson 
for a group of 
political parties, also claiming fraud, including UNITA. Finally, on October 12, UNITA generals 
suspended their participation in FAA. Interview, Luanda, November 17 2001. 
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This focus on the effect of the war on local populations has consistently been a key 
element in the churches discourse throughout the years of conflict, critical of both 
sides inability to protect the lives of those for whom they claimed to be fighting. 
3.2. The devastation caused by war. 
The first few weeks of conflict were of an unprecedented nature in Angolan history 
and saw thousands of people killed across the country, and much destruction to 
national infrastructure (CEAST 1993: 301). The majority of those killed in Luanda 
were Ovimbundu, suspected of being UNITA sympathisers. A second wave of 
violence swept Luanda in February 1993 directed against the Bakongo people from 
northern Angola, many of whom had previously lived in the DRC (CEAST 1993: 301). 
The attacks were triggered by rumours that the DRC was involved in the war on the 
side of UNITA, which brought suspicion to bear on Bakongo people living in 
Luanda. 16 
By 1993 CEAST (1993: 3 02) described the war as 
"a systematic violation of the most sacred human rights. Weapons of long 
range with great destructive power, both aerial and terrestrial, indiscriminately 
devastate our towns and cities, without even sparing sacred places. Churches, 
hospitals, creches and other congeneric places, have always constituted sacred 
zones, which even so called uncivilised people respect during war. ... 
[T]o 
achieve its ends war has little regard for the means adopted", '° 
Great concern was expressed about the relentless bombing of cities. Mention was made 
of Bie, Malanje and Menongue, bombed for many months by UNITA troops, and of 
Huambo, bombed by government air force jets (CEAST 1993: 312). All appeals for a 
cease-fire or a truce failed and at no stage did the Angolan government or UNITA 
open humanitarian corridors to permit assistance to populations under siege. As a 
result international humanitarian organisations were forced to stand by until the 
fighting ended. This new war made little or no attempt to distinguish between military 
and civilian personnel. 
The churches public discourse reveals great frustration at not being able to impact on 
the direction of the war or bring it to an end. The conflict took hold despite the logic of 
16 This wave of violence, referred to by many people as Bloody Thursday', was quickly brought under 
control. Many Bakongo keep this day as an unofficial day of mourning because of the nature of the 
attacks perpetrated against their kinsfolk. 
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argument presented with appeals for renewed negotiation or dialogue. The discourse 
however reveals a strong humanitarian concern for the civilian population subjected to 
such appalling suffering. In terms of public sphere discourse there is a strong 
emotional content to what the churches said. It is discourse that can be characterised as 
`crying' and `shouting', rather different to the formal discursive arena Habermas 
suggests in his public sphere (Curran 1991: 41). There is a tremendous urgency about 
what the churches are communicating, as they sought to challenge the logic of war 
with their religious-humanitarian rationality. 
3.3. Underlying factors in the conflict. 
In examining what the churches identified as underlying factors in the new conflict, it 
is noticeable how the churches, especially CEAST, refrain from apportioning blame in 
the conflict. This is somewhat surprising given that the international community was 
unambiguous in seeing UNITA's rejection of the election results as the reason for the 
war (chapter one, section 4.1). In so far as I have been able to establish, at no point in 
the church based documentation is UNITA referred to as the reason for the resumption 
of war. CEAST believed that to take sides in the war would not have been conducive 
to the overall goal of national reconciliation, nor have facilitated the church's role in 
that process. CEAST (1993: 304-305) explains its position: 
"For those hoping to see in the pastoral documents of CEAST condemnation of 
whoever is to blame in the actual conflict, it beholds us to state that to exercise 
our ministry of reconciliation, this is not the best way. ... 
However, we cannot 
refrain from condemning unjust situations by drawing attention to them in a 
way that people can examine their consciences, recognise the responsibility that 
". '° " belongs to them and take measures to end [these situations] 
While apportioning no individual blame, CEAST points to injustices existing within 
warfare. 
The CEAST position raises the question of whether in fact it considered UNITA to 
have been responsible for the resumption of hostilities, but refused to say so? CEAST 
was in a difficult position on this issue as to have taken sides in the war, could have 
placed many of its personnel in danger who worked in areas controlled by the 
government and UNITA. The CEAST documents however, suggest that whatever the 
trigger factor in the war, it was quickly overtaken by other factors which then became 
the real issue. An examination of CEAST references to tribalism and political 
manipulation clarifies this point. 
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Firstly, a few weeks into the conflict in November 1992, CEAST spoke of tribal 
rivalry and hatred as the motivation behind much of the killing. A prominent CEAST 
figure stated in an interview that the war had briefly taken on tribal overtones after 
hostilities began. '? Most seriously, CEAST (1992: 297) commented that tribal rivalry 
had been "ignited" in order "to reap political dividends". It took the view that the wave 
of tribal killing had been politically orchestrated: 
"If the Angolan people were not manipulated, they would live together 
fraternally without turning ethnic differences into an obstacle to peace. Some 
years ago the city of Luanda used have hundreds of thousands of citizens from 
other ethnic groups, mostly Mbundu [Ambundu] and Kikongo and there were 
no reports of tribal difficulties between them, nor with the local ethnic group. 
The same can be said of other locations in the country. For this reason, the 
responsibility for the recent political-tribal events goes beyond the level of the 
ordinary people" (CEAST 1992: 299). """" 
Secondly, twelve months later CEAST again addressed this theme of political 
manipulation of tribal sensibilities: 
"If in recent times things have happened that can have tribal connotations, this 
is due to the manipulation of leaders, who for their own interests, exploited 
dominant political rivalries in certain ethnic sectors. For this reason therefore, it 
is to the political leaders above all, that we address our appeal that they show 
human maturity in accepting their brothers and sisters from whatever ethnicity, 
in a generous spirit of national reconciliation, without any form of exclusion, 
without regarding them as possible political rivals" (CEAST 1993: 320). '° 
These are serious accusations that CEAST levels at the feet of the political leaders, 
accusing them of having instrumentalised ethnic tensions for political gain. CEAST is 
making the point that `ordinary' people had learned to live peacefully together, but the 
political leadership had not. These failures of political leadership were a crucial and 
deadly dynamic in the conflict. Schubert's (2000: 123) comment on the understanding 
of political power within the Angolan nationalist parties is most relevant: 
"The government just as much as the rebels were only able to conceive of 
political power as a monopoly, combatting one another with a determination 
ever more exaggerated". 
While Schubert was referring to Angola in 1975, CEAST was making a similar point 
in 1993. 
17 Interview in Luanda, November 7,2001. 
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3.4. Media. 
The critical stance adopted by the churches vis-ä-vis the Angolan media continued 
throughout this period, becoming more pronounced. The severest criticism came in late 
1992 when CEAST expressed the view that the state media had played a key role in 
setting Angola on the road to war again. 
"The most decisive instrument in mobilising feeling for peace or war is the 
mass media - newspaper, radio and television. We have absolutely no doubt 
about the devastating influence the media has exercised in relation to recent 
events. We therefore repeat our appeal to those responsible for the media on 
both sides, to use information to unite Angolans, and not divide. .... The 
substance and the shape, even the tone with which communication is 
transmitted, the editorials and daily news, can be as much an invitation to 
reconciliation and peace as a stimulus for hatred and war. End this ... 
communication which sees only good in your own party, and only evil in the 
other" (CEAST 1992: 300) (emphasis added). "' 
Clearly CEAST regarded the state and UNITA media as an instrument of war in the 
hands of the Angolan government and UNITA and called for an end to the 
demonisation of the opposing side. CEAST linked the frenzy of killing at the outbreak 
of war with the nature of media broadcasting during the same period. The media was a 
key instrument in achieving political manipulation. CEAST hoped to eventually 
counteract this through the relaunch of its own station Radio Ecclesia (only achieved 
in 1997), which had been closed since 1977. In this analysis from CEAST we hear 
echoes of how radio was used in Rwanda to organise the genocide of 1994 (McNulty 
1999). 
4. From the Lusaka Protocol to the 1998 war. 
After a year of negotiations in Lusaka, Angola's second international peace agreement 
was finally signed on November 20,1994. The Lusaka Protocol ushered in a four-year 
period of relative peace, Angola's longest period without war in the post-independence 
era, a period described as one of "armed peace" by Messiant (2000: 2), and of "neither 
peace not war" by Munslow (1996: 187). The implementation of the Protocol was slow 
with many missed deadlines, though it did witness the inauguration on April 9 1997, of 
GURK (Governo da Unidade e Reconciliagdo Nacional), the government of unity and 
national reconciliation. '8 The period was to end with Angola once more at war. In this 
section I outline the churches' peace engagement in the following areas; the need 
for 
18 Angola Peace Monitor Vol. 3, No. 8, April 25,1997. 
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concrete action to consolidate peace; democratisation; building a culture of peace; 
(re)defining the conflict; and the media. 
4.1. Peace requires concrete action. 
Within the churches there was a sense of relief that a new peace agreement had been 
signed. However, the bitter experience of the Bicesse failure and the subsequent 
devastation caused by two years of war, meant that more than ever, the signing of a 
peace deal was but one component in a wider peace building task. The churches had 
learned to be suspicious of promises that could prove hollow and challenged the peace 
signatories to consolidate the agreement through concrete action. The history of 1992 
had shown that a highly publicised peace ceremony and lengthy verbal assurances 
counted for little, while rearmament was secretly occurring 
By March 1995, four months after the Lusaka Protocol signing, there was already 
public unease that the agreement was in trouble, as war preparations were once again 
in progress. CEAST (1995: 343) expressed its profound apprehension at the 
importation of weapons, and the recruitment of individuals below the minimum age for 
military service. It called on the international community to act immediately and 
deploy the promised UN blue helmets as a matter of urgency. In August 1995, AEA 
and CICA (known collectively as EDICA) issued a press statement which outlined 
fresh concerns in the peace process, highlighting the laying of new landmines, 
emphasising that the quartering of troops was not underway, and that military 
confrontation was still continuing (EDICA 1995a). The statement also expressed 
criticism of the slow arrival of UN `blue helmet' peace keepers nine months after the 
Lusaka signing. All of this provided evidence that the Protocol was in difficulty and 
that much needed to be done to bolster the peace agreement. 
4.2. Democratisation. 
In 1995, AEA and CICA announced a first ever ERICA conference called 'It's Time to 
Construct'. 19 The published conference documents provide important insights into the 
Protestant churches' thinking regarding the democratisation process during this post- 
Lusaka period. A conference paper by the CICA secretary-general, Augusto Chipesse 
19 E Tempo para Ed fcar, Luanda, September 6-10,1995, with 350 participants. Edificar can also be 
translated as to build, to edify, to enlighten, to instruct. 
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(1995: 19), affirmed democracy as the only means for achieving lasting peace in 
Angola, which in turn would foster "development and a just distribution of the wealth 
of the country". He also argued: 
"It is within parliamentary democracy that ethnic problems, created generally by colonialism in Africa and Angola in particular, are and should be debated 
and resolved, because by any other means war will continue to enrich the 
weapons manufacturers, and producers of emergency food rations, of the 
already wealthy nations" (Chipesse 1995: 9-10). """' 
International weapons manufacturers and food producers were seen as benefitting from 
the Angola war. 
Despite the failure of elections, democracy was still understood as the best political 
framework within which to work for peace. However, the thinking had developed in 
the direction of seeing parliamentary democracy as the means to guarantee 
development and an equitable distribution of the nation's wealth, as the ideal forum for 
the resolution of Angola's problems, ethnic and otherwise. The seventy UNITA 
parliamentarians elected in 1992 had still not taken up their seats in the parliament. 
They would do so later, but at the time of Chipesse's comment, the parliament 
consisted of the MPLA deputies and a handful of opposition parties. 
Emilio de Carvalho, bishop of the United Methodist Church of Angola (who had 
signed the 1975 ecumenical document referred to earlier), argued in his presentation 
for a new approach to politics within the churches. On the lack of Christian leaders 
within politics, he commented: 
"We have a dilemma: as politics progressively becomes the most decisive 
power in our society, ... we are the 
less able to act within it as Protestants and 
Christians. And what's happening? Cruel forces are taking control of our 
political institutions and our view of these institutions as contrary to `Christian 
principles' ... means we 
do not participate in them. As a consequence of our 
attitude, Christianity in Angola will not exert any significant or positive 
influence in our future society" (de Carvalho 1995: 2). ""? "' 
A new theology of engagement was being called for within the churches, which 
considered politics as an arena of Christian activity. Those who wanted to enter 
politics as part of their Christian commitment were encouraged by Bishop de Carvalho 
to do so. Given the theoretical distinction between the public sphere and the state, this 
represented a call for individuals to move from the public sphere into the political 
arena. 
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The EDICA conference also provided evidence that the Protestant churches had begun 
to review their former political affiliations. As mentioned earlier, the main nationalist 
parties had strong links with the principal Protestant churches, but by 1994 AEA was 
expressing regret for "failing to have been non-party political" (AEA 1994: 0. """"' This 
expression denotes a shift away from party-based support for particular political 
parties, to a concern for the wider health of the Angolan political system. The 
resolutions of the conference illustrate this shift, four of which address political issues 
faced by the churches. 20 Firstly, church members were encouraged to engage positively 
in politics to build a harmonious society, to promote justice and true peace, echoing the 
sentiments of Bishop de Carvalho above. Secondly, Christian leaders were encouraged 
not to establish political parties, a resolution probably connected with the proliferation 
of political parties occurring in Angola. Thirdly, Christian leaders were to refrain from 
making party-political statements which compromised their churches, but should use 
their influence to educate the people. Fourthly, the churches were not to identify with 
any particular political party, but were to transcend party politics. These resolutions 
capture the extent to which the major Protestant churches were redefining their public 
role in Angola and realigning themselves within Angolan society. At a church policy 
level, the resolutions reflected a desire to be politically relevant without being party- 
political. It was interesting how at a time when the churches were encouraging 
members to pursue a career in politics, to leave the public sphere in Habermasian 
terms, the churches themselves were seeking to take up a position more clearly within 
the public sphere by redefining their public role. This was a process CEAST 
underwent in the early post-independent years (Schubert 2000: 127-130). 
4.3. Building a `culture of peace'. 
It is relevant here to introduce the concept of a `culture of peace', before examining 
it 
more fully in chapter six, in the context of local communities. The churches 
began to 
speak of a culture of peace in the post-Lusaka period to suggest that working 
for peace 
was the challenge of every Angolan, illustrated in expressions such as 
"tolerance is the 
face of peace" (CAST 1995: 338), and "peace building is the work of all" (LEAST 
1997: 374). A statement made by Ntoni-Nzinga (1995: 7-8), later secretary-general of 
the churches ecumenical peace commission COIEPA, regarding the prevalence of a 
culture of violence in Angola and the politics of exclusion, 
is important to highlight: 
20 The relevant EDICA (1995) resolutions are 3a, 3c, 3d, and 
3f. 
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"In the past eighteen years many lives have been cut down by people wanting 
to increase their sphere of influence, wishing to declare themselves kings of Angola. Each one uses the political pronouncements of the other to justify their 
use of a culture of violence. Today as a result, only those who carry weapons 
and kill ... are seen as wise in Angolan society. Whoever refuses to use firepower is viewed as stupid and refused the right of participation in decision- 
making affecting his/her life. ... This expression of a culture of violence. which 
maintains the political agenda inherited from colonialism is regrettable, and has 
never served the true interests of this nation". " 
The promotion of a peace culture by the churches was conceived of as a means to 
address the culture of violence that Ntoni-Nzinga argued had taken root in political 
life. An interesting suggestion made in the same presentation was for the establishment 
of an Institute of Peace and Development. Though the nature of this institute was not 
spelled out, the creation of COIEPA four years later can possibly be connected with 
the need identified here, for a wider structure to specifically address the peace agenda 
in Angola. 
4.4. (Re)defining the conflict. 
As early as November 1992 CEAST revealed a fundamental shift in understanding the 
Angolan conflict when it stated: 
"the fighting of a new civil war will be against whom? Of UNITA against the 
MPLA, and of the MPLA against UNITA? None of these. It will be both sides 
against the people. ... 
In a civil war it is always two armies fighting against the 
people and the Nation" (CEAST 1992: 298). "v 
This analysis of a war against the people formed the basis upon which CEAST, in 
1996, defined the war as genocide. The relevant text emerged after the Lusaka 
Protocol: 
"... our past must be a lesson for the future. Therefore, what has our past been 
in terms of the war? A cruel genocide which wiped out hundreds of thousands 
of innocent people. A hell of destruction that has sent our country from the 
vanguard of most advanced African countries, to the bottom of the most needy 
people of our continent" (CEAST 1996: 363). ""v' 
CEAST was the only church to apply the term genocide to the Angola war. 
21 Because 
of the seriousness of the charge, I will explore the use of the term and ask whether the 
designation is appropriate. The term is emotive, and its use just two years after the 
Rwanda genocide suggests that certain parallels were being drawn. The application of 
the term in peacetime is somewhat unusual. 
21 The genocide claim was also made by Namibia's National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) 
in a 
report on UN sanctions in Angola, Entitled 'A Critical View Of The Angola 
Sanctions Regime, An 
Appeal For Urgent Angola Dialogue', located at http: //nshr. namweb. com. na, dated April 27.2000. 
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As CEAST did not offer a definition of genocide, it is helpful to look at the definition 
agreed at the 1948 UN `Convention for the Prevention and the Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide'. Article 2 defines genocide as: 
"Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national. ethnic, 
racial or religious group". 
Destexhe (1995) highlights four constituent parts within the definition of genocide: 1) 
a criminal act; 2) with the intention of destroying; 3) an ethnic, national or religious 
group; 4) that is targeted. Any attempt to apply these constituent parts to the Angolan 
conflict raises questions in relation to `who are the perpetrators of the criminal act? T 
'What intentional criminal act was committed? ' and "what group was targetted? ' 
Attempting to apply the four elements of the definition to the Angolan context is 
problematic. Having redefined the war as `a war against the people', it is possible to 
point to the `Angolan people' as the target group, but this seems an over- 
generalisation. Attempting to locate `criminal activity' on both sides of the war is also 
complex, though less so in relation to UNITA. The suggestion of `criminality' within 
the Angolan state, carrying the implication that it was engaged in a war against its own 
people, raises serious questions about how CEAST viewed the state, and its 
understanding of the legitimate use of force by nation states. A further comment is 
significant in this regard from a CEAST 1998 document On the Danger of a Return to 
War. Events had deteriorated within the country after the death of the UN special 
representative Beye and the prospect of another war was considered as inflicting 
greater misery on the Angolan people than that caused by the slave trade in previous 
centuries. In calling for further dialogue to avert a possible war, CEAST stated: 
"Faced with the possibility of renewed warfare no one can remain indifferent 
when thinking that 15 million Angolans will be sacrificed, their lives and 
property, to the personal agendas, perhaps party agendas, of a few" (CEAST 
1998: 386). 22)0'I 
This reference to warfare as `the personal agenda of a few' is as close as LEAST 
comes to locating criminality within the state to justify the genocide claim. At no stage 
is the identity of these people explored publicly. This notion of the 
`instrumentalisation' of both the state and UNITA by `a few', is not unique to the 
churches' narrative. It also emerges within the discourse of civil society organisations, 
and will be examined further there. Does this criminalisation-instrumentalisation of 
22 The population of Angola is usually put at 12 million, though there has 
been no census since 
independence. The Human Rights Watch global report 2002 puts the population at 12,479,000. 
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military structures on both sides merit the description of genocide? It does seem 
imprecise in the context, appearing as an emotional appeal for help within a conflict 
that had become unbearable for the majority of the Angolan people. The Protestant 
churches did not use the word genocide, speaking instead of an unjust or fratricidal 
war. 
While the international literature on Angola places much emphasis on the 'control of 
resources' argument (LeBillion 2001; Malaquias 2001), the church based literature 
does not. The vital role of revenue from oil and diamonds is unquestionable in 
enabling both sides prosecute the war. CEAST referred on numerous occasions to 
Angola's wealth as a `curse', as neither side would have fought over a poor country to 
such an extent. When CEAST comments on the role of natural resources, it is within a 
wider context and includes those involved in international trade with Angola. For 
example, CEAST referred to the existence, 
"[of] groups, if not countries, interested in ruining our country even more with 
destructive weaponry sent here in exchange for diamonds and oil. To these 
people we simply ask that they not do to us what they would not want for 
themselves" (CEAST 1995: 344). """`'"' 
The comment requests countries and businesses involved in trade with Angola to 
consider what their purchase of oil and diamonds enabled the government and UNITA 
to do militarily. The resource argument is sometimes implicit within criticism of 
corruption within the country, and the disparity of wealth between rich and poor: 
"a word of condemnation against those who turn war into a lucrative business. 
To accumulate accounts in foreign banks and to get rich at the expense of the 
hunger, suffering, blood and death of your brothers and sisters is repugnant, 
which never should have a place in the heart of an Angolan, or any person" 
(CEAST 1999). """'" 
The churches however, have never argued that the war is about control over natural 
resources. Oil and diamond revenues were utilised to prosecute the military campaign 
that, in the view of the churches, was caused by the inability of political leaderships to 
reach accommodation and be reconciled. 
4.5. Media. 
During this post-Lusaka period, significant changes occurred within the 
Angolan print 
and broadcast media. Private newspaper titles such as 
Folha 8, Actual fax, Angolense, 
Agora, and Actual commenced publication, and Radio Ecclesia 
began broadcasting. 
LAC was already on air. These provided Angolans with a wider range and variety of 
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news sources. The emergence of these non-state media institutions was exciting and 
new at the time. In public sphere terms, their development was most relevant, bringing 
change to the Angolan public sphere, as a new `public' began to take shape alongside 
of the churches. This issue will be examined in the next chapter. 
Prior to the arrival of these titles however, EDICA (1995b) had called for the creation 
of a permanent church commission to work with the government and other state bodies 
"to insist on the implementation of the press laws in the country and the abolition of 
censorship". " The comments reinforce the churches' view of the state media as 
problematic within Angolan society. 
5. The Third War. 
To date this chapter has primarily focused on what the Angolan churches `said' about 
peace, and in doing so addressed earlier research questions dealing with the churches 
understanding of the causes of conflict, how the conflict was viewed, how the 
churches' believed peace could be achieved, and whether the churches' analysis 
changed over the period. The chapter has traced this narrative over approximately ten 
years, and seen the argument change in response to political and military events, as 
well as in response to the humanitarian crisis. The churches collectively and 
consistently argued that dialogue represented the best way to achieve lasting peace, 
and identified ethnic divisions as the underlying factor in the conflict. Democratisation 
was seen perhaps in an idealised way, as the surest means to consolidate peace in 
Angola, and provide the proper forum where ethnic differences could be addressed in a 
non-violent manner. Though the question of ethnicity or tribalism is referred to as a 
factor in the war, at no stage was the war described as an ethnic conflict. We have seen 
how CEAST described the conflict as a war against the people and later as genocide 
(repeated in 2000, c. f. CEAST 2000), but this interpretation was not shared by CICA 
or AEA, who adhered to the language of a `fratricidal war'. The humanitarian concerns 
of the churches were also outlined. 
23 The discourse also pointed to serious misgivings 
and reservations in relation to the role played by the state media, which stood accused 
23 The true extent of the humanitarian crisis only emerged after Savimbi's death. The international 
NGO 
MSF published a report in April 2002, stating "malnutrition witnessed by [MSF] among people 
emerging from the war zones in Angola [was] among the worst seen in Africa 
in the past decade". 
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of having whipped up ethnic hatred at sensitive times. It was also argued that the war 
was the personal agenda of a few on both sides. 
While this discourse is important, the other crucial research questions in relation to 
what the Angolan churches `did' also need to be addressed. In this section I focus 
specifically on the activities and initiatives promoted by the churches in favour of 
peace. This involves looking at the way in which the churches worked together and 
deals with spatial dimensions in relation to the discourse of the churches. The return to 
war in 1998 reveals a new determination within the churches to work for peace, and a 
change in strategy manifest in new concrete peace initiatives. I divide this section into 
three, looking firstly at the work of COIEPA, the ecumenical peace commission; 
secondly, the Luanda Peace Congress of July 2000; and finally, mediation initiatives. 
5.1. Formation of COIEPA. 
The coming together in 1999 of AEA, CEAST and CICA to form COIEPA, was a 
significant development. 24 COIEPA was responsible for "coordinating the church 
contribution to the search for peace" and described itself as the product of a new 
ecumenical vision in Angola (COIEPA 2001). It hoped that the churches could 
participate more actively in the search for just and sustainable solutions to the 
problems underlying the national conflict. As far back as 1992, CICA (1992a) 
recognised that ecumenical relations were unsatisfactory, and that Angola's peace and 
reconciliation depended in many ways on a strong ecumenical base in order to unite 
the nation. The suggestion here is quite clear: that peace between Angola's political 
parties depended on the ability of the churches to work together, depended on' peace' 
between the churches. In a similar vein, Messiant argues that the failure to secure 
peace in Angola is also a failure of the Christian churches, arguing that traditional 
rivalries and disunity between the churches impacted negatively on the search for 
peace and reconciliation: 
... within the 
failure to secure peace, one cannot but equally see a failure of 
the Christian churches, to the extent that, uniting about 90% of Angolans, they 
were the largest civil force in 1991 and the only possible national moral 
authority. Failure, firstly, in that they could not avoid a return to arms ... 
And 
also perhaps, a failure in its message of peace and reconciliation" (Messiant 
2000: 1). XII 
24 A provisional working group was formed on 19 October 1999 for six months, and 
COIEPA was 
founded on 15 April 2000 (COIEPA 2001). 
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The linkage suggested by Messiant raises important issues, though she overestimates 
the membership and authority of the Angolan churches in 1991.2' 
A number of reasons are suggested as to why the churches failed to unite for peace. 
Schubert (2000: 202-205) highlights the option of the Methodist church to uncritically 
support the MPLA government after independence, in effect becoming the state church 
and remaining silent. Heywood (2002: 182) points to the strength and dominance of 
CEAST as a problem, because, as "the only national organisation with the prestige and 
power to challenge the state on behalf of the suffering Angolan people, [it] failed to 
find common alliance with the weaker and more marginalised Protestant and 
independence groups". Elsewhere, Schubert (2000: 219) suggests that CEAST was 
content to go it alone rather than pursue an ecumenical approach. Interviews with 
church personnel and other individuals familiar with the Angolan churches during this 
period, also identified `leadership' as an issue in the failure to unite for peace, 
commenting on an inability of prominent church leaders to compromise or cultivate a 
common approach. 26 The official launch of COIEPA in April 2000 after some 
significant leadership changes had occurred, appears to justify this opinion. 
Messiant (2000: 9) locates the churches failure in relation to peace specifically in the 
absence of a common ecumenical peace vision. Without a joint approach, she argues 
that the churches could not have an effective role in advocating peace: 
"Given the strength of Christianity in this country, and the lack of autonomy 
and resources to which `civil society' has been reduced by the war and 
dictatorial forces, I believe there could not be a successful Angolan 
intervention in favour of peace, which would be the work of one denomination, 
no matter how strong and respected it may be""" (Messiant 2000: 9). 
That the creation of COIEPA as an ecumenical forum had taken so many years, is a 
criticism and a reflection of the churches inability to work together. 
Particularly within the international community COIEPA, achieved prominence and 
became the vehicle of communication at an international level for the Angolan 
churches, and indeed for many within civil society. Ironically within Angola, COIEPA 
25 Different figures are given for the number of Christians in Angola. Hearn (1997: 201) gives a figure of 
69%. Henderson (1991: 8) suggests 50% Catholic and 20% Protestant, but mentions that membership 
is 
counted differently. Catholic numbers include children who are baptised, with 
Protestant figures 
stressing adult membership. Consequently the figure of 50% for Catholics could 
be revised downwards. 
26 Observation made by Angolan missionaries, Luanda, July 27.2000. 
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remained relatively unknown. 27 Nationally individual churches preferred to use their 
own names and structures when communicating on peace, as they were better known 
than COIEPA. The 2001 award of the European Union's Zakarov human rights prize 
to bishop Zacarias Kamwenho, president of COIEPA and CEAST, did much to raise 
COIEPA's profile at home, and recognise much good work already done at the level of 
international advocacy. The award served to focus attention generally- on the growing 
peace movement within Angola. Kamwenho himself spoke of the award as a 
recognition of all Angolans working for peace. 28 
The guiding principle within COIEPA was that dialogue represented the best way to 
achieve peace and reconciliation. The basis for dialogue was the Lusaka Protocol, 
which COIEPA considered 
"a forum of approximation, where the most delicate issues and representatives 
of all interested sectors of the nation, would be brought to the negotiating table. 
so as to avoid possible political pretexts for a return to war" 29"'"' 
The principle of `dialogue', appearing to suggest renegotiation of the Lusaka Protocol, 
brought COIEPA into conflict with the Angolan government, which ruled out such a 
possibility. For government, the time for dialogue was over, full implementation of the 
Lusaka Protocol was required. For the churches however, much had changed in 
Angola that needed incorporation within the peace process since the signing of the 
Protocol. The general secretary of CICA, Luis Nguimbi summarises the churches' 
argument: 
"Lusaka continues to be valid because there is no other document to substitute 
it. But Lusaka cannot be the bible for the country. It is a solid basis, but it 
belongs to seven years ago. The country has not stopped, politics has not stood 
still. The country has developed and this must be included". 
30xliv 
In Angolan public sphere terms, COIEPA represented an important institutional 
development. Its call for dialogue on the Angolan conflict resonates with Habermas's 
notion of the public sphere as a discursive arena, a place for rational critical debate on 
issues of concern. As an institutional mechanism it promoted cohesion between the 
churches and provided a focal point for many civil society organisations working 
for 
peace. In fact, COIEPA `institutionalised' this focal point further when it 
founded a 
27 It was quite striking during fieldwork how few people knew of COIEPA and 
its function. 
28 Zacarias Kamwenho, Catholic University of Angola, November 16,2001, 
29 CICA (2001b), newsletter (91-93), June 15 2001. 
30 Interview with Rev. Luis Nguimbi, Secretary Geral of CICA, Luanda, November 
21 2001. 
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peace network in November 2001 called Rede da Paz, (Peace Network) which brought 
together other churches, civic organisations, NGOs, and traditional authority figures, 
all sharing the objective of `peace through dialogue'. It is for this reason that I refer to 
the peace narrative of the churches as a `defining discourse' in the chapter title. to 
capture the sense in which many organisations defined their positions on peace within 
the space created by the churches, and in relation to what the churches said. 
5.2. Pro Pace Congress 2000. 
The hosting of a peace congress in July 2000, under the auspices of CEAST's peace 
movement Movimento Pro Pace, was an event of much significance. It brought 
together representatives from the Angolan government, from political and 
parliamentary parties, from twenty two churches, NGO and civil society organisations, 
as well as foreign ambassadors. 31 A detailed analysis of the content of the Congress is 
likely to miss what it achieved in terms of creating space for political, civil and 
religious actors to discuss peace collectively. It is possible however, to summarise the 
main points of the Congress by reference to a number of the 10 conclusions presented 
on the final day (CEAST 2001 c). For example, the Congress called for: a greater spirit 
of democracy (No. 1), greater tolerance (No. 2), human rights education as part of 
school curriculum (No 6), and action against landmines (No. 7). It also called for a 
cease-fire (No. 8) as a "first step towards peace" and the establishment of some form of 
permanent dialogue to include "the most representative levels of civil society, such as 
the churches, political parties and other institutions" (No. 9). 32xiv Clearly the form of 
`dialogue' envisioned by the churches, frequently referred to as `inclusive dialogue', 
includes public sphere and non-public sphere actors. 
The space for open debate on peace has always been contested in Angola and it is 
above all in relation to this public sphere dimension that I propose to assess the 
importance of the four day Congress, where an important contribution was made. It is 
possible to gauge some aspects of this contestation from comment in the state media, 
where I confine my remarks to the national newspaper Jornal de Angola. For example, 
an editorial entitled The Road to Peace' on the first day of the congress, July 18 2000, 
adopted a confrontational stance against "those who wanted peace at any price". It 
3° From the final document of the Congress, Luanda, July 21,2001. 
1 note here that civil society generally does not include political parties 
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reaffirmed the Angolan government's position that peace depended on the 
implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, or the acceptance of a pardon offered to Jonas 
Savimbi. The editorial presented the government's military campaign as a defense of 
democracy and of sovereignty: 
"In the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, it fell to the Angolan 
government to take the difficult decision, to reduce and dismantle the war 
machinery of Jonas Savimbi. The government had no other choice: either it 
made war, or it passively watched the ruin of the nation. If today, sectors of 
civil society come together in relation to a peace movement, it is because the 
campaign of the Angolan Armed Forces has positively changed the balance of 
power militarily. ... 
It never ceases to cause amazement why pressure for peace 
is not applied in the direction of UNITA's armed wing. ... It 
is strange how 
those who want peace at any price, pretend not to know that a peace agreement 
already exists. ... 
[It was] to guarantee freedom and democracy - that the decision was taken to disarm the illegal forces threatening the country". `° 
An article on July 19 criticised CEAST for treating both sides in the war as 
`belligerents' and for not pointing the finger of blame at Jonas Savimbi as the sole 
reason for the continuance of the war. The editorial of July 20 categorically declared: 
"the military wing of UNITA does not walk the way of peace". A column on July 21 
accused "apologists in favour of dialogue of placing the aggressor and the victim on an 
equal footing, and of ignoring the 1992 elections", "I"'" all of which read as propaganda 
against the Congress, and the impossibility of dialogue with UNITA. 33 
The sense that the Congress had expanded the public sphere is referred to by one 
commentator: 
"it opened debate on ways to achieve peace, and helped society lose its fear of 
publicly discussing alternatives in order to leave behind the intrigue of 
war' 5.34X7vi 
ii 
Bishop Mata Mourisca, president of Movimento Pro Pace, summarised the principal 
benefits of the Congress as "breaking the taboo of silence regarding the road to 
peace", 35 and challenging the principle that the third war would ultimately bring peace 
to Angola. As far back as 1994 a message of `encouragement' from a group of 
Protestant churches to those involved in the Lusaka negotiations, stated that the war 
had "no military solution' . 
35`"X CEAST (1997: 370) made the same claim in 1997, that 
33 Prominence was also given throughout the week to UNITA's campaign of terror and killing. 
34 Espiritanos (2002). 
35 Espiritanos (2002). 
36 The text is signed by Octavio Fernando of AEA, and Augusto Chipesse of CICA, referenced as 
(AEAA-CICA 1994). Similar comments were appearing in the international literature at the time, that the 
war had no military solution, c. f. Minter (1994). 
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"this long war of thirty five years has left it abundantly clear. that the Angolan 
question does not have a military solution". ' Broadcasting the debates live on Radio 
Ecclesia throughout the four days ensured that the themes covered reached a wide 
audience in the Luanda area. An edited version went out on short wave each morning 
and evening. As a result the Congress challenged the boundaries of the public sphere, 
and expanded the space for open debate on peace. Having personally participated in 
the Congress and found the various presentations relevant and interesting during the 
four days, it is probable that the longer term significance of the Congress will be its 
public sphere contestation dimension, rather than the content, a point I return to in 
chapter eight. 
A number of issues around the question of church discourse within the public sphere 
are worth exploring in terms of the `mechanics' of communication. Modem 
communication methods have grasped the centrality of `packaging' in user friendly 
ways the message one seeks to communicate. This is something the churches were 
particularly weak at over this research period. CEAST has considerably improved its 
`pastoral letter' form of communication, 37 and all churches are learning to access the 
various print and broadcast media, particularly Radio Ecclesia. Peace communication 
from the churches however, needed to be effective in a multi-lingual environment 
which has implications `upwards' and `downwards'. `Upwards' in the sense that 
Portuguese is not an official working language of the UN (it is in UNESCO), which 
means that any national government or diplomat attempting to pay close attention to 
public church discourse must either understand Portuguese or arrange a translation. In 
other words, the churches did little to get their message into the international forum, 
which a simple translation facility would have facilitated. By `downwards', I make the 
same point in relation to Angola's many national languages. Though Portuguese is 
widely spoken, there is a significant percentage of Angolans, perhaps a majority, who 
are not conversant in Portuguese, for whom the discourse of the churches must be 
translated in situ by local missionaries, placing an extra burden on them. A small 
investment in personnel at the level of translation facilites could have impacted 
positively on the public discourse of the churches nationally and internationally. 
37 The change of style in CEAST's pastoral letters is quite noticeable over the period 1975-2002. Some 
of the earlier documents are strongly doctrinal running to seventeen pages (1984,1988), but the latter 
tend to be shorter (4-6 pages) prepared for public reading in churches. 
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5.3. Mediation initiatives. 
At different stages in the Angolan conflict offers were made by various churches to 
mediate. The earliest such offer in the literature is from CEAST (1986: 1-1) in 
February 1986, which fell on deaf ears. In 2000 COIEPA put forward a considered 
proposal, suggesting a panel of twelve members to explore possible avenues towards 
peace between the two sides. This was rejected by the government. 38 Again in 2001, 
church-based mediation was on the agenda, this time in response to Jonas Savimbi's 
May 2001 letter to CEAST, where he expressed support for the churches' peace 
initiatives, though he did not request church mediation. The letter states: 
"I write ... about the great challenge for peace (through dialogue). I also write 
to actively encourage you to participate in this difficult task which the present 
moment bestows on us. ... 
We would like to see COIEPA and Pro Pace 
initiatives move forward. We believe they have an historical and relevant role 
to offer the Angolan people, providing incentives for reconciliation" (Savimbi 
2001). 1' 
It took some time to establish the authenticity of the letter, but when CEAST replied in 
August it came as a joint response from the Catholic bishops of Southern Africa, who 
had met in Harare. The document reads: 
"In the name of Christ and of the suffering Angolan people, we ask the 
Angolan president and leader of UNITA to meet in a neutral place with the 
view to dialogue on the ending of war and the future of the nation. The Church 
gladly offers its help in finding a convenient location, as well as competent and 
acceptable facilitation for such dialogue""" (CEAST 2001 a). 
This offer to find acceptable facilitation for dialogue was not accepted. 
CEAST was criticised in some quarters because its views reflected a return to a 
polarised understanding of the Angolan conflict, suggesting that a resolution could be 
achieved by President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi meeting together. This offer 
departed from the consensus that had been growing within civil society, that meetings 
of this sort were part of the problem, as other civil foces were excluded. In response to 
this criticism CEAST (2001b) revised and restated its position later in 2001: 
"... however we believe that it shouldn't only be the government and UNITA 
sitting at the negotiating table, but also representatives from other political 
parties and civil society"-"" 
38 `Government rejects church offer to mediate peace talks' http: //www, reliefweb/int, August 
11.2000. 
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By the end of 2001, there were clear indications that both the Angolan government and 
UNITA were open to renewed mediation by the UN. Ibrahim Gambari, the UN's 
special envoy to Angola had informed the Security Council that 
"a `window of opportunity' existed to end the war and that the two parties had 
agreed to resume peace talks, on condition that certain aspects of the 1994 
Lusaka Peace Protocol could be renegotiated" (SouthScan 2002). 
The parties wanted a role for the churches and certain sectors of civil society in 
facilitating the discussions. The details regarding these discussions had yet to be 
worked out when events in eastern Angola overtook the possibility of renewed 
negotiations, and the death of Jonas Savimbi was announced on February 22.2002. It 
was clear that the churches had envisioned a role for themselves in resolving the 
conflict, but the conflict did, after all, have a military solution. 
By way of conclusion, I propose to comment on the outstanding research questions 
dealing with whether the churches worked together in pursuit of peace, and if the 
churches played a role in facilitating public debate within the public sphere. During the 
period covered in this chapter it is clear that significant approximation took place 
between the historical churches, particularly in latter years. Such recent approximation 
however, should not disguise the almost total absence of ecumenical peace initiatives 
throughout the years of conflict. While criticisms of the churches by scholars such as 
Heywood, Messiant and Schubert are well founded, it is important to distinguish 
between the power of the churches as moral authorities enjoying significant popular 
legitimacy, and the power of those at war. The executive and military power of the 
government and the military power of LTNITA, are of a different nature to the power of 
argument and advocacy adopted by the churches. The recent war in Iraq for example, 
illustrates how war can be prosecuted even when many political and religious leaders, 
international organisations and agencies, and international public opinion are opposed. 
The power and influence enjoyed by the Angolan churches should not be 
overestimated. 
The churches clearly saw a role for themselves in resolving the conflict, evident 
throughout the public statements issued over many years, and offers to mediate. 
Whether such a role could have been accommodated at an earlier stage in the conflict 
remains an open question. Neither the MPLA not UNITA sought the 
inclusion of the 
churches when the Bicesse Accords were negotiated, nor during the 
Lusaka Protocol. 
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Had the churches been incorporated into the negotiation structures adopted by the 
Troika or the UN, their outcomes may have been different, ... 
but perhaps not. The 
churches themselves appear to have been insufficiently organised to make an 
intervention at this level. When they finally did organise collectively, they found that 
the international community was sympathetic and willing to listen, as the later stages 
of the conflict make clear. 
Finally, one of the key contributions made by the churches was at the level of creating 
space for public debate. This has particular importance for other actors such as the 
media and civil society organisations who developed in close proximity to the space 
created by the churches. Henderson (1991: 8), a respected church historian, identifies 
this as an important CEAST contribution during the years of one-party rule especially. 
"The measure in which [the Catholic bishops] raised their voices against violence, 
human rights violations, in favour of democracy, peace and reconciliation, they 
pointed the direction the nation should follow. Even in the darkest days, the 
pastorals gave hope to Angolans". 
This space was consolidated throughout the 1990s as AEA and CICA redefined their 
public roles and their political affiliations. This was important in strengthening the 
public sphere as a place of public scrutiny outside the state, a place especially 
concerned with ways to end the war and defend a people decimated by the actions of 
both armies. 
Chapter 4. 
The Angolan Private Media: Fostering `Discursive Space'. 
The Angola private media grew in importance throughout the 1990s and came to 
exercise a key role within the Angolan public sphere in the circulation of ideas and 
perspectives on the national conflict and efforts to promote peace. Prior to the 1992 
elections, the only existing private media institution was radio LAC (Luanda Antena 
Comercial) which began broadcasting a few days before voting took place. The media 
landscape of the time was dominated by state institutions, such as RNA (Angolan state 
radio), Jornal de Angola (national daily newspaper), and TPA (state television). This 
continues to be the case, but since the mid-1990s a host of private media institutions 
have emerged which offer a greater diversity of opinion and news sources. The 
importance of media institutions in a time of conflict is worth underlining at the outset, 
as they play key roles in transmitting information and in building consensus towards 
peace or can be responsible for maintaining momentum in war. The Carnegie 
Commission's report (1997: 121) Preventing Deadly Conflict identified a fundamental 
media challenge during conflict: 
"to report conflicts in ways that engender constructive public consideration of 
possibilities for avoiding violence. The media can stimulate new ideas and 
approaches to problems". 
I firstly provide a brief overview of both state and non-state institutions to give a sense 
of the public sphere within which the peace narrative of the private media developed, 
beginning with some background material on the state-run media: Jornal de Angola, 
RNA and TPA. ' All are financed by the Angolan government and dominate the arena 
within which the private media functions. The origins of the Jornal de Angola date to 
the colonial newspaper A Provincia de Angola, first published in 1923 (Coelho 
1999: 105). After independence it reopened as Jornal de Angola, and remains Angola's 
only daily newspaper. Approximately 10,000 copies are sold daily, the vast majority in 
the Luanda area. 2 
1 Castro (1964) and Coelho (1999) are important sources on early Angolan journalism. 
2 Coelho (1999: 108) gives this figure for 1997. 
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For the majority of Angolans living in the provinces, the national radio station RIVA is 
the key source of information. Many also access international broadcasters such as the 
BBC, RFI of France, Radio Renascenca of Portugal, VOA of the US, and Canal Africa 
of South Africa. 3 RNA broadcasts on FM in Luanda and nationally on short-wave. 
Many provincial capitals retransmit the national signal locally on FM through 
provincial radio stations, and engage in local broadcasting of news programmes and 
talk shows in Portuguese and national languages. The origins of RNA date to 1952, 
when Radio Angola was established in Luanda (Coelho 1999: 124). 
National state television, TPA, began broadcasting in 1972 (Coelho 1999: 144), initially 
only in Luanda. The signal has gradually been extended to many other urban centres 
where a significant percentage of the population now owns a television. Television is 
an increasingly important medium of communication in Angola, though radio remains 
the most accessible to the majority of Angolans. After the Lusaka Protocol, the UN 
was refused permission to establish its own radio station (HRW 1999: 162-167), but 
instead was allocated time on TPA for broadcasting, which it used to outline 
developments within the peace process. With regard to Dundo as a research location, 
the principal media sources for local people are from state television and radio, or 
international broadcasters. There is little access to private media institutions. 
A brief word is also appropriate here on UNITA's former media institutions, Vorgan 
and Terra Angolana. At the time of the Bicesse Accords, UNITA's radio station, 
Vorgan, broadcast on short-wave from Samba in the south eastern province of Cuando 
Cubango. UNITA intermittently published a newspaper, Terra Angolana from Lisbon, 
not readily available in Luanda. As part of the Lusaka Protocol, Vorgan was to cease 
broadcasting and be replaced by Radio Despertar, a commercial FM station. This did 
not materialise and eventually Vorgan was seized when government troops captured 
Jamba in 1999. State-run and UNITA media institutions were the principal sources of 
news and information until the emergence of the private media. These were 
frequently 
used for propaganda purposes by both sides during the conflict, which rather polarised 
debate within the public sphere. We saw in the previous chapter how the churches 
criticised the propagandist use of the media to stir up tension and 
hatred. 
3 Dundo Workshop, October 5,2001. 
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The first private print media titles emerged within this polarised arena in the mid- 
1990s. One of the earliest, Imparcial fax, ceased publication in January 1995 after the 
assassination of its editor Ricardo de Mello in unexplained circumstances. 4 Folha 8 
began on March 25 1995, and was a biweekly publication for a time, before reverting 
to a weekly edition. All of Angola's other private newspapers: Actual, Agora, 
Angolense, and 0 Independente, are weekly publications. 5 The latter title is an example 
of a private publication from the colonial era founded in 1907, but closed down after 
the attempted coup of 1977 (the coup attempt is examined later in this chapter). It 
reopened in November 1997.6 A weakness of Angola's print media is its limited reach 
outside the capital city. No distribution network exists to ensure that copies are 
delivered to Angola's provinces, thereby confining readership almost exclusively to 
Luanda. 7 The circulation figures for these private titles are low by international 
standards, with collective weekly sales of between 15-25,000 copies. 8 Readership 
figures are much higher than sales figures however, because of multiple readers for 
each newspaper. Costing approximately $1 per copy (Jornal de Angola costs $0.35), 
the price of private publications is beyond what many can afford, which places these 
newspapers under considerable financial pressure to ensure viability. The authorship of 
writing within private publications includes articles penned by journalists and `opinion 
pieces' submitted by public figures, such as members of political parties. There is 
almost a total absence of popular writing such as `letters to the editor' which, when 
coupled with the prevalence of opinion pieces, occasionally transforms the private 
print media into something of a political journal. 
4 Nobody has been charged with his murder. 
5A number of other publications existed for a while. Actual fax became Actual. Comercio Actualidade 
was significant for a time, but no longer publishes. Actual (August 12,2000) announced the arrival of a 
new paper Faro, but I have not seen any editions. Maier (1996: 2 10) refers to a Huambo based paper 
called 0 Jango, whose editor David Bernardino was assassinated in 1992 by UNITA gunmen. 
6 The title lasted 56 days in 1907. It was resurrected in September 1974 before being closed three years 
later. It resumed publication on November 7,1997, (Angolense September 23,2000). 
Two comments are relevant here. Firstly, during fieldwork in Dundo in 2000 most of the private 
newspapers were on sale. This was made possible by a number of people who arranged to have the 
papers bought in Luanda and then flown to Dundo, where they sold them. When I returned to Dundo 
in 
2001,1 was told this initiative had ceased as many Dundo residents had not paid their arrears, rendering 
the initiative unprofitable. Secondly, some attempts to distribute private newspapers in the provinces 
were blocked by local provincial governors. For example, HRW (1999: 81) states that 
in 1997, the then 
governor of Huila province, Kundy Paihama, prevented the sale of Agora, Folha 8, and 
Comercio 
Actualidade, all regarded as critical of the government. 
8 Journalists interviewed in Luanda, suggested average print runs of 3-5,000 copies per edition. 
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Five private radio stations exist in Angola, two of which broadcast from Luanda, LAC, 
and the CEAST owned Radio Ecclesia. The other three are Radio Morena in Benguela, 
Radio 2000 in Lubango, and Radio Comercial in Cabinda. These three and LAC began 
broadcasting in 1992 and their major shareholders have strong MPLA links (HRW 
1999: 83). LAC was initially quite radical and controversial but became less so. Both 
Radio Ecclesia and LAC programming involves a mix of news, music, discussion and 
debate. Radio Ecclesia includes a significant proportion of religious broadcasting, 
particularly on Sundays. Its news content is regarded as more objective than that of 
government institutions and generally to be trusted (HRW 1999: 83). 9 Overall however, 
listeners tend to be generally sceptical of news programmes, and frequently contrast 
information from various sources in order to reach their own conclusion. ' 0 
Radio Ecclesia, established in 1955, was closed by the Angolan government in 1977. It 
resumed broadcasting in 1997 and has become the most influential and prominent of 
the private media institutions. On a number of occasions it has been in conflict with the 
Angolan government regarding its broadcasting, a point I examine later. In public 
sphere terms, because of the pre-independence origins of private media institutions 
such as Radio Ecclesia, Angolense, and 0 Independente, their contemporary 
development represents the reemergence of a `public' within the public sphere, in 
Fraser's (1992) sense, outlined in chapter two. This reemergence was a significant 
development during the 1990s, although its influence was confined primarily to 
Luanda. Even though state media material belongs outside the public sphere, some of 
its content will be included in later sections of this chapter because of its relevance and 
the general importance of state institutions within the media nationally. 
The following are Angola's principal media institutions: 
State media. Jomal de Angola; RNA; TPA. 
UNITA. Vorgan, Terra Angolana. 
Private print media. Actual, Agora, Angolense, Folha 8,0 Independente. 
Private broadcast media. LAC, Radio Ecclesia. 
9 This view came across strongly in interviews. Manuel Quintino, director of NGO OIKOS, interviewed 
in Luanda, August 9 2000; Jose Alberto Noe of CICA, interviewed November 29 2001, in Luanda. 
10 The TPA evening news is the most criticised in this regard and can be quite polemical. I have 
frequently watched with Angolans and have been intrigued by `their live commentaries' on what was 
broadcast, revealing a capacity to critique and analyse public communication, rather than merely take 
the news broadcast at face value. 
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The research questions for this, the second of the five Angolan peace narratives, are as 
follows. 
Q What did the private media identify as causes of the Angolan conflict? 
Q How did the private media analyse the Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements, 
and the role of international mediation? 
Q How was the Cabindan conflict analysed? 
Q How did the media evaluate the churches' role in the search for peace? 
Q What issues or themes did the media focus on in covering the conflict? 
Q How were the Angolan President and UNITA leader characterised? 
Q What role did the media play in the development of the Angolan public sphere? 
By addressing these questions the chapter will outline the major elements of the peace 
narrative of the Angolan private media. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section one examines the Bicesse and Lusaka 
peace agreements. Section two looks at media commentary of international peace 
intervention in Angola. The third section deals with media coverage of church activity 
in favour of peace. Section four focuses on the Cabindan conflict. The fifth section 
explores revisionist writing on the 1975 transition to independence, and the May 1977 
attempted coup. This writing highlights important issues and dynamics within the 
Angolan public sphere. The sixth section contrasts two pillars of the private media's 
portrayal of the conflict: the humanitarian crisis and political corruption. The seventh 
section examines coverage and characterisation of the Angolan President, Jose 
Eduardo dos Santos, and the LTNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi. Section eight explores 
issues in relation to the capacity of the private media to give coverage to the conflict. 
The final section highlights a number of public sphere issues. 
Before setting out these sections, I address four media issues relevant to the chapter as 
whole. These relate to the use of cartoons; the importance of radio as a means of 
communication; allegations that elements within the private media were in receipt of 
finance from Jonas Savimbi to enhance his media image; and the government 
clampdown against the media from 1998, during the third war. 
Firstly, the chapter includes a range of cartoons which provide an interesting 
perspective on Angolan perceptions of the conflict, highlighting a different form of 
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`voice' within the public sphere. I I For many years until the mid- I990s, the Jornal de 
Angola frequently published the work of the cartoonist Lito Silva on its front page. 
The cartoon represented an `independent space' within the newspaper's overall 
structure, and expressed criticism of the Angolan government regarding corruption, 
press censorship, a lack of parliamentary debate, and of UNITA's military campaign, 
before eventually being dropped. Many of the private print titles have introduced 
cartoons dealing with similar and other issues. A particular strength of cartoons is their 
communication through imagery, leaving one with a mental picture that can be more 
powerful than a written article. Individuals satirised or lampooned in cartoons are in an 
invidious position, likely to appear rather more foolish if they take exception to their 
depiction, because it was `only a cartoon'. Humour as entertainment is a strong 
component within cartoons, but Aulich (1992: 85) also underlines the capacity of 
cartoons to educate. An appealing feature of Angolan cartoons is their ability to 
capture the humour of the Angolan people, which they have managed to retain despite 
the destruction and devastation caused by war. The cartoon also manages to transcend 
the dividing line between literate and non-literate worlds in a society were literacy 
levels are under 40%. 12 The importance of cartoons was underlined for me when I 
included them in human rights courses I taught in Angola. I was surprised at the level 
of recognition associated with cartoons, especially those of Lito Silva, given the low 
newspaper circulation figures in the provinces. 
Secondly, radio is a very important medium for communication in Angola and plays a 
vital role in opinion formation, particularly in Luanda where individuals can choose 
between state and private stations. Radio performs a different function within the 
public sphere to the print media, being accessible to a much wider audience, and to 
those who cannot read or afford newspapers. Wilcox (1975: 77) underlines the 
importance of radio by situating it within the arena of `oral tradition', so vital in 
Angola and Africa generally. During fieldwork in Dundo and Luanda, I frequently 
noticed people listening to radio outside their homes or as they walked the street. 
Homes, the workplace, markets, and taxis, are all locations where Angolans tune in to 
radio. In 2001, Radio Ecclesia introduced a weekly `review of the national papers' 
'' The cartoons used in this chapter were the basis for a lecture entitled `Cartoons as Commentary within 
the Angolan Conflict' on March 14,2003, part of `Portuguese Week' at the University of Leeds. 
'Z Jornal de Angola, October 30,2000, quoting vice-Minister of Education and Culture Francisca de 
Espirito Santo, who gave a figure of over 60% illiteracy. 
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which gave radio listeners a taste of coverage within the newspapers. Broadcasting in 
national languages is another strength of radio, and extends its reach among local 
populations. The space radio provides for participation in the form of discussion, the 
airing of views, and the venting of anger, is radically different to what can be achieved 
in the print media in terms of immediacy. This `participative space' has been an 
important feature in the type of broadcasting Radio Ecclesia particularly sought to 
promote. Many of its programmes include the possibility of listeners telephoning to 
express an opinion or raise an issue. Frequently the station sent roving reporters on to 
the streets to solicit views, which brings radio as a medium closer to its audience. This 
form of broadcasting is an example of the formative as well as informative roles the 
media can play (Garnharn 1992). Radio Ecclesia's Saturday morning two-hour debate 
was very important at this level, 13 and perhaps because of programming of this nature, 
it was possible to detect a change in the language people used when talking about 
peace in Angola. Individuals could hear discussions taking place on radio which 
presented them with the arguments for and against the war, which helped them reach 
their own conclusions, and also to build on this argument as part of their own 
discourse. In this chapter I use both the print and broadcast media in highlighting the 
issues I raise. Some of these sections reveal a greater emphasis on private newspapers 
than radio, which reflects the fact that I have received the Angolan newspapers since 
1999, whereas the possibility of securing radio material was limited to periods of 
fieldwork. As I have stated, however, I consider radio a more important medium for 
communication in Angola. 
Thirdly, allegations emerged in 2001 suggesting that elements within the private media 
were benefitting monetarily from finance provided by Jonas Savimbi to improve his 
image. The allegations began to emerge in the Jornal de Angola from mid-2001 in 
articles by Alfonso Bunga, Paulina Frazäo, Rui Tristdo, and Antonio Maceira, (names 
believed to be pseudonyms for an MPLA working group) and centred especially on 
Folha 8, particularly its editor William Tonet. They were not levelled against 
journalists in general. The allegations may well represent a campaign to discredit 
Tonet, who was quite outspoken in his criticism of the Angolan government. For 
example, an article in July 2001 asked, "Is it possible that Tonet is a person with a 
13 LAC was the first to introduce the idea of live debates. National radio introduced 
debates in 2001. 
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double personality reflecting the duality of his political alignment". On November 21 
2001, the Jornal de Angola wrote: 
"William Tonet and his Folha 8 tirelessly pursue the military campaign ... proposed to him some time ago: to try to convince us that Jonas Savimbi could be an unblemished politician ... 
dedicated to achieving peace". ' 
The intrigue surrounding these allegations deepened when similar accusations were 
made within the private media itself. An article by Graca Campos, editor of Angolense, 
accused Tonet of extortion, blackmail, and of being employed by UNITA: 
"William Tonet should certainly not ignore the fact that I know of many of the 
alliances, some self-defeating, which he formed to found Folha 8". 14" 
The allegations suggest the existence of `cheque-book' or `brown-envelope' 
journalism (Khan 1998: 594) within Angola. It is because of such allegations that I 
have avoided the term `independent' when referring to the 'private' media. `Private' is 
a more neutral term, involving less of a value judgement that the designation 
'independent'. 15 The point confirms the impression of two respected Angolan 
journalists who described the private print media as "a world of mystery, intrigue and 
secret alliances", ' 6 illustrating some of the complexities of the Angolan public sphere. 
Finally, a brief comment on the Angolan public sphere itself, which I have already 
described as a polarised arena. With the outbreak of war in 1998, government became 
increasingly concerned with media war coverage, and a clampdown occurred against 
the private media in early 1999 (see HRW 1999: 87-91; Amnesty International 2000; 
MISA 1999, on this government clampdown). Initially a blackout on military reporting 
was called for which state media institutions adhered. to. A Jornal de Angola editorial 
in July 1999 suggested "that by reporting on the war, journalists were `facilitating' the 
efforts of [UNITA] in its war against the government" (quoted in MISA 1999). The 
Minister of Communication, Hendrik Val Neto, threatened to ban certain publications 
that he regarded as a "column of Jonas Savimbi's rebel movement"(quoted in MISA 
1999). The private media was seen as jeopardising state security by publishing 
information on government troop movements and military developments. 
14 Angolense, February 23-March 2,2002, p. 7. 
15 Howen (2001: 36) makes a similar point from a different perspective. For Howen, the business 
interests of MPLA members in the private media renders the term `independent' somewhat problematic. 
16 Interviews in Luanda, August 2000 & October 2001. 
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The clampdown lasted throughout 1999 and 2000, and brought pressure to bear on 
journalists. In September 1999 the Union of Angolan Journalists (SJA Sindicato de 
Jornalistas Angolanos) called for an end to police intimidation of journalists. 17 On 
numerous occasions journalists were arrested and questioned by police (IRIN, August 
26 1999; MISA 1999; IRIN, September 6 2000), and some journalists also had their 
homes searched by the police (MISA 1999). Government prevented Radio Ecclisia 
from broadcasting its link-up with the Portuguese Radio Renascenca (MISA 1999), 
and VOA offices were attacked by armed men (MISA 2000). A number of journalists 
during the clampdown were assaulted by armed individuals (MISA 1999). It is 
important here to distinguish between attacks on media premises and journalists by 
armed elements, and specific government actions. All brought pressure to bear on 
journalists, but need to be differentiated. At one point fifteen journalists were barred 
from leaving the country, which had not occurred previously. '8 A journalist in the 
province of Kwanza Norte, living in government accommodation was served an 
eviction notice for using his residence to report for private media (IRIN June 19 2000). 
The listing of the Angolan President in May 2000 on World Press Freedom Day, 
among the `ten worst enemies of the press' by CPJ (the Committee to Protect 
Journalists) did little to lessen the tensions between the Angolan government and the 
private media (MISA 2000). This was later rescinded. 
The private media coverage of troop movements during this time was quite limited, 
and the government clampdown was successful in eliminating what little existed. The 
clampdown generated however a range of writing that explored the meaning of 
`freedom of expression', the limits of the media in wartime, and the link between a free 
press and a healthy democracy. 19 Government sensitivities regarding war coverage 
were new in 1999, and were rather unusual given that prior to the Lusaka Protocol the 
state media frequently carried reports on military activity which were not seen as 
endangering state security. 1999 was different however, as for the first time the 
government was faced with a national non-state media reporting the war, which 
challenged its war strategy, and the clampdown reflects an attempt to reduce this 
challenge. 
17 Agora, September 18 1999. 
18 Agora, November 20 1999. 
19 See for example, Actual, January 29 2000; Folha 8,9 February 2000; Folha 8, March 25 2000; Agora, 
June 17 2000; Actual, 23 September 2000; Actual, 14 October 2000. 
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1. The Bicesse & Lusaka Agreements. 
The Bicesse and Lusaka agreements have been set out in the previous two chapters. 
This section briefly comments on how the private media reported these agreements. I 
utilise the categories suggested by Onadipe and Lord (1998) of 'factual reporting' and 
`evaluative analysis or opinion' in examining Bicesse and Lusaka. Both peace deals 
were invariably dealt with together reflecting the private media's emergence after the 
Lusaka Protocol. LAC, though broadcasting from 1992, had no archived material that I 
could access. 20 
Factual reporting, as the phrase suggests, outlined the content and nature of the two 
agreements. The impression during fieldwork was that few Angolans had detailed 
knowledge of either agreement apart from a cease-fire between the government and 
UNITA, and the demobilisation and demilitarisation of UNITA. 21 This was primarily 
due to poor dissemination of information by the Angolan government, UNITA and the 
UN. Both print and broadcast media did make some attempt to address this gap. For 
instance, Folha 8 published four special supplements on the Lusaka Protocol in 
September & October 2001, also incorporating later developments on UN sanctions 
against UNITA and the Fowler report investigating sanctions violations. The 
educational intent of these articles was clear, but impact was limited to the narrow 
group who read these papers. Radio programming was more effective in promoting 
discussion on the two agreements, which I discuss below. 
Evaluative reporting, which overlaps with factual reporting, frequently takes the form 
of editorial writing or opinion pieces where some assessment is offered. Media opinion 
on the peace agreements either argued that the Lusaka Protocol needed renegotiation, 
or that it could not be altered. The views of William Tonet and Aguiar dos Santos, 
editors of two of the leading private publications, Folha 8 and Agora respectively, are 
relevant here. Both stressed the importance of the Lusaka Protocol for Angola but 
argued that the agreement should have been regarded as a basis for future discussion 
and negotiation. In 1999, Tonet wrote that Bicesse and Lusaka "privileged the 
20 Interview with Louisa Fonsoni, director of LAC, Luanda, December 10 2001. 
21 This was clear during the Dundo workshop (October 2001) and in many interviews where I asked 
about what both agreements involved. 
108 
ideological interests of the largest political parties" to the detriment of other groups in 
Angola. 22i' A month before Jonas Savimbi's death, Tonet argued that Lusaka failed: 
"by not prioritising authentic national reconciliation. ... 
failed by rejecting the 
participation of other actors: [such as] disarmed political parties, churches, civil 
society and traditional authority. ... the Protocol never had programmes or 
schedules [or] concrete gestures with a psychosocial impact, capable of 
mentally disarming the belligerents, and infusing them with a new spirit and 
understanding of harmony". 23'V 
Aguiar dos Santos, writing in June 2001, pointed to the exclusion of key segments of 
Angolan society as a key failure in the agreements, a view also expressed in the 
previous chapter: 
"The experience of these seven years of ... the Lusaka Protocol, has shown that the bipolarised nature of `negotiations' [has only produced], a reductive 
simplistic vision of how to achieve ... national reconciliation. The logic of 
compromise ... underlying the Accords, did not provide the minimum 
possibility for cohabitation between the signatories, much more concerned in 
not allowing any space for involvement of other segments of society, potential 
pacifiers of decades of hatred, repression and distrust". 24" 
This view on the exclusion of Angolan 
actors from the peace negotiations carries 
the suggestion that `inclusion' could have 
made a difference. The views of these 
editors differ from those of the state-run 
media outlined in the previous chapter, 
where government comment on the Pro 
Pace Congress was highlighted. For 
Angolense, the history of exclusion 
continued during the Luena Accords, 
negotiated between military personnel 
from FAA and UNITA. The front page of 
Fig 1: Front page of Angolense from April 6,2003. Angolense on April 6-13,2002,25 printed 
the title `Excluded Once More', and carried the following statement: 
22 Folha 8, September 1 1999, p. 2. 
23 Folha 8, January 26 2002. 
24 Agora, June 2 2001. 
25 The system employed by Angolense to date a newspaper differs from the other newspapers. As can be 
seen here Angolense lists the week of publication, others papers list the Saturday of publication. 
109 
"This space should have been filled with the photo, which Angolense hoped to 
take at the formal signing ceremony of the cease-fire agreement signed on 
Wednesday, April 4, in Luanda. As once again we were excluded from an 
activity, to which various personalities and foreign journalists were invited, 
Angolense decided not to seek a photograph for this space. With this, 
(Angolense) expresses its total repudiation of all practices of exclusion''. " 
The statement shows the depth of feeling around the issue of exclusion. 
A Radio Ecclesia morning phone-in programme on November 21 2001 revealed how 
opinion on the validity of Lusaka was far from unanimous. Most callers suggested that 
Lusaka needed amending to incorporate the increased possibilities for peace that 
inclusion of the churches and elements from civil society could have offered. One 
caller succinctly voiced this majority opinion: 
"Lusaka is valid, but it is not sufficient because it is only between the two 
sides. We need to open a window for civil society and religion to see if they 
can find the key [to a solution]". " 
One who disagreed argued that the full implementation of the Protocol was required, 
not further negotiation: 
"Savimbi was the one to violate Lusaka. What is there to negotiate at the 
moment? The country is not a football. We need Savimbi to declare a unilateral 
cease-fire and disarm his troops". " 
While most callers saw Jonas Savimbi as the reason for the war, some also suggested 
that the behaviour of the Angolan government was a reason for the Protocol's failure, 
pointing to how the extension of state administration was conducted: 
"[Lusaka] failed in the implementation of state administration. It was 
disastrous. I saw people fleeing the administration of the state because they 
were being hunted down by the state, and they took refuge in Bailundo. 
Reconciliation failed, the blame lies with the government for not coming close 
to the people". " 
This last statement is quite important in the overall context. Howen (2001: 25) points to 
the suffering inflicted on `ordinary villagers' by "abusive police and officials sent by 
the government to assert state authority", and how this failure of governance had a 
destabilising and negative impact on the peace process. 
Whether the Lusaka Protocol should have been renegotiated was a crucial question 
after 1998. Opposing views clearly existed, illustrating that opinion within the public 
sphere was not unanimous. I conclude this section with a quotation 
from the university 
lecturer and political commentator Justino Pinto de Andrade, who expressed the view 
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in a newspaper article that there had been no true peace process at all in Angola. He 
stated: 
"I believe there have not been true peace processes. Mechanisms were put in 
place to accommodate personalities, yes, based on an understanding that what 
motivates people is purely and simply material ambition, ambitions for 
power". 26x 
His view is among the most radical expressed in relation to the Angolan peace 
processes, that the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements were mechanisms to 
`accommodate' personalities seeking power, above all that of Jonas Savimbi. 
2. International Intervention. 
Assessment by the media of the role of the UN, the Troika of observer nations 
(Portugal, the US and Russia), and of the international community was rather negative. 
Significant suspicion surrounded the reason for international involvement, centring on 
a belief that intervention to promote peace was secondary to defending economic 
interests. Filomeno Vieira Lopes, a prominent FpD (Frefite para Democracia, 
Democratic Front) opposition politician, expressed this suspicion in Agora in 2000: 
"The international community in general, `seemingly' did not understand the 
depth of the peace process and invested everything in the formal results of 
elections, and has now ceased to have a relevant role in the search for peace. (It 
does not understand the social movement dimension for peace, confining itself 
to the role of mere manager of sanctions, and at the same time deepening its 
military relations with the regime). It is only concerned with strengthening 
economic co-operation, the consequences of which for the Angolan people are 
clearly dubious". 27"' 
The comment suggests a lack of understanding within the international community 
regarding what was required for peace in Angola, indicating that the main international 
priority was the strengthening of economic interests. This view emerges again quite 
strongly in chapter seven on traditional authorities. 
Two cartoons from the Jornal de Angola around 1992-1993 suggest how the UN was 
perceived at the time. Both deal with the UN's inability to `see' what was happening 
in 
Angola. For example, the deployment of a space telescope or the use of binoculars 
(figs. 2&3 overleaf) by the UN were not particularly helpful when the requirement 
26 Folha 8, November 18 2000, p. 11. 
27 Agora, January 13 2000, p. 9. 
40. 
I Fig. 2. Jornal de Angola (1993). UN binoculars. Fig. 3. Jornal de Angola (1993) UN Telescope. 
was to see events on the ground. The comment made by the bandaged Angolan in fig. 
3 reads: "it seems that the defect is from the factory" 
With reference to the TROIKA, Justino Pinto de Andrade mentioned earlier, was 
particularly critical in a newspaper article of Russia's mediation role because of its 
involvement in arms sales to Angola in 1995 and 1998. He also questioned Portugal's 
role, as military contracts for the air force had been signed between Portugal and the 
Angolan government in 1996, during the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. 28 For 
many commentators, military involvement with the Angolan state by members of the 
Troika invalidated their observer role, and indirectly involved them in the conflict. For 
Simäo Catete, the youngest presidential candidate in the 1992 elections: 
"The Troika of observers has long since ceased to contribute positively to the 
ending of the war... The problem is that the countries which make up the 
Troika have interests which lead them to place great importance on a very 
narrow relationship with the government, [while remaining] silent on dramatic 
situations which arise from the duration of the conflict, or [ignoring] other 
proposals or contributions which have emerged, namely the suggestions from 
civil society and opposition parties.... For the Troika, only the positions of the 
government are of interest or counts when taking a stance. In this way, it 
contributes little towards peace and harmony among Angolans". 29x" 
28 Angolense, February 23-March 2 2002. 
29 Folha 8, December 8 2001, pp. 12-13. 
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A sense of disillusionment with the international community became more pronounced 
through the 1990s in terms of its role in facilitating peace. 
Ten years or so after the Troika's inception many Angolan commentators no longer 
considered it credible, advocating that it be disbanded or reconstituted. The logic 
behind the formation of the Troika was relatively clear prior to Bicesse as both the 
MPLA and UNITA had their former sponsors, the Soviet Union and US respectively, 
within the mediating mechanism, with Portugal acting as a broker and mediator. When 
the US formally recognised the new Angolan government in 1994, the logic of the 
Troika altered and UNITA no longer had support within the mechanism. The journalist 
Joaquim Cabanje, reporting on a conference entitled `The Role of the International 
Community and of Civil Society in the Resolution of the Angolan Conflict', 30 held 
days before Savimbi's death, highlighted calls to reformulate the composition of the 
Troika in order to guarantee greater impartiality and inclusion of Angolan civil society. 
None of the three Troika countries were regarded as neutral and were accused of using 
their positions to pursue business interests in Angola. Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark 
or Holland were suggested as possible candidates to replace the original Troika 
nations. Chapter seven will explore this criticism further. 
The Angolan government's opinion on international intervention varied from positive 
appraisal to frustration and condemnation. In January 2002, the Angolan president 
spoke positively of international involvement, particularly in implementing UN 
sanctions against UNITA. 31 Previously, government comment in late December 1998 
by contrast, was highly critical of the UN for allowing UNITA to rearm a second time, 
while the UN kept watch: 
`The Government finds it hard to understand how thousands of United Nations 
observers stationed in Angola within the framework of Unavem II and Monua 
never perceived that fact, especially when, earlier this year, they endorsed 
UNITA' s formal statement [that] it had completely disarmed and demilitarised 
its forces"(quoted in Munslow 1999: 566). 
The examples illustrate a rather mixed appraisal of international intervention by the 
Angolan government, an appraisal that is more negative in civil society circles. 
30 Luanda February 20 2002, sponsored by Open Society. Folha 8, February 23 2002, p. 7. 
31 Jornal de Angola, January 12 2002, p. 5. 
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3. Coverage of the Churches. 
This brief section outlines private media coverage of the churches' peace engagement. 
I do not examine coverage given by Radio Ecclesia because it is church owned, 
however, it is important to recognise that Radio Ecclesia gives a significant amount of 
air-time to news from the other churches, not simply the Catholic Church. In 
interviews with members of CICA, 32 it was clear that many churches felt they enjoyed 
good access to Radio Ecclesia and supported its work. 
The private print media was supportive of the Churches' advocacy for peace, giving 
extensive coverage to COIEPA activities, the Pro Pace Congress, church statements 
and pastoral letters, events organised by individual churches, and interviews with 
religious personnel. Little criticism of the churches is advanced within the private 
media unlike the state-run media, as seen in the previous chapter. As Leopoldo Baio 
editor of Actual, made clear in an interview, this lack of criticism was intentional. He 
argued that his publication wished to focus on the `real issues' of Angola, the greatest 
of which was the need for peace and therefore actively supported those seeking peace 
through dialogue or negotiation. 33 In his opinion, other issues could wait until this 
national challenge had been achieved. 
A particularly clear example of this support is evident from an editorial in Actual of 
June 17 2000, written in support of a CEAST pastoral letter: 
"In the name of Angolans, the church has once again expressed a desire for the 
peace Angola needs. Challenging the voice of a powerful minority in the 
country, who advocate `war to end war', the religious [have enabled] the voice 
of reason be heard.... Recently criticised by those holding power, the religious 
are clearly opening up space in order to make themselves heard in Angolan 
society. ... 
The recent church pronouncements refute the discourses coming 
from overseas, which reveal a lack of interest and/or knowledge of the Angolan 
reality, supporting as they do, the military option as the only means for peace 
between Angolans. The blessing of Washington and others for example, 
especially those exploiting the principal natural resources of Angola, show how 
[little] interest they have in ending hostilities in the country. Everything 
indicates how the little interest they have in the life of Angolans. ... 
In this 
context the option chosen by the churches - peace through talks, is in our 
opinion the most realistic. ... 
Therefore great applause for the church". "°.. 
32 November 21,2001, Luanda. 
33 Interview, Leopoldo Baio, Luanda, November 19 2001. 
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We see here support and encouragement offered to the churches, contrasted in this case 
with negative appraisal of foreign intervention in the Angolan conflict. 
Important questions arise here however, around this support for the churches. For 
example, did this supportive stance actually serve the best interests of Angola in 
relation to peace? Would a critical approach have been more appropriate? Perhaps the 
churches needed questioning about their lack of unity, and how this impacted on 
peace? A critique (evaluative analysis) of statements and pastoral letters from the 
churches could possibly have been more helpful than the largely `factual' reporting, 
and perhaps succeeded in bringing the churches closer together in the search for peace. 
4. Cabinda. 
Since the death of Jonas Savimbi, the Cabindan conflict has received a great deal of 
attention in the media. In this section, I briefly address this conflict because of its 
importance as the `second' of the two state conflicts fought against the Angolan 
government, but I do so primarily with reference to material prior to Jonas Savimbi's 
death. Some background material was outlined in chapter one on the rebel movement 
FLEC, excluded from the Alvor Accords and fighting for independence since 1975. 
Media articles trace the origins of the Cabindan conflict to the 1885 Berlin Conference, 
when Africa was partitioned between the European powers. To ensure access to the 
Atlantic Ocean, the Conference gave the former Belgian Congo a strip of land along 
the river Congo, physically separating Cabinda from Angola. Though Portugal 
contested the division, it was forced to accept it when the Congo river was later 
internationalised. 34 Until 1933, Cabinda remained a Portuguese protectorate, at which 
point it was incorporated as one of Angola's districts. 
35 Cabindan protests were evident 
from 1956 when the Portuguese government transferred the administration of the 
province to Luanda. 36 The military conflict has been on a lesser scale to that of 
UNITA's, explaining why it has received much less attention. As mentioned in chapter 
one, neither the Bicesse nor Lusaka agreements addressed the conflict in Cabinda, 
confining themselves to issues between the Angolan government and UNITA. The 
34 Folha 8, September, 21 2001, p. 8. 
35 Agora, September 21 2001, p. 9. 
36 Folha 8, May 24 2000, p. 13. 
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1992 elections were extensively boycotted in the province, with only 5000 votes cast 
for the election of five parliamentary deputies. 37 The reason for the boycott was that 
electoral participation would have given consent to the status quo, would have 
confirmed the identity of those in the province as `Angolan', when they regarded 
themselves as `Cabindan'. 
A range of voices are heard on the Cabindan conflict in the media, such as those of the 
various FLEC factions and traditional authorities. Prior to the death of Jonas Savimbi. 
the most vocal were those of local church figures who favoured independence for the 
province. Full independence is the most radical of the calls made, with others arguing 
for some degree of autonomy, perhaps within a federalist solution. 38 This would 
guarantee greater local authority and administration of the wealth of the province, 
which contributes over 60% of Angolan oil exports (Hewitt 2003: 122). Appeals have 
been made by church personnel for a referendum on the question of independence, 
confident that the vote would be carried in favour of local sovereignty. 39 A suggestion 
in 2002 by the leader of the FLEC-FAC faction, that the local Catholic bishop mediate 
in the Cabindan conflict, was discounted as unnecessary by the MPLA secretary- 
general, Joäo Lourenro. 40 Cabinda remains unfinished business. 
5. Historical revision. 
A crucial component of the private media's peace narrative has been to revisit and re- 
examine key moments or periods in Angolan history. This section looks at two such 
historical moments: the transition to independence, and the attempted coup of May 
1977. Both of these events have particular importance when analysed from a public 
sphere perspective, as they impacted on the ability of Angolans to pursue peace, on the 
space Angolans had to organise in defence of their interests, and the space to freely 
express their opinions. While these events have important spatial implications, it has 
been suggested, as we will see, that the long-term process of national reconciliation in 
Angola requires that these events be addressed in some way. In Angola, as 
Kapuscinski (1987: 34) noted, "the past takes up more space than the future". Different 
37 David Kramer at British-Angola Conference, London, November 13 2002. 
38 Folha 8 interview with Fr. Jorge Congo, January 21 2001, p. 14. 
39 Agora, December, 21 2002, p. 12. 
40 Agora, September, 21 2001, p. 9. 
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constituencies attribute varying degrees of importance to these two events. The need to 
examine the transition to independence is higher on the agenda of UNITA and the 
FNLA, than of the MPLA. The importance of the coup attempt is greater for certain 
groups within the MPLA, and political parties such as the PRD (Partido Renovador 
Democrdtica, Democratic Renewal Party), the first political party founded after the 
multiparty reforms in 1991,41 than for UNITA and the FNLA. 
5.1. Transition to independence. 
The anniversary each year of Angolan independence, November 11, has generated 
writing and radio commentary exploring the 1975 transition to independence, which 
resulted in armed conflict between the three nationalist parties. 42 Prior to independence 
a transitional government had been created, involving the three nationalist parties and 
the Portuguese administration, and a question posed in the media asks, `was war 
inevitable'? Was a peaceful resolution of the issues dividing the Angolan parties not 
possible then? Unsurprisingly perhaps, contradictory responses emerge. 
Firstly, Jeronimo Wanga of UNITA, the Minister of Education and Culture in the 
transitional government stated: 
"In 1975 the major political forces in the country, FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA, 
had not exhausted the possibilities of coming to an understanding. What 
happened was that military logic and the desire to eliminate the other at all 
costs, were stronger in each of the parties. The proof of this was the 
introduction of foreign troops, already visible in April and May 1975, well 
before November 11,, 43xiv 
The foreign troops in question were Cubans arriving in Luanda to support the MPLA, 
the South African army marching on Luanda from the south with UNITA soldiers, and 
Zairean troops supporting the FNLA from the north. By contrast, Beto Van-Dunem of 
the MPLA, argued that a peaceful transition was impossible: 
"ideologically UNITA and the FNLA were not at the same level as the MPLA, 
not at one with it. The MPLA was a movement which fought for the Angolan 
people, the other two movements fought for power. Therefore, there was 
absolutely no possibility of cohabitation". 44"`' 
4' Among the first PRD acts was a visit to a mass grave of victims of the coup attempt, where allegedly 
1,500-2,000 people have been buried. Interview with Silva Mateus and Jose Fragoso, president and vice- 
president of the Fundacdo 27 de Maio (May 27th Foundation), Luanda, December 2001. 
42 Mateus et al (2000) is an interesting collection of opinion on Angola's 25 years of independence 
containing a wide range of views from within civil society. 
13 Angolense, November 1 1-18 2000, pp. 12-13. 
44 Angolense, November 11-18 2000, p. 8. 
117 
Such a view is rather contentious, but is critiqued later in this section. 
The journalist Fonseca Bengui voiced a popular sense of confusion in 2000, in relation 
to events as the Portuguese were departing: 
"Nobody really knows what happened. Everyone blames the war, but 'why 
war'? ... 
The MPLA wanted all power for itself, because it represented the 
urban intellectuals, but the FNLA [also] wanted power for itself, because the 
true hopes of the oppressed people resided within it. If that wasn't enough, 
Savimbi came along later forming UNITA, bringing together the peoples from 
the south. These movements never got on from the beginning, each had their 
own way of seeing Angola, each imagined their own type of independence.... 
Sometimes the rebels talk of `root causes' which one supposes are the same 
causes that led to the formation [of each party] ". 4"`"i 
A caller to a Radio Ecclesia debate spoke for many when stating: 
"conditions for dialogue existed, but unfortunately war was the preferred 
option.... I often ask myself why those nationalists who did everything to 
achieve independence, hardly do anything now to achieve peace? " 
The caller voiced a sense of disillusionment palpable among Angolans regarding their 
leaders, with the relentless pursuit of war as the means to achieve political objectives, 
coupled with a reluctance to negotiate and implement a lasting agreement. 
Van-Dunem's comment that the MPLA was somehow different to the other parties is 
contradicted by Vincente Pinto de Andrade, also of the MPLA and a possible 
presidential candidate in the next elections. In November 2001, de Andrade argued that 
none of the three movements were willing to settle for anything less than absolute 
power, and suggests that a peaceful transition was highly improbable. He argued that 
no movement understood what it meant to `liberate' Angola or to promote freedom, in 
the sense of "granting political, civic, economic, social rights". He added: 
"[After the creation of a one party system], political exclusion, the denial of 
others, and political intolerance had fertile ground to grow. It was the MPLA 
who did this by proclaiming independence, but the other two liberation 
movements would have done exactly the same, because the logic, at the time of 
independence, of these three movements was the seizure of political power and 
the exercise of this power alone, solitarily. Their idea was not to share political 
power, it was not to respect the spirit of the Alvor Acdords". 
46 " 
It is a rather damning indictment de Andrade offers of the three independence 
movements. 
15 Actual, November 11 2000, p. 7. 
46 Radio Ecclesia debate, November 10 2001. 
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The views of Holden Roberto, president of the FNLA at the time of independence, are 
worth considering. 47 Roberto was particularly critical of the role played by Portugal 
during this crucial time, arguing that it failed to implement the Alvor Accords. 
"It was Portugal that violated the Alvor Accords by permitting the entry of foreign forces. The colonial power should not have permitted the MPLA to 
take power. As a co-signatory to the Accords, Portugal should have put in place 
a process to bring the three movements together and put the process back on 
track. ... 
This is the basis of everything. This violation caused all the trouble 
we are living with today. Portugal should assume this responsibility, because 
the difficulties began in Alvor". 4s"''"' 
Ngola Kabangu, also of the FNLA and Minister of the Interior in the transitional 
government, 49 blames Portugal for having been partial to the MPLA in the transition 
process. He argued that when conflict broke out, the Portuguese administration 
"which constituted the nucleus of this [transitional] government, openly 
supported the MPLA for ideological reasons, [and] didn't know how to carry 
out the process of decolonisation in 50xix 
There can be little doubt that Portugal's withdrawal from Africa, a process of 
abandonment rather than decolonisation, created immense problems for its former 
colonies. However, suggesting that Portugal was responsible for everything that went 
wrong in 1975, as Roberto and Kabangu do, is surely misplaced, failing to attribute 
any culpability to the nationalist parties themselves. 
Before concluding this piece on the transition to independence, I propose to highlight 
reflection which emerged around Independence Day from 1999 to 2001. When 
commemorating the 25th anniversary of independence in 2000, Folha 8 saw no cause 
for celebration and printed a stark front cover under the heading `Black November', 
presenting a single candle flame against a black background. The following year the 
paper carried a photograph of President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi beside the 
caption: `Different but Equal in the Culture of War. ' Tonet's editorial expressed anger 
that a cease-fire had not been called during the president's 2001 Independence Day 
speech, as many had expected. Bishop Zacarias Kamwenho had been awarded the 
Zakarov prize by the European Union some weeks previously, an award that had 
47 Holden Roberto lived for many years in France after independence, returning briefly after the Bicesse 
Accords to contest the 1992 Presidential elections, arriving too late to mount a viable electoral 
campaign. After some further years in France he returned to Angola in the late 1990s. (Summary from 
Angolense 11-18 November 2000, p. 6. ). His views appear occasionally in the private media. 
48 Folha 8, November 10 2000, pp. 7-8. 
49 D Independente, November 11 2000, p. 13. 
50 Angolense, November 11-18 2000, p. 10-1 1. 
119 
furthered expectation that a cease-fire announcement would be the government's 
response. Tonet wrote: 
"to declare peace is not a concession to Savimbi, [it is] not even done because 
of him, but is a response to the cries of millions of Angolans who have died 
ingloriously all these years""51xx 
The President's speech signalled no change in government policy, where he clearly 
outlined his vision of how the war would end: Jonas Savimbi would either surrender, 
be captured or killed in combat. 
The Radio Ecclesia news of November 12,2001 carried a report by the journalist 
Laurinda Tavares, evaluating the President's speeches from 1999-2001, which 
provides an interesting perspective of the legacy of 26 years of conflict. She stated: 
"The future begins now, Angolans can begin to dream, and the future has 
already begun. These are the main points of the President's speeches on the 
occasion of the last three anniversaries of independence, speeches which create 
within the population expectations that the war is at an end, and the country 
journeys safely towards normality. Observers comment that yesterday's speech 
brought nothing new, once again the President invoked the war as the worst of 
all evils, thereby justifying so many mistakes of government during these 26 
years of Angolan independence.... Yesterday, Jose Eduardo dos Santos stated 
he was not open to negotiate with Jonas Savimbi, considering him a chronic 
liar. He pointed out that only a miracle could save UNITA from defeat. In 1999 
after the fall of Andulo to government troops, the presidential speech carried 
the same victorious tone. After 25 years of independence Jose Eduardo dos 
Santos once again said the war was ending... Some people continue to believe 
that such a satisfactory date will come soon, others argue that only with 
dialogue between the government and UNITA can there be peace. The fear is 
justified by the fact that after so many victories claimed by the FAA, it has not 
been possible to end the war. ... 
Hunger, illness and misery continue to be the 
reality for the majority of Angolans. For many Angolans the future has not yet 
begun". ""' 
Quite clearly, individuals had grown tired of hearing that the war was ending, while all 
the time their lives became more miserable. 
The private media was an important location where independence related issues were 
aired, where some of the political parties involved sought to put forward their 
perspectives on what happened. UNITA and the FNLA are particularly interested in 
seeing these issues debated publicly, as part of the process of understanding what set 
Angola on the path to war, over quarter of a century previously. 
51 Folha 8, November 17 2001, p. 3. 
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5.2. The attempted coup of 1977. 
The attempted coup of May 27 1977, known as 27 de Maio, is regarded as an `open 
wound' in the psyche of Angolans. While the details of the coup attempt are important, 
my primary concern here is to examine its consequences for Angolan society, for the 
Angolan public sphere, and the ability of Angolans to promote peace. As Maier 
(1996: 3 5) reminds us: 
"[flew Angolans have forgotten the massive killing spree that gripped Luanda 
after Nito Alves ... attempted to seize power in 1977" 
In a fieldwork interview, a Radio Ecclesia journalist commented that the consequences 
of the events symbolised by this date, explain why many Angolans assumed a posture 
of silence, withdrawing from what could be interpreted as `political space'. 52 I explore 
the background to this observation. 
The coup attempt led by Nito Alves, a member of Neto's cabinet, was quickly put 
down by forces loyal to President Neto with the help of Cuban troops (Birmingham 
1998: 9), and appears to have been quite poorly organised. Alves was eventually caught 
and executed with many of his supporters. The exact number of those killed is 
unknown. One government source is quoted as saying that about 200 people were 
killed'53 while the Fundagdo 27 de Maio (May 27th Foundation) claims that the figure 
is between 40,000 and 82,000 people. 54 The Foundation interprets 27 de Maio, not as a 
single date, but as the period of time from May 27 1977, to the `Carnival de Vitoria' 
(Victory Carnival) on March 27 1979. That the attempted coup continues to cast a 
shadow into present-day Angola is clear from the following comment from a 2001 
Radio Ecclesia debate on 27 de Maio: 
"To speak of 27 de Maio 1977 is, even today, extremely delicate and even 
dangerous in this country. To hold an open debate on this issue is not easy, as 
many wounds are still open.... We [Angolans] are accused of being passive 
and fearful, despondent and introverted, silent and unaware of our situation, 
phlegmatic or even apathetic, in part because of the consequences of this sad 
days S5xxii 
52 Interview, Luanda, November 8 2001. 
53 Angolense, I 1-18 November 2000, p. 9 quotes Iko Carreira's estimate of 200 dead. 
54 Founded September 26 2001. Interview with Silva Mateus and Jose Fragoso, Luanda, December 4 
2001. 
55 Rädio Ecclesia debate, November 10 2001. 
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Some of the trauma associated with this date relates to the arbitrary nature of 
executions conducted, the use of torture, and the non-return of bodies to families for 
burial. 56 For others the trauma relates to the MPLA executing its own people, many of 
whom had fought for independence. It was clear during fieldwork that this history 
remained `live' in the psyche of Angolans, and that the private media had begun to 
facilitate examination of this `wound' within the public sphere. An interesting 
contribution here was made by Folha 8 which initiated a serialisation of an unedited 
version of a book by Nito Alves entitled `13 Teses em Minha Defesa', `13 Theses in 
My Defense', dated February 11,1977. Folha 8 described its serialisation of these 
extracts, which contined from May 4 to December 21 2002, as a "Folha 8 contribution 
to Angolan history". 57 
Silva Mateus and Jose Fragoso, president and vice-president respectively of Fundagdo 
27 de Maio, have suggested that the continuation of the war with UNITA was in part, a 
pretext by those in power to avoid dealing with unaddressed internal MPLA issues 
related to the attempted coup. Their suggestion was that the MPLA was able to remain 
cohesive because the war provided it with an external focus. 58 They went so far as to 
argue that the issues requiring reconciliation within the MPLA, were on a greater scale 
than those between the MPLA and UNITA. These are very strong claims to make, but 
with Jonas Savimbi no longer a factor in the equation, and the basis for lasting peace 
apparently improving, it will be interesting to see what happens within the MPLA 
regarding these historical issues. One of the few MPLA statements regarding 27 de 
Maio was made 25 years after the coup attempt when its `Political Bureau' stated that 
it had `negatively marked' Angolan history, without outlining any further detail. 
From the perspective of the public sphere, 27 de Maio is fundamental with regard to 
understanding Angolans' fear to engage in public sphere discourse, and explains why 
Angolans have chosen a self-imposed silence. The terror waged by UNITA is also 
56 While Cuban troops were credited with acting swiftly to put down the coup attempt, there has been a 
growing emphasis within the private media on their role in organising the purge that followed, in 
torturing and executing the victims of 27 de Maio. See for example Agora March 29 2003, article 
entitled `Tropas Cubanas Exterminaram em Massa', Cuban Troops Exterminated en Mass'. This role 
has yet to be fully explored. 
57 From Folha 8, December 21 2002. 
59 Interview, Luanda, December 2001. 
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important, but 27 de Maio has exercised Angolan commentators in quite a different 
way. The point is made by Campos Neto, a caller to the Radio Ecclesia debate: 
"The whole of our society has been conditioned by 27 de Maio.... Those who 
replaced Neto did nothing to change things; on the contrary, they took 
advantage of the fear and continue to take advantage of the fear imposed on the 
population, while misgoverning the nation. It is necessary to take the next step. One must speak of 27 de Maio in order to demystify it, so that we can begin to build a new society based on law and order, if not we will continue to de 
prisoners of 27 de Maio". 59"""' 
The terror created by 27 de Maio has shaped the Angolan people's ability to publicly 
engage in critical discourse, including peace discourse, simply because they felt unsafe 
to do so. 
Just how deep the fear associated with 27 de Maio is, can be deduced from analysis of 
a demonstration in 2000 organised by the political party, PADPA (Partido de Apoio ao 
Desenvolvimento e Progresso de Angola, Party of Support to Angolan Development 
and Progress), to protest at a 1600% fuel price rise. The party leader Carlos Leitäo 
used 27 de Maio as the framework within which the significance of the demonstration 
was interpreted: 
"It is true there exists among the population a certain reluctance to participate 
in demonstrations, afraid perhaps of what happened during 27 de Maio". 6 ""'V 
An article by Wilson Dada suggested something very important happened through the 
realisation of this demonstration. The article entitled `They have Defeated the Barrier 
of Strategic Fear'61 included the statement: 
"this barrier has its historical roots immersed in the bloody repression which 
happened in 1977 and subsequent years". "' 
For Leopoldo Baio, the editor of Actual, this and a subsequent demonstration soon 
afterwards were the first protest marches in Angola since May 1977,62 illustrating the 
`psychological' constraints imposed on the public sphere by 27 de Maio. 
A key issue here is that the space associated with the Angolan public sphere cannot be 
conceived of as a neutral space. It has its own specific traumatic history which strongly 
54 Radio Ecclesia debate, November 
60 Folha 8, March 4 2000, pp. 5-6. 
61 Folha 8, February 26 2000, p. 11, 
62 Actual, March 18 2000, pp. 3-4. 
10 2001. 
`Venceram a barreira do medo estrategico. 
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influences Angolans' ability to organise and speak publicly, foundational rights of 
Habermas's public sphere. 63 Munslow (1999: 560-561) makes the important comment: 
"One has to revisit [Angolan] history to understand the limited space that exists 
for civil society to flourish in Angola. Under colonial rule independent African 
organisations were suppressed.... Within the ranks of the MPLA, the Nito 
Alves coup attempt of May 1977 had enormous ramifications for constraining 
the potential future growth of civil society in Angola". 
With the exception of the Angolan churches, who continued to engage in public 
discourse, the Angolan public sphere was in effect closed down by 27 de Maio. It must 
be understood that the private media (and civil society) organisations are emerging 
from within this space. 
In the Radio Ecclesia debate above, Vincente Pinto de Andrade suggested three ways 
to move forward in relation to 27 de Maio. Firstly, one could follow a judicial process 
similar to the Nuremberg trials, a method he opposed on the grounds that too many 
people were involved. Secondly, forget about the past and move on, which de Andrade 
argued was an impossibility given the emotion attached to the issue. Thirdly, hold 
some form of truth and reconciliation commission along the lines of that held in South 
Africa, which was his preference. As noted, prior to the death of Jonas Savimbi, calls 
for a South African style truth and reconciliation commission in Angola, were in 
relation to 27 de Maio, not in relation to UNITA years of brutality. As CUR (1999a: l) 
noted in relation to Angola, "there appears to be no desire at government level to 
confront the past, and strong government resistance to investigations or calls for 
them". 
27 de Maio has had long lasting repercussions within Angolan society generally, 
transforming the public sphere into a fearful place where self-imposed silence was 
preferred to speech. Furthermore those who did speak were more likely to do so in a 
representative rather than an individual capacity, hence the importance of the 
corrective I suggested to Habermas's definition in chapter two. Habermas's work on 
the public sphere does not address issues of fear and trauma, which curtail the ability 
of an individual or a group to assert their rights of association and expression. 
Nor 
does he address historical legacies which give the public sphere its specificity in each 
63 Minter (1996: 1 14) locates the trauma of Angolans and their "fear to speak out and participate" 
in 
violence that followed the 1992 elections. 
This research argues that the 1992 violence reinforced the 
trauma from 27 de Maio. 
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context, and that a nation may have to face as part of building peace and national 
reconciliation. Clearly within the Angolan private media, the manner in which the 
transition to independence occurred and the attempted coup of May 1977 are two 
issues still demanding attention. 
6. Contrasting Images of the Conflict. 
Two quite contrasting images emerge in the media's coverage of the Angolan conflict: 
one illustrating how a majority of Angolans became impoverished, the other depicting 
how a minority became tremendously wealthy, in many cases through corruption. 64 By 
drawing largely on newspaper articles, I will outline these two contrasting realities, 
focusing firstly on the extent of the humanitarian crisis caused by war, and secondly on 
the levels of corruption and self-enrichment occurring in its shadows. 
6.1. Humanitarian crisis. 
Print media coverage given to the humanitarian crisis and to levels of corruption, share 
a similar reliance on international reporting of these issues. Foreign media coverage 
and the reports of international organisations such as MSF, OCHA (UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), and UNDP (United Nations Development 
Programme), were significantly relied upon in outlining the humanitarian situation 
particularly after 1998. Some of the disturbing statistics for 2001, when Angola was 
classified 146 on the `human development index' out of 162 countries, include the 
following: 
- 75% of Angolans lived below the poverty line 
- Angola was considered among the ten worst countries in which to be poor. 
65 
- 3.8 million Angolans were displaced, with 1.9m depending on food aid. 
- Average life expectancy was 45 years. 
- Highest child mortality rate in Africa. 
- 62% of Angolan population were without access to clean drinking water. 
- 56% had no sanitary facilities. 
- 43% of population were undernourished. 
-8 doctors for every 100,000 people. 
-1 in every 500 Angolans is an amputee, nearly all landmine victims. 
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64 As early as 1990 President dos Santos publicly acknowledged the seriousness of corruption in Angola, 
describing it as "the second most important problem of the state after the problem of war" (Fituni 
1995: 151). 
65 Angolense July 14-21,2001, p2. Agora, October 27 2001, p. 13. 
66 From Agora, December 8 2001, p6; Folha 8, December 8 2001 p. 9. 
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Newspaper headings such as `The Extermination of the Angolan People' (Folha 8, 
April 21 2001) and `Government indifferent to Suffering of the People' (Actual, 
February 19 2000), drew attention to the seriousness of the plight faced by so many. 
Newspaper and radio gave significant coverage to these statistics, using them to renew 
calls for a negotiated end to the war. While photographs of starving children were used 
to illustrate the humanitarian needs of the people, I propose to highlight how a number 
of cartoons created images of the crisis, some of which leave the reader 'seeing more' 
than a photograph, particularly as many have two tiers, offering a contrast. A sense of 
Fig 4. Mozambican floods. Fig. 5. Presidents dos Santos & Chiliba. 
irony is presented in fig. 4 as the speaker, presumably a government official, calls for 
help for Mozambican flood victims in 2000, while ignoring the plight of fellow 
Angolans in Kuito, Caxito and Gabela (Actual, 15 April 2000). Fig 5. depicts 
Presidents Chiluba of Zambia and President dos Santos at the airport, with the Angolan 
president speaking of economic and social progress in Angola, while the second image 
shows two tattered figures, one foraging for food among the rubbish, the other beside a 
bag of `misery' (Actual, March 25,2000). 
Fig. 6 (overleaf) (Folha 8, April 20,2000) shows a man surrounded by skulls and 
bones shouting to another passing overhead on a cloud (suggestive of the Angolan 
flag). The man below calls out: "Hey! Oh holy saints (Santos)! Come here below and 
have a look at this s**t! " suggesting that President dos Santos needed to have a closer . 
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look at the misery of his people. Finally, fig. 7 (Actual, March 25,2000) captures the 
perception that while little money was available to alleviate the suffering of the people, 
money was available for public street parties such as `Carnaval '. 
As public discourse, cartoons have a strong visual impact, which goes beyond the 
`bubble' comments cartoons frequently contain. Through depiction, they can subvert 
the official discourses of government and the powerful by representing a view from the 
`underside', in a way statistics and well-argued articles do not. 
6.2. Political Corruption. 
Media coverage of the humanitarian crisis and of levels of political corruption served 
to question the legitimacy of the war. Taken together these images asked the question: 
`was the humanitarian crisis worth the price? ', and suggested that the logic behind the 
war was in fact to disguise processes of illicit self-enrichment, of political corruption. 
Filomeno Viera Lopes argued in 2001, that "war has become necessary [for those] 
involved in the primitive accumulation of capital" and the transfer of the nation's 
wealth to "selected private hands". Szeftel (1998) defines political corruption in the 
following way: 
"Political corruption involves the abuse or misuse of public office, public roles, 
public duty or some public obligation, for purposes of private (personal, group 
or sectional) gain". 
The question of corruption in Angolan society received little or no `public scrutiny' 
until the emergence of the private media. In this, the private media broke new ground, 
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and exposed the shady side of the war. On one level, media coverage of corruption 
merely confirmed what Angolans knew already through their informal communicative 
networks in markets and bars, and by means of stories relayed and retold by people 
travelling from different parts of Angola. In a Habermasian sense, the media brought to 
`publicity' issues that previously had only been discussed in informal spaces, material 
that circulated as rumour or hearsay. In other words, we are dealing with content 
within the `plebeian public sphere' becoming `public' within the wider public sphere. 
Interestingly the way in which this happened was not by Angolan journalists engaging 
in investigative journalism and uncovering political corruption, but by publicising 
international reports on Angola such as those of Global Witness dealing with 
corruption. 
A Global Witness report on Angola in 1998 focused on the role of conflict diamonds 
in providing UNITA with revenue to rearm. The publication of a second report in 1999 
on the misuse of oil revenues to bankroll political elites, created quite a stir. When 
Folha 8 and Agora attempted to publish material related to the second report, they 
found their articles censored by the printers, merely captionless photographs of oilrigs 
appearing on pages allocated to carry the story (MISA 1999). The censorship was 
possible because shareholders in the printers Lit©tipo are close to the Angolan 
president, though it must be pointed out that Litotipo has only rarely intervened in the 
publication of articles. Other examples to gain prominence included the trial in France 
in 2000 of Andre Tarallo of Elf Aquitane, accused of securing exploration rights in 
Angola and elsewhere, by paying African leaders a commission of 45 US cents per 
barrel of crude oil. 67 Also in French courts, the trial in 2001 of Jean-Christophe 
Mitterand, son of the former French president, brought much unwanted publicity. His 
trial for alleged illegal arms shipments to Angola and secret payments to dos Santos is 
still ongoing at the time of writing. The ranking of Angola as the fifth most corrupt 
county by the NGO Transparency International in 2000, was damning at a time when 
the government sought to legitimise the war against UNITA. 68 
A high profile case of corruption, publicised without sourcing material internationally, 
was that of the governor of Malanje province, Flävio Fernandes. Based on the Fowler 
67 Agora July 22 2000, p. 8. Tonet mentions 90 US cents, Folha 8, July 22 2000, p. 7. 
68 Folha 8, September 16 2000, page 5; Agora, September 16 2000, p. 8. 
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(2000) report's suggestion that prominent Angolan public figures had sold fuel to 
tTNITA in violation of UN sanctions, an Agora article of June 23,2001, cited the 
governor of Malange as a provider of fuel to UNITA at a time when it was besieging 
and bombing the city. 69 The private media regularly condemned the way the province 
was administered and accused the governor of selling provincial government property 
for personal gain, and of personally appropriating the provincial budget for 2000.70 In 
2001 Angolense described his provincial administration as being "in a high state of 
criminal ity". 71 Despite these allegations, Flavio Fernandes's removal from office came 
about in July 2002, not through dismissal by the President, but by collective public 
repudiation, which I outline in chapter six. 
The cartoons commenting on corruption clearly reveal an understanding of the 
Angolan conflict as a resource-based conflict. Fig 8 situates the character Borrego in a 
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Fig 8. War: the most lucrative business. Fig. 9. Oil, diamonds and distracted leaders. 
classroom where he is asked what is the most lucrative business in Angola (Actual 
September 2,2000). His answer `It's the war!! ' leaves his teacher and female 
colleague speechless, but receives the applause of his fellow male student. Another 
classroom scene (fig 9, Actual, June 1,2000) suggests three answers to the question, 
"why is Angola considered a country in crisis? " The replies identify petroleum, 
diamonds, and distracted leaders as the reasons for the crisis. 
69 Agora, June 23 2001, p. 6. 
70 Agora, April 7 200 1, p. 7. 
71 Angolense, April 7-14 2000, p. 14. 
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In fig 10 Borrego (Actual, September 23,2000) is told that the Angolan participation 
in Sydney is awful", to which he replies, "of course. If it had to do with robbery, 
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Fig. 10. Sydney Olympics. Fig. 11. War Intensified in the Country. 
deception, and war, we would have won many gold medals! " Fig 11, (Jornal de 
Angola, 1993) from the state media, carries the newspaper headline `War Intensifies in 
the Country' and suggests that war was a profitable business for some in Angola. 
In fig. 12, (Actual March 2,2002) from just after Jonas Savimbi's death in 2002, 
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Borrego looks pensive and asks who will they blame now? " His comment suggests 
that Savimbi was somehow needed in order to conceal and justify poor and corrupt 
governance in Angola. 
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7. The Private Media: `Scrutinising' Public Figures. 
In chapter two, the public sphere was described as a place of `public scrutiny', a 
description I draw on here to examine how the private media 'scrutinised' the two key 
personalities of the Angolan conflict, Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi. I 
look separately at how these men were treated in the media. A significant degree of 
analysis of both men occurs in literature critiquing the health of Angolan democracy. 
7.1. Scrutinising the Angolan President. 
The previous section highlighted allegations of political corruption made against the 
Angolan president. I do not explore the truth or falsehood of these allegations in this 
thesis, but rather focus on the private media's coverage of the President and on his 
commitment to democratic transition and to peace, issues many commentators 
regarded as intrinsically linked. Filomeno Vieira Lopes for example, writing in January 
2000, suggested that the continuation of the war reflected the lack of democracy in the 
country. 
"In Angola, as in other parts of the world, there is an intrinsic relationship between 
peace and democracy. ... 
It was believed that the deepening of democracy would 
be the corner stone for the consolidation of peace in the country. ... 
War offers a 
pretext for anti-democratic forces to exercise strict control over society, restricting 
citizen intervention. ... 
The basic issue is that the insipidness of democracy in 
Angola feeds the war"72x"v' (emphasis added). 
We see here a similar argument to that made by the churches, a belief that greater 
democracy would promote peace. 
Within the Angolan political system the president holds great power. He is the head of 
government and the armed forces and has the right to nominate provincial governors. 
The government of unity and national reconciliation, which President dos Santos 
presides over was formed in 1997, comprises members of the MPLA, UNITA, and the 
PRS, the Lunda based party. In an attempt to promote national unity, 28 ministerial 
and 55 vice-ministerial posts, were allocated to these parties. 
73 The President's 
political power increased after he sacked the Prime-Minister in 1998, leaving the post 
vacant until the end of 2002, though the constitution required the position be filled. 
72 Agora, January 13 2000, p. 9. 
73 Angola Peace Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 8, April 25 1997. 
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The private print media's coverage of the Angolan President has been regarded by 
many as rather sensationalist and at times too confrontational, though important 
questions were being asked of the President regarding his administration of public 
office. 74 This public scrutiny of the President reflected what was essentially new 
`discursive material' in the Angolan public sphere. This `public scrutiny' came to a 
head in 2000 when the journalist Rafael Marques, (then writing for Agora but later 
became director of Open Society Foundation), accused the President, in a published 
article, of being a dictator. The article created quite a storm, and eventually Marques 
and his editor, Aguiar dos Santos, were put on trial for `defamation of the President'. 
The trial, partly heard in secret, was subject to much international attention (Amnesty 
International 2000, MISA 1999) and both men were found guilty under a previously 
repealed law. 75 They were fined and received suspended jail sentences. 
Two examples of criticism levelled against the President question his style of 
leadership, indicating that little room for divergent opinion existed within his party, 
and that political power had become too centralised. Firstly, in 2000 William Tonet 
criticised the lack of internal democratic structures within the MPLA. 76 Tonet, perhaps 
one of the President's strongest critics, pointed to the levels of `conformism' within the 
MPLA, and argued that "democracy in Angola, [was] at serious risk" because of it. ' " 
Secondly, in August 1999 Aguiar dos Santos contrasted the man who assumed the 
presidency in 1979, with the same man twenty years later. Aguiar concluded that the 
former `immaculate' image had given way to one of a politician damaged by 
allegations of commissions on oil and arms deals. Aguiar was also critical of the 
President's style of leadership, describing it as a "democratic dictatorship", pointing to 
the exercise of "strong presidentialist power". He concluded that the system was 
"founded on not allowing the necessary `power-balances' in a democratic regime, 
breathe" 
. 
77 \F ' The lack of `checks and balances' was a frequent criticism of the 
74 This opinion frequently emerged in interviews, where it was suggested that the sensationalist style of 
the print media was about promoting sales. In two interviews with private media journalists (July 11 
2000; November 5 2001) I asked about this `sensationalism' but both denied that their papers were in 
any way sensationalist. 
'$ IRIN (2000) posted March 21 2000. Jeanette Minnie, Regional Director of MISA, stated that the 
relevant law had been repealed in 1978. 
76 Vincente Pinto de Andrade expressed concern at the lack of democratic procedures within political 
parties, regarding the extent of fragmentation within political life a cause of serious concern 
for the 
future of democracy. Agora, June 10 2000, p. 5. 
77 Victoria Brittain's book (1998) is highly critical of how power became centralised in the hands of the 
president, and describes the Angolan political system as "presidential regime" 
(Brittain 1998: 94). 
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Angolan political system, explaining why many authors argued that the system itself 
needed restructuring, with some proposing a federalist system of governance. The 
nature of Angolan democracy has frequently been described using a phrase, the origin 
of which 1 am uncertain, `democracia para os Ingleses ver', `democracy for the 
English to see'. It suggests that a veneer of democracy exists which disguises the lack 
of authentic democratic practices within the system. 
The functioning of the President's foundation, FESA (Fundacäo Eduardo dos Santos), 
was also criticised because of the potential damage it was doing to democratic 
structures. FESA, founded by the Angolan president in 1996, functioned like an NGO, 
rehabilitating clinics and schools that were sometimes reopened with great media 
attention during the week of the President's birthday in August. 78 Christine Messiant's 
(1999) article in Politique Africane on FESA, published by Agora on August 28,1999, 
suggested it represented a new form of clientelistic distribution, creating a forum 
whereby the President acted benignly as a private citizen in society. By engaging in the 
health and education sectors, he distanced himself from the failures of his government 
and portrayed himself as a generous caring figure in the midst of a failing and 
incompetent state. Messiant argued that FESA represented an attempt by the President 
to occupy the space of civil society, presenting himself as its symbolic leader and 
patron, further extending his power. 
The comments of the Angolan President after the death of Jonas Savimbi were well 
received in the private media, when he called for forgiveness between Angolans, and 
the need to forget about past hatreds. His speech to the nation was published in Folha 
8 under the heading `Those who Love Peace, must Learn to Forgive'. 
7.2. Scrutinising the UNITA leader. 
The figure of Jonas Savimbi was strongly demonised in the state-run media, where he 
was presented as the reason for the continuation of the Angolan conflict. The private 
print media took a somewhat different view, arguing that because Savimbi was part of 
the problem, he must also be part of the solution, though this view was far from 
unanimous, (see cartoon below). Many within the private media believed that renewed 
negotiations were required for peace. Prominent opposition politicians for example, 
78 The FESA (2003) website outlines further the range of activities engaged in. 
I) 
such as Ngola Kabangu of the FNLA. believed that renewed negotiations incorporating 
developments since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, such as the formation of 
COIEPA, represented new avenues to be explored in seeking peace. 
A September 1 2001. article in Actual ,, w. -as critical 
of the possibility of renewed dialogue with the 
r ý. UNITA leader. The cartoon in fig. 13 which 
accompanied the article, depicts Savimbi saying: 
with me, it is murder in order to dialogue, and 
dialogue so as to murder!? " The implication was 
that either way, it was all about killing for 
Savimbi. Agora in September 2000 published an 
article The Fall of the Devil" after the UNITA 
bastions of Andulo and Bailundo were taken by 
government troops. The author Antonio Pinto 
IFig 13. Savimbi and Dialogue. described Savimbi as a `monster': 
"[Megalomania], intolerance, and cruelty, are the dominant characteristics of 
this controversial political personality, who could have been the great 
alternative within the Angolan opposition". 
He went on to speak of his legacy in terms of mass graves and holocaust for the 
Angolan people. Eugenio Manuvakola, signatory to the Lusaka Protocol on behalf of 
UNITA, argued that renewed negotiations with Jonas Savimbi would have been anti- 
democratic. 79 He had broken away from UNITA and formed the UNITA-Renovada 
(Renewed) party. 8° 
Public awareness of the gravity of the atrocities committed by Jonas Savimbi can 
probably be dated to revelations in 1992 that he had ordered the death of Tito 
Chingunji, "one of the most brilliant UNITA activists", 81 along with his wife and three 
children. These killings led Fred Brigland (1986) who had written a biography of 
Savimbi, to reappraise what UNITA represented. The image of Jonas Savimbi as anti- 
communist fighting for democracy quickly unravelled after the signing of the Bicesse 
Accords, and accelerated upon his return to war after the elections. 
79 0 Independente, February 3 2001; 0 Independente, February 10 2001. 
80 Munslow (1999: 559) mentions rumours that the Renovada founders had received three million 
dollars each from the government"" to found UNITA-Renovada. 
s! Angolense, I6-23 March 2002. p. l0. 
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8. Media Capacity. 
The capacity of the private media to cover the war is an important issue to explore. The 
question arises because we have seen a significant reliance within the private print 
media on research conducted by international organisations, which it then reported. As 
stated earlier, the Angolan private media was a relatively new phenomenon and at an 
early state of development in the 1990s, seeking to express itself in a country where 
freedom of expression had been curtailed by the experience of war and the 1977 coup 
attempt. This meant that, to a certain extent, the media had to work `under siege' and 
create a space within which it could exercise its role. A number of other constraints 
can be identified however, which further reduced the capacity of the media to cover the 
war. 
Firstly, I underline the possibility of professional training for those seeking to pursue a 
career in journalism. The Luanda school of journalism is a second level institute, 
generally regarded by journalists themselves as providing inadequate preparation. 
During the course on `Human Rights and the Mass Media' which I attended in October 
2001, journalists spoke openly of their need for further training to enhance their 
professional writing and communication skills. 82 Curiously, journalists from the state- 
run media institutions were more open and interested in this training than those from 
the private media. 
The question of financial resources is also relevant to the issue of media capacity at 
different levels. The print media was publishing in a very difficult environment, in a 
society where a high proportion of personal income was spent on basic necessities. The 
Angolan journalist Reginaldo Silva suggested that newspaper sales covered only ten 
percent of the costs involved in publishing, that advertising revenue was required to 
bridge the shortfall. 83 A lack of advertising revenue was the reason behind the closure 
of Noticias in 2001, a promising Dundo based newspaper. 
84 Also, some journalists 
82 Course organised by the NGOs ADRA and Search for Common Ground. I comment further on this in 
the next chapter. 
83 Folha 8, December 8 2001, p. 19. 
84 Noticias published five editions between July 2000 and August 2001, and reported on events in the 
provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. It began promisingly with businesses eager to advertise. 
The 
first four editions covered topics such as: the poor treatment of Angolans by local mining companies; 
the plight of displaced people; UNITA attacks in the region; PRS. the local political party; poor 
Dundo 
prison conditions; interview with the local Catholic bishop; and a suggested division of 
Lunda Norte as 
a province. Advertisers gradually withdrew amid suspicions that the provincial government pressurised 
them to do so. After four editions the paper opted for publication as a supplement to Angolense. One 
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were salaried while others were paid per published article. For the latter, this meant 
that journalism was but one job among others engaged in, to earn a living. This 
restricted the time available to pursue an `investigative' journalistic line. 
The ability of the media to report from the front-line was also limited. Travel in 
Angola is expensive and precarious, and journalists were not welcome in certain areas. 
As a result, the print and broadcast media relied heavily on local reporters to provide 
information. Those reporting from Dundo, for example, were faced with basic 
problems such as access to telephones and fax machines, having to join the queues 
waiting to use the town's two phone lines. Given the difficulties of travelling to cover 
a particular story, there is a sense in which the media waited for news to `travel' to 
Luanda from the provinces, which posed problems regarding the reliability of news. 
The print media had great difficulties in securing newsprint for publication, all of 
which has to be imported. Actual ran a front-page headline on December 18 1999, 
entitled `The Paper War', protesting at the shortages of paper. The private print media 
have on occasions provided their own newsprint to the printers to ensure publication. 
85 
Ziegler & Asante (1992: 30) have suggested that controlling the allocation of newsprint 
is a means by which governments control the media. 
The tradition of investigative journalism is weak in Angola and has not served the 
country well at crucial times. One wonders could investigative journalism have altered 
the course of Angola's conflict as early as 1992, had journalists set out to scrutinise the 
implementation of the Bicesse Accords and follow up suggestions that UNITA had 
secretly hidden its army in the bush. The same point may be made with reference to the 
Lusaka Protocol, where it seemed that the discovery of `secret armies' was the task of 
international observers or peace keepers, but not of Angolans. 
article in the supplement is thought to have angered the provincial government, which resulted 
in 
Angolense refusing to print further editions of Noticias. The article assessed the performance on national 
television (July 4 2001) of a government delegation commemorating the province's 
foundation. By all 
accounts the delegation did very poorly, causing acute embarrassment. 
NotIcias accused one participant 
of "stretching the truth" by stating that the number of classrooms 
in the province had increased from 48 
in 1997 to over 100 in 2001, when "not a single classroom had been built since 
1975". 
85 Interview with Actual journalist, Luanda, November 5 2001. 
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Finally, with the death of Jonas Savimbi, Angolense declared the end of the "Savimbi 
boom" for Angolan journalism. 86 It likened the LJNITA leader to "the goose that laid 
the golden egg" for the private media. A photograph of Jonas Savimbi on the cover 
usually pushed up newspaper sales, an acknowledgement that different methods were 
used to drive the sale of the private newspapers. Angolense recognised that the post- 
Jonas Savimbi era would confront the media with new challenges, particularly that of 
improving the quality of its work. 
9. The Public Sphere. 
Chapter two pointed out that Habermas (1989: 227) premised the effectiveness of the 
public sphere on the guarantee of basic rights such as "freedom of speech and opinion, 
freedom of association and assembly, and freedom of the press". I wish to review the 
Angolan public sphere in the light of these rights, bearing in mind that some initial 
discussion on the freedom of association and assembly has taken place in the section 
on historical revision. There, I underlined how history profoundly influenced and 
shaped the Angolan public sphere, most particularly the events surrounding 27 de 
Maio, which led to the substantial closure of the Angolan public sphere. Here, I 
propose to focus on issues related to the possibility of `freedom of expression'. 
A particular difficulty faced by the private media in general was the relatively 
polarised political arena they were communicating into, where political discourse was 
invariably characterised as either pro-government or pro-UNITA, as if only two 
possibilities existed. The lack of critical reflection within the state-run media, 
providing sympathetic and largely uncritical reporting of government activity, created 
a very narrow arena within which communication was conducted. As a result, criticism 
of the government was reductively equated with pro-UNITA sentiment. The private 
media tried to address this polarisation by encouraging an understanding of 
`constructive criticism' and fostering a culture of public debate. For example, a Radio 
Ecclesia debate in October 1999, explored the theme of how to be patriotic and 
simultaneously express criticism, challenging the basis upon which this polarisation 
was founded. 87 Much more needs to be done in this regard. Seeking to engender a 
86 4ngolense, January 4-11 2003, p. 3 
87 Outlined in Folha 8, October 20 1999. 
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culture of debate is an important contribution Radio Ecclesia has made to the Angolan 
public sphere. The discursive space created through its Saturday morning debates was 
the most public of the public sphere spaces identified in this research, where a strong 
notion of `equality' prevailed, based on speech. These public debates attempted to 
build citizenship through public talking and reflection, hence the reference in the 
chapter title to fostering `discursive space'. 
The government clampdown following the return to war in 1998 was highlighted 
internationally by Amnesty International (2000) and MISA (1999) reports. Journalists 
interviewed during fieldwork described this time as particularly difficult, with many 
Fi . 14. Too much freedom of expression Fig 15. Private media under threat! 
personally fearful for their safety. 88 A number of cartoons give voice to perceptions at 
the time which are worth exploring in terms of what they reflect about the public 
sphere. In fig. 14 (Actual, January 22 2000) an MPLA representative states there is 
"too much press freedom" as two journalists stand before him gagged and blindfolded. 
In fig. 15, (Folha 8, December 24 1999) the government is rather shockingly depicted 
as urinating on the private media. These cartoons reveal a public sphere where the 
private media was under significant pressure to be less critical, and where freedom of 
expression was subject to significant restraint. 
88 Interviews with private media journalists, July 5 2000; July 10 2000; July 1 1,2000 
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Following the resumption of war, an 
article by Tonet on January 20 1999, in 
Folha 8 entitled 'General Mobilisation', 
commented on the "selective 
recruitment" of the children of the poor 
"while the children of the leaders go 
overseas". This article was 
accompanied by the cartoon in fig. 16, 
and both were likely partly responsible 
for the government clampdown itself. 
The cartoon shows youths in a line 
awaiting army registration, 
commenting: "here we go once again 
paying for the mistakes of politicians"; 
"I have already lost four brothers in this 
stupid war, I'm all that's left"; "while 
they are getting fat, we're being served 
as cannon fodder"'; and "afterwards we 
will be abandoned like dogs on the 
street". Fig 17, from Folha 8, of January 
23 January 1999, is on the same theme. 
The first caption states: "the defense of 
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Fi 16 General Mobilisation. Fig. 17. `Our' Children. 
the country is a duty of every citizen", 
followed by "their children" about to 
board a plane, and "our children" 
awaiting military registration. These 
cartoons expressed what many felt was 
the case, but the Angolan government took a dim view of such comment. The private 
media was at this time engaged in a fundamental struggle to assert a foundational 
premise of the public sphere, that of `freedom of expression', which these cartoons 
highlight. The government sought to restrict the space for `freedom of expression' as it 
prosecuted the war, while the private media sought to engage in debate on the reasons 
for the return to war and articulate its disagreement with the military option. We see 
here that in a relatively short period of time the Angolan private media had become 
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significant as a vehicle of public opinion, particularly for the churches, civil society 
organisations, journalists and politicians, and was essentially engaged in a struggle 
with the Angolan government over the legitimacy of the war and the right of the 
government to declare war on behalf of the people. 
A striking feature of the private print media within the public sphere, and in its 
discursive struggle with the Angolan government, was the space given to politicians of 
the opposition parties. A similar space was not available to them within the state 
media. Contributions in the form of articles or interviews turned the private media into 
a `mini-parliament', giving the private media a high political content. From a 
theoretical perspective this raises questions as to whether the private media belongs 
within the public sphere framework, given that political parties are not public sphere 
actors in the Habermasian sense. Civil society theory is faced with a similar 
definitional question based on the exclusion of political parties from civil society. The 
issue can be partially resolved if articles and interviews were conducted in a private 
capacity, but this was not the case. In many cases, the authority of an article or the 
importance of an interview lay precisely in the person being a spokesperson for his/her 
party. I do not propose to exclude the private print media from the public sphere 
because of the range of actors who have a voice within the media, but its inclusion 
needs to be qualified because of the significant involvement of political actors. 
By way of conclusion, I propose to briefly review the earlier research questions. 
It was seen how the Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements were criticised for 
excluding non-militarised sectors of Angolan society that could have played a positive 
pacifying role between the two sides. A generally negative assessment of the role and 
influence of international organisations within the Angolan conflict was put forward, 
where peace involvement was regarded as secondary to the economic interests of the 
international community. The peace engagement of the churches was viewed 
positively by the private media, but I have questioned whether this was the best 
approach to adopt. Some brief discussion relating to the Cabindan conflict was also 
presented, a conflict that received little media coverage before the death of Jonas 
Savimbi. 
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It was shown how the media argued for a negotiated end to the war by presenting the 
appalling humanitarian cost of war in conjunction with the levels of corruption in the 
country. By offering such a contrast, the private media argued that war was not worth 
such suffering, that the price was too high. The roles of the Angolan president and 
Jonas Savimbi were also examined, where both men received negative coverage for 
their inability to end the war. The fundamental importance of historical issues to peace 
and national reconciliation, and to the development of the Angolan public sphere, 
emerged as a key theme in this chapter. A public sphere approach enabled the 
importance of the spatial issues involved here to emerge and be assessed in a manner 
that a civil society framework does not permit, underlining the importance of the 
theoretical framework chosen for research. 
Chapter 5. 
Civil Society Organisations: A Multi-Focused Narrative. 
The third of the Angolan peace narratives dealt with in this thesis is that of national civil 
society organisations. These organisations have grown numerically and become quite 
influential since the Bicesse Accords. In a similar way to the private media institutions, 
the development of national civil society organisations throughout the 1990s signals the 
re-emergence within the public sphere of a dimension of Angolan life that disappeared 
after the introduction of the one-party state. While the particular focus of this chapter is 
the role of national organisations, it is important to acknowledge the key role international 
organisations and international NGOs have played as `facilitators' within the development 
of Angolan civil society, a point I examine later. It is also important to highlight the role 
of international agencies and NGOs, in responding to the humanitarian crises since 1992 
(Kibble 2000). These played a vital role through the provision of personnel, finance, food 
aid and medical support during a particularly difficult period of Angola's history. 
The Carnegie report Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997: 111),, highlights an array of peace 
related activities engaged in generally by civil society organisations to address conflict 
and promote peace in different parts of the world. The report points to attempts by NGOs 
to mediate in conflict, build trust between warring parties, provide conflict resolution 
training and education, the strengthening of democratic and judicial institutions which can 
provide a framework for conflict resolution, building indigenous capacity for coping with 
ongoing conflicts, fostering development of the rule of law, and enabling the creation of a 
free press. This list of possible peace activities highlights the need to interpret `peace 
related activity' in a broad sense, as wider than efforts to directly resolve conflict. 
Initiatives which enhance the rule of law, strengthen legal and democratic institutions, 
promote human rights issues, provide space for reflection on the causes of conflict and 
how peace could be promoted, are fundamental to the building of a peaceful society. This 
chapter adopts such a broader approach in highlighting Angolan peace related initiatives, 
hence the chapter sub-title `A Multi-Focused Narrative'. 
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The research questions for this chapter read: 
Q What were the-'principal areas of civil society engagement in favour of peace 
during the period under review? 
Q What form of analysis and reflection occurred within civil society in relation to 
promoting peace and characterising the Angolan conflict? 
Q How prevalent were civil society organisations in Angola and how extensive 
was their impact? 
Q What implications did civil society development have for the development of 
the public sphere? 
In addressing these questions, this chapter focuses on particular aspects of Angolan civil 
society organisations, most of which are engaged in a wider range of humanitarian and 
developmental activities. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section one I trace some contours of the Angolan 
public sphere prior to the Bicesse Accords, a period when the first civil society 
organisations were established. In so doing I situate the origins of organisations such as 
AAD (Accdo Angolana para o Desenvolvimento, Angolan Action for Development), ACA 
(Associacäo Civica de Angola, Angolan Civic Association), and ADRA (Accäo para o 
Desenvolvimento Rural de Angola, Action for the Rural Development of Angola) within 
the political climate of the one-party state, on the eve of the introduction of multiparty 
democracy. Section two begins the specific focus on components of civil society peace 
related activities by looking at how human rights were promoted by three local NGOs, 
Maos Livres (Free Hands), Mosaiko (Mosaic), and AJPD (Associacdo Justica Paz e 
Democracia, Association for Justice, Peace and Democracy). Section three examines two 
texts which I term `peace appeals', produced by groups within civil society, and which 
provide an important window on how Angolan civil society analysed the nature of the 
conflict post-1998. The fourth section highlights the peace engagement of MPD (Mulheres 
Paz e Desenvolvimento, Women Peace and Development), one of the few women-only 
civil society organisations in Angola. The fifth looks at a submission from a group of civil 
society organisations regarding the new Angolan constitution. The final section explores 
initiatives concerned with enhancing `capacity building' within civil society in relation to 
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peace. I examine what ADRA, Mdos Livres, Rede da Paz (Peace Network) and FONGA 
(Forum das ONGs Angolanas, Forum of Angolan NGOs) did in this regard. 
1. Civil society stirrings. 
As indicated in the introduction, I begin by exploring the space within which the first 
group of civil society organisations emerged prior to the Bicesse Accords. The section 
further develops the discussion from the previous chapter regarding the defining 
importance of specific moments in Angola's history which have impacted upon the public 
sphere, through to the present day. In chapter four I showed how events surrounding the 
27 de Maio coup attempt had profound implications for Angolan society and public sphere 
development, particularly in relation to the `freedom of expression'. Here, I want to 
highlight the significance of colonialism and the years of one-party rule, in order to 
underline their impact on the public sphere and on the capacity of Angolans to organise 
independently, and to assert their right to `freedom of association'. I do not posit a strict 
separation between `freedom of expression and `freedom of association', nor intend to 
suggest that 27 de Maio only impacted on `freedom of expression'. These rights of 
association and expression are deeply intertwined in Angolan history, and have impacted 
on the ability of civil society organisations to pursue a peace agenda. 
In relation to the impact of colonialism on Angolan civil society, the historian Maria da 
Conceiräo Neto (200la: 39) makes a valuable contribution. 
"To understand the weaknesses of ... civil society 
in Angola we must study 
Angolans' social and political experiences. People commonly refer to the `sixteen 
years of one party rule', or to lack of freedom of the press under the `MPLA 
regime'. But we must look back further in time. Angola was dominated by a 
Portuguese political system that, after 1926, was a fascist single party regime. 
Even formally, it allowed no room for anybody to practice democratic politics". 
Spatially, Neto is making a most crucial point. By including the colonial legacy within our 
argument instead of taking the MPLA rise to power as a starting point, a sense of 
continuity between the MPLA one-party state and the Portuguese administration becomes 
clear. This continuity is above all a continuity of space. It is important to remember that 
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Angola did not inherit a democratic form of government or democratic institutions in 
1975.1 As Munslow (1999: 557-558) commented: 
"Portugal' s colonial legacy left few democratic footprints upon Angolan soil. Autocratic rule brooking no opposition was the ubiquitous legacy of the Lusophone African empire". 
The period of one-party rule, which continued to the Bicesse Accords, must be appraised 
from a number of perspectives. While seeking to avoid repetition of arguments made 
earlier in relation to the 27 de Maio coup attempt, it is important for the purposes of this 
chapter to underline the sense of terror that accompanied the manner in which the 
government dealt with the coup threat. Coming soon after the birth of the new nation, it 
ushered in a culture of silence and withdrawal which for Schubert (2000: 125-6) meant, 
that "from then on the people knew they must keep their distance from issues of power 
and political responsibility". ' It marked a fundamental rupture between the Angolan state 
and a significant section of its citizenry. Faria (2000: 18) makes the point that 27 de Maio 
illustrated how the government proposed to deal with dissent in the new state. By not 
following due process in granting Nito Alves and his co-conspirators a fair trial, the state 
made it clear that dissent would not be tolerated. 
The introduction of Marxist-Leninism at the Party Congress of December 1977, in the 
wake of the government response to the coup attempt, served to reinforce the closure of 
public space already occurring. It led to the initiation of a `rectification' process which 
brought all civic organisations and associations under the direct control of the Party. 
Somerville (1986: 90) quotes a 1977 MPLA document which described rectification as, 
"[a movement] launched at all levels in order to correct errors, improve methods of 
work, cleanse the organisations of harmful elements and unite all militants behind 
the party's goal. The rectification movement will be the guarantee of unity within 
the party and of ideological firmness of its militants". 
Independent organisations were incorporated within the MPLA's various `mass 
organisations', such as the women's movement OMA (Organizacdo da Mulher 
Angolana), the trade union movement UNTA (Uniäo Nacional do Trabalhador 
Angolano); and the youth movement JMPLA (Jovem MPLA), thereby eliminating 
1 Bender (1978) provides a comprehensive outline of Angola's experience of colonialism, and exploded the 
myth of racial equality that had dominated Portuguese thinking in relation to Angola. 
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independent expressions of civic associational life. In his analysis of this period Malaquias 
(1995: 54-55) writes, 
"[the] Soviet-model adopted by the MPLA ... did not allow for the development of civil society. In fact, it discouraged even the most simple and innocuous initiatives 
from individuals and/or groups. Thus, important segments of the population that had not been co-opted or incorporated into the regime - including peasants, traditional leaders, religious groups, as well as some intellectuals and members of 
the petite bourgeoisie - were not only excluded from the political arena but also 
prevented from constituting an independent social sphere outside of the realm of 
the state". 
As can be seen, 1977, with an attempted coup and the introduction of Marxist-Leninism, 
was a key year in reducing the public sphere. Apart from the churches, no other 
organisation existed independently of government, which underlines the importance of the 
churches to the survival of the public sphere itself in Angola. 
The above description of Angola at the end of 1977 contrasts sharply with that of life in 
Angola from 1974 to 1976. Again I quote Neto (2001a: 42-44) who wrote: 
"Whatever attitude one takes about the course of Angola's transition to 
independence and about its consequences, it was certainly a time of great popular 
mobilisation. ... During this period the people had opportunities for expression and 
action which they had never previously enjoyed. ... 
[T]hey tried various forms of 
organisation, although often without continuity or success; many people had their 
first leadership experiences (particularly women and young people). For many 
Angolans the transition from colonialism to independence was a period of great 
participation". 
This sense of openness and spontaneity had been quickly overturned by the combination 
of factors outlined above. These years were rather unique in Angola, situated between the 
colonial experience and the birth of the one-party state, both characterised by the exercise 
of strict control over public spaces and the curtailment of `freedom of expression' and 
`freedom of association'. 
1.1. Signs of f change. 
The latter years of the 1980s witnessed a slight opening up of the Angolan political 
system, but significant change was only to occur as a result of the peace negotiations 
preceding the Bicesse Accords which witnessed Angola move towards multi-party 
democracy. Notable in this regard, was the abandonment of Marxist-Leninism as the 
political ideology of the MPLA during its third national congress in December 1990. In 
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effect, these changes were to establish the 'legal' parameters which facilitated the re- 
emergence within the public sphere of civil society organisations and private media 
institutions. Hodges (2001: 50-51) lists some of the principal laws passed during this 
period of reform: 
"A constitutional revision law (law 12/91) was enacted in May 1991, coinciding 
with the Bicesse Accords. This proclaimed a democratic state based on the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, and introduced a multi-party system. The 
constitutional revision was accompanied, in the same month, by new laws on 
associations (law 14/91), political parties (law 15/91), the right of assembly (law 
16/91), the press law (law 25/91), and the right to strike (law 23/91). Further laws 
in April 1992 established a new electoral system, [and] permitted the establishment 
of private radio stations". 
The constitutional revision law referred to here did not lead to a new constitution, a task 
reinitiated in 1998 and covered in a later section. 
Prior to the introduction of the new legislation during this pre-Bicesse period, the first of 
the modern civil society organisations were founded. AAD, ACA and ADRA were among 
the first. The challenges faced by these organisations as they sought to establish 
themselves, permit certain contrasts to be drawn. 
Firstly a few words on ADRA which from rather humble beginnings developed 
throughout the 1990s to become one of the leading Angolan NGOs. As director since its 
foundation, Fernando Pacheco has done much to strengthen the organisation, and expand 
its activities throughout many parts of Angola. ADRA was originally founded to assist in 
national rehabilitation and reconstruction after the Bicesse Accords, focusing particularly 
on agricultural development. According to Pacheco, ADRA experienced relatively few 
difficulties when it was founded in 1990, though it took until 1993 for the organisation to 
be legalised. 2 The lack of legal status however, did not prevent ADRA's development or 
functioning as an organisation. Those setting up ADRA and AAD were known within the 
government and their initiatives were regarded as not posing a threat. There is a sense in 
which ADRA and AAD did not represent the birth of new `independent' organisations, so 
much as a migration of personnel from government institutions, the public sector and the 
MPLA, to this new `non-governmental' sector. 
2 Interview with Fernando Pacheco, Luanda, July 14,2000. 
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Malaquias (1995: 195-196) takes the view that these early organisations had nothing to do 
with the development of civil society, but were part of a strategy to extend MPLA 
influence and retain power: 
"the emergence of organised groups commonly associated with civil society and 
their dependent relationships with the state constitutes an integral part of a well- 
designed strategy by the regime to keep itself in power. The MPLA had not 
planned to liberalise the regime and institute a genuine democratisation process 
that would eventually make party-state accountable to common citizens. In fact, 
the reverse is closer to reality". 
The comment rings true for AAD and ADRA whose origins were rather uncomplicated, 
but does not explain why the foundation of ACA (examined below) was so contested, 
except to conclude that ACA, as a first generation civil organisation, was outside the 
sphere of influence of the MPLA. The comment also fails to convey the sense in which 
`independence' from political structures can be achieved over time, as appears to have 
happened with ADRA in particular. While maintaining agricultural development as its 
primary focus, ADRA has in fact widened its activity base to include the promotion of 
human rights, civic education and media training, suggesting that close links with the 
MPLA may have been necessary initially, but that organisations can develop 
independence over time and become critical of government. 
ACA was founded on January 25 1990, and many of its members were active in political 
life to some degree. Its formation was opposed by the MPLA on the basis that it might 
become a political party. 3 However, having failed to prevent ACA organising, the 
government sought to secure the election of its own candidates to prominent positions 
within the organisation. The threat of a crisis was overcome when it became clear that 
both the MPLA and ACA wished Joaquim Pinto de Andrade to be the Association's 
president. The intervention of significant MPLA personalities such as Lopes de 
Nascimento (former chairman of the MPLA and a possible presidential candidate), and 
Marcolino Moco (former Prime Minister) in support of ACA, was also instrumental in 
creating space for the organisation to establish itself initially. During fieldwork in 2001, 
ACA's president, Imaculada Melo described the climate of tension and fear during ACA's 
first meeting as participants noted the heavy police presence outside, and anticipated being 
3 Interview with Justino Pinto de Andrade, Luanda, November 8 2001 
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arrested for their action "4 ACA was certainly viewed by the government in a different 
light to either AAD or ADRA. Melo explained that the delay in securing ACA's legal 
recognition was a significant factor in causing the association's energy to dissipate. By the 
time the legal status had been secured, many ACA members had joined political parties 
and become politically active. In March 2000, after many years of decline and inactivity, 
ACA relaunched itself with Imaculada Melo elected president. 
The composition of ACA, AAD, and ADRA in 1990-1991 renders their inclusion within 
civil society or the public sphere somewhat ambiguous, given the presence there of 
members of political parties and the existence of significant links to the state. This 
ambiguity had changed significantly and was much less evident by the turn of the century. 
The early activity of these organisations indicates a certain direction within `civil society' 
towards development and post-war rehabilitation in the case of AAD and ADRA, and 
towards greater political and civil rights in the case of ACA. Within a short space of time 
these directions were overtaken by the crisis that unfolded when war resumed, and the 
urgent need for a response to the humanitarian crisis witnessed the arrival of many 
international organisations and NGOs. These were to have a significant impact on the 
development of Angolan civil society, an impact I briefly trace next. 
1.2. The role of international civil society. 
As the humanitarian crisis deepened after the outbreak of war in late 1992, organisations 
such as the World Food Programme and a host of international NGOs moved quickly to 
establish structures and deploy personnel in response to the plight of Angolans. The 
majority of these organisations were new to Angola, but collectively they played a 
fundamental role in providing necessary assistance to the unfolding post-electoral 
humanitarian disaster. Howen (2001: 34) put the figure of international organisations in 
Angola in 2001 at about ninety-five, which marks a significant increase from the single 
digit total of pre-Bicesse days. 
After the signing of the Lusaka Protocol many international organisations redefined their 
role and functioning in Angola. While humanitarian relief work remained a priority 
4 Interview with Imaculada Meto, Luanda, November 9 2001. 
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concern, many began to assist the development of national organisations particularly 
through the provision of funding. This post-Lusaka period was one of major growth for 
national organisations, with international organisations actively encouraging the 
development of local partnerships and exercising. a `facilitation' or `enablement' role 
within national civil society. Many international organisations worked closely with local 
organisations frequently taking their lead from them. 5 They provided important funding 
for local organisations to engage in a wide range of activities dealing with human rights 
promotion, adult literacy, poverty reduction, gender issues, the private media, and so on. 
Though Prendergast & Smock (1996) concluded in a consultancy report in early 1996, that 
"NGO-sponsored peace activities hardly exist in Angola", it is during this early post- 
Lusaka period that I date the beginning of what became a significant peace engagement by 
Angolan civil society organisations in the form of human rights promotion. This 
development represented the emergence of a `second' generation of national civil society 
organisations. 
2. Promotion of Human Rights. 
Murithi (1998: 276) noted that since the ending of the Cold War, the task of maintaining 
peace and security has "gradually been linked to the promotion of the respect for human 
rights". He quotes the 1993 report to the Security Council by the then UN Secretary- 
General, Boutros-Ghali, concerning peacekeeping and conflict in Angola, which makes 
explicit the linkage between building peace and promoting human rights. Boutros-Ghali 
(1993) stated: 
"respect for human rights constitutes a vital, indeed a critical, component among 
measures to resolve, on a long-term basis, conflicts of this nature, including efforts 
to promote enduring conditions of peace, national reconciliation and democracy" 
(in Murithi 1998: 276). 
This clear statement regarding the importance of human rights work as a vital part of a 
long-term peace approach is praiseworthy for the ideals it sets out, though the UN in 
5 It is also relevant to highlight an advocacy role of some international organisations on behalf of Angola. 
For example, the Angolan Peace Monitor has contributed significantly to knowledge on Angola. Alex Vines 
has been a key figure in this, and was also influential in promoting the British Angola Forum as a location 
for ongoing reflection on Angola. Jim Kirkwood has done similar work in Canada through the Angola Peace 
Action Network, which helped maintain Angola on the political agenda. 
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Angola has been severely criticised for turning a blind eye to many human rights 
violations and of having pursued a strategy of "see no evil, speak no evil" (HRW 1996: 6). 
In reviewing Human Rights Watch's Angola Unravels, Margaret Anstee (2000) highlights 
some of the difficulties associated with an overt position of publicly denouncing human 
rights violations as advocated by Human Rights Watch. Anstee argued that such an 
approach 
"overlooks the harsh reality that the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG), as a mediator, must remain in communication with both sides 
and that public declarations can result in the breaking of that vital link.... 
Moreover, denunciations by an SRSG are useless unless backed up by elective 
action from the Security Council, which has not been forthcoming in the past.... 
transparency, though desirable, is not always advisable in delicate negotiations 
where premature revelation runs the risk of new approaches being strangled at 
birth". 
While not suggesting that human rights are not fundamental to promoting peace, Anstee is 
stating that a delicate path must be followed between denunciation of human rights 
violations which may antagonise one side or the other, possibly damaging relations during 
peace negotiations, and turning a blind eye. The suggestion within the Angolan literature 
is that this delicate balance was not achieved. Howen (2001: 25-26) for example, argued 
that human rights violations played an important part in fuelling mistrust between the 
Angolan government and UNITA. 
Reports assessing the human rights situation in Angola generally make grim reading, with 
both UNITA and the Angolan government accused of violations. 
6 The 2000 Human 
Rights Watch report on Angola stated: 
"[t]here was little sign of greater respect for human rights as the violations of the 
laws of war for which this conflict has been notable continued. Both the 
government and the rebels... have been responsible for these violations. " 
The Angolan government's response to accusations of human rights violations, was 
frequently one of frustration, as the organisations alleging violations rarely had access to 
LNITA held areas. On many occasions the government's reply to them was to take their 
message directly to UNITA, instead of equating government violations with those of 
6 C. f. the annual reports of Amnesty International, United States Department of 
State Human Rights Reports, 
and of Human Rights Watch. 
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UNITA. Apart from highlighting the extent of human rights violations in Angola, these 
reports also served to underline the difficult context within which national civil society 
organisations operated. As Vines (1998: 25) pointed out, organisations preferred to label 
their human rights work as `civic education', a much less controversial term. 
Organisations made the point during fieldwork that many human rights violations in 
Angola were independent of the war itself, that the military conflict did not explain or 
justify all human rights violations. 7 
Finally, it is interesting to note how the international community's promotion of a human 
rights agenda changed over the period of this research. From being `absent' under the 
Bicesse Accords, human rights promotion formed a significant component of the Lusaka 
Protocol. After Lusaka, increased human rights activity was noticeable, especially with 
regard to training human rights activists, and through the UN's coverage of human rights 
issues, particularly on national television and radio. Speaking during the 2000 Pro Pace 
Congress, the head of the human rights division within the UN Angolan Mission stated 
that the UN "regarded human rights as part of the peace process in Angola" adding that 
the human rights division "had become the principal contribution of the international 
community in the search for peace since 1999" (Howland 2001: 112). " The point illustrates 
how much the international community itself shifted in terms of stressing the relevance of 
human rights work. 
2. I. Human Rights: a Threefold Focus. 
In outlining where Angolan organisations have focused their human rights activity, I 
suggest that three interconnected areas can be identified. Firstly, I look at efforts to build 
public awareness in relation to human rights issues, particularly through the media. 
Secondly, I examine a more focused educational approach which attempted to train human 
rights activists by conducting human rights workshops and seminars. Thirdly, I deal with a 
specific human rights issue focused on by a number of organisations, which illustrates 
increased capacity and awareness within Angolan civil society. I deal with each in turn. 
Firstly, the role of the state and private media has been important in fostering public 
awareness of human rights issues. In assessing this `public awareness' dimension, I offer a 
7 Interviews with AJPD and Maos Livres personnel. 
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specific focus on the NGO Maos Livres, translated as `Free Hands,. 8 The composition of 
Maos Livres is unique: David Mendes the director was a former member of the 
government's counter-intelligence; Alexandre Andre Sebastiäo was a sitting parliamentary 
deputy and member of the National Assembly's human rights commission; Pedro Mateus 
Jodo was a 2000 PhD graduate from Lancaster University9; and also included other 
lawyers and journalists. By 2001 Mäos Livres had established provincial offices in 
Lubango, Benguela, and Sumbe, and was active in many other provinces. The 
organisation was involved in preparing articles for publication each Monday in the Jornal 
de Angola under the title `Law and Citizenship' (Direito e Cidadania), so as to build 
awareness of human rights. Some of the articles dealt with domestic violence 
(12.03.2001), women's rights (03.04.2000; 10.04.2000; 16.10.2000), rights of the child 
(12.06.2000), the right to trade union membership (18.12.200), and the police in relation 
to human rights. For a time the column also hosted a monthly competition entitled `Know 
your Rights', for which prizes were awarded. 
Mdos Livres also furthered awareness of human rights by hosting a radio programme on 
Radio Ecclesia. In March 2000 it began broadcasting a programme called `The Citizen 
and the Law' (0 Cidadäo ea Lei) each Monday morning from 10.00-12.00.10 Many of the 
programmes I listened to were informative, often based on letters from Angolans seeking 
legal advice on court cases, housing issues, unlawful detention, and so on. Callers also 
rang in with queries which the panelists dealt with, or if it required a fuller explanation 
referred the question to the next programme. According the David Mendes, the 
programme had been transferred from LAC after management there wished to screen 
callers in a bid to control content, which Radio Ecclesia did not attempt to do. 11 These 
examples illustrate approaches adopted by an Angolan NGO engaged in promoting human 
rights awareness. It illustrates a relationship of inter-dependence between this form of 
'A direct translation is difficult as the phrase suggests hands that are not handcuffed or bound, hands not 
compromised or tarnished, in other words, an organisation that acts without reserve in favour of human 
rights. The full title of Mäos Livres is `Associagdo de Juristas e Journalistas na Defesa e Divulgagdo dos 
Direitos', the `Association of Lawyers and Journalists in the Defence and Diffusion of Rights'. 
9 JoAo PM (2000). 
10 Each Tuesday and Thursday morning from 10.00-11.00 a similar programme called `Entre Nos' (Between 
Ourselves) with the subtitle `Conversas na radio sobre a nossa diäria, a nossa vivencia, e os nossos direitos' 
(Radio conversations about our daily life, our living and our rights), was broadcast. 
11 Interview with David Mendes, Luanda, October 19,2001. 
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peace work and media institutions. Positively, this ensured that activities engaged in 
received publicity and reached a wider audience around Luanda. Conversely however, 
given the limited reach of the private media and newspaper circulation, large parts of 
Angola are not exposed to this civil society activity. 
Secondly, although many NGOs have engaged in promoting human rights workshops and 
seminars, I propose to look at one organisation active in this area, the Catholic based 
organisation Mosaiko established in 1995. It was among the most prominent and 
important of these because of its commitment to training human rights activists across 
Angola, and also for its publication of a human rights training manual dealing specifically 
with Angola (Mosaiko 1999). By the end of 2001 Mosaiko personnel had conducted 
workshops in at least eleven of Angola's provinces. A week-long workshop held in Dundo 
in 1998 brought together representatives from local churches, the police, local government 
and from surrounding villages. In other places traditional authority figures have also been 
involved. The Mosaiko trainer's manual, around which workshops were organised, is 
divided into four parts: 
1) the history of the universal declaration on human rights; 
2) an explanation of each of the articles within the declaration; 
3) situating human rights within a number of the world religions; 
4) a specific focus on human rights in Africa and Angola in particular. 
The chapters raise issues about the implications of each article for life in Angola and set 
questions to facilitate group reflection. Methodologically the manual is quite interesting as 
it seeks to avoid the suggestion that human rights are being `imported' into Angola, by 
highlighting the relevant articles within Angolan constitutional law which defend the 
principles of the universal declaration. It locates human rights within the framework of the 
Angolan constitution, thereby connecting the promotion of human rights with securing the 
constitutional rights of each Angolan citizen. 
Thirdly, in terms of dealing with specific instances of human rights violations, the NGO 
AJPD was one of many civil society organisations working to address prison detentions 
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and instances where the period of preventative detention had overrun. 12 I examine this 
issue because of its consequences for the Angolan state itself, seen here to be acting 
outside of the law by failing to follow due process with regard to the legal rights of its 
own citizens. AJPD was a relatively new NGO founded by Fernando Macedo and a group 
of young Angolans in 2000,13 all of whom were motivated by their Christian beliefs to 
promote, as the title of the organisation suggests, peace, justice and democracy in Angola. 
In interviews with NGO personnel, 14 many thought that AJPD was overly confrontational 
in its approach, particularly Macedo who on numerous occasions had publicly asked Jonas 
Savimbi and President dos Santos to remove themselves from political life in order to 
allow the Angolan people to live in peace. '5 Others were impressed with the directness of 
their approach, and found it refreshing. 
Under Angolan criminal law a person may not be held for longer than 135 days without 
trial, or a maximum of 180 days of preventative detention under the national security law. 
Regarding these laws, the United States Department of State Human Rights (2001) report 
commented: 
"Over 90 percent of inmates in Luanda still are awaiting trial, and it is believed 
that the national average is over 50 percent. Inmates who have been awaiting trial 
for 2 or 3 years are common". 
The extent of the problem highlighted by AJPD and other NGOs was quite serious and 
went unaddressed for many years. According to one press report, AJPD successfully 
secured the release of a twenty-one year old man who had been detained without trial for 
seven years for stealing a pair of jeans. 16 AJPD also co-ordinated a seminar on `the 
Administration of Justice and the Penitentiary System' on October 11-12 2001, which 
examined difficulties inherent in the Angolan justice system and explored ways forward. 
Recommendations made included the need for greater financial investment and reform of 
the legal system, where some laws date back to 1886. A UNDP (1999: 99) report 
12 Folha 8 interview with Fernando Macedo, December 9 2000, page 10. 
13 AJPD published its statutes in Diärio da Republica on August 11 2000, but still had not been legalised by 
the ministry for Justice in August 2002. 
14 September 25 2001; October 19 2001; October 21 2001. 
15 One such instance was during the 2000 Pro Pace Congress. 
16 Named as Faustino Nguamba, from 0 Independente, December 9,2000. 
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highlighted article 421 in particular, by which crimes involving small sums of money can 
lead to twelve years in prison. 
The above outlines some of the activities undertaken by Angolan civil society in relation 
to human rights. I do not suggest they were occurring evenly across Angola, but they 
represent significant new initiatives from within Angolan civil society in relation to 
furthering peace. As public sphere discourse, these organisations were involved in calling 
on the Angolan government and UNITA to act legally and within a constitutional 
framework in defence of the human rights of ordinary Angolans. This discourse involved 
an appeal for law and order, directed from within society to the parties at war. It represents 
something of a reversal of the argument one is more familiar in Britain and elsewhere, 
where the state is seen to call on citizens to respect law and order. Here civil society is 
calling on the state and UNITA to do so. 
3. Civil society peace appeals'. 
A significant dimension of Angolan civil society's response to war was the publication of 
short treatises or reflections on the conflict, which I term `peace appeals'. These read like 
position statements or open letters, and are relevant to examine because of insight they 
provide into how key groups within civil society analysed the war, and proposals made to 
achieve peace. In so far as this research could ascertain, since the resumption of war in 
1998, four such documents have been published which fall within this category. Firstly, 
the 1999 document called `Manifesto for Peace in Angola', is probably the earliest of 
these texts. Secondly, the April 1999 document from GARP (Grupo Angolano de Reflexäo 
para a Paz, Angolan Peace Reflection Group) entitled `Let us Opt for Dialogue as the 
Definitive Solution to the Angolan Conflict'. Thirdly, an appeal made in 2000 by MPD, a 
women's NGO; and finally, a document published in 2001 by AMC (Amplo Movimento 
de Cidadäos, Broad Citizen Movement). For the purposes of analysis, and given that 
similarities in structure and content exist between all four appeals, I will focus only on the 
first two appeals which were the most important and detailed of the documents. These are 
included as appendixes 1 and 2 at the end of the thesis. I also add some brief comment on 
the MPD peace appeal in the next section. 
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Before examining these documents I draw on a distinction advanced by Ottaway (2000) 
who characterised a relationship between a civil society organisation and its constituency 
as one of either trusteeship or representation. Representative organisations, such as trade 
unions or business associations are formed to articulate the interests of members and 
negotiate on their behalf. Trustee organisations on the other hand: 
"are organisations whose leaders have taken it upon themselves to define and 
represent the interests of people who do not speak for themselves" (Ottoway 
2000: 83). 
Trusteeship in fact, catches the nature of the `peace appeals' examined here, as well as 
much of the activity engaged in by the civil society organisations highlighted throughout 
this chapter. 
The `Manifesto for Peace in Angola' (hereafter 'Manifesto') was signed by over one 
hundred and twenty individuals including journalists, sociologists, university lecturers, 
lawyers, trade unionists, pastors, NGO personnel, musicians, and writers. A number of 
parliamentary deputies and political party affiliates also signed. It had hoped to collect ten 
thousand signatures but this total was never reached. In a 2001 conference paper Justino 
Pinto de Andrade and Rafael Marques (2001) stated: 
"[the Manifesto] should be considered as having been the real launching moment 
for a series of explicit and co-ordinated demonstrations within society, in favour of 
peace and reconciliation''. '? "` 
The GARP document was the product of a `think-tank' which included among its 
membership: Daniel Ntoni Nzinga, general-secretary of the ecumenical body COIEPA: 
Filomeno V Lopes, member of the political party FpD, (some of whose analysis was 
covered in the media chapter); Rafael Marques, the journalist accused of defamation of the 
President; and Francisco Tunga, the director of FONGA. Some international 
commentators described the GARP document as a 'breath of fresh air' at the time. '8 A 
number of points can be made jointly about both documents. 
17 de Andrade & Marques (2001 ). 
18 IRIN website hti. '_ y v. irin. org ofJuk 26,1999. entitled New Peace Movement Launched'. 
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Firstly, each can be considered essentially a trustee document, written by groups claiming 
to be representative of the Angolan people. For example, the opening line of the 
`Manifesto' reads: 
"The Angolan people want a lasting peace, social justice, good governance, the 
right to citizenship, and mutual respect for the diversity of people and cultures, 
which comprise [Angola]" (emphasis added). 
Throughout the document the sense of trusteeship became stronger through the repeated 
use of the phrase "we, the Angolan people". The GARP document expressed trusteeship 
by questioning the legitimacy of the war, stating: 
"Nobody has the right to speak on behalf of the people to start a civil war by citing 
arguments of defence or of resistance. The people were not consulted. " 
The method by which such a consultation could have been conducted was not clarified, 
but both groups clearly saw themselves articulating the view that the Angolan people were 
opposed to the war. The authors of both documents saw themselves as speaking for a 
wider constituency than that of civil society or public sphere actors, speaking on behalf of 
the Angolan people to those who waged war in their name. 
Secondly, the documents set out their understanding of what led to war in 1998. The 
signatories of the `Manifesto' argued that the war was about those in power "plunder[ing] 
the nation's wealth", but their analysis also suggested something more sinister, when they 
commented on the total perversion of power" that operated behind the conflict. The 
`Manifesto' stated that the war would only end when it was realised "that there was no 
definitive military solution for Angolan conflict". The GARP document was more 
forthright in setting out its views on the logic of the war: 
All that appears to matter is the will of half a dozen Angolans immune to the 
sufferings of an entire people and estranged from ... the majority of the people. This reignited war is about disguising a deliberate process of disengagement from 
issues related to the identity and the unity of the Angolan people. The current war, 
imposed on the Angolan people, is nothing but a disguise for the lack of political 
and ideological arguments ... The denial of politics hides the actions of minority 
groups through the slow destruction of the Nation. War has not served the Angolan 
people". 
It was suggested to me by one of the GARP authors, that while the phrase `half a dozen 
Angolans' needed to be interpreted figuratively, it referred to a very small group of 
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individuals on both sides. 19 The argument suggests that the Angolan state and UNITA 
were instrumentalised by these individuals in pursuit of narrow political and economic 
objectives. 
Thirdly, the question of control over Angola's natural resources was also put forward as a 
reason for the war. In both documents, the struggle for control of oil and diamonds was 
situated in a wider context, placing the international community at the centre of the 
struggle. The GARP document highlighted international economic interests and weak 
Angolan political will, in explaining the continued conflict: 
"the successive failures in the peace processes is due to a lack of political will 
among the belligerents, in conjunction with the immediate [economic] interests of 
the international community". 
The Manifesto argued that the '`plundering of the nation's wealth" was carried out 
in partnership with speculative20 outsiders and foreign countries. Oil, diamonds 
and their revenues are the major source of greed by the rulers, the armed 
opposition and the oil multinationals, in particular". 
There is little differentiation here between the `plundering' roles of the Angola 
government, UNITA, and those of foreign countries with economic interests in Angola. 
All are seen as contributing to the misery of the Angolan people. 
Fourthly, the above references regarding the international community's role in Angola are 
part of wider general scepticism, also seen in the media chapter, in relation to international 
involvement in Angola. The GARP analysis was extremely critical, believing that foreign 
intervention had in fact become part of the problem, and partially explained whti peace 
had failed in Angola. It listed Alvor, Mombasa, Gbadolite. Bicesse, Addis Ababa. Abidjan 
and Lusaka, as locations where peace negotiations on Angola had occurred under 
international supervision, each attempting to bring international pressure to bear on 
Angolans. The `Manifesto' was equally critical of international intervention calling on the 
United States, France, England, Brazil, Russia, Portugal and South Africa to "reverse their 
efforts", meaning that 
19 Interview with one of GARP authors. Luanda, October 22,2001. 
l" MY text is an English translation and uses the word 'adventurous' here. I suspect the original Portuguese 
word is aventui-eiro which I would translate in this context as speculative. 
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"instead of pursuing immediate economic and political interests [in Angola], ' these 
countries ought to examine how their involvement in the oil and diamond 
industries served to fuel the conflict, and consequently worked against the 
reconciliation of Angolans". 
These were strong criticisms of the international community. It is normal to expect that 
civil society would engage in `scrutiny' of the functioning of the state, but these comments 
reveal a much deeper `scrutinising' involving analysis of the functioning of the 
international community, finding it complicit in the Angolan conflict because of its 
economic involvement which enabled both sides to wage war. 
Fifthly, both documents set out a number of ways forward. The `Manifesto' addressed 
seven demands to the Angolan government, to UNITA and to FLEC. These were: 
i) an immediate ceasefire; 
2) the establishment, with civil society mediation, of formal communication 
between the warring sides; 
3) the setting up of humanitarian corridors; 
4) the inclusion of a humanitarian budget within the military budget; 
5) the elaboration of an agenda for peace talks; 
6) safe passage for those wishing to participate within a process of national 
dialogue; 
7) funds from within the military budget to cover the costs of procuring peace. 
None of these seven demands were met by the various parties which led some to regard 
the `Manifesto' as a failure, even though there was little that could be done concretely by 
the group itself in relation to most of its demands. A possible exception is the second 
demand calling for the establishment of formal communication between the warring 
parties. Although Jonas Savimbi was under siege from persistent government offensives at 
the time, the possibility of formalising contact with the UNITA parliamentary deputies in 
Luanda loyal to him seems not to have been explored. 
The way forward for GARP was outlined in the opening line of its document: 
"the time has arrived to deal with, in public forum, the absolute promotion of 
dialogue as the exclusive means to find adequate ways to end the Angolan 
holocaust'". 
The nature of this dialogue was also spelled out: 
this dialogue must be inclusive, in relation to the different currents and tendencies 
within civil society, rejecting the idea that without foreigners Angolans are 
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incapable of mutual dialogue, and discover their own way to national 
understanding". 
For GARP, the question of peace in Angola concerned every Angolan. The authors 
believed that a pacific solution was obtainable if the process of dialogue was left to 
Angolans themselves, and included representative societal groups. Again we hear the 
argument that the exclusion from the peace process of Angolan 'civic' actors, had 
undermined the search for peace itself and had been a key structural weakness of previous 
peace agreements. All four 'peace appeals' in fact, were insistent that renewed dialogue 
offered the best chance for peace. 
A sense of collective ownership in relation to Angola's difficulties. and an attempt to 
restructure the manner in which the question of peace was framed through inclusion of 
civil forces permeates these texts. Also emerging was the vie4ý that Angolans had to take 
responsibility for their own crisis, evident in the folloýý ing CARP statement: "We should 
not keep on blaming the colonial heritage and/or third parties for our grievances-. 
Publicly, a shift in understanding was occurring that moved away from blaming the 
colonial legacy or the Cold War for the conflict in Angola. arguing that it was time to look 
deeper and accept greater collective responsibility for the continuation of war and the 
failure to secure peace. The `Manifesto' echoed this sentiment stating "we, the Angolan 
people, should take full responsibility for the solution of our own problems". It as quite 
clear that around the year 2000, the argument for peace put forward by Angolan civil 
society. the media and the churches, had crystallised around key concepts or themes: the 
need for renewed dialogue and negotiation, the need to include civil forces in building 
peace, that the international community was compromised as a peace broker because of its 
economic interests, and that war was a disguise for plundering the nations' resources. This 
structure also revealed a growing awareness that civil society had a fundamental role in 
resolving the conflict. It reflected a degree of ownership from within society. absent in the 
past, in the search for peace. 
Biggs & Neame's (1996: 45) statement that a great deal of NGO or civi I society activity 
does not belong within the scope of what can be 'delivered' in the usual NGO or donor 
sense of the word. is hc{pful in interpreting these documents. I add peace engagement to 
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their comment that "[the promotion of democracy and civil society] are goals to be 
achieved rather than processes and arenas that continually evolve". Appraisal of these 
appeals is best done from a perspective of process and arena. Public sphere and civil 
society `space' is not likely to develop in a linear fashion, but rather evolve by expanding 
and contracting over time. Losses and gains are best assessed with a degree of hindsight 
rather than at the moment of perceived success or failure. It is possible, for example, to be 
critical of the Manifesto for making too many demands which were not considered. 
However, given the general weakness of Angolan civil society and the restraints it 
operated under as the new war began, these appeals were dissenting voices within the 
public sphere offering a critique of both government and UNITA, and international 
bodies. 
4. Women 's organisations. 
Women exercised a variety of important roles within Angolan civil society and were 
reasonably visible with the sector in the period under review. Many key organisations 
such as ACA and the Development Workshop peace programme (discussed later) were 
run by women, though on the whole the number of women exercising prominent 
leadership positions was rather small. This section looks at MPD, mentioned in the 
previous section, one of the few exclusively female organisations within Angola civil 
society . 
21 Founded in 1999, MPD described itself as a 
"civic movement of women in the defence of peace and reconciliation, democracy, 
human rights and the development of Angolan society, without political or 
religious affiliation". ý2' 
The founding group of over t\venty people was largely comprised of professional women 
who were lawyers, psychologists, economists, journalists, teachers and businesswomen. A 
number had trained overseas on government scholarships. By the end of 2001 membership 
had risen to over one thousand, and MPD had established itself prominently within civil 
society. I highlight here three of MPD's peace initiatives. Firstly, I look at its 'peace 
21 OMA, the Organi_acäa dda Mir/her Angolana, affiliated to the MPLA is the largest women's organisation 
in Angola. Founded in 1962, OMA reportedly had 1.8 million members in 1989, and 800.000 ten years later 
(figures quoted by Ana Maria Bastos Nascimento during MPD conference, Luanda. June 15,2001). 
22 Article 1 of MPD Statutes. 
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appeal'; secondly, I examine the June 2001 women's conference on peace organised by 
MPD; and thirdly, I comment on the organisation's expressed wish to personally meet 
Jonas Savimbi in order to discuss peace. 
Firstly, the MPD peace appeal of May 2000 shares many similarities with the GARP and 
`Manifesto' documents, but what distinguishes it from these appeals is that it is written 
from the perspective of Angolan women. There is a real sense of anger in the document 
that springs not merely from the continuation of the war, but from the fact that women as 
wives and mothers had lost husbands and children in the war. This personal sense of loss 
at the level of family is not present in the other documents. Cesinandra Xavier, the MPD 
president, had expressed the view that the women of Angola were tired of having children 
only to see them used as cannon fodder in the war. The organisation had in fact 
encouraged women to become conscientious objectors and not allow their children join 
the armed forces . `3 As International Alert (2001: 18) noted, many women's organisations 
and "women activists express their values, behaviour and codes explicitly as a factor of 
their gender". Clearly MPD was doing this in its peace appeal and brought a unique 
gender perspective to bear on the reality of the Angolan war. 
Secondly, this gender perspective was also evident when MPD hosted the first women's 
peace conference in Angola, held in Luanda from June 14-16,2001. The conference 
(MPD 2001) entitled `Let us Search for Peace with Love', set out as a principal objective: 
"to define a more active role for women in the resolution of the Angolan conflict". 24 
International Alert (2001: 21) observed that in most peace processes and peace 
negotiations there is a tendency to exclude women, despite a "common request from peace 
activists and commentators that there should be more of a female presence". All speakers 
at the conference were women and among the themes developed were: `war and its impact 
on women'; `displaced women during wartime'; `building a culture of peace, tolerance 
and reconciliation'; and `women in the Angolan peace process'. The live broadcasting of 
the conference on Radio Ecclcsia as well as extensive coverage in the private press were 
Opinion ofCesinandra Xavier expressed in Agora, March 3l 2001, p. 5. 
,4 From the closing communique of the conference. 
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significant in maximising the publicity associated with the event, and in placing a female 
perspective on the war at a higher level within the public sphere, even if only temporarily. 
The paper delivered by Cesinanda Xavier contained an interesting reflection on peace, 
which I highlight: 
"we desire development in our society but we know that without peace there will 
be no development. We also know there will be no peace without dialogue and 
reconciliation. Within the African societies we belong to, based on orality, 
dialogue presents itself as the socialising element between men and women, and 
the most effective mechanism for the resolution of conflict.... Therefore, for 
peace to be achieved in Angola, the only means to do so is through inclusive and 
encompassing dialogue.... Many Accords have already been signed, many peace 
negotiations taken place. All this effort in favour for peace failed for two reasons: 
1. The causes were not addressed, only the effects and symptoms. 
2. The process involved only those who possess weapons and make war, not all 
those interested in the pacification of the country". " 
Here we again encounter civil society's emphasis on dialogue as the preferred means to 
end the war, with the conviction that a negotiated settlement was possible despite two 
failed peace agreements. For MPD, this inclusive dialogue envisaged the coming together 
of political parties, church representation, traditional authority, civic movements 
promoting peace, and individuals with an important contribution to make. A strong female 
component was envisaged in all this, which involved public sphere and non-public sphere 
actors working together. 
Thirdly and finally, the MPD initiative to request a personal meeting with Jonas Savimbi 
to discuss ending the war, is worth highlighting. UNITA's representative in Portugal. 
Carlos Morgado (2001), described the initiative at the time as one of "immense courage" 
with the capacity to bear fruit". He was critical of the UN's silence and lack of support in 
relation to the initiative. When interviewed on this issue, Cesinanda Xavier was less 
critical of the UN, stating that the request apparently had to be processed through the UN 
in New York, but did express disappointment that no meeting took place with Jonas 
Savimbi. 2s The example is an important instance of a group of Angolans attempting to 
intervene directly in the search for peace in their own country. 
25 1ntervitw kith Cesinanda Xavier and Ana Maria Bastos de Nascimento. Luanda. NoNember 13 2001. 
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5. A new constitution -a civil society contribution. 
The issue of a new constitution moved up the political agenda when the National 
Assembly formally agreed to draft a new one in 1998 (law l/98). 26 As seen in section one, 
the need for a new constitution had been agreed prior to the signing of Bicesse Accords 
(law 12/91), but the process was not underway before war broke out, being put on hold 
until these new procedures were established in 1998. The need for debate on the new 
constitution was important within the context of building peace. In South Africa and 
Northern Ireland for example, constitutional reform has frequently been a key component 
within the peace process itself. It provides society with an opportunity to re-imagine and 
reshape political structures that may have been divisive or discriminatory, and also to 
build new structures that foster inclusion and a greater sense of nationhood. It potentially 
provides society with a key moment in terms of laying new foundations for peace, with an 
opportunity to start again. The holding of future elections in Angola is dependent on a new 
constitution being ratified. A constitutional revision law of February 1996 (18/96) stated 
that the new constitution must be approved before future elections can be held., ' Speaking 
at the British Angola Forum conference in 2002, Bornito de Sousa of the MPLA. a key 
member in the drafting of the new constitution, thought everything should be completed 
by 2003-2004, and then spoke of a possible 12-18 month adjustment period before 
elections would be held in 2004-2005.28 
In this section I examine the contribution of sixteen civil society organisations who 
together formulated constitutional proposals. ,9 Under the initiative of AAD, ADRA and 
Mosaiko, these organisations focused primarily on 'part two' of the government's seven- 
part provisional constitutional structure, dealing with `rights, freedoms and fundamental 
guarantees'. where a civil society contribution was felt most relevant and appropriate. 30 
2b Angola Peace Monitor, Vol. IV, number 8. April 30 1998. 
27 Point highlighted in Mosaiko (2001) summarising the law establishing the constitutional commission. 
28 Speaking in London November 12.2002. The comment caused some surprise as 2004 had previously 
been indicated as a probable election year. 
'Q A copy of the submission is available at litti): /'www. oaan. Q. or, _Y, adra. 
htm 
30 The new constitution will be divided into seven parts: Part I- Principles and Fundamental Objectives of 
the State. Part 2- Rights, Freedoms and Fundamental Guarantees. Part 3- Economic & Social 
Organisations. Part 4- Organisation of State Power. Part 5- Defence and National Security. Part 6- 
Guarantee and Control of the Constitution. Part 7- Final Dispositions. The Angolan government's 
constitutional commission's website is located at http: -',, vww. comissao-constitucional. v. ao/. 
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Three meetings were held to prepare the submission. The first on December 15-16 1998, 
examined the history of Angolan constitutional law, and identified `part two' as the key 
area where civil society could formulate proposals. At the second meeting a week later, it 
was decided to widen the process of consultation and seek opinion and proposals from 
across the country and from a greater number of civil society actors. This was in response 
to article 7 of law 1/98, which stated: 
"parties recognised by the national assembly, social organisations and citizens. 
may present proposals and contributions on the project of a constitution for the 
Republic of Angola, to be directed to the president of the national assembly, who 
submits them to the Constitutional Commission". 
The third meeting in late February 1999 elaborated the final document which was sent to 
the president of the National Assembly on June 28,1999. 
Many of the points made in the submission reflect concerns of the time. With journalists 
coming under increasing pressure in 1999, these organisations requested that the 
protection offered to many other professions also be extended to media personnel. It 
argued for greater respect for human rights, focusing particularly on the rights of 
prisoners. The organisations advocated that the rights of conscientious objectors be 
upheld, requested to perform a form of civic or community service instead of military 
service. Other points reflected contemporary concerns, such as the inviolability of a 
person's mail and all forms of private communication. The latter reflects a suspicion that 
phone conversations were listened to by the state. Also highlighted were the right to a 
basic education for all Angolans, including those with disabilities, the need for 
clarification in relation to access and use of land, reflecting the growing concern that 
traditional rights were not being respected. In 2000, ADRA personnel approached the 
chairperson of the constitutional commission with a view to establishing if any of the 
suggestions had been accepted. The document had apparently not been forwarded to the 
chairperson of the commission. A further copy of the document was provided. 
Two years after the initial submission, a new range of constitutional issues had gained 
prominence. Mo. saiko personnel identified two key issues around which debate on the new 
constitution had crystallised: %%hether the eighteen provincial governors should be 
nominated by the President or elected by the population of each province; and ho%% should 
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traditional authority be defined within the new constitution? 31 In relation to the first issue, 
many within Angola argued that the new constitution should opt for the election of 
provincial governors in a bid to strengthen local democracy. The argument was that if 
provincial governors were elected by the people, rather than nominated by the President, 
they were more likely to govern better. A National Assembly debate in March 2002 
decided the new constitution would maintain the former system of presidential 
nominations. According to the report, only the Lunda based party PRS voted against the 
proposal. 32 It seems however, that the new constitution will require that provincial 
governors be chosen from the political party with a majority of parliamentary seats in each 
province. 
Attempting to define traditional authority posed a number of problems for those drafting 
the new constitution. Despite having no legal status in law, traditional authority figures 
were entitled to a salary from the state and were classified as public service workers. This 
raised the question as to whether they were state employees and representatives of the 
government, or as they saw themselves, representatives of the people before the 
government. The administration of traditional justice by traditional authorities, and its 
relationship to state justice also needed clarification, given that state law is applicable 
nationally, and traditional justice systems are required to correspond to this. The new 
constitution envisaged the establishment of local government in Angola, which Pacheco 
(2002) believed needed to accommodate traditional rulers and civil society within its 
structures. He argued that this 
"would allow for a smooth transition between the current situation and full 
democracy. It would constitute a magnificent opportunity for civil society to play 
an important role in the restructuring of local societies and the institutional 
strengthening" (Pacheco 2002: 59-60). 
The 1999 submission from a collective of civil society organisations and the later debate 
on the future constitution itself, were partially hampered by the absence of a constitutional 
lawyer within civil society. This did not prevent civil society however. engaging with `part 
two' of the proposed constitution. 
-" Mario Rui of Mosaiko, speaking at the annual meeting of the Catholic Commission for 'Justice, Peace and 
Migration, ' held in Luanda from October 30 -November 1.2001. 
', Jornal de Angola, March 7,2002, internet edition entitled 'Goo ernadores provinciais väo ser nomeados'. 
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6. Capacity building for peace. 
This section examines `capacity building' as a particular dimension of civil society's 
peace agenda. The reason for this inclusion is based on the general characterisation of 
Angolan civil society as `weak', hence I explore efforts to strengthen civil society itself, 
and how such efforts enhanced peace involvement. As outlined in the introduction, I use 
the term `capacity building' to include the ability of an organisation to lobby in pursuit of 
its objectives but, specifically in this case, refers to the ability of civil society 
organisations to organise and co-ordinate action in favour of peace. 
As indicated earlier, many Angolan civil society organisations were founded in the period 
after the Lusaka Protocol. My recollection of this time is of the many workshops and 
seminars held to improve the managerial skills of these organisations, as kkell as skills in 
the areas of needs assessment, project elaboration, report writing and accounting. This 
initial emphasis appears to have been followed by an emphasis on `capacity building' to 
improve the quality of existing outputs. In exploring peace related capacity building, I 
examine how ADRA, Development Workshop, FONGA and Rede da Pa.: engaged in this 
area to illustrate some of the activities undertaken. 
Firstly, I explore a point of collaboration between the national NGO ADRA and the 
international NGO Centre for Common Ground, referred to in the previous chpater. The 
context was a three day seminar in 2001 for Angolan journalists from the private and state 
media on 'Human Rights and Social Communication' which I attended. 33 The seminar 
was organised and financed by the Centre for Common Ground, but ADRA personnel 
were sourced to facilitate the seminar. Forty journalists participated during the three days, 
many of whom had attended previous seminars dealing with media training. An important 
theme examined during the seminar was how better utilise the media to promote peace at 
various societal levels, including awareness of human rights. Many participants pointed to 
the lack of training available to journalists in Angola, where no third level qualification in 
journalism can be obtained. Others highlighted restrictions imposed by editors who 
prevented publication of work overl\-critical of government. They argued that a greater 
'Direitos Humanos e Comunicacäo Social'. Luanda. October 23-25,2001, facilitaed by Helena Farinha of 
ADRA. My thanks to Centre for Common Ground for their invitation to participate in the seminar. 
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peace agenda engagement was not primarily a matter of incapacity or inadequate 
journalistic training, but a question of ensuring their work got past the editor. The point is 
important because it relocates the problem from one of journalistic incapacity to one of 
censorship. 
During the seminar, a consensus emerged that journalists needed to challenge this 
perceived or real editorial space, and reengage professionally in favour of peace. It was 
especially journalists from the state media institutions who raised this issue and by all 
accounts it is they, not private media journalists, who are most eager to frequent similar 
NGO-led seminars. A point made by Berger (2002) is helpful here, which suggests that 
capacity building of this kind belongs more to a public sphere rather than to a civil society 
approach. Berger (2002: 34) comments: 
"While the civil society perspective suggests that the solution to government 
control of broadcasting is deregulation and privatisation, the public sphere 
approach calls for the transformation of government propaganda media into 
properly public media. This conceptual difference has significant implications". 
It appears to me that the facilitation undertaken by ADRA personnel and promoted by 
Centre for Common Ground, was about transforming media institutions into informative, 
critical sites of inquiry, which asked real questions about peace and conflict, about the 
long term development of Angola and the good of its people, irrespective of their 
designation as `private' or 'state-run'. The facilitation approach adopted in the seminar 
revealed a concern with improving the quality, and exploring the possibility of public 
debate within the media, a concern essentially with constructing a critical public sphere. 
Secondly, l highlight two examples of where a number of organisations came together to 
strengthen their collective capacity in working for peace: the peace programme of 
Development Workshop (hereafter DW), 34 and the peace network known as Rede da Pu:. 
both of which are significant in this regard. According to the DW peace building 
programme co-ordinator, Eunice Inäcio, the programme was closely linked with the 
"' Though a Canadian NGO, DW is one of the most established international organisations in Angola, 
operating there since 1983, (Kibble & O'Neill 1997: 332). The DW peace programme reflected the activities 
of local actors such as AEA, CICA. CEAST, AEDSA (Ecumenical Action for Social Development in 
Angola). IECA, : ý/osaiko and EONGA. For this reason I include the DW peace programme as an Angolan 
location where perspccti\es on peace ýýere discussed and developed. 
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activities of the major Churches or church organisations, especially at local level. 35 In 
chapter three it was seen how the historical churches established COIEPA as an 
institutional mechanism in 1999 to work together for peace. Prior to this in 1998, the 
churches and a number of NGOs had come together with a view to "providing assistance 
to small initiatives of churches and civil society organisations that aim at leadership, 
conflict resolution and human rights" (Development Workshop 2001). At local or 
community levels, many churches and civil society organisations had programmes to 
promote peace and the DW initiative attempted to consolidate these. 
The other example is that of Rede da Pa: or `Peace Network', established by COIEPA in 
late 2001. The sole criterion for membership of the network was the acceptance that 
dialogue between those at war represented the best means to secure peace. It brought 
together many civic organisations including traditional authority figures. and its very 
formation was a clear and public statement in favour of alternative methods to end to war. 
other than the military campaign under way at the time. It was a further attempt to 
institutionalise the Angolan peace movement by speaking with a unified voice and 
establishing clearer communication in relation to peace. The initial impact created by Rede 
da Paz was positive in terms of publicity and media coverage. After the death of Jonas 
Savimbi Rede da Paz called for a role for civil society in the monitoring of the Luena 
Peace Accords. At a meeting held in Luanda from May 29-31 2002, the peace network 
met to analyse the Luena document itself. I discuss this meeting briefly in the next 
chapter, as some of concrete proposals put forward are particularly relevant at the 
community level. 36 
In setting out these examples of capacity building, mention must also be made of FONGA. 
Given its role as an NGO forum, it is reasonable to expect that FONGA would have taken 
the lead in initiatives of this nature. Indeed FONGA was a member of both the DW peace 
programme and Rede da Pa:. However, it appeared beset by many internal problems and 
in need of serious reorganisation and reform at the end of 2001. Faria (2000: 25) criticised 
FONGA for acting primarily as an intermediary organisation between local NGOs and 
Interview in Luanda, October 26 2001. 
See Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2002) for the full text of this document. 
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donor agencies, rather than offering leadership within civil society. Other criticisms to 
have emerged in fieldwork in relation to FONGA, included: it was undemocratic and in 
breach of its own constitution by not conducting elections; it failed to bring Angolan 
NGOs together or serve as a forum for reflection and priority setting. Munslow (1999: 56 1) 
highlights a general assembly held in 1997 where only 70 of the 300 registered NGOs 
participated, and of these only 30 had actual programmes. During fieldwork research in 
November 2001, FONGA called a meeting to draft a letter to represent the views of 
Angolan NGOs for Ibrahim Gambari, then UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on 
Africa. Only five organisations were present at the meeting. 37 Such weak participation 
reflects disillusionment with FONGA, as NGOs no longer regarded it as representative of 
them. There remains however a need for a well co-ordinated Angolan NGO forum. 
6.1. Capacity Building: some financial considerations. 
The question of international funding for Angolan organisations is one I propose to 
address in a general sense, in relation to its potential to enhance peace related capacity. 
The issue is important because a significant degree of civil society's development is a 
direct result of the availability of external funding. Also, civil society organisations 
themselves have been highly responsive to the shifting emphases and directions of donor 
finance and donor priorities. particularly as Angola moved from the humanitarian crisis of 
1993-1994, to post-war reconstruction following the Lusaka Protocol and an increased 
emphasis on human rights promotion, then back to crisis again in 1998 with a new 
emphasis on supporting local peace initiatives. Some interviewees were of the opinion that 
some organisations were good at tracking the changing donor environment, and submitted 
projects for funding that had more to do with identifying donor funding priorities. than 
anything that emerged from a basic needs assessment. 38 This is suggestive of what Chabal 
(1996: 46) termed the `Caliban syndrome', the `'extent to which Africans have learned to 
speak the language we [non-Africans] want or need to hear" (quoted in Jackson 2003: 20). 
'' In September 2002, Ibrahim Gambari, was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General in 
Angola and head of UNM. A, the United Nations Mission in Angola. 
's Interview July 27 2000, interview October 22 ? 001. 
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Questions over the role of funding are prompted by an assessment of Angola's early civil 
society development offered by Malaquias (1995) in his doctoral thesis. Analysing 
thirteen of the first national NGOs, he wrote: 
"they were created by individuals who wanted to take advantage of the real or 
perceived economic and financial advantages associated with having an NGO. 
This inflation of pseudo-NGOs was further stimulated by the perception that 
financial help would be forthcoming from the government and, possibly, from 
international partners as well" (Malaquias 1995: 198-199). 
The author is unequivocal that the first generation of NGOs were founded primarily as a 
response to potential financial opportunities on offer. Malaquias's overall assessment of 
Angolan NGOs prior to 1995 is rather negative. It leads to the impression that the creation 
of these NGOs was more about personal gain for their founders, than about pursuing 
objectives in relation to development or reconstruction. Malaquias's view not surprisingly, 
differs to that outlined by Fernando Pacheco, who situated ADRA, the organisation he 
founded, within the anticipated requirements of post-war reconstruction following the 
Bicesse Accords. There is no doubt that many people involved with national NGOs have 
done well financially, through their salaries paid in foreign currency, the lease of 
properties as office space, foreign travel and other opportunities. But to suggest a singular 
reason for the development of the NGO sector in Angola is overly reductive, and denies 
the possibility of altruistic and patriotic motivations of those involved. Angolan civil 
society seemed a different place at the end of 2001 to that identified by Malaquias in 1995. 
The perception that a great deal of international funding was available to Angolan civil 
society is seriously challenged by data from a number of surveys. For example. Hodges 
(2001: 82) quotes a 1996 survey conducted by the UNDP and the government ministry 
MINARS, which found that the average annual budget of national NGOs was less than 
$170,000, compared to international NGO budgets of $2.4 million. Howen (2001: 33) adds 
further detail to national NGO finance by quoting a 2000 PACT39 survey which stated that 
"51 % of NGOs had annual incomes of less than $20,000, and only 7 organisations or 8% 
had funding of over $200,000 per year", illustrating that the majority of national 
organisations deal with relatively small sums of finance. Howen also quotes an ADRA 
survey which revealed interesting findings regarding the salaries paid to NGO personnel. 
39 PACT - Private agencies Collaborating Together Inc. Howen is quoting an unpublished sure,. 
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ADRA found that only 29% of NGO staff received a salary, that 18% received some form 
of subsidy, and 53% received no remuneration. It is unclear how extensive this latter 
survey was, but taking the data at face value, these figures point to a very high level of 
dependence on voluntary work within civil society, and that almost 70% of Angolan 
personnel are non-salaried staff. These must presumably secure income from elsewhere, 
perhaps the informal sector, but the figure has profound implications for the capacity of 
any civil society organisation to achieve its objectives or to engage in peace related issues. 
Taken collectively, this data from Hodges and Howen challenge the suggestion that civil 
society organisations are motivated primarily by perceived financial rewards, pointing 
instead to nobler values. 
Some of these values include altruism and dedication, perhaps even patriotism, and a 
sense of doing something positive by helping those in need. I would also suggest that 
some of the initiatives outlined in this chapter, such as human rights awareness and 
capacity building initiatives, were motivated by a sense of professional engagement with 
peace, that many from within a civil society `workplace' engaged creatively and 
professionally to transform Angola incrementally. These professionals, part-time or full- 
time, understood peace work as a long-term strategy that went beyond an end to military 
confrontation, but involved addressing structural and institutional issues. This 
professionalism may have been born out of frustration with the unending nature of the war 
and its devastating impact on the country and its people, and with the inability of the 
Angolan government and UNITA to implement any of their peace agreements. 
I conclude this chapter with some brief discussion on the earlier research questions. The 
chapter has explored key aspects of Angolan civil society peace engagement, revealing a 
significant emphasis on human rights awareness, which became a key component of civil 
society discourse within the public sphere. A civil society contribution in relation to the 
new constitution was also outlined, highlighting a willingness within civil society to come 
together to influence the content of the future constitution. The chapter also examined a 
women's organisation which contributed to peace by appealing for an end to the war and 
creating space for women to meet and discuss peace issues, especially how women were 
affected by war. 
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The analysis of two peace appeals was particularly insightful regarding perspectives on 
the conflict from within Angolan civil society. These revealed a desire for greater national 
participation by non-political actors in the search for peace, and were highly critical of the 
Angolan government and U-NITA, arguing that war had become necessary for elements on 
both sides to pursue economic and political objectives. The documents negatively 
appraised international intervention, suggesting that a civil society component was 
essential in any future peace process, illustrating increasing maturation occurring within 
civil society generally. The chapter identified the post-Lusaka period as significant in the 
development and growth of Angolan civil society, a time when its peace engagement 
became more prominent. 
The `public sphere of civil society' was certainly a much larger place at the beginning of 
2002 than that which existed prior to the Bicesse Accords. This related to quantitative 
issues, such as the numerical growth of associations and organisations active in peace, 
humanitarian and developmental areas, which consolidated the associational basis of civil 
society. However, it is the discursive basis of civil society, its contribution to public 
sphere discourse in relation to peace issues, that this chapter identified as having particular 
importance in qualitative terms. As a form of critical discourse, indeed 'critical trustee 
discourse', civil society challenged the basis upon which war in Angola was fought. This 
challenge, had previously been located within the discourse of the historical churches, but 
now also found expression in civil society and in private media institutions. 
This development, in terms of a plurality of locations engaged in critical discourse, 
presents a theoretical paradox in Angola. As seen in chapter two, a democratic expectation 
accompanying the development and growth of national civil society is that the state 
becomes more accountable and transparent before its citizens. The paradox in Angola is 
that the development of Angolan civil society, where the public sphere has also increased 
spatially, has not resulted in increased governmental transparency or accountability, but 
instead witnessed state power become progressively centralised in the hands of the 
presidency. One must conclude that the expectation of greater accountability 
accompanying civil society development is either unfounded, or that civil society must 
reach a particular level of maturity and stature before the expectation is met. Either ýtiaý. 
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during the latter years of the period under review, the processes of civil society 
development and governmental transparency and accountability, appeared to be 
relationally independent of each other. 
Chapter 6. 
Community-Based Peace Responses: 
A Narrative of the Common People'. 
This chapter on `community-based peace responses' situates itself within Angolan 
communities. Little analysis has taken place at this level within Angola either during the 
colonial or post-colonial periods, though as Robson (2001: 6) pointed out: 
"it is becoming clear that peacebuilding might involve actions at the community 
level that require some prior knowledge of social trends at that level". 
The focus of this chapter is slightly different to that of the previous, where analysis 
concerned how the national conflict was understood. Here, attention is more locally 
focused on what Angolan communities did for themselves to address issues of violence 
and conflict within their immediate contexts. On occasions this material will be relevant to 
the national conflict, but primarily the focus will be on local peace concerns which 
required local solutions. In adopting this approach, the chapter will contribute to a greater 
understanding of local Angolan communities, and their responses to violence and conflict. 
A basic expectation of a peace process is that the cessation of hostilities leads to a 
reduction in violence and insecurity. Unfortunately this expectation is sometimes 
unfounded as peace agreements inadvertently usher in new forms of violence. A CIIR 
(I 999b: 11) report on Haiti, Guatemala and South Africa concluded that it is not 
uncommon to find that formal peace processes alone are not enough to rid a society of 
violence". Pankhurst & Pearce (1998: 160) found that the El Salvador peace process, 
"[had ended] the more extreme elements of violence, but ... poverty and 
human 
rights violations remain as persistent as ever, many exacerbated by the very 
conflict itself. Yet this is widely regarded as a successful mediation" (emphasis in 
original). 
Afshar (1998: 5) identified a weakness in formal peace deals, whereby 
"[they] do not alloy violence at the micro-level to be included in the negotiation 
process. They tend to draw a veil over the reality that though armed conflict may 
have been subsumed, ex-combatants are often responsible for domestic and other 
' The reference here to -common people' is in no sense intended to be offensive. It is taken from Habermas 
(1992: 427) as a description of his plebeian public sphere, explained further in the chapter introduction. 
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forms of violence. Failure to resolve the structural issues which led to the conflict 
generate frustrations in the form of increased criminality". 
What persists is a form of `horizontal-violence' (CuIR 1999b: 11) which, though frequently 
a major issue during the conflict itself, was considered of secondary importance and 
placed to one side while efforts to resolve the national conflict were explored. However, 
with national peace agreements in place, the continuation of this violence becomes 
problematic and is seen as destabilising attempts at consolidating a peace process. 
Chapter three of this thesis noted the rise in violence in Angola, identified by the historical 
churches in the months following the 1991 Bicesse Accords. AEA (1991) highlighted 
increased criminality and pointed to the failures and inadequacies within the justice 
system of the time, whereby "citizens [felt] obliged to take matters into their own hands". ' 
CEAST (1991: 269) referred to levels of criminality and violence previously unseen in 
Angola. In effect, Angola's own experience after the Bicesse Accords especially, suggests 
a similar reality to that identified in other countries, where conflict may have ended but 
violence and criminality threaten security and stability in new ways. Clearly peace 
processes in themselves do not necessarily bring about an end to violence. Other processes 
are required and it is at the local level that I explore community based responses and 
initiatives. These stand alongside the activity of civil society organisations, the churches 
and the media. 
The research questions for this chapter can be set out as follows: 
Q What have Angolan local communities done to address violence and conf ict' 
Q What specific issues have these local communities addressed? 
Q What mechanisms or structures have been used locally to promote peace? 
In addressing these questions I have divided the chapter into two main sections: section 
one deals with community responses within local churches, and section two examines 
traditional community responses. I will outline the content more fully at the beginning of 
each section, but a brief explanation is relevant here. Firstly, interviewees pointed out 
during fieldwork that all the significant community-based organisations involved in peace 
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activities were associated with a church. 2 I was surprised by this response, but found it 
reflected of the nature of the organisations in question. Hence, the section deals with 
church-based community organisations. Secondly, section two uses the word 'traditional' 
because the peace related material here concerns the role of the traditional healer within 
rural communities. It explores the relevance of activities and practices engaged in by local 
healers for consolidating peace, especially in terms of `psychologically' demobilising ex- 
combatants, particularly relevant following the signing of the Luena Accords. At the 
beginning of section two I will outline how the word `traditional' is used in this research. 
The word `response' in the chapter title is an important indicator to the material that 
follows. It embraces more than the term `organisation' which fails to capture some of the 
community-based activities this chapter considers important. Some church-based 
community responses clearly belong to organisations. but. as will be seen later. key 
elements do not. 'Responses' helps distinguish communit\-based organisations from civil 
society organisations, though I do not postulate an absolute differentiation between them. 
The two areas overlap and in many cases the distinguishing criterion is one of degree. For 
example, community-based organisations generally have deeper roots within Angolan 
society than civil society organisations and have little or no access to international donor 
assistance. If finance is available, it is usually micro-finance rather than project-based 
donor funding. Both leaders and members of community-based organisations generally 
have remunerated employment elsewhere, frequently considering their voluntary 
community involvement as a contribution to society or their church. Community-based 
structures are more informal and temporary than those of civil society. Traditional 
community-based material is better understood as a cultural response rather than an 
organisational one. Traditional healers apply their knowledge of healing as part of their 
profession, unrelated to any organisation. The word 'response' more accurately captures 
the nature of the material the chapter engages. 
The use of Habermas's public sphere framework is faced with certain challenges and 
difficulties in the context of this chapter. The revisions to the public sphere set out in 
2 During interviews for example with Justino Pinto de Andrade, Luanda. November 28 2001: Manuel 
Quintino, Luanda, September 26 2001; Lourdes Diogo . Aimeida of 
CICA. Luanda, 'November 21 2001. 
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chapter two which expanded the concept of the public sphere in keeping with Habermas's 
original insights, enabled Habermas's theory to be used in the earlier part of this thesis. 
The concerns of this chapter however, take us away from these generally formal structures 
within Angolan society, to community based responses that are sometimes informal and 
often semi-structured. These concerns lead us in the direction of what Habermas termed 
`the plebeian public sphere', which he excluded from his public sphere framework. I have 
shown in chapter two where Habermas recognised how he failed to appreciate the 
significance of this sphere in his original presentation of the bourgeois public sphere. It 
was not simply "a variant of the bourgeois public sphere that remained suppressed in the 
historical process", as Habermas (1992: 425) had initially thought. Nor as we have seen, 
was it 
only a backdrop, that is, a passive echo of the dominant culture; it was also the 
periodically recurring violent revolts of a counter-project to the hierarchical world 
of domination, with its official celebrations and everyday disciplines" (Habermas 
1992: 427). 
This plebeian public sphere or "culture of the common people" as Habermas (1992: 427) 
described it, was radically different to the bourgeois. 
In setting out the theoretical framework for this thesis, I sought to expand Habermas's 
insights in a direction that seemed appropriate and consistent within the parameters of his 
original concerns, based on Habermas's recognition of the limitations of his earlier work. 
To explore the "culture of the common people" within a revised Habermasian framework 
would, I argue, push Habermas too far away from his original field of inquiry and seek to 
name something as `Habermasian', which Habermas did not engage. This is not to suggest 
that Habermas's insights cannot assist in furthering understanding of the plebeian public 
sphere, in this case community based realities, but to name this sphere as '1 Iabermasian' 
seems unnecessary and inappropriate. As I illustrate in chapters six and seven, Habermas's 
insights are instructive in understanding processes and cultures that his theory did not 
engage or envisage, but to frame these processes within a `Habermasian public sphere 
framework is beyond where I situate the limits of his theory. The public sphere dimension 
of these next two chapters is better captured by Seyla Benhabib's (1992: 87) definition of 
the public sphere: 
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"whenever or wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action 
engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity". 
I refrain from calling it Habermasian, but where possible, I read these realities through 
Habermas's public sphere. 3 
1. Community-Based Church responses. 
Speaking at the `Angolan Reflections on Peace Building' conference held in The Hague, 
Octavio Fernando (1999) of AEA delivered a paper on The Role of the Churches and 
Church-based NGOs' in promoting peace and national reconciliation. Referring to 'micro 
level' church involvement, Fernando identified the following activities as important 
contributions to peace: human rights workshops and seminars, civic education, conflict 
resolution and prevention, training of leaders, activities fostering the development of a 
harmonious society, ecumenical services and demonstrations. A number of these activities 
were examined in the last chapter, for example, human rights workshops promoted by the 
church based NGO Mosaiko, indicating a certain overlap between this and the previous 
chapter. I situate many of the activities listed above within this community-based 
approach to peace and reconciliation. Before examining these however, I look at the 
concept of `culture of peace' which informs much of the activity occurring within the 
churches at the community level. 
The `culture of peace' concept became significant within the language of the historical 
churches in the late 1990s in framing its peace initiatives. This reflected its growing 
emphasis within international circles, most notably the UN, where UNESCO (2002) 
described a `culture of peace' as: 
"transforming conflict; preventing potentially violent conflict and rebuilding peace 
and confidence among peoples emerging from war. ... Building a culture of peace 
involves providing children and adults with an understanding of the principles of 
and respect for freedom, justice, democracy, human rights, tolerance. equality and 
solidarity. It implies a collective rejection of violence". 
1 am keenly aware of the vastness of Habermas's work and theorising. Given that my theoretical 
framework is based on Habermas's public sphere and not other parts of his theoretical project, I will restrict 
the commentary I provide in this chapter to Habermas's writing on the public sphere. 
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Malang's (2001) definition is similar but includes an important emphasis on "inter-cultural 
understanding". The notion of `culture of peace' is important because it encapsulates 
much of what the churches contributed to peace at a societal level, where they have argued 
that an end to the war, understood simply in terms of weapons becoming silent will not 
bring about peace. Unchallenged violence, even in wartime, compounded the task of 
working for peace by creating a climate of insecurity. Building a culture of peace was seen 
as involving each member of society in an attempt to invert a culture of violence. This 
approach to peace is sometimes referred to within the churches as "education for peace" 
(CICA 2001 a) or "creating a new mentality" (CEAST 1996: 366). seeking to build or 
rebuild civic behaviour and foster wider citizenship. It reflects a belief that "the logic of 
peace begins with each one of us". `' 
A number of documented examples convey this broad civic approach to peace promoted 
by the Churches. For example, a series of seminars on `Lasting Peace' by the Angolan 
Evangelical Congregational Church (IECA 2000), held in a number of Angolan provinces 
in 1998 and 1999, produced a report which stated: "every citizen has the duty to be an 
ambassador of peace in his/her house, place of work, and the city where they live". It 
added that "any programme of lasting peace is participative, and its success depends on 
the contribution of all its members". This work for peace was described as seeking to 
effect a deeper transformation of the person and society, in the hope "of having peace at 
home, peace in the street, peace in the schools, progress and prosperity for all". " At one 
level these statements appear to reflect a top-down approach from a national church to 
local communities, which is undoubtedly a factor, but in an important sense these 
statements exemplify the national church reflecting back to the local community what the 
local community itself is saying. A further example again from the IECA church, was a 
youth conference held in Benguela in August 2000. A statement from the conference 
reads: 
"the present war which has taken so many lives, has no foundation..... peace is 
not simply the absence of war, but a process which ought to be concerned with 
relationships between human beings" (CICA 2000). "' 
Comment made during a meeting with a bible -group at the Carmo Church, Luanda, November 21 2001. 
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It went on to call for greater action by the churches in the promotion of peace. arguing for 
the development of moral and civic education programmes within the churches, schools 
and families, and to include democratic education. 5 Initiatives at the local level are not 
simply the implementation of institutional policies from above. but reflect shared 
concerns. As the example illustrates, the local level was asking for greater leadership and 
planning from above. 
The section is structured as follows. Section l .1 situates 
local churches , ti ithin the 
community, underlining their role as places of `interpretation' and as centres of -civic 
education' for local people. This is important because it provides individuals and 
communities with a vision of a better Angola that seeks to strengthen the fabric of society 
based on civic and family values. The section developed out of a question I frequently 
posed during fieldwork about the reasons for an individual's church involvement. Section 
1.2 outlines some of the structures utilised by local communities in addressing violence. 
particularly domestic violence, which is a serious issue in Angola. Section 1.3 explores 
means by which local communities communicate publicly, examining the role of peace 
gatherings and peace marches, and also presents a statement by Angolan refugees living in 
Zambia, highlighting their desire for peace in their native land. Section 1.4 adopts a 
gender perspective, looking at the place and role of women's organisations, specifically a 
Catholic organisation called Promaica, which challenged police officers and military 
personnel regarding the insecurity created by them in the communities where they worked. 
1.1. Places of Interpretation and of Civic Education. 
While churches are clearly places where local communities worship, they have also 
exercised other functions within Angolan society. On occasions local churches have been 
used as locations for the distribution of humanitarian aid, or church networks have been 
used to ensure that aid reaches the most needy in society. 6 In many places churches are 
used as schools, health clinics, dispensaries. and as locations for holding meetings. 
s In 2000, CICA and COI EPA were working on a project called 'Education for Peace', which it hoped 
would result in a school textbook. Interview with Noe A tberto Jose of CIC, A. Luanda, \ovember 21 2001. 
6 Caritas was responsible for a good deal of food distribution at one stage of the 1992-1994 war and used 
church buildings and personnel for food distribution. 
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Robson and Roque (2001: 135) highlighted the "social and religious activities" undertaken 
by the churches, before commenting that: 
"[c[hurches are almost the only places where residents of ... neighbourhoods can meet, discuss or take part in an activity together.... Also, churches appear to 
provide points of stability in a context of rapid change'". 
While the churches have provided stability for many people, they have also played an 
important role as `places of interpretation', where people could seek understanding and 
advice in the midst of high levels of insecurity and poverty caused by war and internal 
displacement. This space, characterised by the promotion of values such as love and 
forgiveness, peace and reconciliation, and the affirmation of human dignity, (which is not 
to suggest that churches are immune to disharmony). became increasingly important as the 
sequence of wars unfolded especially for Angola's poor, who transformed them into 
vibrant hopeful centres, in contrast to the harsh realities that surrounded them, becoming 
places where new interpretations and perspectives were gained. This space has been 
important on two levels. 
Firstly, individuals responding to the question of why they were members of a church, 
frequently underlined the advice or `conselho' received there. 7 Catechists, teachers, 
preachers, priests, or pastors - whatever the designated term within different churches - 
were often described as people who listened and tried to understand, and could be called 
on for advice. For many, their church was one of the few places within society where 
advice could be obtained. Counsel had been sought on a range of issues, including 
personal problems, family matters, issues of reconciliation within the home, extended 
family or with neighbours. Others stated that this advice was part of the general 
communication process within the church, considering it as locally focused practical 
advice. It was civic in nature, promoted within a context where violence was rejected as a 
means to resolve disputes, and peaceful means encouraged. There was also a strong public 
quality to the nature of this communication, conducted in an open place. The style of 
communication varies from one church to another with some quite participative and 
discursive, suggesting we are dealing with a public sphere location in the Habermasian 
sense in such instances. 
This opinion was voiced by many individuals and groups, perhaps most clearly during a meeting with over 
thrty members of a 'bible study' group in Luanda on November 21 2001, at the Can-no church. 
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Secondly, the churches were also understood by many as places of interpretation of wider 
political and social issues. Church participation often provided a person with a language, 
usually biblically based, with which to identify and analyse Angola's ills. In the retelling 
of stories from the bible, for example, and reflecting on biblical themes such as oppression 
and liberation, slavery and freedom, many Angolans heard echoes of their own history. 
particularly the struggle for national independence. Themes dealing with conflict and the 
need for forgiveness, or hatred and the need for reconciliation. have also prompted 
reflection on the war and the need for non-violent means to resolve disputes. Epstein 
(1991: 225) noted how some 
"Christians like to point out that poor people in the Third World understand the 
message of the bible easily because it is about oppression and resistance in a 
society very much like those they live in". 
Those frequenting the historical churches would have heard communications from CICA, 
AEA. and CEAST, where the perspective from the churches' leadership were set out. The 
comment highlights a sense of identification experienced in local communities as biblical 
stories are recounted, an identification which instilled hope that things could change, that 
war could end. 
1.2. Local Structures to Address Conflict and Violence. 
The existence of groups with a mandate to act on behalf of the community in relation to 
peace, reconciliation and justice is a positive feature of many church based communities. 
lt is not uncommon to encounter groups such as 'Comissäo da Justica e Pa. J '. (Justice and 
Peace Commission), 'Comissdo da Familia', (Family Commission). 'Comissäo do Lar e 
Famdia' (Commission of the Hone and Family), `Assembleia de Catequistas' (Catechists 
Assembly) and other similar structures. Though strength and effectiveness varies in 
different communities, the existence of these groups denotes the presence of an 
infrastructure that can be called on to address violence and to effect peaceful change, and 
also to engage with issues of social justice in society. These groups are not found within 
all church-based communities but were well established in the fieldwork areas. For 
example, CICA has a 'Department of Justice. Evangelisation, Reconciliation and Co- 
operation' (Deparlamento de Justices. Evangelismo. Reconcilia(do e Cooperaý o, 
DJERC). run by Noe Alberto Jose who co-ordinates local initiatives, including outreach 
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programmes to the provinces. 8 Local `Justice and Peace Commissions' within the Catholic 
Church are part of a diocesan and national structure. The IECA Church had a project 
called `Paz Durävel' (Durable Peace) based on the idea of a `peace ondjango', the term 
used in Angola to denote the traditional meeting place and site where conflict was 
addressed. 9 The ondjango will be explored more fully in the next chapter, a key structure 
within traditional society. 
These examples point to community structures which provide a framework for local 
communities to address violence and conflict, thereby potentially making their local 
environments more peaceful. To explore these structures more fully I focus now on the 
specific issue of domestic violence and examine different approaches utilised. 
1.2.1. Domestic Violence. 
Meintjes (2002: 4) makes the rather disturbing comment: 
"[e]vidence confirms that the gender violence women experience in ýý artime 
increases when the fighting dies down". 
The quotation points to the importance of examining domestic violence within the context 
of this research, a form of violence that increases once conflict ends, and explore some of 
the means available to address the issue. Pillay (2002: 35) notes that in the "aftermath of 
conflict" women's exposure to brutality and torture generally escalates. This is related to 
the return home of soldiers from war, often traumatised and poorly equipped to speak of 
their experiences. Demobilised soldiers may not cope well with their new unfamiliar 
situation, perhaps adapting poorly to civilian life and feeling a sense of powerlessness 
away from their `familiar' military context. Though women invariably suffer more than 
men during conflict, Sideris (2002: 52) has suggested that "men's identity might emerge 
from conflict even more damaged than women's", underlining the need for effective 
demobilisation programmes that address the question of identity, and experience of trauma 
in war. 
s Interviewed in Luanda on November 21 2001. 
From APAN (2002). Update Angola, No. 2 Vol. 4, July-September 2002. 
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Attempting to establish the incidence of domestic violence within any society is difficult 
because of under-reporting. No detailed reports exist for Angola which provide statistics 
on the prevalence of domestic violence, but the existing evidence suggests that the issue is 
a serious one-10 A Jornal de Angola editorial from April 2002 entitled 'Violence in the 
Home', strongly suggested that domestic violence was increasing and had resulted in the 
death of a number of women, though it did not connect this with the post-conflict increase 
in domestic violence mentioned above. " I have identified three approaches used to 
address domestic violence in Angola, which I set out below. 
Firstly, domestic violence has been covered in the print and broadcast media, as part of an 
educational approach which highlighted and examined the issue, though in neither case 
could the coverage be considered extensive. Radio Ecclesia programmes, particular]v 
those dealing with human rights, also dealt with the issue. In the private print media the 
topic generally received greater attention during the month of March, when 'International 
Women's Day' and 'Angolan Women's Day' are celebrated. Within the churches this 
educational approach is evident through talks and seminars. CICA's women's department 
for example, promoted a series of talks in member churches on the theme `Violence 
against Women'. 12 A perception prevails however, that domestic violence is a private 
issue which receives occasional publicity but then recedes again. It is a transient issue 
within the public sphere that moves between the private and public spheres. 
Secondly, church groups occasionally intervene in cases of domestic violence. The pastor 
of the Seventh Day Adventist church in Dundo spoke of his church's twelve member 
`Comissdo de Lar e Familia' (Home and Family Commission) which intervened in such 
issues. '3 Many churches have similar family structures. While usually waiting to be 
invited by families needing assistance, such groups also take the initiative themselves. The 
10 See for example, Actual December 8 2001, page 11; 0 Independente August 31 2002, page 7: Jornal de 
Angola reported a statistic of 1772 cases during the first six months of 2002 in Cazenga, Luanda's most 
populous bairro. 
11 Jornal de Angola (April 3 2002). It commented that the Ministry for the Family and Promotion of 
Women, the National Children's Institute and the Women's Network had important roles to play in 
addressing domestic violence. 
From CAA (2000). 
j' Interview with Pastor Eliseu Vitor, Dundo, October . 
2001. 
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right of church based groups to intervene is largely unquestioned, especially if those 
involved are from the same church. Despite the prevalence of violence, Angolans have 
retained a belief in talking or dialogue as the means to resolve conflict, inherited, in my 
view, from practices within the traditional structure of the ondjango. Though the ondjango 
is not found in the city. its principle of providing a forum where individuals meet and talk 
still prevails. Hecht and Simone (1994: 85) commented that, 
"[though] more and more Africans now live in urban areas, they've neither 
abandoned the sensibility of the rural village nor have they assimilated themselves 
into an urban ethos". 
Many, if not most urban Angolans, live semi-urban/semi-rural realties. In many respects, 
church-based interventions are built on traditional structures and principles, particularly 
the rights of elders to offer counsel as they would have done in the village setting, though 
this has changed in the context of the city. The mandate of church-based groups to 
intervene is built on this cultural understanding and expectation. 
A third approach to domestic violence straddles church-based and traditional practices, 
based on the cultural practice whereby women have the right to call a meeting of key 
individuals to express how they are being treated. These individuals include: members of 
both extended families; those who witnessed the payment of the dowry, regarded as 
trustworthy in the eyes of the couple and both families; and those who were the official 
witnesses at the civil or religious wedding, known as padrinhos. These meetings provide 
the woman with an important forum to express her opinion, and outline her grievances. 
All present are given the opportunity to speak and if the relationship is considered 
irretrievable, the dowry may be returned and the couple divorce according to traditional 
means. If the relationship continues, a family member is sometimes nominated to 
accompany the couple. This forum, belonging to the private sphere, is more usual in rural 
than urban areas, and points to an important cultural mechanism invoked to address 
domestic violence. 
There is also evidence of limited government support in this area through the creation of 
Advice Centres to support women. For example, a centre established by the '%.. I inistry for 
Family and Development of Women' dealt with 1,820 family related issues, many related 
to domestic violence. in the first six months of 2002 (Joi"nal de Angola. October 14. 
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2002). According to media reports, a number of cases were referred to lawyers; _ 
but in so 
far as I could establish during fieldwork from interviews with a number of lay"yers, there 
has yet to be a case in Angola of someone being convicted for domestic violence. This 
raises the issue of an effective legal system that takes the question of domestic violence 
seriously and enables women to have confidence that the legal system offers them 
protection and the possibility of redress. These legal mechanisms are not in place in 
Angola. 
1.3. Local Communities Communicating Peace. 
This section sets out to consider ways in which local communities publicly communicated 
a desire for peace. Local communities have always prayed for peace and an end to the 
war. It was especially from within this sector of the population that the rank and file of the 
FAA and UNITA troops were drawn, in many cases through conscription (FAA) or 
conscription and capture (UNITA). Families frequently attempted to hide their sons during 
times of conscription so as to prevent them being drafted into the army. Often there was 
little that could be done when a new draft was announced and their sons were taken away. 
The families' pain and anguish was often compounded by a lack of information 
concerning where the young men were sent for training. Despite a feeling within local 
communities that this was not `their' war, as shown in the cartoons in chapter four, these 
feelings rarely took the form of organised protest. This was due I believe, to a feeling of 
powerlessness that anything could be done to make a real difference and, bearing in mind 
the sense of terror that followed the 27 de Maio coup attempt, by a fear of organising 
publicly. 
Within this context where public protest was rare and perceived as dangerous, I highlight 
two examples which illustrate some occasional means used by local communities to 
express a desire for peace. The first is that of demonstrations such as peace marches or 
gatherings, where public communication was both verbal and non-verbal. Chazan 
(1994: 273) noted how events such as demonstrations and vigils, were methods used by 
grassroots organisations "to express their positions". While peace marches usually 
involved speeches. the communication occurring is best judged, not from the content of 
the speeches. but from the size, mood. and enthusiasm of the crowd. A candle light vigil 
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for peace with people walking silently, for example, may communicate as powerfully as a 
well delivered speech. The second example is a document by Angolan refugees in Zambia, 
communicating their wish for peace and a desire to assist in the process, through their 
churches and an international organisation. 
1.3.1. Peace Demonstrations. 
Peace demonstrations in the form of gatherings or marches represent a popular forum 
where thousands have come together to express a desire for peace. '-` These gatherings or 
marches are usually expressions of support for institutional peace initiatives, but also 
reveal an alliance between community-based organisations and leadership structures in 
pursuit of a shared ideal. It is not uncommon generally, for leadership initiatives and top- 
down processes to fail to attract popular support, but a feature of Angolan peace marches 
and gatherings was the support they enjoyed, revealing significant popular ownership and 
support for the peace strategies promoted by the institutional churches. This for example, 
was a feature of how COIEPA (the historical churches ecumenical peace commission) 
sought to mobilise public opinion in favour of peace, after its establishment in 1999. It is 
because these strategies enjoyed such local level support that I locate them within the 
framework of community-based responses, not within the peace narrative of the historical 
churches. 
Though I have suggested that peace demonstrations represented a relatively recent 
phenomenon in Angola, they belong within an older cultural form familiar to Angolans, 
where events involve public walking and singing. Burials, for example, usually involve 
people walking from the home of the deceased to the cemetery. crying and singing as they 
go. In more recent times, the walking has been replaced by the hire of vehicles and, 
though the form may have changed, the public nature of the event remains. Marriage and 
betrothal ceremonies follow a similar pattern of public celebration. It is not uncommon in 
rural areas to encounter a crowd singing and dancing as a young woman is accompanied to 
14 Schubert (2000: 217) refers to an ecumenical celebration after the Bicesse Accords, held on June 2 1991, at 
the national football stadium in Luanda. It was requested b% the Angolan president and was not an initiative 
of the churches. 
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the house of her future husband. Against this cultural background I interpret peace 
demonstrations as a public form of communication in favour of peace. 
The Economist (2000) captured some of the vitality and dynamism of a peace march 
organised by COIEPA in 2000, stating 
"COIEPA's first big action was to organise a march for peace on June 1 Ith in 
Luanda, which culminated in a huge ecumenical service in the national football 
stadium. The marchers set out from three points in the capital, to converge, singing 
and dancing, on the stadium. By the time COIEPA's secretary-general rose to 
explain his organisation's goals, he found himself addressing a congregation of 
10,000. This is the churches' strength: no other organisation can mobilise as many 
people" 15 
Gatherings of this nature represented a means by which individuals and local communities 
expressed their desire for peace in their own right, and also supported the peace work of 
organisations such as COIEPA. Collective gatherings and peace marches of this nature 
represented a secure form of demonstration, on the basis of `safety in numbers'. Collective 
forms of demonstration address both the needs to communicate and to feel secure in doing 
so, representing, to use Scott's (1985) celebrated phrase, `a weapon of the weak'. It has 
the advantage of ensuring greater security for those who may fear speaking individually 
and being singled out, and also ensures greater representativity than individual 
communication. These gatherings also validate `from below' the positions adopted by 
organisations within civil society whose work reveals a posture of `trusteeship', as 
outlined in the chapter five. 
Popular mobilisation is by no means confined to church organisations. The government 
and UNITA have a long history of organising comicios or political rallies in support of 
their objectives (Schubert 2000: 163). These involved speeches to assembled crowds who 
gathered to hear a speaker or number of speakers. Two examples are worth highlighting 
because they illustrate clearly this collective form of communication. Though not 
originating within church-based communities, the examples concern peace activity at a 
" CICA newsletter no. 49, stated that a similar peace march also took place in the province of Bengo on the 
same day. CICA no. 107, highlighted the strong peace theme that accompanied the ecumenical gathering 
held at the national football stadium in 2001. celebrating 26 years on independence in 2001. During my time 
in Dundo, many of the churches held public events to celebrate a religious festival or occasion, which 
invariably involved prayers for peace and an ending to the war. 
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community level. The first expressed popular approval after the April 2002 cease-fire; the 
second communicated disapproval at the administration of the governor of Malange Flävio 
Fernandes, during the President's visit to the city in June 2002. 
Firstly, the Jornal de Angola of April b, 2002 described the general sense of relief and 
celebration at the signing of the Luena Peace Accords, on April 4,2002, manifested in a 
peace demonstration: 
"Angola, from Cabinda to Cunene, yesterday dressed in white to salute the 
definitive end of the war and the arrival of peace. Thousands of people, especially 
in the provincial capitals participated in long marches to greet the signing on 
Thursday of the formal signing of a cease-fire between the Angolan Armed Forces 
and UNITA military forces". 16iv 
Over fifty thousand were said to have marched before gathering near the offices of the 
national radio station, to celebrate the ending of the war, a momentous moment in the 
history of Angola. 
The second example centres on the Presidential visit to Malange in July 2002, part of the 
new 'open presidency' style of government, in which the President proposed holding 
regular government meetings outside the Angolan capital in order to have a clearer 
understanding and appreciation of local concerns. The Journal ofAngola (July 6,2002, 
p3) estimated that 70,000 people turned out to greet the President in Malange. After the 
President had spoken, the provincial governor Flavio Fernandes (mentioned in chapter 
four in relation to critical media coverage of his administration), was called on to speak. 
The disaffection with which he was held by the people became apparent as the crowd 
prevented him from making his address and protested by booing and holding placards 
aloft at his years of misgovernment. 17 The President, who had seemed impervious to 
media criticism regarding Flävio Fernandes' administration, was obliged to intervene and 
declare that the province would have a new governor. It was an extra-ordinary moment 
16 The statement strangely ignores the fact that FLEC's war in Cabinda had not ended. also evident 
elsewhere in the state media at the time. A Jornal de Angola editorial of November 11, stated "Today, for 
the first time in their history as a free nation, Angolans commemorate their national feast in peace". The 
November 12 editorial quoted President dos Santos's address to the nation on the previous day: The page 
of war has been closed for good, and the political agenda for national pacification has been fulfilled". In his 
2002 end of year message, President dos Santos did speak of the Cabindan conflict, expressing the hope that 
peace would have been secured before the next elections. 
"Agora, Jul} L', 2002. 
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and Angolense suggested that the protest reflected a new form of civilised `rebellion' in 
the country. '8 The public repudiation of Flävio Fernandes reveals the degree of 
exasperation felt by a people no longer willing to follow the script of the comicio, to 
simply applaud what was said by political officials. The protest was probably not entirely 
spontaneous (placards require preparation) and it is an interesting example of people 
recasting their public behaviour to demand change, to reveal that local government no 
longer enjoyed their consent. Worth noting here is how the comicio as a communicative 
arena was transformed and became a `temporary public sphere' when the crowd began to 
express its disapproval and voice its own opinion. We have an example here of the culture 
of the common people breaking through to communicate with the political sphere. It 
shows that the public sphere within Benabib's definition can be most anywhere, as long as 
people are engaged in critical communication with one another. 
1.3 2. Refugees. 
This sub-section highlights how Angolan refugees utilised their churches as a resource to 
communicate their aspiration for peace in their native land. The document entitled The 
Mongu Communique on Peace Initiatives on Angola', comes from refugees living in 
Zambia and is included as appendix 3 in this thesis. 19 Some of the Angolans in the camps 
in question, had been refugees for thirty-four years and longed to return home. The 
document was the result of a visit to these camps on November 26-27,2000, organised by 
the Committee on Angola for Peace, a sub committee of the Southern Africa Churches' 
Ministries for Uprooted People (SACMUP 2000). 
The text itself, signed by eight representatives of various churches within the camps, 
testifies as to how a group generally considered 'voiceless', successfully communicated 
their sense of desperation and a desire for an end to the war in order that they could return 
home. They utilised a resource available to them to articulate their point of view, namely 
their membership of different churches. The following extract illustrates their perception 
Is 
, -{ngofense, 
July 13-20 2002, page 5. 
'° This text was forwarded to me bý a colleague in Angola. All information in the document is attributed to 
Shirley Wolf, Regional coordinator of SAC\IUP, The refugees at Nangweshi and )vtavukwa}uk\\a Camps 
met at Limulungu Pastoral Training Centre. v1ongu, Zambia. 
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of the war as senseless, and communicated their desire to be included, together with 
church leaders, in peace negotiations: 
"As refugees, we feel rootless, abandoned, forgotten and have become a group of 
people without human dignity. It is in this vein that we strongly ask for peace in 
Angola because we do not have an answer as to why the war is continuing. ... We [recognise] the existence of a fragmented church; i. e. the urban, the bush and the 
refugee camps.... We appeal to political parties to exercise tolerance and stop 
intimidating Angolans praying and working for peace. We recommend that leaders 
of the church in the diaspora be included in all efforts for peace in Angola.... We 
hereby unreservedly offer ourselves to be included in all peace negotiations for 
Angola. We are tired of the war and we want to go home". 
A strong sense of isolation is palpable in the document, including the frustration of being 
unable to communicate effectively with the outside world. Circulated among the Angolan 
churches, the text reveals how refugees responded to a visit by an international agency to 
publicise their needs. The example shows that powerlessness and poverty do not 
necessarily imply passivity, but also suggests that the views of groups such as refugees, in 
order to receive adequate attention and due consideration, require other influential actors 
within the public sphere to highlight them. The document is an example of how discourse 
within the plebeian public sphere can be picked up by another party considering it 
2° important and relevant and communicated within the bourgeois public sphere. 
1.4. Community based women's organisations. 
The approach adopted in the previous chapter, examining the contribution of women's 
organisations as a specific category, will be continued here by looking at church-based 
women's organisations. I take a specific focus on a group called Promaica, a 
Catholic 
organisation engaged in promoting women's development. Organisations of this nature 
generally have multiple objectives including faith and personal development 
(through 
bible study, prayer and group meetings, talks and human development programmes), and 
skills development (literacy, cooking, sewing). These provide various settings 
for social 
interaction and offer practical means to improve the quality of people's lives. 
Many of 
these activities are directed at strengthening the `private' or `domestic' sphere. 
but these 
20 I also wish to include here a brief reference to a group of displaced people from the area of 
Lövua, about 
50kms west of Dundo. In 1997 they fled to Dundo and eventually settled as a group near the old airport. 
After building their homes. they proceeded to build two small churches, one Protestant, the other Catholic. 
It 
appears to me that for this displaced group, the rebuilding of community structures was 
intrinsically 
connected with the recreation of church structures, which maintained the cohesiveness of the group. 
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organisations are frequently characterised by a strong social commitment evident through 
a range of outreach activities. For example, during interviews with Lourdes Almeida of 
the CICA's women's department, and with personnel from Caritas (CEAST humanitarian 
agency) in Luanda, 21 it was pointed out that many groups had taken it upon themselves to 
visit prisons and hospitals recognising that prisoners and patients needed assistance, being 
among the most vulnerable in society. 22 These groups would not necessarily have 
described this as peace work, but rather as part of their civic or Christian duty. In many 
instances those organising the visits had been displaced from their areas of origin and 
remarkably were addressing the hardships experienced by others through a form of `meals 
on wheels'. Donations of food would be collected within the community. prepared and 
transported to the hospital or prison and then distributed. State institutions in Angola 
provide some food to prisoners and patients, usually insufficient to meet a person's 
nutritional requirements. Families generally have the responsibility of providing food. 
These are practical examples of attempts to alleviate the effects of war. 'Vv ithin this 
dimension of women's organisations' social outreach, I examine an instance of peace 
engagement in the southern coastal town of Benguela in 1999. I am aware that the 
example is from outside the chosen research areas, but I justify its inclusion because of its 
importance and the approach to peace and security it reveals. This engagement was 
recounted to me by Promaica personnel in Dundo and Luanda, who had attended a 
training course in Benguela in 1999, where they heard first-hand the details of what was 
undertaken. 
I characterise the nature of the engagement undertaken by Promaica as an attempt to 
`humanise the war'. Uniquely and courageously the organisation took it upon itself to 
challenge military and police personnel in Benguela regarding their threatening behaviour 
and the stealing of goods and money, primarily from local women as they returned home 
from their fields or traded in the town market. The issue of insecurity in Benguela has 
Lourdes Diogo Almeida, interviewed Luanda, November 21 2001; group interview with Paulo Antonio 
Jodo, Ana and Quintas, of Caritas team, Luanda, August 4 2000. 
11 For example. a number of Dundo churches collaborated over a number of years to ensure 
food was 
brought to the local prison each Friday. As a result, prisoners were not only fed once a week, but the prison 
was cleaned and tidied, which had not been occurring on a regular basis. 
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been highlighted elsewhere by Parson (2002) who commented on the government's 1997 
`anti-banditry' campaign in the provinces of Benguela, Huila and Huambo. Parsons stated: 
"[this campaign had to be] abandoned because the MPLA were forced to admit 
they did not have control over their own security forces, while in Luanda violence 
perpetuated by those services was often indistinguishable from general criminal 
activity". 
Clearly the area was experiencing serious internal security problems, independent of the 
threat posed by UNITA. International Alert (2001: 22) identified the security forces as one 
of the institutions frequently most in need of reform in post-conflict contexts, where 
retraining is generally needed to ensure a reduction in violence and corruption. 
Central to the approach adopted by the Promaica group was the use of a strategy based on 
shared cultural understandings of the extended family, whereby one addresses others as 
mother-father, grandfather-grandmother, aunt-uncle, brother-sister and so on. out of 
respect, though there may be no relationship of consanguinity. The usage appears 
somewhat unusual at first, and one is unsure of how these familial terms apply in different 
contexts. It does however, indicates friendship and respect for the person with whom one 
is speaking. Having received authorisation from the respective commanding officers, 
groups of six or eight women visited army barracks and police stations in the area, with 
smaller groups calling at checkpoints and to private security personnel. In their meetings 
the women got to know the personnel in question by engaging them in conversation about 
where they were from originally, if they received news from their families, if their 
families knew where they were and what their families did for a living. They asked how 
the war had affected their families, if they had been displaced, had access to food, to their 
land, and so on. Building on this information, they then asked how these men would feet if 
their families, their mothers and fathers, had food and money stolen from them, and were 
assaulted if they did not co-operate. The police and military accepted that such things 
should not happen which enabled the women to ask why similar things were being done to 
the men and women of Benguela who, in the cultural context, were also family, were their 
mothers and fathers. 
The strategy produced tangible results as some of the military and police apologised for 
their behaviour. saving they had not understood what they , giere doing. Others wrote letters 
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conveying regret for what happened and thanked the women for their visit and for what 
they had said. Culturally speaking, the women were the mothers of these men, an 
understanding they were able to build on in addressing the issues threatening their 
livelihoods and the security of their households. We see here a group of women drawing 
on their gender and culture to address a local issue. The engagement promoted by these 
women was creative and remarkable, and I look at it from two perspectives: the nature of 
their political engagement and the possibility of engendering peace discourse. 
1.4.1. Political engagement. 
Swerdlow (1989: 22216) has characterised the political engagement of women's groups as 
"usually short-lived", leaving "an ambiguous legacy in terms of political culture and 
feminist consciousness". Though the women's group cited above continued to exist, its 
activity can be described as short-lived, reflecting a task-centred approach that focused on 
a specific achievable concern. Had the word 'political' been applied to the women's 
activity, they would possibly have terminated the initiative because as King (1989: 282) 
states, "politics is by definition a big-time, abstract, male enterprise". Most likely the 
women would have characterised their activity as Christian rather than political, 
highlighting the overlap or ambiguity that oftentimes exists between religions action for 
justice and political engagement. Rowbotham (1992: 294) however has cautioned against 
ascribing a consciousness to a group that they themselves do not claim and has instead 
spoken of "protests that have no name-, a description that can perhaps be applied here. 
This usage of familial terms reveals what Faure (2000: 161) calls "an integrative 
mechanism" that "leads to a shift in problem framing". The question of insecurity in 
Benguela was not interpreted as an `us-them' problem, but was addressed (not resolved) 
by establishing relationship and common links. This approach also sheds light on the 
unease felt by many at the community level in relation to what they perceive as the 
confrontational approach adopted by some media publications and civil society 
organisations. Confrontation, in the sense of condemnation, is generally only resorted to 
by community-based organisations %ýhen other methods have failed to produce a dividend. 
By conducting their campaign in familial terms, the women felt comfortable in doing ýýhat 
they did. 
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The right of women to speak publicly or voice protest in Angola raises issues about the 
discourse of women within the public sphere. Though no legal or constitutional 
restrictions to impede women in this regard, ambiguity arises at the cultural level as some 
interviewees suggested that women have no public voice and no authority to speak 
publicly. 23 These argued that rural women in particular had internalised a strong sense of 
not having a voice, highlighting the existence of significant cultural barriers that need 
surmounting. Despite these cultural assumptions and interpretations, and statements to the 
effect that women have no voice, Angolan women have protested and made their voices 
heard. This is sometimes done by organising in a different way through transient or task- 
centred structures, as in the Benguela example. It was also seen earlier in relation to 
domestic violence, where women speak by invoking family structures within which their 
right to protest is unchallenged. Peace demonstrations and marches were also used by 
women in communicating their desire to see an end to the war, and reflected some of the 
peace-related activity engaged in by Angolan women. 
1.4.2. Engendering Peace Discourses. 
Pankhurst and Pearce (1998: 158-159) have raised an important question regarding the 
need to engender peace discourse. They stated: 
"a gendered analysis of conflict would help to provide a more sophisticated 
understanding of conflict which could assist in conflict settlement and conflict 
resolution. In understanding the causes of conflict, there is a need even to reach the 
first level of engendering, i. e. making women visible amongst the male-dominated 
narratives of war which dominate those of conflict analysis". 
In relation to the Angolan conflict, the paucity of women's organisations speaking on 
behalf of women is noticeable. The various Angolan discourses outlined in previous 
chapters reveal a public sphere dominated by men. This is not necessarily to suggest that 
these voices are unrepresentative of women, but to underline the fact that women's 
experience articulated by women, has been weak within the Angolan public sphere. 
Though war disproportionately affects women. and peace is above all understood as a 
victory for women, this differentiated experience remained under-represented 
in public 
sphere discourse. 
'' Group interview with setien Angolan women, members of a religious order, 
Luanda. July 27 2000. 
-4 David Birmingham, concluding remarks at BAF (2002) 
Conference. 
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While the majority of Angolan women's organisations are most evident at the community 
level, there is a certain invisibility about them. The quiet unobtrusive way in which these 
organisations go about their work possibly contributes to this. Nevertheless. their 
importance for women and society should not be underestimated. These organisations 
represent important meeting places where women meet and talk. constituting one of the 
key arenas for women. A number of Promaica organisations I visited had over one 
hundred members present, with weekly meetings beginning around 6.00 am, (the early 
hour perhaps further explains why some women's organisations remain invisible)! One 
woman described her weekly meeting as "a place where women can speak freely. We all 
speak, we all want to partake". v Conversation takes place across different languages, with 
women translating for one another. The establishment of community radio and 
community-based print media, neither of which exist in Angola, could be significant in 
ensuring that local voices are heard, especially women's, thereby promoting greater 
diversity of opinion. 
Women have clearly created spaces for themselves where they can talk and communicate, 
but in many cases these places fail to achieve `publicity' to be considered public sphere 
discourse. The public sphere is certainly weakened by the failure to have these `other' 
spaces included, spaces where women feel more comfortable to communicate. Kendrick 
(1991) argues that it is especially within such spaces that solidarity is generated, which 
later becomes a basis for mobilisation. Women's peace action and peace discourse is 
largely a product of experiences of solidarity gained in these `other' places. 
Women's public discourse is faced with different issues to that of men's public discourse. 
One of these is the crucial role of culture, where women's public opinion is undervalued 
and often not welcome because of the gender of the speaker. Cultural influences shaping 
and constructing the public sphere should not be underestimated, where the female public 
use of reason is often invalidated because of the 'identity of the speaker', a key 
characteristic of the public sphere as seen in chapter two. Though Habermas failed to 
recognise the gendered nature of the public sphere, his belief in a space where identities 
were suspended so that rational argument could occur, is potentially an important 
contribution towards expanding the Angolan public sphere. Cultural processes of 
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exclusion within the public sphere need to be challenged to ensure the inclusion of 
women's voices. 
2. Traditional Community-Based Responses. 
This section on traditional community-based responses represents a different point of 
entry into the same arena as explored in the previous section. It outlines a second set of 
peace responses within this community-based arena, by applying the research questions to 
`traditional' personalities, and asking about `traditional' structures in the resolution of 
conflict. This section explores the role of the traditional healer. the kimbanda, 25 and will 
focus in a particular way on the rituals of healing employed by the kimbanda, when 
reintegrating soldiers back into local communities. 
It became clear during fieldwork that local communities, particularly in rural areas, expect 
former soldiers to be demobilised in a specific way by partaking in traditional ceremonies 
and undergoing rituals of purification, ideally occurring before their reintegration into 
family and community. 26 Soldiers themselves had an expectation that they would undergo 
these rituals upon return to their villages. This traditional material which I had initially set 
out to explore as `historical' material, continues to have contemporary relevance and 
application, and was used in Angola in the period after the Lusaka Protocol, as Honwana 
(1998) makes clear. There is need for ongoing research in this area in terms of 
highlighting peace resources within local communities and exploring its potential for 
promoting and consolidating peace. Effective demobilisation of UNITA troops will be 
crucial for stability in Angola and will also make considerable demands of local 
communities. The return of former military personnel. a potentially volatile group of 
individuals, may have a destabilising effect if inadequate attention is given to their 
transition to civilian life. 27 One can assume an increase in the incidence of domestic 
violence and general insecurity if the transition is poorly handled. 
s The spelling of the word varies, sometimes appearing as chinihanda. 
I am grateful to the Dundo resource group for the insights provided in understanding the 
importance and 
the nature of these rituals, and to CCF (Christian Children's Fund) for the material made available to me. 
Comment made by Christopher Alden, during his presentation to the BAF (2002). 
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A key publication in the area of traditional rituals for demobilisation is the consultancy 
report Local Knowledge in the Post- War Healing and Reintegration of War-Affected 
Children in Angola by Alcinda Honwana (1998) for the Angolan Christian Children's 
Fund (CCF). CCF appeared to be the only organisation in Angola engaged in research at 
this level. Interviews conducted by Angolan CCF personnel were carried out in the post- 
Lusaka period when many troops were demobilised in accordance with the Protocol. CCF 
personnel found that local communities used rituals which involved the use of water. 
flour, ashes, eggs, and chickens in reintegrating returned soldiers, which I deal with 
later. 28 Of particular relevance here was the carrying out of this research in the provinces 
of Uige, Malange, Huambo, Bie, thereby covering the ritualistic practices of the Bakongo 
(Uige), Ambundu (Malange), and Ovimbundu (Huambo and Bie) ethnic groups. from 
where the major protagonists of the various Angolan wars drew support. For HomVwana 
(1998: 14), the CCF project was 
"grounded on the conviction that, there is a body of knowledge rooted in local 
ancient traditions which informs specific cultural understandings about the causes 
of ill-health and psychological trauma; about notions of childhood and adulthood. 
and also about the effect that traumatic experiences and events might have on 
individuals and groups". 
Honwana highlights the importance of cultural anthropology in understanding how 
individuals found meaning and interpreted the world around them, especially regarding 
war and conflict, illness and health, and post-conflict reintegration. As Ranger (1992: 703) 
has commented, "[the] need for healing ... 
depended on participants' understanding of 
their violence". Evident here is a belief that effective approaches to health, trauma and 
distress, must be based on cultural understandings. Honwana (1998: 6) argued that the 
"dominant western conceptions of mental distress and trauma cannot continue to 
be blindly imposed on afflicted populations across the globe since the way in 
which people embody, give meaning and manage their afflictions is essentially 
shaped by social and cultural understandings". 
At issue is the need for a pluralist approach to health and illness, with western methods 
viewed as complementary to local methods. 
`8 Interview with Carlinda Monteiro, Luanda. December 10,2001 
200 
In examining traditional community-based responses, I begin in section 2.1 by outlining 
how the word `traditional' is used here, and in chapter seven on traditional authority. In 
section 2.2,1 provide examples which highlight the issues involved and illustrate how 
demobilisation is effected. Section 2.3 examines the figure of the traditional healer known 
as the kimbanda, or in Portuguese curandeiro. I also underline the role played by certain 
family members in this regard. Finally, section 2.4 inquires about the contemporary 
relevance of this traditional knowledge, and possible utilisation in consolidating the 
transition to peace. 
2.1. 'Traditional' defined. 
Vansina (1990: 257) points out that the popular use of the term `traditional' generally 
refers to a "lack of change", to something static and in the past. Osaghae (2000: 203) 
commented that we are trying to define a term where "colonialism and other external 
influences have transformed social formations in such fundamental ways that there is very 
little that may be considered authentically indigenous and traditional". Zartman (2000: 7) 
in his turn, stated that 
"tradition is likely to have been updated, adjusted, and opened to new accretions in 
order to stay alive through changing times. Traditional does not mean unaltered or 
archaic". 
As in other parts of Africa, traditional structures in Angola have not remained static. 
Osaghae's (2000: 204) definition of `traditional' is helpful: 
"the legacy of the past, including the changes and transformations that this past 
may have gone through. ... The search 
for traditional strategies of conflict 
management then looks for the past in present-day social formations that can be 
applied to modem conflicts, and stresses the indigenous content". 
Calhoun (1995: 149) points out that tradition needs to be understood as 
"an active verb, as traditio, referring to the passing on or handing down of 
information. Tradition, then, is a mode of transmission of information". 
Within Angola tradition is passed on through initiation rites (where they are practised), by 
observing what is done, and listening to the stories told within the community. 
Hobbsbawm and Ranger (1983: 1) use the phrase "invented tradition" to refer to this 
process where certain values and norms of behaviour are inculcated "which automaticall` 
implies continuity with the past". This dynamic. adaptive. responsive nature of what is 
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considered traditional is how the term is employed here, suggesting a more modern usage 
than the term would initially indicate. 
2.2. Examples of traditional healing methods. 
Traditional communities expected that all soldiers returning from war would receive 
treatment from the kimbanda, the principal practitioner of traditional healing methods 
(Honwana 1998: 75). Usually this involved withdrawing with the kimbanda for a period of 
time apart from the village, to talk through war experiences and explain what happened in 
order to `tirar a guerra', to `remove the war'. This Portuguese phrase is used extensively 
in naming the therapeutic process engaged in. Honwana (1998: 67) quotes a soba from 
Malange who explained: 
if a person goes to fight a war, he becomes another person. because he learns how 
to kill other people, even his own mother and father ... during that time he only thinks of killing ... when he returns he has to be treated to become his own self 
again". 
Not only are we dealing with a cultural expectation that soldiers undergo some form of 
treatment upon returning home to remove the war, but a cultural belief that it is possible to 
rehabilitate returned soldiers by enabling them move beyond their experiences of war, to 
distance themselves from the past. 
A number of descriptions of rituals illustrate what was usually undertaken. The first 
involves washing in a local river. 
"From the start to the washing in the river, the treatment took a month. During all 
this time one couldn't wash in the river. Having prepared the medication 
(purification) one goes to the river to wash. Your clothes are left to one side, and 
you put on new clothes after coming from the river. You cannot look back. After 
all this treatment you are not allowed to talk about what went on during the war". 29 
The second concerns the returning home alive of a person thought to have been killed in 
war, and involves the use of water and fire. 
-The person cannot enter the village. A basin (calabash) of water is taken which is 
broken around the feet of the person, who then walks on the broken basin before 
entering the village. AU the members of the village are told to extinguish their 
fires, and a new fire is prepared and lit. It is with this fire that food is prepared, 
") Description provided in a CCF research account dated 'March 9,1998. 
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which is eaten by all with the one who has returned. It is only by doing this that the 
person can live without having problems". 30 
Traditional healing methods combine ritual and talking, differentiating them from 
psychotherapeutic models of healing which emphasise 'analysis' of one's problems . 
31 In 
fact, a key aspect of what individuals receive during these rituals is `conselho ' or advice 
(The Lancet 2002), 32 which echoes the responses set out in relation to church-based 
communities. 
The rituals used for those who killed during war differ from the rituals for individuals who 
did not kill. The taking of another person's life implies possible contamination or 
possession by the spirit of the one killed. The belief is that the spirit of that person may 
seek to exact revenge against the perpetrator by taking possession of him, which then has 
consequences for the community to which the soldier returns. At issue here is a belief in 
the migration of the spirit', that a spirit can travel from one person to another with the 
potential to do harm. Communities need protection against this migration and from those 
who may have taken the life of others in war. 33 This is the reason for purification. 
It was pointed out that during wartime, in their efforts to protect themselves and remain 
safe. soldiers taste the blood of their victims in order gain extra courage in war and to 
prevent the spirit of the dead seeking revenge. 34 Hence, the need to have different healing 
rituals for those who killed in wartime and for those who did not. Ellis (2001) has done 
interesting work on the use of "mystical weapons" by soldiers during the Liberian conflict, 
where fighters disembowelled their victims to eat the flesh or internal organs, particularly 
the heart. 
"Practices of this sort stemmed from a belief. quite well-documented in Liberian 
history, that the essence of a person is contained in the heart and the blood. and 
that by consuming these a warrior acquires some of the power formerly possessed 
by his victim" (Ellis 2001: 222). 
1° Description provided in a CCF research account dated March 9,1998. 
31 Crewe & Harrison (1998: 34) argue that though "some writers have challenged the perception of local 
people's ignorance, many still assume oppositions between indigenous knowledge and science 
by assuming 
that the latter is in some sense more `theoretical'. " 
The Lancet (2002) has given some brief coverage to traditional healing in Angola. 
Manuel Teixeira, Angolan missionary interviewed in Lille. France, December 8 -2001 
Gabriel \lbilingi. Catholic bishop of Luena. interviewed Luanda, November 7 2001, 
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This form of `African science' as Ellis (2001: 222) noted, was grounded firmly within 
indigenous religious belief, within African traditional religion. I propose not to engage in 
lengthy discussion around traditional religion in Angola, where Altuna (1993) and 
Quipungo (1987) have done interesting work, but there are two issues I propose to explore 
that go some way to explaining what is involved in rituals of purification for demobilised 
soldiers, and why it is considered necessary as part of a post-war peace strategy. I examine 
the relationship within traditional religion between an individual and their ancestors. 
which situates the soldier or `warrior' in a particular context; and then explore the means 
by which one becomes an ancestor, which places 'burial rites' at the heart of traditional 
peacemaking strategies. 
Firstly. interviewees often pointed out that the ancestors are understood to be part of the 
world within which Angolans live and can be called on to assist the living from their place 
beneath the earth. 35 In relation to Angola. Tvedten (1997: 132) commented: 
"In the traditional cultural system. there is no room for the accidental. and 
ancestral and nature spirits are believed to play an important role in people's life 
situations". 
Misfortune or illness are understood as signs that the ancestors have been neglected and 
this can be addressed by consulting with the ancestors through the mediation of the 
kimbanda, functioning in this sense as a diviner. Vansina (1990: 98) noted "illness was the 
quintessential manifestation of abnormality and abnormality always resulted from the 
neglect of spirits or attacks by witches". Life within traditional religion is lived in 
relationship with the ancestors. The strong influence and presence of Christianity within 
the country prompts the question, `whether, and to what extent, this understanding is still 
the case? ' The answer requires multiple responses. Traditional religion is still practised in 
many parts of the country and is strong in the psyche of the people of the Lundas, the ones 
I know best. The eastern Angolan provinces by and large had their first systematic contact 
with Christian missionaries in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Dundo for 
example, dates the first missionary contact to 192736 whereas parts of western Angola 
have over 500 years contact. Many individuals draw on both religious systems, traditional 
and Christian. when seeking divine assistance and traditional beliefs permeate the 
Interview with Manuel Sabino. retired Angolan missionary. Luanda, August 2 2000. 
'`' I was present in Dundo in 1997 when the seventieth anniti ersarti was celebrated. 
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understanding of many who describe themselves as Christian, creating what Schreiter 
(1985: 145)37 identified as the functioning of "dual religious systems" with people. 38 
Secondly, while the role of the ancestors is crucial within traditional religion, the way in 
which one becomes an ancestor is also of vital concern, bringing into focus the centrality 
of funeral rites, the öbito or the wake, as essential components within a post-war 
peacebuilding framework. Funeral rites are given much attention and care to ensure that 
everything expected of a family is undertaken. 
"[P]roper burial rituals, to appease, ask for forgiveness and place the dead in their 
proper positions in the world of the spirits, are seen as extremely important to 
avoid spiritual anger and retaliation" (Honwana 1998: 65). 
Willis (1999: 32) spoke of funerals being "replete with symbolic acts of purification, 
clearly designed to separate the persona of the dead from the community of the living". 
Fortes (1965: 16) wrote that 
"[it] appears that death alone is not a sufficient condition for becoming an ancestor 
entitled to receive worship. Proper burial ... 
is a sine qua non". 
v 
The point is that peace requires the proper burial according to custom of people killed in 
war so as to release their spirits into the world of the ancestors, and prevent the 'migration 
of the soul' with its potential to exact revenge and harm. 
In a time of war however, the holding of burial rites is thrown into chaos as bodies are left 
unburied and the dead unmourned. The upheaval caused by war itself is compounded by a 
further upheaval at a cultural-spiritual level, with people psychologically fearful of the 
unmourned spirits left to wander and seek revenge. In relation to this, Andrade (2001: 137) 
writes about the feelings of Angolans displaced by the war, stating: 
"The people who left their places of origin under fire were completel% 
disorientated - they had faced death in the most immediate sense possible.... A 
factor that weighed heavily psychologically and caused `rief was `leaving the dead 
37 Quoted in Magesa (1999). 
38 Also, the flourishing of independent African and Angolan churches, may have much to do 1, ith the 
syncretic nature of these churches and the accommodation of aspects of traditional religion within their 
worship, particularly the emphasis on the ancestors (Thomas 1997: 2 1). To dismiss independent churches as 
problematic. as the historical churches have tended to do, fails to ask why these churches have multiplied in 
recent times, and the local needs they obviously address. Hastings (1979) speaks of prayer within 
independent churches as a mixture of pra\er for healing and deli\erance from witchcraft or sorcery, as ý+ell 
as for spiritual and material things. 
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without even burying them'. Older people showed the greatest anguish about this, 
since they have a particular respect for ancestors and for death rituals". 
Honwana (1998: 65-66) quotes an unidentified speaker: 
"[w]ith this war many people died and did not have proper burials. their heads are in the bush ... the souls of those who died and were not buried are wandering 
around and will not let us have peace. The war will continue because the spirits are 
angry". 
The absence of proper rituals is understood to impede this journey, resulting in the dead 
person's spirit being frustrated and unable to move on, underlining the importance of 
burial rituals within a peace strategy. 
2.3. The `kimbanda'. 
This section situates the kimbanda or traditional healer within the context of the local 
community, and attempts to further understanding of their role. The kimbanda was 
described in the Angolan newspaper Agora as "a psychologist ... a specialist 
in natural 
remedies, ... an authentic mediator between the invisible world and the patient. '39`' To 
this i would add their knowledge and understanding of ritual practices. Before the arrival 
of Western medicine, Angolans consulted the kimbanda as the person who understood the 
curative qualities of plants, leaves and roots, and who could provide remedies and cures. 
Given the understanding of health and illness within African traditional religion, based on 
the quality of relationship with the ancestors, the kimbanda was understood to have the 
power to consult with the ancestors (divination) and to establish the cause of illness. 40 
in general, the belief in spirits (ancestral or natural), witches, and sorcerers is 
associated with a world view that leaves no room for the accidental. Whether 
events are favourable or adverse, responsibility for them can in principle be 
attributed to a causal agent - [the spirits or ancestors]". 
41 
Thus curing illness invariably involved activities be undertaken to make amends and to 
restore the ancestral relationship. 
The roles therefore of the kimbanda as traditional herbalist and a diviner (advinhador) are 
largely inseparable. Both can be required in making a diagnosis. However, in discussing 
'9 Pedro Calueyo, Agora, August 12 2000, p. 10. 
40 See also brief commentary on 'Healers and Dig iners' located at http:, w vw. chokwe. com div ination. htm 
with reference to the Chokwe people. 
41 From 'Angola, Indigenous Religious Systems, ' located at k-ittp: 1cweb2. loc., io\ 
bin/query/r? frd/cstdv: (iýfield(DOCID -ao0088). 
206 
the kimbanda it is important to introduce a word of caution. In some communities the 
kimbanda is feared because of their involvement in sorcery and witchcraft, known in 
Angola as `feitico'. These practices cloud the presence of some kimbandas within the 
community, sometimes creating an ambiguous figure. Discussion on these issues would 
take me away from the main focus of this section but it is important to acknowledge this 
other shadier dimension. 
It is not just the kimbanda who conducts rituals for demobilised soldiers. On occasions 
other members of the family have a role in the process, as illustrated in the following 
account from one former soldier: 
"I was demobilised in January 1997.... When I arrived in the kimbo (village) my 
mother called our relatives and acted according to tradition. ... My aunt took a live chicken and rubbed it all over my body. as if she was dusting it, then she rubbed 
palm oil on my hands and some ashes on my forehead. After that she threw fuba 
(maize meal) all over my body" (Honwana 1998: 70). 
Clearly, the mother and aunt in question were aware of a requirement to perform certain 
rituals for the returning soldier. The family response fulfills a cultural need and can only 
be understood with reference to cultural beliefs. 
These traditional community-based responses reflect a particular way of understanding the 
world, and are based on a set of epistemological assumptions informed by African 
traditional religion. These assumptions are quite different to those underpinning 
Habermas's public sphere, conceived within a western world-view. Habermas's theory 
reveals an emphasis on rational critical forms of discourse, whereas the traditional healing 
methods outlined here reveal an emphasis on ritual, shared communal assumptions, verbal 
and non-verbal forms of communication, a radically different and more complex 
communicative arena than the Habermasian public sphere. This arena is a location where 
meaning is communicated through ritual and participation in ritual (Karecki 1998: 3 10). As 
Evans-Pritchard (1965: 112) commented regarding research of this nature, "[it] demands a 
poetic mind which moves easily in images and symbols". I do not situate these traditional 
community based responses within Habermas's public sphere because of the different 
nature of the communication involved. I do however wish to raise the question of the 
'publicness' of this material, because while this material has received little national or 
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international publicity, its publicness is taken for granted within local communities, within 
the `culture of the common people', but not outside it. In other words, Haben-nas's public 
sphere does not allow us to see this arena very clearly or appreciate its significance and 
importance. 
2.3. Contemporary relevance? 
In this final section, I examine the contemporary relevance of this material in relation to 
four areas: demobilisation; peace consolidation; the `pacification of the spirits' (a 
discussion deferred from chapter three); and social capital. Some of these have already 
received brief treatment, so I will limit myself to brief comments. 
Firstly, a different concept of demobilisation is clearly at work within African traditional 
religion, to that which prevailed in the functioning of the United Nations and international 
community in Angola. The demobilisation processes set in place after the Bicesse and 
Lusaka peace agreements involved the surrender of personal weapons, the granting of a 
document to certify that demobilisation had occurred, the gift of civilian clothing, money, 
blankets, food, and agricultural equipment. The demobilised were usually given transport 
to their area of origin, where arrival home marked the end of the process. Traditional 
knowledge by contrast, understands the demobilisation process to commence at this point. 
This is not to undervalue the clothing, money, tools, etc.. that the demobilised received, 
but to recognise that culturally `the war must be removed' before the person can be 
reintegrated within the local community. In other words, two completely different 
processes are understood by the term `demobilisation', processes which are not 
contradictory. but in fact can be complementary. 
Secondly, Honwana (1998) provides important evidence as to how some of this traditional 
knowledge could be structurally integrated into peacebuilding at an institutional or 
national level. The suggestion comes from traditional authorities and traditional healers in 
the Kuito area. who saw their region devastated in 1993-11994, when UNITA and the 
government fought for control of Bie. Prior to the resumption of war in 1998 these 
traditional personalities argued that the spirits of the dead must be honoured to secure 
peace. 
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"Kutximuila and Aurord, two female traditional healers, stated that the government 
should organise a big feast to honour the dead of the plateau. Their views were 
shared by soba [traditional authority] Capumba who pointed out that The 
government must think of having collective ceremonies to bury the bones of those 
killed by the war ... for example here in Kuito many people died and no 
ceremonies were performed to appease their souls. Their souls are wandering 
about and can afflict anyone'. Chief Kavingangi from Bie, went as far as saying 
that if the government gives its permission `it would be possible to collect all the 
bones that are still lying in town and in the bushes and bury them with an obito 
(proper burial ceremony [wake]). But for that we need the government's approval, 
we cannot do it without their approval"' (Honwana 1998.27-28). 
Such collective rituals are known locally as ayele rituals, and if implemented could last a 
week (Honwana 1998: 28). As we can see, traditional knowledge was seeking expression 
in Angola prior to 1998 in calling for these rituals, but required Angolan government 
authorisation. Much more recently, Rede da Pa: made an appeal in May 2002 for the 
introduction of reconciliation mechanisms based on the 
"application of local practices of communal reintegration and social stabilisation 
which covered: a) the reception of people, b) (symbolic) purification. c) 
reintegration/acceptance, d) commencing a new life ". '2ý" 
These calls illustrate that traditional practices are still relevant for many Angolans, and 
that incorporating the wisdom of Angola's traditional belief systems, can potentially have 
an important role in consolidating and securing peace. 
Rituals of this nature to release the spirits of the dead, which many believe to be necessary 
for peace, are not unique to Angola. The Guardian newspaper of November 16,2002. 
provided a moving description of a purification ceremony held in Bali when over two 
hundred people were killed in a terrorist bomb blast. The ceremony called Tawur Agung 
Pamarisudha Kari-pubhaya was directed at 
"freeing the victims" souls - which the Balinese believe were trapped between 
earth and heaven until yesterday - blessing the wounded, and forgiving the 
perpetrators". 
The government minister who coordinated the event said: 
"the most important aim is to restore the microcosmic and macrocosmic balance 
between the earth. atmosphere and heavens". 
Two rituals were conducted as part of this purification, one took place at the bomb site and 
the other at sea, and both involved the sacrifice of animals such as buffalo. cow. goat, 
dog. 
"2 Final Document of Rede da Paz, located at Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2002) website- 
209 
piglet, goose, duck and hen. Purification and burial ceremonies play an important role in 
how certain cultures come to terms with the past, and address emotional. psychological 
and spiritual issues for peace. 
Thirdly, the Angolan government specifically requested that the churches engage in the 
`pacificacäo dos espiritos, ' or `the pacification of spirits'. In a letter to the Vatican (Jornal 
de Angola, April 9 2002) President dos Santos spoke of 
"a fundamental role to be played in the pacification of spirits, the re-establishment 
of mutual confidence, and the acceptance of mutual forgiveness between citizens 
[by the churches]". ""' 
As mentioned in chapter three, the churches have also used this language but generally 
utilise the terms reconciliation and forgiveness. The exact meaning of the phrase used by 
President dos Santos is somewhat uncertain, but it has distinct cultural overtones which 
may not be intended. However, even if unintended, it is language familiar to traditional 
healers who can exercise a role in this regard if called on by government to host avele or 
other relevant rituals. For many Angolans, the hosting of such a ritual would represent a 
significant moment in consolidating peace and addressing their cultural needs. 
Finally, this chapter has also pointed to the existence of important reserves of what 
Putnam (1993: 167) defined as social capital: 
"[the]features of social organisations, such as trust, norms and nevýwrks, that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions". 
By way of comment on the levels of social capital in Angola, I would like to contrast two 
references on the subject. Firstly, Christoplos (1998: 6) stated that: 
"[at] a first glance Angola, does not appear to have high reserves of accumulated 
social capital. It lacks the conditions usually mentioned as essential for the 
development of social capital (democracy, trust, freedom of expression. etc. ). 
These conditions require a degree of stability and faith in the future which does not 
exist in weak and collapsed states". 
Secondly, Robson and Roque (2001: 140) provided comment specifically in relation to 
local church communities: 
"the level of social capital is high inside churches. There is a high level of 
structural social capital (rules and established procedures) and a high level of 
cognitive social capital (norms, values, beliefs and trust) and this is reflected in the 
attitudes of solidarity and cooperative behaviour of members. " 
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In their research, Robson and Roque (2001: 120) found that there was strong pressure on 
Angolan social capital given the levels of poverty and social crisis which prevail in the 
country. In promoting and consolidating peace, reconciliation and democracy in Angola, it 
seems clear that activities at the community level can do much to enhance these processes. 
The material outlined in this chapter has illustrated how local Angolan communities have 
attempted to address questions of violence and peace. I have identified two significant 
arenas, those of church-based and traditional community responses which facilitated 
analysis of peace activity and engagement within Angolan society at this level. Both 
responses reveal a substantial degree of agency occurring within local communities. 
illustrating that ordinary Angolans have not been passive during the many years of war. 
Two particular concerns emerged in this chapter: that of addressing domestic violence, 
and the need to reintegrate and heal former soldiers. Both reflect concerns to address local 
expressions of violence, including the possibility of violence from returning soldiers. 
Important mechanisms exist within Angolan society that have been called on to deal with 
these issues. While traditional healing methods can be utilised as part of a national peace 
strategy in a time of post-conflict with the consent of government, domestic violence will 
require a much stronger legal system if adequate protection is to be given to women. 
Chapter 7. 
Traditional Authorities, Traditional Perspectives: 
An Ancient and Modem Narrative? 
The final of the five peace narratives examined in this thesis explores Angolan 
traditional authorities in relation to peace. The concerns of the chapter however. are 
much wider than an exclusive focus on traditional authorities themselves, as I also 
examine perspectives on the Angolan conflict and how the peace processes were 
pursued, from within a traditional context. In doing so, the chapter explores a 
`traditional space' that has not been used in analysing the Angolan conflict. I propose 
to argue that this traditional space is a vital one, particularly for rural communities, and 
that the perspective offered here poses important questions on how peace was 
promoted in Angola, and how conflict was understood. Towards the end of the chapter 
I explore what I term 'traditional consultancy', how knowledge of Angolan traditions 
could have been drawn on to strengthen Angola's peace processes, and to further 
understanding of events that required analysis from a traditional or cultural 
perspective. This traditional knowledge is above all knowledge of relevant rituals 
employed by traditional authorities in addressing conflict and making peace. The 
chapter tries to make connections between this traditional material and how the UN 
and Troika pursued peace, and for this reason the chapter is partially explorative. 
Essentially I argue that working for peace needs to be based on traditional and modern 
methods and understandings of war and peace, especially the understandings of those 
in conflict. 
Increased attention has been paid in recent years to the role and potential of traditional 
authority across the African continent in addressing conflict. Somalia has been the 
focus of much attention in this regard, where traditional mechanisms were successful 
in resolving local and regional conflict, but failed at a national level (Abokor 2002, 
Menkhaus 2000). The literature also points to the use of traditional methods in Burundi 
(Nindorera 1998). Kenya' (Duba et al 1997), Mozambique (Meintijes et al 2002, 
Harrison 1999). Sierra Leone (Barnes & Polzer 2000), Uganda (Pain 1997), and 
' Research carried out among the Maasai. Borana and Turkana peoples of Kenya. 
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Namibia (Becker 2002). Zartmann's (2000) work in this area is also important. In a 
broad sense this literature is concerned with what resources Africa can draw on in 
resolving its own problems, with ``[the] need to harness all our resources - traditional, 
intellectual and spiritual - for the building of peace in our troubled continent" (Kiplagat 
1998). The British Government and some non-governmental agencies have placed the 
`peace potential' of traditional authority on their agendas. The UK Department for 
International Development (DfID 2000) identified "helping to restore local Paramount 
Chiefs" as one component in a multi-dimensional approach to promoting peace in 
Sierra Leone, indicating a new policy initiative. The UK based NGO ActionAid (2001) 
"has been exploring ways to support the Bashingantahe2 as part of [its] peace building 
work" in Burundi. 
The Angolan literature on traditional authorities, known locally as sobas, 3 is not very 
extensive but one frequently finds references within other research. For example. the 
work of Carlos Estermann (1956,1957,1960a, 1960b, 1961 a, 1961b) on the peoples of 
southern Angola deals with traditional authorities within a broad anthropological 
approach to cultural issues. Similarly, Jose Nunes's (1991) important work on the 
Angolan ondjango, the village meeting place, examines traditional authorities. More 
recently, Pacheco's (2001) work illustrates traditional authority's continued relevance 
and function in the life of rural communities in the Huambo area. Neto's (2001 a, 
2001 b) concerns are historical, highlighting difficulties associated with incorporating 
traditional authorities within democratic structures. Despite the fact that the influence 
of traditional authority had clearly declined over many years, it was re-emerging as a 
"potential political force" (Tvedten 1997: 51) and achieving a significant degree of 
prominence at the turn of the twenty-first century. This points to the definition set out 
in the previous chapter, where `traditional' was defined not as a static reality 
concerned with the past, but as dynamic and changing. 
The research questions for this chapter are: 
Q What did Angolan traditional authorities identify as the underlining causes 
of the Angolan conflict'? 
2 The term Bashingantahe refers to the traditional authority figures and was used "to 
designate a body of 
men [who] were an organised corporate group in whom was vested the social, political and 
judicial 
power of their society"' (Nindorera 1998). 
The origin of the word soba is from the Umbundu osoma, meaning traditional 
leader. The word is used 
across Angola to denote traditional authorities. 
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Q What did Angolan traditional authorities believe was necessary to secure 
peace? 
Q How and where did traditional society ordinarily resolve conflict? 
Q Do traditional conflict resolution strategies have anything to offer modem 
methods? 
u Can traditional authority or traditional knowledge provide insights to help 
explain the failure of recent Angolan peace accords? 
The latter question will explore the `structuring up' potential of this material, where I 
propose a notion of `traditional consultancy', which possibly could have helped 
unravel some of the complexities of the Angolan conflict. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one sets out introductory material on 
traditional authorities past and present, from their former role as political leaders in 
Angola's ancient kingdoms to one of significant marginalisation. I examine the 
processes that effected this decline. Section two outlines perspectives on peace from 
traditional authorities drawn from traditional authority conferences and fieldwork 
interviews. The third section examines where and how traditional society addressed 
issues of conflict, where I detail the importance of the key discursive site in traditional 
society known as the ondjango, and then deal with various rituals used in traditional 
peace making. The final section explores the concept of `traditional consultancy' and 
its possible usefulness as a mechanism to incorporate traditional expertise and 
understandings, part of enhancing the knowledge base of a peace process, Angolan or 
elsewhere. 
1. Traditional Authority - past and present? 
The objective of this section is to place Angolan traditional authorities within an 
historical context that situates them in Angolan society. and identifies the major factors 
that led to their decline. I trace four factors - the years of Portuguese colonialism, the 
spread of Christianity. the growth in urbanisation, and policies pursued after 
independence by the MPLA government - which explain the eclipse of traditional 
authority as an institution, and highlights its contemporary ambiguity within present 
day Angola. These factors help contextualise the perspective on peace put forward by 
traditional authority. 
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The arrival of colonialism and Christianity introduced powerful new variables into 
Angolan society, progressively leading to the decline and marginalisation of traditional 
authorities. This decline was not uniform across the country because of the uneven 
nature of colonial penetration and the varying regional responses to Christianity. It was 
most accentuated in the areas of longest colonial exposure, while remaining 
significantly untouched in eastern Angola especially. Neto (2001 a: 31) stresses the 
importance of appreciating the unevenness of the colonial experience, arguing against 
a simplistic understanding of the length of colonial contact. She points out that the 
kingdom of the Congo had 500 years of irregular contact, but "the occupation of 
Luanda lasted 400 years ... 
110 years in Malange and 72 years in Huambo". This 
differentiation explains why the institution of traditional authority weakened 
particularly among coastal and urban populations, where it is not a significant 
reference point. This contrasts with rural and provincial areas where the institution 
exhibits varying degrees of influence and importance, where the soba in some areas 
continues to administer the local village, distribute land for farming. and practice 
traditional justice with a council of elders. 4 
Urbanisation too weakened traditional authorities as urban areas were more visibly 
under colonial control and influence, but also because access to land is an important 
dimension of the sobas power. This heterogeneous reality has implications for 
research, as rural communities attach much greater importance to traditional authority 
than those in urban areas. The peace narrative of this chapter can therefore be 
considered a rural one, which distinguishes it from the largely urban narratives of the 
media and civil society chapters. 
The colonial administration recognised the importance of the soba within local 
communities and exploited them to extend the reach of the state. The cooption of the 
soba to ensure the collection of the Hut and Native taxes (Neto 2001 a: 
34). the 
recruitment of labour (Pacheco 2001: 62). and road maintenance (Maier 
1996: 48). 
collectively fomented local resentment. Attempts to resist the colonial process 
frequently resulted in the soba being replaced, though some s©bas grew wealthy 
from 
their commission for tax collection. ' By independence many sobas 
had become 
4 In many of the villages around Dundo this continues to be the case. 
Point made by Dundo research group, June 3.2000. 
215 
discredited in the eyes of their own people because of their collaboration (Tvedten 
1997: 51). Robson (2001: 12) gives the example of sobas from the central highlands, 
who in 1973 were 
"in favour of the forced concentration of rural people in protected hamlets 
because it would increase their power and influence and control over their 
communities: rural people were strongly against concentrations". 
For Robson, the example illustrates how the interests of sobas and their communities 
did not necessarily coincide. A further discrediting factor was the provision, forced or 
voluntary, of young soldiers to both UNITA and the government (Honwana 1998: 34- 
35). 
In more recent times, traditional authorities have challenged allegations of 
collaboration by pointing to their role in protecting and sheltering the various 
nationalist movements during the war of independence. Speaking at a traditional 
authority conference in February 2002, sobas from the northern provinces of Uige and 
Zaire stated: 
"traditional authority played a fundamental role ... above all 
in 1961, when the 
armed struggle began. It was the sobas who welcomed the national liberation 
movements; ... who mobilised and organised the population to support these 
resistance movements during the first and second liberation wars against the 
Portuguese". 6' 
This role however remains undocumented. Interestingly, since the creation of FAAT, 
the Forum of Angolan Traditional Authority (Forum das Autoridades Angolanas 
Tradicionais) in January 2000, traditional authorities have sought to challenge aspects 
of their portrayal in Angolan history. 
The years of greatest crisis for traditional authority were those following independence 
when the MPLA-government substituted many sobas by replacing them with members 
of the Party's central committee (comite central), who then assumed tasks previously 
undertaken by the soba. 7 This period is particularly important in tracing the origins of 
contemporary confusion associated with the identity of the soba, as government 
nominees themselves adopted the title of soba, while the hereditary soba was pushed 
to one side but did not disappear. Like many other post-independence nations, the 
Angolan state "attempted to modernise and to replace traditional hierarchies with a 
`' 
. -Ingolc'nse. 
February -3-March 12002, page VII. 
Interview with a group of five sohas in the bairro of Rocha Pinto, Luanda, June 1 1,2000. 
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new system of government [but] never entirely succeeded" (Jorgensen 1996: 43). The 
result is the existence of two sets of traditional authorities no longer entirely 
distinguishable. In fact, many `nominated' Bobas present a lineage to validate their 
hereditary credentials, thereby further blurring the possibility of distinction. 
Other sources suggest that the penetration achieved by Christianity was of greater 
long-term significance in undermining traditional authority. David (1989: 69) for 
example, wrote of how pastors and missionaries 
"were the first to penetrate traditional society. By bringing a new religion, they 
brought the civilisation of the coloniser, and new ways of living and thinking". " 
Anyinam (1992: 142) wrote of how "European missionary activities led to the rejection 
of traditional beliefs [and] rituals [across Africa]". The point is important because by 
challenging the religious foundations of African traditional religion, Christianity also 
undermined the political power of the soba, as political and religious power were 
intrinsically linked. The creation of other centres of power and authority within 
communities by the appointment of teachers, catechists and other church leaders also 
shifted power away from traditional leaders (Neto 200la: 35; Pacheco 2001: 61). 
At the end of the 1990s the Angolan government was re-engaging with traditional 
authorities for a number of reasons. Firstly. a national consultation had commenced in 
early 2001 to "clarify the role of traditional authority and its attributes in the process of 
national development". 8 The Journal de Angola wrote of the need to articulate 
"the relationship between modern administrative structures and traditional 
authority from the perspective of promoting social and community 
development, and democratic consolidation". 9i' 
This consultation resulted in a traditional authority conference hosted by the Ministry 
for Territorial Administration from 21-23 March 2002 in Luanda. The consultation 
sought to situate and define traditional authorities within the proposed new national 
constitution, an issue left unaddressed since independence. Press reports leave 
unclarified whether conference participants were hereditary or `nominated' sobas. or a 
mixture of both. Held a month after the death of Jonas Savimbi, this conference saw 
traditional authority express the desire to: 
8 Comment made by the vice-minister for Territorial Administration. Joäo Baptista Kussumua 
in Jornal 
äe, 4ngo1a, January 19,2001. 
9 Jornal de. -angola. March 26,2002. 
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"assist the central and provincial government with the registration of 
populations in rural areas, the reconstruction of roads, and of all that was 
destroyed in the war". lo'v 
It was the third such `national' conference on traditional authority in a period of six 
months, which by any standards was quite remarkable activity. The other two 
conferences are examined later. 
Secondly, the soba's potential to influence public opinion during an election campaign 
may also explain the shift in attitude. During fieldwork in June 2000 (when 2001 had 
been mooted as an election year), a meeting I had arranged with the sobas of a village 
near Dundo was postponed because local members of the MPLA comite central were 
there with the sobas seeking electoral support from the villagers. In rural areas 
especially, sobas represent a means by which government communicates with local 
people. 
Thirdly, following from this. Andrade's (2001: 145) research on displaced people in the 
provinces of Malanje and Benguela. noted that 
"[the displaced had] been encouraged by the State administration to choose 
new sobas to facilitate communication between the administration and the 
displaced people. Relations with the State are maintained through the soba, and 
the soba has an important role in resolving family problems". 
Andrade also recognised that "[t]raditional leadership [was] important for the 
displaced people's emotional stability". These comments point to the role of the soba 
as a bridge between local communities and the State and underline the continued 
relevance of traditional authorities in different contexts. 
2. Traditional Authorities and peace: some perspectives. 
The formation in January 2000 of FAAT, was a significant moment for Angolan 
traditional authorities in terms of organisation and voice. Previously no mechanism or 
forum existed to facilitate traditional authority participation in the peace 
debate. 
Despite this development, FAAT struggled to establish itself as an organisation in 
2001, due to a lack of structures, personnel and finance. FAAT seemed to 
have 
expected that donors would provide them with finance unquestioningly and were 
somewhat startled when faced with the expectations of 
international agencies 
ýo Jui jrul ý1,, . 4ngola, 
March 27,2002. 
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concerning project proposals, budget, and accountability. Struggles of this nature, 
according to Baranyi (1998: 9), are characteristic of 
"[o]rganisations representing sectors with a history of being marginalised 
[who] are often severely challenged by political and technical requirements of 
participation". 
FAAT was faced with this challenge early on and had sought assistance from FONGA. 
I now explore material in relation to FAAT, by drawing on a number of sources to set 
out traditional authority perspectives regarding peace and war in Angola. In section 
2.1, I look at a suggestion that traditional authorities could have exercised a mediation 
role in the conflict. Section 2.2 examines the first ever FAAT conference (September 
2001) which dealt with the issue of peace. Section 2.3 deals with an Open Society 
conference (February 2002) where traditional authorities were involved. Finally, 
section 2.4 highlights a number of tensions and ambiguities related to traditional 
authorities. 
2.1. A mediation role? 
The suggestion of a mediation role for traditional authority within the conflict surfaced 
prior to the death of Jonas Savimbi. A Jornal de Angola editorial of mid-February 
2002 noted positively the "increasing interest and passionate presentations 
[concerning] the role of traditional authority in the Angolan political system", 
" 
including arguments favouring its inclusion in promoting peace. The editorial urged a 
degree of caution because of internal disputes over "inheritance, representativity and 
legitimacy" associated with traditional authority. A mediation role had been advanced 
in March 2000 by one of the minor political parties, the Angolan National Congress, 
whose party leader was critical of western mediation: 
"[we believe] it was not necessary to go to the West to arrange mediators, .... 
The conflict is internal and it is not logical to bring foreign mediators who 
make mistakes which they have themselves admitted, of which the MONUA 
mission is a clear example. We have our ancient traditions, the sobas are there 
who could exercise an influential role in conflict resolution. Sometimes the 
politics practiced in Africa leave much to be desired". 
12v' 
This call for mediation by traditional authority appears to be one of the earliest. 
" Jornal de . Angola, 
February 14,2002, editorial. 
12 Jose Txingueletxi, interviewed in 0 Independente, March 4.2000, page 11. 
219 
However, a 1996 United States Institute for Peace (USIP) consultancy report by 
Prendergast and Smock (1996), NGOs and the Peace Process in Angola, had urged 
research into "traditional Angolan dispute resolution processes and [how to] adapt 
them for contemporary use", as part of a broad approach to "[national] reconciliation at 
the middle and grassroots levels of society". The report expressed the opinion that the 
"views of the vast majority of Angolans have been neglected in the high-level 
negotiations and maneuvers". USIP conceived of a role for traditional authority 
particularly with reference to land disputes. '3 
2.2. The FAAT Conference. 
According to media reports, the first FAAT conference (September 10-1.3,2001) 
brought together over three hundred traditional authorities from all over Angola. 
Conference papers on `Traditional Power: an Overview' and The Role of Traditional 
Authority in Armed Conflict' were presented, as well as testimonies from the four 
kings and one queen present. 14 The principal conference conclusion was a proposal to 
create a `traditional authority commission' to mediate in the Angolan conflict. The 
commission appears not to have been established prior to the death of Jonas Savimbi, 
some five months later. 
Among the recommendations put forward were for: 
a) two parliamentary chambers - for elected deputies, and for traditional 
authority figures; 
b) a cease-fire, and renewed dialogue (to include traditional authority) 
between those at war; 
c) governmental non-interference in the nomination of sobas because of the 
hereditary nature of the institution; 
d) inclusion within the state budget. '' 
e) government not to sell land, because land was the basis of traditional 
power; 
f) government consultation with traditional authority before passing laws; 
g) the development of natural resources (oil, diamonds. coffee, timber. etc. ) to 
be done in consultation with traditional authority; 
The question of ownership of land is one that will be important to address in the aftermath of war, and 
has quickly moved up the political agenda since February 2002. Traditional grazing rights 
have come 
into conflict with ranching practices in southern Angola. where traditional pastoralists are 
being denied 
access to water for their livestock. The NGO Leonardo Sikufinde was working closely with 
traditional 
authority to ensure that these traditional rights were protected. Rede 
da Terra or Land Network' %k as 
established by ADRA in January 2003, to co-ordinate civil society's response to 
the land issue. 
14 From 'Final Conclusions and Recommendations' of the Conference. The 
four kings were: Vasco Felix 
Ekuikui IV of Bailundo. Henriques da Silva Meso Mankala of the Bakongos. 
Muatchisengue Watembu 
of the Lunda-Chokwes. Muana Wuta Kabamba of the 
Bay aka. and queen Nha Katolo. 
15 The recommendation does not specil the form of 
inclusion hoped for. 
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h) the Angolan government to urgently promote social justice. 
These recommendations cover a range of issues, illustrating traditional authoritti's 
multi-dimensional conception of peace. Peace was about ending hostilities in order to 
promote dialogue; about establishing processes of political inclusion and 
communication within society; and about the just development of Angola's natural 
resources. For traditional authorities, peace was much more than a cease-fire. it 
embraced political, economic, and social processes. 
Many of the above recommendations where traditional authorities sought political 
power and inclusion within the decision-making structures of the state (the creation of 
a second chamber), theoretically situate traditional authorities outside the arena of civil 
society and the public sphere. As I argued in chapter two, it is for this reason I place 
traditional authorities outside the public sphere, while at the same time recognising 
that much of their discourse shares similarities to other public sphere actors. These 
other actors however, are not seeking political power. and this fundamentally 
differentiates the traditional authority narrative from the others in this thesis. 
Traditional authorities however, saw themselves standing alongside civil society actors 
in the search for peace. FAAT's membership of Rede da Pa.:, the Peace Network. was 
an indication of this. The FAAT conference called for the inclusion of traditional 
authorities with the churches and politicians from the civil opposition parties. in 
renewed peace negotiations. As seen throughout this thesis, it had become increasingly 
clear from 1999-2000 that a range of national actors had emerged - traditional 
authorities, the churches, civil society organisations and some political parties - 
seeking national mediation within renewed peace talks. Some conceived of this 
exclusively as national mediation, others as a national component within renewed 
international mediation. This represented something quite new in Angolan politics 
compared to the political landscape of ten years previously, when only the churches 
could possibly have exercised such a role (Messiant 2000). 
A second FAAT conference in Cabinda was announced by Francisco Tunga of 
FONGA in September 2002, but no conference dates were indicated. '6 An objective 
FAAT set itself in the immediate post-Savimbi era was to work for a complete end to 
the Angolan conflict by seeking resolution of the Cabindan conflict. The death of 
", actual, September 22.2002, p. 14.1 have been unable to establish if such a conference took place. 
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Savimbi did not bring peace to Angola, it brought peace to seventeen of Angola's 
eighteen provinces, which led some commentators to speak of the `17,18th peace'. ' 
This objective contrasts with the non-recognition of FLEC's conflict with the Angolan 
state, especially noticeable in the state media around the 2002 Independence Day 
celebrations as illustrated in the previous chapter, and in the celebrations following the 
signing of the Luena Accords. 
2.3. The Open Society Foundation Conference. 
The conference organised by the Open Society Foundation in February 2002 dealt 
primarily with the role of civil society in the Angolan conflict, and within this explored 
the place of traditional authority. It is unclear whether the Open Society Foundation, or 
its director Rafael Marques, considered traditional authority as part of civil society . but 
theoretical distinctions of this nature were secondary to the greater concern of building 
public opinion in favour of peace through dialogue. One of the ironies of the 
conference was that its proposals and recommendations were published in the local 
media, or posted on the internet, on the day Jonas Savimbi was killed. 
An internet report of February 22,2002 entitled `Chiefs Call for Cease-fire', is 
especially striking in this respect. ' 8 The report called for a cease-fire and for a national 
conference on peace and Angola's future. It contained chilling descriptions of the 
devastation wrought by the years of conflict which are worth highlighting. The full text 
was published in Angolense under the heading `We Sobas do not accept the Vision of 
our Leaders', and is included as appendix 4 to this thesis. 
'9 The sobas stated: 
"[the war had] already affected everyone. ... 
Traditional authority and local 
communities look on, increasingly revolted at the destruction of the country, at 
the waste of its natural resources, at the killing of the Angolan population.... 
Today, Angola is a land of displaced people" the people live under inhuman 
conditions in displacement camps on the edge of large cities. Regrettably we 
see little or no political will to overcome this situation. ... 
The Angolan people 
have nowhere left to go. ... 
We, the sobas, as the true heirs of the cultures. 
traditions and wealth of our people, do not accept the vision of our political 
leaders....... Angola has almost ceased to exist. The country is only Luanda. 
Family has come to mean only those who live in Luanda. as those A ho live in 
the provinces are condemned to isolation". 
17 Vincente Pinto de Andrade, speaking at BAF (2002) Conference. 
IB Report located at http: /allafrica corn stories 2002022200IO. html. 
1 `' 
. Angolense, 
February 23-March 2.2002, page I X. 
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As the war with UNITA came to an unexpected conclusion, the description sets down 
a marker on how severely the conflict affected the lives of Angolans, especially those 
living in the provinces. Significantly, it shows that Angolan organisations had not 
given up on the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In fact the 
conference called for a new type of peace process that 
"[started] at the bottom and not from the top down, so that those at the top may 
come to understand that their position depends on those who are at the bottom". 
The above statement from the sobas, "we ... 
do not accept the vision of our political 
leaders", raises a question about political legitimacy. and how traditional authorities 
viewed the political leadership of the country. A particular viewpoint within the 
traditional authority perspective saw the war in Angola as a logical consequence of 
political power having been usurped by the nationalist parties. not from the departing 
colonial power, but from traditional leadership. Many traditional authority figures see 
themselves as the disenfranchised legitimate rulers of the country. as the true heirs of 
the cultures, traditions and wealth of our people". The reason for this was given in an 
interview by a member of FAAT who stated: 
it was the sobas who sent their children away to study overseas, and when 
they returned they refused to recognise who their parents were, because they 
were motivated by personal greed". 20 
To a great extent, traditional authority believes that the nationalist parties seized their 
political inheritance. 
2.4. Traditional Authority: Tensions and Ambiguities. 
The previous sections provided reflection on how traditional authorities analysed the 
war and what they considered necessary for peace. We have seen how traditional 
authorities believed that further talking between the Angolan government and UNITA 
was deemed the most appropriate means to end the conflict. The peace agenda of 
traditional authority was also permeated with a political agenda, whereby they sought 
greater recognition and rehabilitation of their role in Angolan society, 
based as we 
have seen, on a perception that national independence should have passed to them as 
the country's ancient rulers, rather than the nationalist parties. 
20 Interviewed in Luanda. November 20,2001. 
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While the emergence of this perspective was interesting twenty-five or so years after 
independence, it was based on an autocratic understanding of political power which 
appeared to have shifted little over many decades. For Neto (2001b: I-II) many aspects 
of traditional authority were "incompatible with democratic rules" and universal 
suffrage. The democratic separation of powers is generally not understood within the 
institution of traditional authority, where these powers are conflated. The existence of 
a hereditary aristocracy combined with inherited socially inferior positions is difficult 
to reconcile with the constitutional equality of all citizens. Also, the lack of political 
power for women within traditional power structures serves to highlight some of the 
issues requiring attention and updating within traditional structures. 
A further crucial perspective on peace relates to traditional authorities' role in making 
war itself, in both past and recent conflicts. At first glance this suggestion appears to 
contradict what has been said about the soba as a potential mediator and seeker of 
peace, but ironically, by knowing how to wage war it was understood that the soba 
also knew how to make peace. The Angolan literature is largely silent on the sobas 
involvement in Angola's wars. One of the few documented references emerged during 
the Open Society conference when sobas from eastern Angola called attention to this 
issue: 
"we appeal to sobas, regedores, and seculos21 to cease the magical preparations 
of military personnel and leaders, because they kill, destroy and confuse the 
people. Afterwards [the military] go to the curandeiros, who are sobas and 
seculos to prepare their bodies so that nothing will happen to them". 
"`" 
Elsewhere, Honwana (1998: 4 1) highlighted the preparation of UNITA military 
commanders and soldiers by curandeiros. The comment in effect points to traditional 
practices within modern warfare, a factor explored in more detail later. This connects 
with the involvement of some curandeiros in sorcery, and to `mystical weapons' 
mentioned in the last chapter, an extremely complex dimension of Angolan culture. 
2 
The recourse to sorcery was for the purpose of personal protection during combat. 
21 Within soba hierarchy, the regedor (Portuguese term) was above the soba, the seculo (Umbundu 
term) was just below. Taken from Pacheco (2001: 107). 
22 
, -4ngolense, 
February 23-March 2,2002, page VII. The identification of the curandeiro with the person 
of the soba, as suggested here, is not always the case. 
Fred Bridyland's (1986) book contains an interesting photograph of UNITA soldiers engaging 
in a 
'traditional spirit dance` prior to battle, suggestive of the 'traditional preparations' soldiers underwent 
prior to combat. The sohus would ha\ e had input into this preparation. 
224 
most likely through the use of potions and charms. 24 The malevolent dimension 
involved using sorcery to harm others. The extent of these practices during the war has 
not been ascertained, but its primary importance for military personnel lay at an 
individual level. This magical-religious world of traditional authority is never far from 
the surface in discussions with the Bobas, and can be quite inaccessible. 25 The 
important point however, is that, for a significant number of people, these issues are 
important and played a part in the Angolan war. 
3. Traditional Peace Making: Where and How? 26 
This section examines peace making within traditional society, setting out to address 
the research question of where and how peace was made. In section 3.1,1 look firstly 
at the ondjango, 27 the space and place where conflict was resolved within the 
community, with a view to understanding its significance for traditional society. 
Section 3.2 outlines how peace was `signed' by illustrating the key place of ritual and 
ritualised food sharing. Section 3.3 explains how an oath was taken to ensure 
compliance with an agreement which involved invoking the ancestors. Though these 
three sections reach back somewhat into Angola's past, I was struck during fieldwork 
by the animated responses to questions I posed about the relevance and applicability of 
traditional peace making methods in Angola in the 1990s. I include some of the replies 
received. It is important to state that the material in this section brings together 
responses from individuals and groups from across Angola's major ethnic groups. This 
reveals similar approaches to peace making in traditional society, though specific 
details may differ from one group to another. 
24 Pacheco (? 001: 105) noted that sorcery was frequently directed at those who distinguished themselves 
economically or socially within the community. 
2' Interview with Maria de Conceigdo New. Luanda, December 6.200 1. 
'6 An earlier draft of sections three and four has been accepted for publication (Comerford 
2003). 
The origin of the word ondjungo in Umbundu, is derived from 'ondjo' meaning `house, 
' and 'ohungo' 
meaning 'issues' or 'talk' (Nunes 1991: 157). `Ondjo ± ohango' became ondjango, to 
denote the house 
where people talk or discuss issues. The relevant Kimbundu words are 'on: o '- 'hango 
'. though the 
word ondjango is used. In the Lundas among the Chokwe peoples. the word 'chota' 
is used instead of 
oncjango. Structurally the ondjungo was designed quite simply - an open circular structure with 
thatch 
rooting and a strong timber pole in the centre to support the roof. Any walls were 
lo%ý externalones 
made of mud and wattle, ensuring that proceedings could be followed 
from outside. Animal skins 
invariably hung from the rafters beneath which the soha and other elders would sit to signify authority. 
Various charms to protect the soha and the community were sometimes 
in evidence. 
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3.1. The Ondjango: A Place to Make Peace. 
Before looking at the ondjango as the place where conflict was dealt with, I briefly 
outline some of its other functions. Its key function was as a community meeting place 
where issues were discussed in the presence of the soba and elders, representing a form 
of `traditional parliament' (Nunes 1991: 151). Villages, which were generally extended 
family units, had their own ondjango, whereas larger populations tended to have an 
ondjango in each bairro. Other important functions included the following. It was 
where guests and visitors were welcomed upon arriving in the village. 28 It served as 
place of socialisation for younger members of the community as they listened to the 
stories of the elders (Robson & Roque 2001: 84). The ondjango functioned as a 
traditional court where crimes, misdemeanours, and other offences were dealt with, 
and fines or penalties imposed (Chikueka 1999: 393; David 1997; Nunes 1991: 166- 
167). It is also important to underline the educational role of the court system as 
offenders were instructed about what the community expected of them in the future. 
Finally, the ondjango was the place of peacemaking and reconciliation. a function 
closely connected with its role as a traditional court. Nunes and Estermann examined 
the `traditional court' dimension of the ondjango, but left its peacemaking potential 
unaddressed. As can be seen from this, the ondjango exercised different functions 
within the community and represented a powerful institution within traditional 
Angolan society. 
The description of the ondjango as a 'traditional parliament' disguises the fact that it 
was by and large a meeting place for men, though some sobas were women. 
Traditional society was patriarchal, with few administrative or leadership roles 
exercised by women. Women had the right to participate but in a substantially different 
way to men. From outside the ondjango women signalled their intent to speak by two 
claps of their hands and would then be called on. However. women's agreement or 
disagreement with what was said within the ondjango was frequently expressed to 
other women in such a way as to be clearly heard inside. 29 In the introduction, it was 
stated that Df1D (2000) and ActionAid (2001) were exploring the peace making 
potential of traditional authority. There are serious reservations particularly among 
feminist writers to this, in that a renewed interest in traditional authority could have an 
Even today it is courteous to introduce oneself to the soba when visiting a village. Local cooperation 
may in fact depend on whether this courtesy call is made. 
"' Comment made during the Dundo workshop, October 200 I I. 
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adverse effect on women's democratic participation in society, by closing down the 
space women have worked hard to create. The fear is based on the lack of gender 
equality within traditional society, where gender determines one's right to 
participation. 30 The ondjango as a place of male discourse echoes, in many respects, 
Habermas's early public sphere where women were largely excluded from public 
discourse. The key difference however is that for Habermas, access to property was the 
determining factor in securing participation, whereas within the ondjango, 
participation was based on gender and age. Young men were deemed to lack the 
necessary experience to offer advice within the community and were excluded, though 
their temporary exclusion until a certain age. structurally differentiates it from 
women's exclusion. 
It is difficult to establish how widespread the use of the ondjango is in present day 
Angola. Its decline is intrinsically connected to the marginalisation of traditional 
authority within the country. Many urbanised Angolans, especially the young. may 
never have seen an ondjango and are puzzled by it, expressing confusion with regard 
to its purpose and role. 31 For them it points to a past that has been left behind as 
`backward', in contrast to the apparent freedoms associated with city living. By 
contrast, Angolans from the provinces or those of an older generation speak with 
affection of the ondjango and recount stories of their participation in the past. Robson 
& Roque (2001: 84) describe the ondjango as "an important institution in the 
countryside", while Pacheco's (2001: 86) research found that the ondjango was still 
used in the Huambo region to address local conflicts. In Dundo. the use of the 
ondjango has certainly declined but there was evidence of its use to resolve disputes, 
particularly in relation to families' inheritance issues. In many cases the older 
generation favoured bringing their complaints before the soba instead of involving the 
police. On occasions I have heard people suspending an argument by saying "vamos 
ao soba", ``let's go to the chief', for arbitration. In most places the ondjango itself is 
30 An International Alert (2001: 24) publication on gender in peacebuilding put forward "two gender- 
based reasons why donors should approach material support for so-called 'traditional' reconciliation and 
conflict resolution mechanisms with caution. First, they are much more a reflection of highly gendered 
local politics and power relations than they are part of some value-free traditional culture. Second, 
women's needs are normally completely marginalised in their practice of these mechanisms and may 
even be undermined by them". 
Opinion of young people interviewed at the Igreja de Carmo, Luanda, November -1 1,2001. 
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no longer used, with sobas using the veranda of their house or a closed yard, to 
conduct their `ondjango' meetings. 
Though the use of the ondjango in the resolution of conflict has obviously declined, a 
crucial issue to highlight here is the importance of the ondjango as a traditional space. 
which I explore as a form of archetypal space in Angola, an 'original blueprint' of 
what Angolan discursive space looks like. In spite of the gendered nature of ondjango 
discourse, it was the key communicative arena, a forum that made provision for the 
"rational guidance of society" (Calhoun 1995: 30). where the (male) community 
gathered to talk and listen. There was no question of gender being `bracketed', one of 
the ideals of public sphere discourse. In reflecting on the appeals for inclusive dialogue 
to end the Angolan conflict, made throughout these peace narratives, it is my view that 
these appeals are based on the memory of the ondjango as a place where the 
community met to talk about its problems, to review the past and make preparation for 
the future. Calls for dialogue are, I believe, calls for a form of ondjango 
communication, for the creation of an ondjango-like space where public talking could 
occur on the way to resolve Angola's conflict. The Pro Pace Congress of 2000 was just 
such an attempt to create an ondjango context, where people could talk about Angola. 
3.2. The `Signing' of Peace Ceremonies. 
Traditional society used various mechanisms to maintain peace and harmony. For 
example, conflict within the community or village was sometimes resolved by 
communities breaking up and members leaving to establish a community elsewhere 
(Gesler 1999: 120). Inter-marriage between members of different villages was also a 
means by which conflict was settled within traditional societv. 32 Conflict (or crime) 
was also addressed through the payment of fines in cash or livestock as restitution to 
the offended party. Major conflicts however, were much more threatening to the 
stability of the community and subject to special rituals involving the sharing of food 
and drink as signs of reconciliation. Turner (1969) referred to rituals of this nature as 
"rituals of affliction'". 33 Cox (1998: x) underlines ritual as a communicative process to 
be entered into, where meaning is experienced through participation: 
"ritual is a repeated and symbolic dramatization directing attention to a place 
where the sacred enters life thereby granting identity to participants in the 
Interview v ith Conceiq o Neto, Luanda. December 6,200 I. 
Quoted in Coy (1998: x-yii). 
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drama, transforming them, communicating social meaning verbally and non- 
verbally, and offering a paradigm for how the world ought to be". 
While not all ritual necessarily involves this sacred dimension, Cox's definition 
highlights a qualitative difference in terms of place and space when these are used 
ritualistically. In Angolan culture, the ondjango embodied this ritualistic place and 
space, presided over by the soba and community elders. 
Important cultural considerations have emerged in the literature regarding the 
construction of peace agreements in non-western societies. With particular reference to 
Uganda, Pain (1997: 94) described the western approach of "signed formal agreements'' 
as "restrictive" with "minimal effect on the ground". He stated that "the measure of 
reconciliation is that one will ... 
be able to share food together" (Pain 1997: 76). The 
implication is that without some form of `peace meal' one cannot assume that 
reconciliation has occurred. Fieldwork showed that Angolans echoed Pain's view, and 
that all Angola's major ethnic groups share this cultural assumption that the sharing of 
food was the basis for reconciliation, traditionally. Traditional Angolan societies 
`signed' peace and were reconciled through participation in a ritualised meal. Sharing 
food was the `peace signing' ceremony. Western peace agreements by contrast 
emphasise the legally binding nature of written documents where both sides publicly 
exchange copies of the signed agreement, with the event frequently televised as part of 
the public ritual of peace making (Sussman & Muliro 2000). This western model is not 
inappropriate in an Angolan context but, in my view, other models expressing the 
traditions and cultures of those making peace must also be incorporated. 
Neither the Bicesse nor Lusaka peace agreements involved the sharing of food as part 
of the peace signing. Some interviewees felt that a 'peace meal' could have added 
another dimension to the signing of these agreements by further validating and 
consolidating what had been signed. After the signing of the Bicesse Accords both 
sides apparently went back to their respective hotels. 34 My memory of the televised 
signing of the Lusaka Protocol is of an elaborate event which prioritised the exchange 
of signatures. Paul Hare (1998: 65) makes no mention of a meal, instead described the 
signing of the Lusaka Protocol as a "sweet moment", one ``filled with appropriately 
worded statements of peace and the rites of protocol". The rites of protocol in question 
34 The recollection of a Portuguese missionary, resident in Portugal at the time of the Bicesse signing. 
Interviewed Luanda, September 25 200 I. 
229 
are different to what one interviewee called "the cultural rites of protocol'", where food 
would have been shared as part of the reconciliation process. 35 Sao Vincente (1995: 19) 
also noted the importance of song and dance as part of the process of restoring 
"harmony and understanding" within Angolan communities, issues I deal with later in 
another context. 
As observed at the time, the absence of Jonas Savimbi from the signing of the Lusaka 
Protocol was a troubling sign that did not bode well. When word filtered through that 
Eugenio Manuvakola, who signed the Protocol on behalf of UNITA, had been 
imprisoned by Savimbi upon his return to Angola, the sense of foreboding deepened. 36 
Some traditional authority figures interviewed suggested that the Lusaka Protocol 
should not have been signed because of Savimbi's absence, pointing out that from a 
traditional perspective the delegates had no authority to make peace. only those in 
conflict had the right to sign the agreement. 37 This view however seems extreme and 
does not take into account the importance of the Lusaka Protocol in bringing to an end 
one of the most brutal periods in Angola's history. 
3.3. Honouring the Ancestors: the Act of Oath-Taking. 
In the case of serious conflict, the peace meal was highly ritualised and included a 
moment when the ancestors were invoked as witnesses to the agreement. As pointed 
out in chapter six, the reason for this is located within African traditional religion, 
where the ancestors were understood to be intimately linked with the living, and peace 
therefore was about harmony being re-established horizontally between those in 
conflict, and vertically with the ancestors. The ancestral component involved pouring 
libations and symbolic drinking, and was a sacred moment of appeasing the spirit 
world. Honouring the ancestors also signified the moment of -oath-taking' within 
traditional religion, 38 where few, if any oaths had higher significance. 
35 Phrase used by Alvaro Rodrigues, Baptist pastor, interviewed in Luanda, July 28,2000. 
36 Burity da Silva, Pro Pace Congress 2000. Also. HRW (1999). 
'' Interview with five sobas in the bairro of Rocha Pinto, Luanda, June 11,2000. They used the phrase 
"Ninguem cumpre cadeia para o seu tilho" meaning "nobody goes to jail for their son daughter". 
38 Kouassi's (2000: 72) comment: The most common methods by which the Akan[of Ghana] sealed 
their treaties, alliances, and diplomatic relations was the 'drinking of the gods'. ... 
[A]II members 
present would drink ... and then swear an oath to abide 
by the terms of the treaty on pain of being killed 
by the god", indicated a similar form of oath-taking beyond Angolan borders. 
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These libations were traditionally conducted where the ancestors were buried, which 
raises the issue of applicability had this aspect of traditional peace methods been 
incorporated into a peace signing ceremony. Where would the honouring of the 
ancestors have taken place? It was generally accepted by those interviewed that 
libations poured at Bicesse or Lusaka would have been insufficient, and that libations 
could only be poured at the burial sites of the respective ancestors. The implication is 
that a second ceremony, or a second moment within the same ceremony, would have 
been required in Angola, with both UNITA and the MPLA personnel honouring their 
respective ancestors. The suggestion presumes that such a link with this ancestral 
dimension exists for both political parties, and furthermore that the MPLA and UNITA 
would have accepted participation in such rituals. Any ancestral link with the MPLA is 
more tenuous because of its strong historical connections with European culture 
(Birmingham 1992: 12-13; Kambwa 2000: 63; Kibble & Vines 2001: 540). These 
traditional rituals would have been of greater importance for L NITA because of its 
origins in the central highlands. 
An implication of this material suggested during fieldwork, was that this form of oath- 
taking could have gone far in building public confidence in peace agreements. Maier 
(1996: 14) and Robson (2001: 4) noted a general lack of confidence after the Lusaka 
peace process in particular. An approach to peace that sought to incorporate some of 
these cultural dimensions would have made the peace agreements `culturally 
recognisable', particularly among rural populations. 39 It was suggested that public 
confidence in the peace agreements would have been enhanced on the basis that 
Angolans would have recognised their traditions at work, and understood what had 
been entered into. The suggestion runs deeper however, based on the implication that 
this cultural recognition would later have turned people away from either side in the 
conflict should they have attempted to break the agreements. In effect. the implication 
is that Jonas Savimbi's own people would not, and could not, have supported him in 
violating peace and returning the country to war. Having sworn an ancestral oath, his 
own people would have shunned him had he attempted to remobilise his troops. The 
argument is that Jonas Savimbi's non-compliance with international agreements must 
19 The material in this paragraph is from interviews conducted during fieldwork, including traditional 
authority figures, church personnel and a number of NGO workers Interviews conducted on October 10 
2001, November 7,9,16,28,2001. One interviewee stated that UNITA soldiers were known to have 
said we have never drunk from the calabash" implying that they expected to drink ritually as part of 
their decommissioning, echoing material presented in chapter six. 
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be located in this arena, that the cultural space left open allowed him to be duplicitous. 
At the cultural level these agreements were not binding on UNITA. highlighting a 
fundamental weakness in the agreements. 
4. `Traditional Consultancy': Exploring a Concept. 
This final section explores `traditional consultancy', by which I mean an individual or 
group of individuals versed in the culture and traditions of an ethnic group or groups, 
capable of offering expert and informed advice. The concept I propose to argue, 
appears especially useful in the context of a peace process, where reliable information 
based on an understanding of culture and tradition could prove invaluable in 
smoothening the road a peace process has to travel. I explore how this concept of 
`traditional consultancy', with its emphasis on furnishing traditional knowledge. could 
have been helpful in Angola at crucial times. The concept has already been in use in 
the previous section, where I sought to establish connections between traditional 
perspectives and the needs of a country in conflict. My coining of the phrase is partly a 
response to the lack of such advice available to Margaret Anstee during her time as 
Special Representative in Angola. Anstee (1995: 527) wrote: 
"I have several times described in this book how desperately lonely I felt at 
times of great crisis, with few means at hand to combat it, and seldom anyone 
nearby to whom I could confidently turn for advice". 
I was very struck by this comment in her book and was convinced that her mandate 
required expert advice in the area of tradition and culture. 
Fisher (1998: 3) highlighted a lack of attention to cultural differences within 
international decision making generally: 
We note that people responsible for international decision making often 
operate from a traditional Western vantage point and, in the process, fail to 
recognise their own intellectual ethnocentricity and their dependence on 
conventional conceptions about the ways that nations behave, or should 
behave. When confronting societies and cultures (e. g.. ethnic groups) that 
follow less familiar patterns of logic, political leaders, military strategists. even 
diplomats tend to project their Western experience and analytical orientation 
without sufficient effort to take contrasting cultural realities into account.. . 
Fisher's argument is that when building peace, there is a need to understand the culture 
of those in conflict, to appreciate how the protagonists themselves perceive the 
conflict. Cohen (1991: 95-96) has noted that political scientists use the word culture 
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in a narrow, specialised sense ... more concerned with the study of national institutions and attitudes than with investigating the organic link between 
political behaviour and culture as it is understood by anthropologists". 
Such a narrow definition results in anthropological insights being lost. Cohen 
(1991: 153) argues that though the cultural dimension may be hidden, it has a pervasive 
influence on the behaviour of individuals, groups and societies. 
Before exploring `traditional consultancy' in the Angola context, I propose to illustrate 
how some of the skills, understandings and knowledge operated informally to 
successfully avoid a `cultural incident' during the early stages of the Mozambican 
peace negotiations. Mario Marazitti (2002: 6-7). a spokesperson for the Sant'Egidio 
community in Rome which played a crucial role in facilitating the peace agreement. 
highlights the following moment: 
"A far from insignificant moment arose over the choice of menu. In 
Mozambique, the head of the table has the right to the head of the fish. 
Knowing this the Italian hosts served two whole grilled fish, so that each 
delegation leader could have a head. It was these two fish which pointed 
towards the parties' mutual recognition, and the moment when the 'facilitators' 
became the `mediators"'. 
We are dealing here with issues of cross-cultural communication where symbolic 
meaning is of great importance. Awareness of cultural sensitivities enabled the hosts to 
avoid conflict and affirm the leadership of both sides. The example illustrates that 
traditional knowledge is not the exclusive preserve of nationals immersed in the 
traditions of their own people, but that non-nationals familiar with the issues at stake, 
can exercise an effective role. 
I now examine three inter-related areas which suggest that some form of `traditional 
consultancy' could have been helpful in Angola. Firstly, I deal with the cultural 
assumptions underpinning mediation within conflict and then look at the roles of the 
UN and Troika. Secondly, I highlight the need for those working for peace to 
appreciate informal and non-verbal communicative processes. In an Angolan context 
and probably Africa generally, this requires a competency in relation to understanding 
what ceremonies of welcome are saying, what the drum and dancer are 
communicating, and what rumour may be informing. Thirdly, I assess the place of 
'peace envoys' or 'peace delegations. paying some attention to Blondin Beye. before 
examining the UNITA peace delegation stationed in Luanda after the signing of the 
Bicesse Accords, many of whom were killed ,w hen hostilities erupted in 1992. My 
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question concerns the consequences for peace of their deaths, from a traditional 
perspective. 
4.1. The role of mediators. 
In exploring mediation in the Angolan conflict it is important to differentiate between 
the role played by the UN Secretary-General's special representatives Margaret Anstee 
and Alioune Blondin Beye, and that of the Troika of observers. I treat these separately 
after making two points dealing with cultural assumptions underpinning mediation. 
Firstly, from a traditional perspective those called to mediate take upon themselves a 
sacred duty and are accorded special respect and protection. The person who accepted 
the task of mediation stepped into a sacred space that set them aside from others in the 
community, explained further below. Secondly, within the ondjango, the mediator's 
task was to listen as each side set out grievances and explained the reasons for conflict. 
This initial step where both sides talked about the nature of the problem, was followed 
by a second which involved negotiations and attempts at resolution. Calhoun (1995: 32) 
highlights a helpful Habermasian distinction between these two types of 
communication, differentiating between "speech oriented to understanding itself' and 
"speech oriented to practical effects". The former, I submit, captures the major concern 
of ondjango discussions, where opposing sides examined 'roots causes' of conflict. the 
latter suggests a task-centred approach to communication, where negotiations and 
timetables are prioritised. Theoretically, the latter follows the former in peace 
discussions. In interviews with traditional authority figures, the impression prevailed 
that the Angolan peace agreements focused on `negotiations' rather than examining the 
`root causes' of conflict, which they argued have never been examined. This is 
probably because international mediators believed they knew the root causes, and 
considered a negotiated ending more urgent. As mentioned, this urgency was 
particularly real during the Lusaka negotiations, given the scale of suffering caused 
by 
the war. 
International mediators have set out their understanding of what motivated the 
Angolan conflict. Margaret Anstee identified "spoils politics" and "power" as the 
basic 
issue in a section of her book explaining her hope that a private, rather than a general 
meeting. between the parties might be more productive. She wrote: 
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"Carving up the spoils of government involved many delicate issues internal to Angola and the striking of bargains between people who were not just fighting 
one another, but also knew one another very well, had in some cases been to 
school together and were even related to one another. The basic issue was 
power, and how to share it. They were much more likely to get down to the `nitty-gritty' on their own, face to face, than under the prying eyes of foreigners, however well-intentioned" (Anstee 1996: 457). 
The assessment put forward by Paul Hare (1998: xvii) was similar: "[the] prime motive 
behind the Angolan conflict has been the struggle for power and domination". While 
these are undoubtedly central factors in explaining the war, in my view, Angolans were 
saying something different, that the way forward necessitated going back to the first 
step where, in an ondjango-like space, parties in conflict set out the reasons for 
disagreement and moved forward from there. 
Three of Angola's kings, interviewed in 2001, stated that they had the means to bring 
the conflict to an end. 40 When asked to clarify these means, they answered, "we as 
Angolans must sit down to talk about the reasons for this war, we must promote 
dialogue". In doing so, they highlighted a fundamental assumption within traditional 
perspectives which shares a common assumption with Habermas's public sphere, that 
conflict or problems can be resolved through talking. This view has been reflected 
elsewhere. Jaka Jamba, a LNITA negotiator during the Addis Ababa talks, argued that 
the Angolan peace accords were concerned with the division of power between the 
parties involved, while all the time ignoring the underlying causes of the war itself. He 
stated that: 
"Bicesse created a `winner takes all' situation through the mechanism of the 
1992 elections, while Lusaka dealt with the allocation of percentages of 
ministerial posts and governorships to the various parties'". 41 
The issue of 'roots causes' arose in a curious way during the Addis Ababa talks. 
Anstee (1996: 384) quotes Manuvakola who at one point insisted 
"that there should first be "general debate about the underlying causes of the 
renewed conflict in Angola in plenary session. The government delegation did 
not want this and it was hard to see where a time-consuming reprise of mutual 
grievances would get us other than precipitating an unhelpfully acrimonious 
exchange" (Anstee 1996: 384). 
40 Vasco Felix Ekuikui IV from Bailundo, Henriques da Silva Meso Mankala of the Bakongos. and 
Muatchisengue Watembu of the Lunda-Chokwes. meeting at their residence in Viana, Luanda, 
September 2.2001. 
41 Interviewed in Luanda, August 4.2000. 
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Anstee believes that Manuvakola was `filibustering' as he may well have been . 
42but 
his statement appears to stand alongside others calling for discussion before 
negotiation. 
The issue of mediation also concerns the Troika of observers who played a central role 
in the negotiation of the Bicesse Accords, and continued to `oversee' the Angolan 
peace processes. Traditional authority's evaluation of the Troika's 'observer' role in 
the peace processes, and of international mediation in the conflict, has been rather 
negative. For example, in 2001 traditional authorities stated that in any future peace 
process, international organisations should not be "the only peace mediators in 
Angola", 43 that a national mediation component needed to be included. In the course of 
fieldwork in 2000, sobas in Dundo made the following statement reflecting their 
disillusionment with international mediation: 
We have something to say about the war, for more than twenty years we have 
been waiting to speak. We have ways to resolve our own problems. We do not 
need foreigners to make peace. Those from outside are also making weapons 
and are making a great deal of money here. People from outside do not 
understand. We would get the two of them [President dos Santos and Jonas 
Savimbi] to sit down. We were born here, we are from the same family. The 
war is not in our interest, it is foreigners who are profiting, deceiving the two of 44v" them". ' 
At the Open Society conference, the following critical evaluation (appendix 4) was 
made of the Troika and international mediation as a whole: 
"Whenever we have a problem, the first thing we do is call foreigners to 
resolve our problems. Independence was like that, and the various peace 
processes. Stop and have a look. We have a snake in the chicken coop, which is 
Angola, and we have called a fox to get rid of the snake. We ask ourselves, will 
the fox be more interested in running after the chickens to eat them, or in 
chasing away the snake? And if three foxes had been called, what can we 
expect of them? "4 
This use of simile or metaphor to describe a problem is not unusual in Angola. The 
above comment represents the sharpest criticism this research encountered of 
international involvement in trying to resolve the conflict. The suggestion is that 
42 In a private communication (telephone conversation April 2000) with Margaret Anstee, she stated that 
this suggestion came very late in the day and was interpreted as a stalling mechanism so as to give 
UNITA troops more time to consolidate their military gains in Angola. 
'' Taken from a FAAT conference document dated September 1-1200 1. 
4' Meeting with eight sobas, Dundo, June 5,2000. 
45 angolense, February 23-March 2,2002, pp. IX-X. 
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mediation has made the problem worse, that the mediators (foxes) forgot what the 
original problem was and set about feeding themselves, looking after their own 
`interests', shorthand for `economic interests'. The members of the Troika have 
substantial economic involvement in terms of oil, diamonds and other business 
interests in Angola, and traditional authorities believed these were of greater concern 
than their mediation role. This perspective is a reversal of the usual resource argument, 
in that those seeking control over Angola's natural resources are not those at war, but 
those involved in mediation. 
4.2. `Communicative Competencies'. 
Here I suggest that a particular expertise of `traditional consultancy' would be its 
communicative ability and competency, not merely linguistically in terms of speaking 
a language or a number of languages, but dealing more widely with an ability to 
unpack cultural metaphors and similes, to measure and assess non-verbal and 
"informal means of communication" (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 25-26), such as rumour. 
music, dance, drums, and gift-giving. It refers to an ability to analyse public 
communication at different levels, other than at the `rational-critical' level one 
associates with Habermas's public sphere discourse. I give an example from the 
colonial period which illustrates some of the subtleties involved, then go on to explore 
traditional welcome ceremonies. before looking at rumour and oral communication. 
4.2.1. Subversive nationalist music and dance. 
The following example of how Angolan music and dance played a subversive role 
during colonial times, provides a basis upon which to read traditional ceremonies of 
welcome, examined in the next two sections. The Angolan author Xitu (1989) points 
out that cultural displays, performed for foreign visitors, were sometimes used to 
communicate a different message than that imagined by the visitors. Xitu (1989: 146- 
147) refers to the music 
"[known as] `get out of here' and another, one day we will get rid of you', at 
the time when the coloniser was fleeing the Belgian Congo ... 
It was music 
written in great quantity that alarmed the PIDE [colonial secret police] and 
confused the Portuguese government... These singers and musicians 
continually offered a critique, singing about suffering, about their peoples' 
misery, there were spokespersons of ancestral culture. One could even say they 
gave birth to the revolution. ... 
In the colonial era, ýe ww ere forced many times 
to sing and dance for the president of the Republic, ministers and their retinue 
visiting from Portugal and other places in Europe. In these songs and 
dances 
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we succeeded in mocking the visitors, without them knowing. On the contrary. the visitors clapped appreciatively because they didn't understand the 
significance of the words in the national languages". 
The example illustrates that something other than what visitors suspected was 
occurring before their very eyes. It shows that music and dance have been used by 
Angolans as part of their communicative repertoire and that such communication was 
not always accessible, hence the need for `consultants' competent to unpack the 
various layers of meaning. 
4.2.2. Traditional Welcome: Gift Giving. 
Music and dance form part of the 'traditional welcome' afforded important visitors in 
Angolan culture. Here I examine the welcome given to Margaret Anstee and her 
delegation prior to the Bicesse Accords during a visit to Jamba. then UNIT, -\'s key 
strategic base. Anstee (1997: 179-180) describes her visit as follows: 
The reception on our arrival was mind-boggling. A large concourse of young 
girls and youths were frantically dancing and chanting to the beat provided by 
equally frenetic drummers. ... After we had visited the quarters of our two 
observers - grass huts - there was a large and long-drawn-out luncheon 
followed by more speeches and the presentation to me of an elaborate carved 
wooden apparatus. In the centre of this was a large cylindrical pot, with a lid, 
and lined with yellow plastic foam. The central pot was surrounded by several. 
smaller pots, connected to it and to one another with spokes like an open wheel. 
I felt it impolite to ask what on earth it was for, and no one has been able to tell 
me since". 
Interviewees who knew Jamba well and to whom I showed this description made a 
number of points which I set out here. In terms of understanding what is being 
communicated in a welcome ceremony, it is important to go beyond the content of the 
speeches and ask what the dancers expressed in their dance, and what the drums said. 46 
These were not merely providing entertainment, but communicating a message as seen 
in Xitu above. Also, in Angolan culture it is polite to ask what a gift means. It is a way 
of expressing appreciation, and it would have been appropriate for Margaret Anstee to 
have requested an explanation of the gift. An interviewee who had lived in Jamba for 
many years, pointed out that UNITA craft-workers held meetings to discuss and 
prepare arteseanal gifts for visitors. and a great deal of reflection went into what gifts 
a`' Chernoffs (1979) book is an interesting study of the communicative power of African music and 
dance. For example. he describes how in traditional societ\. court historians were drummers. and how 
the drummer continues to be the 'master of ceremonies' at public events (Chernoff 1979: 27-75). 
Browning's (1995) study of the communicative power of dance in Brazil. traces many of the Brazilian 
expressions of dance back to their African roots prior to the slave trade. Browning (I 995: xxii) refers to 
dance as a form of "cultural record keeping". 
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were given and why. 47 None of my informants however, knew the meaning of the gift 
to Margaret Anstee, but thought it could only be about the peace process. 
Again I suggest that a form of traditional consultancy familiar with the language of 
symbol and gift-giving, with the language of the drum and the dancer could have 
exercised an important role here, particularly in relation to the nature of the 
communication taking place beyond the cultural reach of international mediators and 
observers. 
4.2.3. Traditional Welcome: Placards? 
Paul Hare's (1998: 72) description of his trip to Jamba some years later. shares 
remarkable similarities in structure with Anstee's at the level of speeches. dancers and 
drummers: 
On their arrival, the visitors received a rousing welcome. A special 
programme of speeches, plays, and traditional dances was presented. 
Commenting on the music, I wrote: A somewhat ragtag but determined military 
band played martial music, spurred on by the drummer who somehow managed 
to throw one of his batons in the air and retrieve it, while gyrating in circles and 
thumping the drum exactly on beat. I also noted the `release of two doves by 
the children's contingent who held placards, sometimes upside down, that 
contained only one word, 'Pa: ' or 'Peace"'. 
Many of the same points can be made about the need to understand the form of 
communication, but some of the same interviewees who commented on the above text 
were intrigued by the description of the children's placards. Aware of possibly over- 
interpreting the text, their own experience of similar events, especially where children 
are carefully lined up, led them believe that the placards were upside-down because 
they were supposed to be, that UNITA was saying that the peace process was upside- 
down! Whatever the truth of the matter, the moment required some mechanism to 
facilitate and translate the communication occurring. 
47 Interview with Bernardo Bongo, Luanda, November I5 2001. 
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4.2.4. Oral Tradition. 
A concern with oral tradition and rumour is by no means a marginal concern (Fonseca 
1996). 48 Anstee (1996: 346) described Luanda as "always a-buzz with rumour" after 
the Bicesse Accords pointing to rumours that UNITA had hidden its army in the 
Angolan bush (Anstee 1996: 52-53) and that both sides were rearming (Anstee 
1996: 337). The `truth' of these rumours was later to painfully unfold. The Kimbundu 
word mujimbu is frequently used to refer to rumour and can be asked as a question, 
mujimbu? to mean `any news'? Xitu (1985: 35) provides an interesting description of 
mujimbu: 
"the newspaper with the largest print run, circulation, and distribution in 
Angola, is the Mujimbu, which is read and discussed by almost all the 
country's inhabitants, even by the illiterate, blind, dumb and sick. ... The Mujimbu is the cheapest paper in the world: it's free and has a believing 
audience without precedent. Distribution and diffusion in the streets, the bars, 
clubs, beaches, markets ... all over, without exception, mujimbu! ... the term which simply means, news, information, conversation, quarrel. trouble, 
problem, complaint, lost its true and original meaning to become RUMOUR" 
(emphasis in original). 'x 
As Monga (1996: 151-152) points out, in countries where the media is state-owned and 
where freedom of expression is curtailed or restricted, it is important to pay attention to 
oral communication as a "means of effectively distributing critical messages". One 
interviewee stated that for many in Angola the only news believed and trusted was 
mujimbu, the news on the street, often the product of people returning from various 
parts of Angola and recounting their first hand experience. 49 
Though contradictory at times, an appreciation of oral communication and rumour is 
fundamentally important. Within a culture where individuals are reluctant to speak 
publicly, and are fearful of being personally identified with an opinion. there is a 
tendency to anonymously `suggest' what is known, to "deliberately adopt an imprecise 
way of communicating in order to protect themselves and disguise their first-hand 
knowledge"" (Monga 1996: 152). Given that rumours existed regarded UNITA's hidden 
army and rearmament, 50 the question must be raised as to why no means was found to 
48 In his review of Dia Kassembe's book Angola 20 ans de guerre civile, Une femme accuse, Rene 
Pelissier (1996: 320) quotes the author who "warn[ed] the reader against the boato (rumour), an intrinsic 
part of the societies set up by the Portuguese". Lefebvre's (1973) book on the role of rumour in France 
at the time of the French Revolution illustrates that rumour has played a very important role also in 
western societies, particularly when society relied on oral forms of communication for information. 
41' Interview in Luanda, October 22 2001. 
' Bakeý+ell (1999: 150) comments on how Angolans were aware of arms caches and soldiers hidden in 
the bush, indicating that there was widespread scepticism about the peace process. 
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explore these allegations by attempting to follow the rumours back to their source, or 
indeed to work with the churches who had expressed similar concerns, as seen in 
chapter three. 
Traditional consultancy could also have exercised a vital function at the level of 
linguistics. Jonas Savimbi was renowned for his linguistic skills, and rumours 
circulating prior to the elections expressed concern at the content of his speeches when 
delivered in national languages. In contrast to the more accommodating tone he 
adopted when addressing the crowds in Portuguese, oral reports described the 
threatening tone of his speeches in national languages. A disturbing example of this 
dates from the post-election period, during the welcome ceremony afforded Blondin 
Beye upon his first visit to Huambo. According to three key informants present, 
Blondin Beye was warmly welcomed by Jonas Savimbi who spoke to him in 
Portuguese and French and presented him to the crowds as the new UN Special 
Representative. 51 As he did so, Savimbi broke into Umbundu and ridiculed Beye for 
dressing like a woman in his long Islamic robes. Encouraging the crowd to chant 
Beye's name, he told them that no man dressed as such could have any authority. 
While the example reflects negatively on Savimbi (and demoralised the crowd who 
understood what had taken place), it also reflects negatively on the UN missions, 
poorly resourced linguistically to cope with such situations. 52 
4.3. The role of peace envoys. 
Because it is not always possible in a mediation process to bring together both sides in 
conflict, delegates or envoys are appointed to represent their leaders. These delegates 
are traditionally accorded the same rights and protections as the peace mediators 
because of the importance of their duties. After the signing of the Bicesse Accords a 
UNITA delegation was stationed in Luanda to deal with peace related matters. There 
was no need for the Angolan government to have a reciprocal delegation. A crucial 
question arises from a traditional perspective when these delegates are killed or 
51 Interviews November 16 2001; November 21 2001. 
52 A further example from this linguistic arena concerns the phrase where Jonas Savimbi is referred to as 
`o mais velho', sometimes carelessly translated as 'the oldest one'. A more accurate translation ktiould be 
the senior elder', but even that misses the point, because `o mais velho' is a translation of the Umbundu 
`Sekulu vvo-la sekulul', meaning the 'chief of chiefs'. 'king of kings'. In other words. within his own 
linguistic group, Savimbi aggregated to himself the title of the countr\'s traditional ruler. which none of 
the translations capture. 
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threatened, or when the mediator is killed, as happened when Alioune Blondin Beye 
was killed in a plane crash in Abidjan on June 26,1998. What if any, are the 
consequences for peace when such events occur? I examine Beye's death, firstly. 
A brief introductory comment is relevant concerning the death of Beye. I was resident 
in Angola at the time of his death and aware of popular concerns that war between 
UNITA and the government might resume. However, I was not aware that some of 
these fears concerned a possible war with Mali. During fieldwork in 2000, I was told 
of Angolans who left their homes at the time of Beye's death to temporarily hide in the 
bush, assuming that a Malian declaration of war was imminent in order to avenge and 
honour the death of their son. Dundo is close to the border with the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and these people assumed Mali would invade overland. 
Significantly, the non-declaration of war was understood by some as irrational, as a 
failure by Mali to honour its son. The understanding behind this perception was that 
Beye had been killed while involved in `sacred duties' of mediation, that Angola had 
failed to protect him. Beye had worked tirelessly for peace in Angola, and his demise 
was a contributing factor in Angola slipping back into war later that year. 
The death in Luanda of members of UNITA's delegation in 1992 raises serious and 
complex issues. In effect, it suggests that the trigger factors behind the conflict, were 
not solely UNITA allegations of fraud and rejection of the election results, but that 
cultural issues were also involved. Fieldwork research inquiring about the implications 
of these deaths yielded contradictory responses, with some considering these deaths as 
irrelevant, while others believed they were the issue in the post-election return to 
war. 53 The different responses hinged on whether the UNITA delegation was 
considered a `peace delegation' in the traditional sense. The point was frequently made 
that the UNITA delegation did not behave as a `peace delegation', to be considered as 
such. Their "behaviour in Luanda infuriated the civilian population" (Maier 1996: 100). 
They were heavily armed during peacetime and in television interviews they 
threatened war rather than promised peace. This behaviour contradicted claims that 
they were a `peace delegation' in the traditional sense. 
53 On two occasions when conducting group interviews during fieldwork (October 200 : November 
2001) these divergent opinions emerged. On both occasions the opinions reflected the ethnic origin of 
the speaker, with Ambundu interviewees stating the episode wkas unrelated to the resumption of war, 
while Ovimbundu interviewees arguing that it was the trigger factor. 
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An important question here, is how did Jonas Savimbi and UNITA understand the 
status of this delegation? It is here, I believe, that Anstee's book becomes an especially 
invaluable resource on Angola, because she records her conversations with Jonas 
Savimbi after the outbreak of fighting in Luanda before full-scale war had erupted. 
Two examples from her book are especially relevant. Firstly, Anstee (1996: 420) quotes 
Savimbi at this time of renewed hostilities, in an address to the nation in March 1993: 
"`Wars are bad and destructive but often they are worth it so that, once peace is 
established it will be a lasting peace... ' `The war was started by the MPLA 
assassinating our men in Luanda when they were on a peace mission-. 
Here Savimbi was referring to the killing of Chitunda and Salupeto Pena, and other 
members of the UNITA delegation. 54 
Secondly, her description of a meeting with Jonas Savimbi outside Huambo. is 
particularly important: 
"As in the case of the marathon telephone calls during and after the recent 
conflict in Luanda, we had the impression that Dr Savimbi was presenting `a 
stream of consciousness' and obtaining psychological relief by pouring forth 
his grief and grievances. ... 
There was much agonising and speculation over 
what had happened in Luanda and on the death of his closest collaborators 
(You never kill an envoy; you send him back and then the envoy may be 
changed or the message may be changed)" (Anstee 1996: 308). 
It is clear from Anstee's account that Jonas Savimbi understood his delegation in 
Luanda as a peace delegation. Though approximately ten thousand had been killed in 
Luanda at the start of the war, it was the deaths of members of the delegation that was 
of singular importance, constituting from a traditional perspective a declaration of war. 
An attack on the peace delegates was an attack on the peace process. Furthermore, 
Salupeto Pena was Savimbi's nephew, and within Umbundu consanguinity was 
Savimbi's heir and closest relative. Despite the fact that Savimbi had many children of 
his own, culturally his sister's son was his immediate heir. Within the traditional 
framework, the death of Salupeto Pena was of the greatest importance within the peace 
process because it meant that Savimbi himself had been killed. 
sA C. f. Anstee (1996: 292-310) on the post-electoral outbreak of violence. UNITA frequently called for 
the return of the bodies of delegation members. c. f. a letter from Alcides Sakala to the United '. Nations 
on September 12,2001, quoted in Folha 8. September -19. X001. UNIT. -\ thought the 
bodies had been 
kept in storage but Manuvakola disclosed in a LAC radio inters ieýv (Agora. September 29.2001). that 
they had been buried prior to the Lusaka negotiations. 
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The implications of this material suggests that while the international community was 
engaged in trying to get UNITA to accept the election results, a different concern was 
propelling UNITA back to war, a concern which only traditional and cultural 
knowledge can explain. As a prominent member of a national NGO stated in an 
interviewee: 
"though UNITA had fought and lost the elections, its return to war had little to do with electoral defeat, but was about avenging the death of its peace delegates". 
This analysis however is not without its difficulties because it does not explain why 
UNITA had begun to remobilise its forces and had occupied the town of Caconda on 
October 8, weeks before the battle of Luanda (Maier 1996: 83). UNITA was 
undeniably on a war footing prior to the killing of members of the delegation. 
Nonetheless, Jonas Savimbi's comments to Margaret Anstee about the 'death of the 
envoys' cannot be explained except at a cultural level, representing for him according 
to Anstee's account, the moment that triggered full-scale war. 
Paul Hare highlights another episode during the implementation of the Lusaka 
Protocol where a form of `traditional consultancy' could possibly have assisted. It 
shows that events on the ground in Angola overtook international mediation efforts at 
key moments in the peace process, and that mediation failed to appreciate the 
significance of what was happening. 
"Another serious setback occurred during a shooting incident at the residence 
of General Ben Ben in Luanda on October 14,1995.... Ben Ben and two other 
UNITA generals had come to Luanda to discuss various military issues, 
including the number of troops UNITA would contribute to the FAA and the 
concept of `global incorporation'. The presence of high-ranking UNITA 
military officers in Luanda was considered a sign of UNITA's commitment to 
the peace process. When I saw Ben Ben immediately after the incident, he was 
agitated. The shooting reignited memories of the October 1992 massacre in 
Luanda. 
... 
I tried to persuade Ben Ben and his colleagues that they should stay 
in Luanda, but the military team went back to Bailundo shortly thereafter, and 
the peace process slowed to a snail's pace" (Hare 1998: 95-96). 
Shooting at General Ben Ben would ordinarily not imperil the peace process, but doing 
so while he was a peace delegate was very different. 
The material outlined here suggests, to answer an earlier research question in terms of 
what insights a traditional perspective can provide, that certain traditional factors were 
at work within the Angolan conflict. International mediation needed a mechanism that 
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facilitated an understanding of Angola's traditions and cultures and which could offer 
traditional knowledge to the peace processes. This suggestion parallels a point made by 
Munslow (1999: 558) regarding Linda Heywood's work on the Ovimbundu peoples. 
Munslow commented: 
"scholars of Angola need to pay as much attention to traditional African 
political ideology as to Western ideas of democracy. ... Ovimbundu ethnic identify and pride were cultivated by Savimbi' s intimate knowledge of 
traditional beliefs". 
Zartmann (2000) and others in his edited work, have attempted to 'structure upwards' 
traditional methods of conflict management in order to address national conflict. It is 
not an argument I make here. Instead, I argue that the `structuring upwards' of 
traditional knowledge and perspectives, employing a mechanism such as 'traditional 
consultancy', could strengthen the knowledge base of a peace process and help in 
reading complex events. It is for this reason I include the words 'ancient and modern' 
in the chapter title, to suggest that `ancient traditions and perspectives have something 
to offer `modern' approaches in understanding and addressing conflict, a question I 
posed at the beginning of this chapter. 
Earlier sections of this chapter addressed the questions of where and how traditional 
society resolved conflict. The ondjango emerged as the key site in this regard, where 
communicative processes and ritual were seen as occupying key places within 
traditional peace making methodologies. Traditional authority perspectives on the 
causes of the conflict were also put forward, where the international community was 
situated, not as a peace broker in the conflict, but as a player in the conflict itself 
because of its economic interests. The need for ondjango-like space within which to 
conduct peace negotiations emerged as a key theme within the peace narrative of 
traditional authority. 
The issues highlighted in this section are culturally complex, but validate Cohen's 
(1991) argument that cultural issues can have significant implications for peace 
negotiations. I have attempted to present the material in a way that reflects the nature 
of the responses I received, which at times were contradictory. but point to important 
issues regarding what pushed Angola back to war. When Alioune Blondin Be} e was 
appointed as the UN Secretary General's special representative it . vas felt that an 
African man would have a better chance in bringing peace to Angola. because he 
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would understand his fellow Africans better, than a European woman. The issues 
involved here, appear however to revolve around questions of socialisation, and not 
gender or place of birth. An urban environment with strong western influences 
socialises individuals and communities in a radically different way to a rural 
environment. This should not surprise us. Different socialisation processes explain 
why some Angolans interviewed discounted the material presented here, while others 
verified it. 
I conclude this chapter with a comment from Fisher (1998) regarding the work of 
Robert McNamara (1995), US Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War. As the 
quotation illustrates, the cultural and traditional issues highlighted here are by no 
means unique to Angola, but have a wider relevance in cross-cultural situations: 
"[McNamara] cites disaster after disaster in decision making as the right 
questions about local cultures were not asked and events were ethnocentrically 
interpreted, especially as attempts were made to quantify as many factors as 
possible to make the conflict fit into a systems analysis framework. 
Consequently, a war was pursued in a very foreign place with little appreciation 
for the real motivation and purpose that drove the Vietnamese in both the North 
and the South - and consequently little appreciation of the inappropriateness of 
the objectives and strategy pursued by the United States. This was the more 
ironic as the decision makers at the centre were known as `the best and the 
brightest' in the American system. But it was a brilliance that did not travel 
well across contrasting cultural systems- (Fisher 1998: 4). 
The quotation underlines the importance of factoring cultural issues into analysis of the 
causes of conflict, an issue requiring serious attention in any peace process. 
Chapter 8. 
Conclusion. 
The final chapter of this thesis has two principal objectives which I deal with in two 
separate sections. The first section revisits the theoretical framework adopted for 
research, commenting on the usefulness and appropriateness of the `revised 
Habermasian public sphere' as a research tool. The second section draws together the 
principal themes and findings to have emerged within the five Angolan peace 
narratives from the Bicesse Accords to the death of Jonas Savimbi. In outlining these, 
I readdress the research questions outlined in the introductory chapter, which situated 
this thesis within the arena of Angolan perspectives on peace `from below'. These 
questions related to how Angolans themselves interpreted the nature of the conflict. 
the reasons they identified for it, what they said about peace and how it could have 
been achieved. The questions also asked how Angolans in these arenas assessed the 
peace efforts of the international community. 
1. Public Sphere framework. 
Chapter two set out the theoretical framework within which research was conducted, a 
`revised Habermasian public sphere'. There, I argued that it was possible to locate the 
historical churches, private media and civil society organisations within this 
framework, but that community-based organisations and traditional authorities fell 
outside. By incorporating a number of minor revisions to Habermas's original public 
sphere concept, an analytical framework was established for the first three Angolan 
peace narratives. In the case of community-based material, I argued that it was situated 
within the `plebeian public sphere', and not part of Habermas's original theory. 
Though the institution of traditional authority shared much in common with the 
historical churches, the private media and civil society organisations, I have situated it 
outside the public sphere framework because traditional authority regard themselves as 
political actors and have argued for their inclusion within the institutions of the state. 
In both cases, I introduced Habermasian material which promoted further 
understanding of these peace narratives, and in so doing maintained a' Habermasian 
focus' on these arenas which I considered to be 'beyond' a revised framework. 
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The use of Habermas has been fruitful in analysing how the five Angolan peace 
narratives situated themselves in relation to peace. The Habermasian public sphere 
introduced crucial spatial issues into this research, which provided the thesis with an 
important and original point of entry into analysis on Angola. These spatial concerns 
are fundamental in understanding the possibility of `freedom of expression' and 
`freedom of association' in Angola, of which the Habermasian framework facilitated 
due consideration. The framework also proved particularly relevant in relation to 
traditional authorities where, despite the decline in the use of the ondjango as an 
institution, Habermasian concerns interpreted the ondjango as an important Angolan 
spatial construct, holding the memory of how Angolans came together to talk about 
community concerns. and promote harmony and peace. The ondjango shares many 
similarities with Habermas's public sphere. and represented the key discursive arena 
within Angolan traditional society. I argued that when Angolans called for renewed 
dialogue and peace negotiations between the Angolan government and UNITA, they 
were appealing for the recreation of this traditional discursive space where 'talking' 
could take place. 
In assessing the appropriateness and the potential of Habermas's public sphere for the 
research outlined here, I propose to make five points. In doing so, I argue that the 
research potential of the framework is strong in Angola (Africa), and should be 
explored further to help overcome many of the difficulties encountered by researchers 
working within a civil society framework, as I highlighted in chapter two. The 
framework brings the fundamental question of the nature of public space into focus, a 
key issue underpinning the development of associational life and civil society 
organisations, which civil society theory does not fully address. It seems clear. for 
example, that citing the numerical growth of civil society organisations as an 
indicator of civil society development may be rather misplaced, if the public sphere in 
terms of 'freedoms of speech' and 'freedom of association' is not also expanding. A 
Habermasian approach enables some measurement of this to take place. giving a 
sense of how the public sphere is developing, which a 'head-count' of civil society 
organisations does not achieve. 
A great strength of Habermas's model of public sphere is the strong 
focus on public 
rational critical discourse, a democratic space where individuals 
discuss issues of 
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concern to them. A weakness of this focus is that other public forms of discourse, 
expressed according to a different rationality, are diminished in importance. The later 
chapters of this thesis highlighted the communicative power and potential of Angolan 
ritual, the Angolan drummer or dancer, as key components of traditional Angolan 
communicative processes. The richness, diversity and importance of these processes 
are missed by the emphasis on rational critical discourse, yet for those concerned with 
how communication is conducted and what is said publicly, these require scrutiny and 
appraisal, otherwise the communication occurring can be lost. Public communication, 
in fact, is more varied and complex than that presented by Habermas within his public 
sphere model. 
Secondly. a weakness in the conception of the Habermasian public sphere is its 
inability to deal with questions of untruth, deceit. duplicity or lying. when these 
emerge within public discourse. -'The political arena", as Barnes (1994: 30) reminds us. 
is second only to warfare as a domain where lies are expected, do in fact occur, and 
are to a substantial extent tolerated". The issue is important because within a peace 
process, one would like to assume truthfulness of communication, given that building 
peace is based on building qualities such as transparency, honesty and trust. All too 
often however, in the Angolan peace processes, the absence of these qualities had to be 
confronted, especially as UNITA secretly rearmed while it officially declared to be 
disarming, and had these declarations confirmed by the UN. Habermas appears unable 
to offer much guidance with regard to issues of untruth within communication. To 
quote Barnes (1994: 4) again: 
"Given the interdependence of the concepts of the truth and the lie, the central 
attention paid by Habermas ... to the concept of truth seems out of proportion 
to the lack of critical attention he and his followers have given to deception". 
His public sphere is based on the presumption that collective debate and scrutiny will 
expose falsehood within the public sphere. This does not necessarily happen, revealing 
the public sphere as poorly equipped to deal with untruth. 
'It is not' ust Habermas who struggles with the question of untruth. Kucich (1994: 19) writes: 
"[Foucault] is unable to imagine lying - in terms of his own dramatoIo`g} of poNýer and 
kno%ý ledge - as 
an attempt to create and protect a counterdomain of knowledge. or as an attempt to refuse the 
v 
legitimacy of institutional technologies of truth, or even as a repudiation of the political structures 
associated with 'truth' production-. 
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Thirdly, Habermas's approach gives preference to non-violent forms of engagement in 
seeking to resolve discord and conflict, whether at local or national levels. There is 
therefore, an underlying belief in his work that rational public discourse provides 
society and government with the required mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of 
conflict and crisis. The weakness in this approach concerns the legitimate use of force 
by governments in defense of sovereignty, and safeguarding the protection of its 
citizens. While governments may be hasty in going to war, the legitimate use of force 
as the right, and even the duty, of sovereign government must be recognised and 
upheld. This argument was frequently used by the Angolan government in its struggle 
with UNITA's military wing, but Habermas, in his framework comes close to not 
conferring this right on sovereign governments. This is perhaps a reflection on 
Habermas's own experience of war in Germany. 
Fourthly, the Habermasian `spatial' approach to society is. in my view, among the 
greatest strengths of his theory. Throughout this thesis, issues and events which 
shaped and scarred the Angolan public sphere came into focus as part of what enabled 
or disabled Angolan actors to organise and communicate. It was seen how Angola's 
colonial experience, the 27 de Maio attempted coup, and the introduction of Marxist- 
Leninism, combined to shape and demarcate the boundaries of the Angolan public 
sphere, to limit the rights of `freedom of association' and 'freedom of expression'. 
This attention to public space is similar to what Trivedy (1996: 101) calls 'situational 
analysis', an analysis of the political space within which development organisations 
and other agencies work. As Trivedy (1996: 99) writes: 
"How do development agencies assess the political environment in which they 
operate? ... 
There are relatively few studies which have documented the ways 
in which development agencies have sought to use and create 'political space' 
for their operations. Moreover there appear to be no systematic methods for 
analysing, and finding, ways of working effectively in different political 
climates". 
In my view, the public sphere framework is such a methodology to facilitate 
`situational analysis'. The Angolan public sphere is not neutral. but has its own 
traumatic and turbulent history which weighs heavily on the public sphere. and greatly 
affects the ability and capacity of Angolans to organise collectively and express their 
views. 
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Finally, the Habermasian model also facilitates analysis of important moments when 
the boundaries of the public sphere were challenged, and the space for freedom 
expanded. In an interview, the president of ACA, Mild Melo, pointed to three events of 
particular importance in tracing qualitative change within the Angolan public sphere. 2 I 
dealt with these in earlier chapters, but I bring them together here because of their 
salience to the point at issue. Melo pointed to the work of Radio Ecclesia since its 
relaunch in 1997, underlining its important educational role in enabling individuals to 
express their views, the provision of information that is generally trusted, and being a 
key vehicle of public opinion. Secondly, she considered the events surrounding the 
trial of Rafael Marques important. Through his articles in the private media, Marques 
raised issues of public interest and showed that President dos Santos was not beyond 
public scrutiny. Marques broke an unwritten convention or taboo in his journalism, and 
his work in effect, involved the "problematisation of areas that until then had not been 
questioned" (Haberrras 1989: 36). Thirdly, Melo highlighted the importance of the 
2000 Pro Pace Congress which directly addressed, for the first time, the question of 
peace in Angola. She believed that the Congress created a sense of collective 
ownership by carrying out an `audit' on how the quest for peace had been conducted, 
and asked hard questions of the Angolan government and UNITA. To these three, I 
would add the importance of the demonstration held after the 1600% fuel price rise in 
1999, the first peaceful demonstration in Angola since the 27 de Maio. It represented a 
psychological breakthrough that should not be underestimated. 
Habermas's model of public sphere, once subjected to a certain scrutiny and revision 
to correct historical inaccuracies, is a most valuable analytical tool, offering an 
important research framework for analysis of the spatial constructs underlying 
society. Furthermore, his unexplored concept of a `plebeian public sphere' also offers 
interesting research possibilities, which I have found useful in approaching this 
Angolan based research, as it recognises the importance of `common culture' as 
distinct from the 'bourgeois' in the construction of the public sphere. 
I interview in Luanda on November 9,2001. 
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2. Themes and Findings. 
The final section of this chapter outlines eight themes and finding to have emerged 
within this research, where Angolan perspectives `from below' have been prioritised. 
These point to key areas within the peace narratives explored. 
A central theme underlined in many of the peace narratives concerned the exclusion of 
Angolan civil organisations and personalities from the negotiating table in Bicesse, 
Lusaka, and indeed, Luena. It was suggested that this exclusion had been detrimental 
to the search for peace, in that Angolan actors, who could have exercised a moderating 
influence on both the Angolan government and UNITA, were unable to do so. Both the 
conflict itself and its resolution were framed within a polarised arena where only the 
Angolan government and UNITA's voices were heard in relation to peace. This 
polarisation appears to have taken root within the context of the Bicesse Accords. 
when the Troika brokered the peace deal. For example, at no stage did international 
organisations promote the inclusion of the Angolan churches or opposition political 
parties, even as observers, in order to influence to direction of peace negotiations. This 
is not to suggest that international organisations did not consult with the churches and 
other Angolan organisations, ' but that no mechanism was established to guarantee 
their inclusion. The clear suggestion from the narratives presented in this thesis is that 
such exclusion was a factor as to why peace settlements failed. 
We have seen an clear emphasis throughout on the need for dialogue and negotiation, 
with war understood as a failure of political will. This emphasis prevailed despite the 
failure of two international peace agreements where lengthy negotiations occurred. As 
I suggested in chapter seven, calls for renewed dialogue which were made right up to 
the death of Jonas Savimbi, can be located within the memory of the ondjango, where 
traditional society met to talk and address its problems. This memory believed that 
discussion on the causes of the war was an essential first step before negotiations, a 
step upon which none of the peace negotiations were built. Despite the decades of 
conflict, the peace narratives presented here continued to believe in the possibility of a 
negotiated solution through renewed dialogue. For traditional authority in particular, 
this dialogue required that the causes of conflict be placed on a peace agenda. 
In conversation at BAF (2002). Margaret Anstee mentioned that the Angolan churches 
frequently met 
with her to discuss the peace process. 
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These chapters also highlighted an approach to peace as a long term strategy. as a task 
that involved scrutinising democratic institutions, promoting human rights, critiquing 
the judicial system, creating greater space for public debate, highlighting issues of 
corruption, putting forward analysis of the war, engaging in the elaboration of a new 
national constitution, and so on. Engagement with these issues revealed a strong sense 
of citizenship within the arenas explored in the thesis, where many organisations were 
actively involved in building foundations for a more peaceful participative Angola. 
This peace work belongs within the notion of `positive peace' articulated by Gattung 
(1995), which he contrasts with `negative peace', which may see the end of widespread 
violent conflict, but where other forms of social and structural violence continue, with 
domestic violence increasing and social inequality deepening. ' Even during war-time 
these organisations were engaged in promoting `positive peace'. 
The ongoing conflict in Cabinda emerged as a theme within some of the narratives. 
The `Angolan conflict' has frequently been referred to in the singular, to highlight 
UNITA's military campaign against the Angolan state, thereby not recognising the 
existence of FLEC's conflict in the province of Cabinda. Following the death of Jonas 
Savimbi, significant coverage was given to the Cabindan conflict though, apart from 
the private media, coverage prior to February 2002 was insignificant. Perhaps the low 
intensity nature of the conflict explains why it received little attention. Nonetheless, 
peace in Angola remains dependent on a solution being found to FLEC's grievances, 
and this is pending. 
A dynamic was identified towards the end of the 1990s, which was long overdue in 
Angola, when attempts were made to create visible Angolan peace structures, which 
had the effect of uniting and consolidating local organisations working for peace, but 
also raised the profile and visibility of national peace efforts. The formation of 
COIEPA was the most significant in this regard, with Rede da Paz also important at a 
later stage. By positing a third arena, these structures helped to break the polarised 
manner in which peace had been discussed in Angola, where people were identified as 
either pro-MPLA or pro-UNITA. This centre tried to transcend politics and voice the 
need for peace on behalf of millions of displaced Angolans, whose lives were reduced 
4 Taken from International Alert (2001). 
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to abject poverty. Furthermore, it took the position that the war had no popular consent 
among Angolans. 
A major finding of this research was the significance of `traditional' material within 
Angolan peace narratives. Although I was aware of the importance of tradition while 
resident in Angola, it developed further over the period of fieldwork to occupy a 
crucial place within the thesis overall. This traditional perspective is particularly 
evident in the final section of chapter six and in chapter seven. It is clear that 
traditional healing methods, where still practised, can help address the needs of 
demobilised soldiers and facilitate their reintegration into society. In putting forward 
the concept of `traditional consultancy', I have argued that there is a need for greater 
understanding at this traditional level, that its perspectives and insights must be 
appreciated when pursuing peace. because grievances and underlying causes of 
conflict may sometimes only be understood from within this perspective. Chapter 
seven set out some of these `traditional perspectives'. 
A further major theme running through the thesis related to the role of international 
mediation. As the 1990s unfolded, the peace narratives examined in this thesis adopted 
a more sceptical and negative evaluation of this role. In this regard, the traditional 
authority and private media analysis was most critical, where the international peace 
mediation efforts by the Troika were seen as secondary to their economic interests. A 
popular sense of frustration existed within Angola with regard to the failures of 
international intervention to secure peace. As we saw, towards the end of the 1990s. 
the possibility of national mediation emerged quite strongly, with the churches in 
particular indicated as the most likely national organisation with the capacity to 
conduct internal mediation. It is interesting to note that though UN failures 
in Angola 
have been many, the `Lessons Learned Unit' of the UN, established in 1995, has not 
yet reported on its failures in Angola. ' 
5 The 'Lessons Learned Unit, ' located at http: //www. un. or. -,, 'Depts d ko/lessons/llu2. 
htm#Reaching, 
"The Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was set up 
in April 1995 in 
response to a need for a structured mechanism to collect and analyse 
information on the various 
missions being fielded by the United Nations and to recommend ways to 
improve their effectiveness". It 
was collecting and analysing information on the peacekeeping missions 
in the former Yugoslavia 
(UNPROFOR) and Angola (UNAVEM). 
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Finally, the chapters in this thesis have pointed to important peace resources within 
Angola, have located centres of `agency' within Angolan society. While the war 
destroyed much of the physical infrastructure of the country, this thesis has pointed to 
an array of Angolan actors who potentially can exercise an important role in the 
rebuilding and healing of a nation afflicted by decades of war. I do not wish to 
overstate the capacity of these resources, which generally have limited financial or 
political power, but they do point to important `national' arenas where Angolans are 
rebuilding their country. In some instances these arenas represent new spaces within 
Angola, such as civil society and media organisations, but others belong within more 
established and familiar spaces, such as the Angolan churches at an institutional and 
community level, and personalities such as traditional healers or traditional authorities. 
These have provided important spaces for Angolans to work for peace and to address 
conflict in a time of war, and it is to be hoped that they continue to provide and 
develop these spaces in the post-Jonas Savimbi Angola. 
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Appendix 1. 
Manifesto for Peace in Angola. 
The Angolan people want a lasting peace, social justice, good governance and the right 
of citizenship, and mutual respect for the diversity of people and cultures, which form 
the Angolan Nation project. These are the fundamental principles for the setting of a 
common ground among the Angolan people. In essence, these principles are the 
foundation for an in-depth revision of the Nation's concept and valorisation of the 
Angolan citizenry. As well as the consensual definition of a vision for Angola and its 
course towards the future. 
Unfortunately, the war is still being used against the Angolan people. While at the same 
time those who hold power plunder the nation's wealth, in partnership with adventurous 
outsiders and foreign countries. Oil, diamonds and their revenues are the major source 
of greed by the rulers, and the armed opposition and the oil multinationals. in particular. 
All with the complacency of countries like the United States, France, England. Brazil. 
Russia, Portugal and South Africa. Instead of pursuing immediate economic and 
political interests, these countries can reverse their efforts into a platform of values, 
contributing, in that way, for the reconciliation of Angolans. 
The war in Angola will only come to an end when civil society, the people in general. 
realise that there is no definitive military solution for the Angolan conflict. People must 
be aware of the process of destruction in which they are targets, consequently claiming 
their lives and dignity. What is even more perilous, in this regard. is that the silencing of 
guns will not mean, by any chance, in the Angolan context, the end of the war. The 
Angolan mentality, specially those of the politicians, ruled by selfish interests. are more 
armed than the armies under their command. 
In the case of Angola, peace has always been seen as the end of fighting. the disarming 
and demobilisation of the soldiers. This vision, especially harboured by some foreign 
institutions and internal emotions, is little more than a tranquiliser for the ones who 
desperately seek true peace. And a feast for those who serve themselves with immediate 
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peace to profit and to strategically and geopolitically position themselves in the running 
for the Angolan riches. 
We have reached the extreme stage of suffering, social humiliation and the total 
perversion of the use of power. Hence, we have come to the conclusion -a difficult one, 
because it is elementary and evident in spite of being consensual - that we the Angolan 
people, should develop a common ground for the causes as well as for the consequences 
of the military and political conflict we are facing. It is fundamental that we, the 
Angolan people, recognise with courage and determination, that we are all accountable 
for the political and military devastation. As well as the social and economic chaos of 
the country, whether in an active passive way. We must as well recognise the serious 
mistakes and abuses committed by ourselves during our historic course. 
We, the Angolan people. should take full responsibility for the solution of our own 
problems. We should not keep on blaming the colonial heritage and/or third parties for 
our grievances. It is self-pity and a way of self-attesting to ourselves a certificate of 
capacity for systematically transferring the resolution of the national conflict to foreign 
intervention. 
Before the verge of total sweltering of the Angolan society, the moment has come for us 
to act persistently, in a peaceful, courageous and moderate manner, in order to rescue 
the most sought and deserving treasure for Angolans: Peace through Dialogue. The 
Angolan people defend peace in that way, while the belligerents assume that the war 
is 
the way to reach peace, even if this means the humiliation of one part of the nation 
by 
another, because this war does not have any patriotic sense. 
Therefore, we. Angolan citizens, demand that: 
1. The government, LJNITA, and FLEC observe an immediate cease-fire through the 
national territory. 
2. The urgent opening of formal communication lines 
between the belligerents. 
through the mediation of the organised civil society. 
3. The immediate opening of humanitarian corridors to assist the people affected 
b,. 
the war, especially in the countryside. 
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4. The government and UNI A, in co-responsibility, include in their military budgets 
the assistance to deprived people, instead of transferring the burden, of their own 
war against the Angolan nation, to the international community. 
5. The definition of an agenda and schedule for peace talks, by the government 
(MPLA), the armed opposition (UNITA and FLEC) and organised civil society, for 
the definitive resolution of the causes of the Angolan conflict. 
6. The establishment of conditions for the inclusiveness and sage participation of 
Angolans in the Process of National Dialogue for Peace, throughout the country. 
7. The government and UNITA include in their military budgets the necessary funds to 
make peace, with patriotism and dignity. Because, if there is enough money to 
sustain war, then there should as well be enough money to achieve Peace 
effectively. 
We have decided to fight with persistence and determination for the full 
accomplishment of our demands and to work actively for the achievement of a lasting 
peace in Angola, through a patriotic vision of social justice and national equity. 
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Appendix 2. 
GARP Document. 
Paz pela via do Dialogo. 
E chegada a hora de abordar, em foro publico, a promocäo absoluta do diälogo como a 
ünica via para e encontrar solucöes adequadas ao fim do holocausto angolano. Em 
definitivo, esse diälogo tem de ser inclusivo, em relacäo as diferentes correntes e 
tendencias da sociedade civil, e afastar a ideia de que sein os estrangeiros os angolanos 
säo incapazes de dialogar, entre si, e encontrar o seu pröprio caminho para o 
entendimento nacional. 
A guerra, ao conträrio do que se anunciou, näo vai acabar com a guerra, pelo conträrio, 
estä e vai continuar a dizimar o povo angolano e os seus parcos haveres. A guerra estä ai 
para provar que o seu alvo principal ea populacäo civil, a despojada de privilegios, ea 
razäo de ser deste projecto de Nacäo. Sö assim se pode explicar o nivel de mortalidade, 
deslocamento e de destruicäo de milhares de vidas. Por outro lado, afigura-se dificil 
falar de paz, em iniciativas de paz, sein se abordar a questäo da justica, a que age em 
funcäo da verdade dos factos e da razäo. 
O que importa Angola diante do angolano? 0 que importa as instituicöes do Estado 
diante do povo? Seräo as instituicöes mais importantes que o povo? Essas perguntas säo 
essenciais para definir o nivel de prioridade na resolugdo do conflito Angolano. Para tal, 
a imparcialidade ea constituigdo de uma tribuna de consciencia social se apresentam 
como pontos de partida na busca nacional de solucöes do conflito. 
Relativamente ao cenärio actual, jä muito se tern dito eo suficiente para gerar uma onda 
de solidariedade interna a favor das vitimas que diariamente morrem indefesas em 
värios cantos de Angola. 0 minimo que se pode fazer e abandonar o medo, enfrentar o 
terror e chamar ä razäo os detentores do poder, mas näo da verdade, sobre o holocausto 
angolano. Jä nadajustifica para que os an`golanos. ainda sensatos, continuem a lamentar 
282 
pela sorte dos irmäos de Malange, do Kuito, de Maquela do Zombo, de Cabinda, do 
Andulo e do Bailundo como se de um holocausto alheio se tratasse. 
0 sentimento que se alimenta em Luanda, onde se concentram todos os centros de 
decisdo e de definicdo social ndo deve continuar a ser de desprezo em relagdo ao que se 
passa no resto do pals. Temos verificado, com bastante tristeza, a incitagdo ao ödio, ä 
morte dos condenados a inimigos e, assim, vemos o angolano a cavar no peito do outro 
angolano em nome de um poder que näo serve o povo. No meio rural, principalmente, 
as populacöes chegam a ser mortas pela simples razäo de terem sido deixado vivas por 
um dos beligerantes, sob a acusacdo de informantes do inimigo. Os que, as vezes, 
resistem a acompanhar um dos contendores tambem tem o mesmo destino. 
Desde o reacender da guerra, em Dezembro passado, mais de 600,000 pessoas foram 
obrigadas a abandonar os seus lares ea viver como deslocados em condicöes sub- 
humanas e quase exclusivamente dependentes da caridade da indüstria humanitäria. Os 
mortos deixaram de ser contados, tanto os civis como os militares, as perdas materiais 
tambem jä näo säo contabilizadas. 0 que parece contar apenas säo as vontades de uma 
meia düzia de angolanos imunes ao sofrimento de todo um povo e alheios as 
reivindicacöes culturais da maioria. 
Essa guerra, reincidente, vem esconder um processo consciente de desarticulacäo dos 
factores de identidade e unidade do povo angolano. Essa mesma guerra vem cobrir o 
esgotamento dos recursos humanos e financeiros do pals, o debilitamento da 
individualidade e da capacidade de cidadania da maioria dos angolanos. A guerra actual, 
imposta ao povo angolano, näo e senäo o encobrimento da falta de argumentos politicos 
e ideolögicos, assim como das escassas realizacoes socio-economicas e culturais dos 
instigadores da tragedia nacional. A negacäo da politica esconde processos de grupos 
minoritärios atraves da destruicäo paulatina da Nacäo. 
A guerra näo tem servido ao povo angolano. Este näo quer a guerra, seja por que motivo 
for, porque e uma guerra contra si pröprio e na qual eo ünico derrotado. 
Ninguem tern o 
direito de falar em nome do povo para fazer a guerra civil, seja esta com o argumento 
de 
defesa ou de resistencia. 0 povo näo foi consultado. Jä näo adianta apontar o 
dedo a 
quern faz a guerra pelo poder e/ou para enriquecimento e manutengdo 
de privilegios 
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individuais. Importa, acima de tudo, reunir todas as sensibilidades da sociedade civil. 
desejosas de paz e de justica social para uma convergencia de interesses nobres e para a 
luta pacifica por uma causa justa. Acabar com o ödio ea intriga politica que fomentam a 
divisdo ea destruigdo do povo angolano. Sucessivos tem sido os falhancos dos 
processos de paz por falta de vontade politica dos beligerantes, conjugados com o jogo 
de interesses imediatistas da comunidade internacional. 
Resta, para a resolut .o da guerra civil, o recurso ä sociedade civil como dnico factor 
sobrevivente para criar os fundamentos de superacäo da guerra auto-sustentada. Hä a 
urgente necessidade de intervencdo da sociedade civil com voz pröpria e autönoma, 
com rejeicdo absoluta da ideia da guerra e como factor de harmonizacäo de todos 
interesses, humanamente justificäveis, existentes na sociedade. 
A promocäo absoluta do diälogo interno, e entre todos. ea ünica Lia para se encontrar 
solucöes adequadas ao fim do holocausto angolano. Desde Alvor, passando por 
Mombasa, Gbadolite, Bicesse, Addis Abeba e Abidjan ate Lusaka, as negociacöes de 
paz para Angola sempre foram mediadas e pressionadas pelos estrangeiros. 
Como angolanos, temos que abdicar do alarme da nossa intoleräncia e nos envolvermos 
em guerras, ficando ä espera de alguem do exterior, supostamente neutro, para mediar 
as nossas crises. Os angolanos tern que conseguir desenvolver a capacidade interna de 
mediagdo, ao nivel de base, intermedio e de topo. E preciso demonstrar a nossa 
maturidade politica e civica na resolugdo das causas dos conflitos que geram a violencia 
entre nos. 
E hora de dar as mäos, juntar os cerebros e os coracöes e trabalhar Para a causa comum. 
A PAZ. 
Feito em Luanda, aos 2 de Abril de 1999. 
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Peace through Dialogue. 
The time has come to address, in the public forum, the promotion of dialogue as 
the only way to seek adequate solutions to end the Angolan holocaust. Such a 
dialogue must be inclusive, in relation to the different currents and tendencies of 
civil society, and throw away the idea that without foreigners Angolans are 
incapable of talking to each other, and find their own way to national 
understanding. 
War, contrary to what has been announced, will not end the war. On the 
contrary, It will continue to devastate the Angolan people and their few 
belongings. War is there to prove that its principal target is the civil population, 
the removal of privileges, and the reason behind this `national project' (of 
destruction). This is the only way to explain the mortality and displacement 
levels, and the destruction of thousands of lives. On the other hand, it is difficult 
to speak about peace and peace initiatives, without addressing the issue of 
justice, which acts in relation to reason and the truth of the facts. 
What is the importance of Angola compared to the Angolan people? What is the 
importance of state institutions compared to the Angolan people? Are the 
institutions more important than the people? Such questions are essential to 
define priorities regarding the resolution of the Angolan conflict. For this, 
impartiality and the establishment of a tribunal of social conscience emerge as 
starting points in national search for solutions to the conflict. 
As regards the current situation, much has already been said, indeed enough, to 
generate a wave of internal solidarity in favour of the defenseless victims who 
die every day in various corners of Angola. The least one should do is overcome 
fear, face the terror, call those who hold power, but who are not the truth 
holders, call them to account and to see reason regarding the Angolan holocaust. 
There is nothing to justify why Angolans, with the power of reason, continue 
mourn the fate of their sisters and brothers from Malange. Kuito. Niaquela do 
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Zombo, Cabinda, Andulo and Bailundo, as if one were dealing with someone 
else's suffering. 
The prevailing sentiment in Luanda, where all the decision making and socially 
defining centres are concentrated, must not continue to be contemptuous in 
relation to what is happening in the rest of the country. We note with great 
sadness, the incitement to hatred and to death of those condemned as enemies, 
and in this war we see Angolans destroying the heart of other Angolans, on 
behalf of a power that does not serve the people. In the rural areas, above all, 
local populations are being killed for the simple reason that they were left alive 
by one of the belligerents, and are then accused of being enemy informers. 
Those who sometimes refuse to join one of the warring parties often share the 
same fate. 
Since the resumption of war last December, more than 600.000 people have 
been forced to leave their homes to live as internally displaced people in 
inhumane conditions, relying almost exclusively on the charity of the 
humanitarian industry. The dead, both civilian and military, are no longer being 
counted, nor are material losses being calculated. All that appears to matter is 
the will of half a dozen Angolans immune to the sufferings of an entire people 
and estranged from the protests of the majority. 
This reignited (renewed) war disguises a deliberate process of disengagement 
from issues related to the identity and the unity of the Angolan people. This 
same war hides the drain of human and financial resources of the country. the 
powerlessness of the individual, and of weak capacity for citizenship among the 
majority of Angolans. This current war, imposed on the Angolan people, is 
nothing but the disguising of the lack of political and ideological arguments as 
well as the lack of social. economic and cultural achievements from the 
perpetrators of the national tragedy. The denial of politics hides the actions of 
minority groups through the slow destruction of the Nation. 
War has not served the Angolan people. They do not want war, regardless of 
its 
motivation, because this is a war against them and in which they are the only 
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ones destroyed. No one has the right to speak on behalf of the people so as to 
carry on this civil war, using either the argument of defending sovereignty or of 
resistance. The people were not consulted. It is no longer a question of pointing 
a finger at who is engaging in war to achieve power and/or for enrichment or the 
maintenance of individual privileges. What matters above all, is to gather 
together all those promoting civil society sensibilities, eager for peace and social 
justice in order to bring together people of good will, and for a peaceful struggle 
in a just cause. We need to end hatred and political intrigue which foments the 
division and destruction of the Angolan people. Successive peace processes have 
failed due to a lack of political will on the part of the belligerents, enmeshed 
with the short-term interests of the International community. 
What is left to us, in order to resolve the civil war, is recourse to civil society as 
the only remaining factor which can create the necessary basis to overcome this 
self-sustaining war. There is an urgent need for the intervention of civil society 
with its own autonomous voice, to completely reject the principle of war, and as 
the element which can bring together all interests, humanly justifiable, which 
exist in society. 
The radical promotion of an internal dialogue between all, is the only way to 
encounter adequate solutions to end the Angolan holocaust. From Alvor, to 
Mombasa, Gbadolite, Bicesse, Addis Ababa, Abidjan and to Lusaka, the peace 
talks for Angola have always been mediated by and pushed by foreigners. 
As Angolans, we have to renounce the fear of our own intolerance which 
involves us in wars, and then waiting for someone from outside, supposedly 
neutral, to mediate our crises. Angolans must develop the capacity for internal 
mediation, at the grassroots, at the intermediate level, and at the very top. We 
must show our political and civic maturity in the resolution of the causes of 
conflict which create violence among us. 
It is time to join hands, to unite minds and hearts and work together in a 
common cause, PEACE. 
Luanda. April 2 1999 
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Appendix 3. 
Mongu Communique on Peace Initiatives on Angola 
The `Mongu Communique on Peace Initiatives on Angola' by refugee pastors living in 
Mayukwayukwa and Nangweshi Camps Zambia, November 26,27,2000. 
"Peace is what I leave you, it is my own peace I give you. I do not give it as the 
world does. Do not be worried and upset, do not be afraid'..... John 14: 27. 
We, the refugees at Nangweshi and Mayukwayukwa Camps met at Limulungu Pastoral 
Training Centre, Mongu, Zambia on Nov. 26,27. The meeting was organized by the 
Committee on Angola for Peace, a sub committee of the Southern Africa Churches' 
Ministries for Uprooted People (SACMUP). The objectives of the meeting were: 
- To inaugurate and foster dialogue between SACMUP and Angolan refugee 
pastors 
- To share experiences and ideas on the pastoral care of Angolan refugees 
- To explore ways in which the regional church body can accompany peace 
processes in Angola 
- To raise awareness in the local Zambian churches 
in order to enhance their 
support and solidarity. 
We noted with pain that some Angolans have been refugees for over 34 years, whilst 
several ministers have been living among the displaced people since 1976. As refugees, 
we feel rootless, abandoned, forgotten and have become a group of people without 
human dignity. It is in this vein that we strongly ask for peace in Angola because we 
do 
not have an answer as to why the war is continuing. 
We therefore recommend the following: 
1. We recommend to bring the awareness of the Angolans and all 
Christians in the 
region on the existence of a fragmented church; i. e. the urban. the 
bush and the 
refugee camps. We therefore strongly recommend the total 
breaking of the ,l ails of 
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divisions leading to one united church in Angola. We furthermore recommend that 
the church in the region be involved in this initiative. 
2. We appeal to political parties to exercise tolerance and stop intimidating Angolans 
praying and working for peace. 
3. We recommend that leaders of the church in the diaspora be included in all efforts 
for peace in Angola. 
4. We recommend that meetings of this nature be organized regularly with wider 
participation. 
5. We recommend for a gender sensitive and biased peace exchange program for 
women and youths. 
6. We recommend that ecumenical members share with others what has been learned, 
and put it into practice. 
We hereby unreservedly offer ourselves to be included in all peace negotiations for 
Angola. We are tired of the war and WE WANT TO GO HOME. 
Signed by 8 representatives from various churches. 
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Appendix 4. 
Nos, Sobas, ndo aceitamos a visäo dos Tideres. 
Gostariamos, antes de mais, de agradecer o Senhor Rafael Marques, representante da 
Open Society em Angola, pela oportunidade que nos dä para exprimirmos as ideais das 
autoridades tradicionais no seio do Forum Angolano das Autoridades Tradicionais. 0 
tempo ndo nos permite uma maior contribuigao, por isso vamos nos concentrar no 
questäo do conflito armado. 
A guerra em Angola jä mexeu com todo o mundo, ea busca de solucöes jä recebeu 
muitos recursos. Mas a guerra parece nunca acabar. Porque o jogo de interesses e as 
agendas secretas dos que fazem e apoiam a guerra continuam a complicar o processo de 
construcdo de urna paz autentica e duradoura. As Autoridades Tradicionais e as 
comunidades de base assistem, cada vez mais revoltadas, ä destruicdo do pals, ao 
esbanjamento dos seus recursos naturais eä matanca da populacäo Angolana. A maioria 
da populaydo foi e continua a ser forcada a abandonar as suas areas de origem, as suas 
lavras e as suas riquezas. 
Hoje Angola e um pals de deslocados, as populacöes vivem em condicöes deshumanas 
em campos de deslocados nas periferias das grandes cidades. Vemos, com muita 
tristeza, que a vontade politica para se ultrapassar essa situagdo ou e pouca ou ndo 
existe. Essa falta de vontade e reflectida pelo comportamento dos beligerantes, da 
comunidade internacional e mesmo da parte do povo. Tudo isso, porque os Interesses 
particulares e individuais, por enquanto, ainda sdo mais fortes do que a forca do povo. 
Hoje, o povo Angolano ndo tem rurno. 
Nos os sobas jä tomamos consciencia de que esta guerra e contra os interesses das 
comunidades angolanas. Pelo conträrio, a continuacdo da guerra estd a destruir as vidas. 
as idenitdades culturais - os usos e costumes - pröprias 
de cada comunidade. Jä nem 
falamos da desumanizacäo de que os deslocados säo vitimas. 
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Essa guerra estä a ser movida por Tideres ou dirigentes que parecem estar interessados 
em criar um `homen novo', um novo tipo de cidadäo angolano, com novus valores 
culturais e morais desconhecidos pela maioria. E essa a visdo que os nossos politicos 
tem de Angola? Acabar com os angolanos para inventar outro povo? Väo matar o povo 
todo para entregar Angola a quern? Vdo matar todo o povo porque odeiam tanto o povo 
porque näo se identificam corn as culturas de Angola? Um proverbio do Rei Salomäo 
diz, no capitulo 11 e versiculo 14 da biblia, que `o pals sem conselheiros sö pode 
caminhar para o seu desparecimento'. 
Nos, os herdeiros dos reinos que formam Angola, somos tratados como miseräveis. 
matumbos, atrasados, pessoas que näo sabem o que ea civilizacdo. Entäo, nos os sobas, 
perguntamos aos nossos filhos politicos que nos governam ou querem que nos governar 
o sequinte: ser civilizado, ser dirigente e comandar a morte do pröprio povo? E roubar 
as riquezas do pals? E destruir o pröprio pals em nome do inimigo? Mas. quem e esse 
inimigo que merece tantas honras, tantos sacrificio, sobretudo o sacrficio do povo 
inteiro? Um pal que näo tem päo para dar aos seus filhos, convida os vizinhos e os seus 
filhos para o banquete. Podemos dizer que esse pal 6 civilizado? 
Sempre que temos um problema, a primeira coisa que fazemos e chamar o estrangeiro 
para resolver os nossos problemas. Assim foi com a independencia, assim tem sido com 
os värios processos da paz. Entdo vejamos. Nos temos uma cobra no galineiro, que e 
Angola, e charnamos a raposa, para correr com a cobra. Entdo perguntamos, a raposa 
vai estar mais interessada em correr atrds das galinhas para come-las ou vai mesmo se 
preocupar com a cobra? E se forem tres raposas o que que väo fazer? 
Nos sobas, como verdadeiros herdadeiros das culturas, das tradicöes e das ruiquezas do 
nosso povo, näo aceitamos a visäo dos nossos lideres politicos que se dizem civilizados. 
Pelo que, 
Apelamos a todas as conuinidades anýrolanas, aos jovens, velhos. homens e mulheres. 
representantes das igrejas e outras instituicöes da sociedade, que se unam com as suas 
autoridades tradicionais para que se definam os mecanismos de defesa dos seus direitos 
e da proteccäo do patrimönio cultural na sua diversidade, dos recursos naturais e das 
lavras das populacöes. Nüs. os sohas. julgamos que a paz deve ser discutida ao nivel das 
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cornunidades (atraves de consultas e debates) para que torlos os angolanos possam 
manifestar as suas ideias sobre o futuro do pals. A paz näo 6 sö mandar calar as armas. 
E depois? 
Para jä apelamos as comunidades que näo entreguem mais os seus filhos aos que fazem 
a guerra, porque estes sö destroem o pals e as populagöes, enquanto escondem os seus 
filhos na Europa e na America onde esses senhores escondem as riquezas de Angola e 
buscam o apoio para a sua politica contra os filhos de Angola. Mas, tambem säo as 
comunidades que alimentam a guerra com os seus filhos, os soldados das FAA, os 
agentes da Policia e os guerrilheiros das FALA. Todos filhos das cornunidades. Essas 
mesmas comunidades säo as principais vitimas da guerra, porque estäo reduzidas ä 
condicäo de cidadäos de terceira classe. 
Sao essas comunidades que padecem nos acampamentos de deslocados, sujeitas ä fome, 
ä nudez, ä miseria eä morte. Hoje, Angola praticamente jä näo existe. 0 pals e jä sö 
Luanda. Familia e sö aquele que vive em Luanda, porque os que vivem nas provincias 
estdo condenados ao isolamento. 
Por isso, pensamos que o processo da paz tem que comecar na base e näo a partir do 
topo, para que aqueles que estäo em cima percebam que estäo a ser segurados pelos que 
estäo em baixo. As folhas e os troncos, por mais fortes ou impressionantes que sejarn, 
dependem totalmente das raizes que os sustentam. 
Para o bem de Angola e de todos os angolanos verdadeiramente patriotas e amantes do 
seu povo, os Bobas, reunidos no Forum Angolano das Autoridades Tradicionais, apelam 
ao povo para que todos exijam a realizacäo de uma conferencia nacional soberana para a 
paz eo futuro de Angola. Nesse conferencia, devemos definir os papeis dos partidos 
politicos, da sociedade civil, das autoridades tradicionais e das igrejas na resulacäo do 
conflito angolano. Essa definicäo poderä ajudar na criacäo de um entendimento comun 
para o processo de reconciliacäo, de governacäo transparente e patriötica, e de 
reconstrucäo do pals. E nessa conferencia onde poderemos, como angolanos, tracar uma 
ideia para o futuro de Angola, para que amanhä, as novas geracöes possam seguir 
caminhos rectos e de prosperidade. 
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Translation. 
We Sobas, do not accept the vision of our leaders. 
Before proceeding we wish to thank Rafael Marques, representative of the Open Society 
in Angola, for the opportunity presented to us to express the ideas of traditional 
authorities within the Forum of Angolan Traditional Authorities. Time does not allow 
us go into great detail, therefore we will concentrate on the question of armed conflict. 
The war in Angola has already affected everyone, and great attention has already been 
given the search for solutions. But the war never seems to end. Because the interests and 
hidden agendas of those who make war and support war continue to complicate the 
process of building an authentic and lasting peace. Traditional authorities and local 
communities look on horrified at the destruction of the country, at the waste of its 
natural resources, at the killing of the Angolan population. The majority of the 
population was and continues to be forced to abandon their areas of origins, their fields 
and their wealth. 
Today, Angola is a land of displaced people, the people live under inhuman conditions 
in displacement camps on the edges of large cities. Regrettably we see the weakness or 
non-existence of political will to overcome this situation. This lack of will is reflected 
in 
the behaviour of the belligerents, of the international community and even among the 
people. At this time private and individual interests are stronger than the will of the 
people. Today, the Angolan people have nowhere left to go. 
We the sobas are aware that his war is against the best interests of Angolan 
communities. The continuation of war is destroying lives, cultural 
identities - habits and 
customs - belonging to each community. 
This is without addressing the question of 
dehumanisation of which the displaced are victims. 
This war is promoted by leaders who seem to be interested 
in the creation of a new 
man", a new type of Angolan citizen, with cultural and moral values. 
not known by the 
293 
majority. Is this the vision our politicians have of Angola? Put an end to Angolans so as 
to create a new people? Are they going to kill the whole people, and then hand Angola 
over to whom? Are they going to kill all the people because they hate them, and because 
they do not identify with the different cultures of Angola? A proverb from King 
Solomon, in chapter 11, verse 14 of the bible, says 'a country without advisers is bound 
to disappear'. 
We, the heirs of the kingdoms which make up Angola, are treated as miserable. stupid, 
backward, people who do not know what civilisation is. Well then, we sobas, ask our 
political sons and daughters who govern us, or seek to govern us the following question: 
to be civilised, to be a leader, is it to order the death of your own people? Is it to steal 
the wealth of the country? Is it to destroy your own country in the name of your enemy? 
But who is this enemy who deserves such honour. such sacrifice, above all the sacrifice 
of an entire people? A father who does not have bread to give his children, invites his 
neighbour and children to a feast. Can we call that father civilised? 
Whenever we have a problem, the first thing we do is call foreigners to resolve our 
problems. Independence was like that, and the various peace processes. Stop and have a 
look. We have a snake in the chicken coop which is Angola, and we have called a fox to 
get rid of the snake. We ask ourselves, will the fox be more interested in running after 
the chickens to eat them, or in chasing away the snake? And if three foxes had been 
called, what can we expect of them? 
We, the sobas, as the true heirs of the cultures, traditions and wealth of our people. do 
not accept the vision of our political leaders, who call themselves civilised. 
Therefore, 
We appeal to all Angolan communities, to the young, the old. men and women. church 
representatives, and other institutions of society, to unite with their traditional authority 
figures, so as to define the means by which to defend their rights, and defend the 
diversity of cultural patrimony, of the natural resources, and farms of the population. 
We, the Bobas, believe that peace should be discussed at the level of the community 
(through consultation and debates) so that all Angolans may put forward their ideas on 
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the future of the country. Peace is not just about silencing weapons. What comes 
afterwards? 
For now we appeal to the communities not to hand over their children to those who 
make war, because these merely destroy the country and its people, while they 
themselves pack their children off to Europe and America, where these 'gentlemen' 
hide the wealth of Angola and seek support for their policies against the children of 
Angola. But the communities also feed the war through their children, the soldiers in 
the FAA, the members of the police, and the guerrillas of FALA. All are children of our 
communities. These same communities are the principal victims of the war, because 
they are reduced to the condition of third class citizens. 
It is these communities who suffer in the displacement camps. subjected to hunger, 
nudity, misery and death. Today, Angola has almost ceased to exist. The country is only 
Luanda. Family has come to mean only those who live in Luanda, as those who live in 
the provinces are condemned to isolation The leaves and the trunks [of the trees], no 
matter how strong they are, depend totally on the roots which sustain them. 
For the good of Angola and of all true patriotic Angolans who love the people, the 
sobas, united in the Forum of Angolan Traditional Authority, appeal to the people to 
demand the holding of a national sovereign conference on peace and the future of 
Angola. In this conference, we should define the roles of the political parties, of civil 
society, of traditional authorities, and of the churches in the resolution of the Angolan 
conflict. Defining these roles could help in the creation of mutual understanding 
towards a reconciliation process, of transparent and patriotic government, and national 
reconstruction. It is at such a conference that we could, as Angolans, outline ideas for 
the future of Angola, so that tomorrow, the new generations may follow pathways that 
are straight and prosperous. 
List of Interviews. 
I provide here a list of important interviews conducted in relation to this research. I 
begin with fieldwork conducted in 2000, highlighting interviews in Dundo and then 
Luanda. Thereafter I list Dundo and Luanda interviews during fieldwork in 2001. before 
concluding with a number of interviews conducted outside of the research locations. In 
some instances, I use the word `meeting' rather than interview, to denote an informal 
(social) exchange that proved significant, and where the description 'interview' would 
involve a misrepresentation of the exchange that took place. 
1. Dundo Fieldwork 2000. 
May 23, interview with Felizardo Gurgel. Lunda Norte's provincial government's 
delegate for culture. 
May 23, interview with Benedita Rosa of Promaica. 
May 24, interview with journalists from RNA (Angolan National radio). TPA (Angolan 
Television) and ANGOP (Angolan news service): Alberto Muguenhi. Amado Jorge, 
Antonio Wazeia, Andre Cristovdo & Miguel Jose. 
May 26, interview with John Coleman, Irish Catholic missionary, then resident in 
Dundo. 
May 26 & June 1, interview with Agusto Calonji, church leader in the Catholic Church. 
May 26, June 3, group interview with Dundo resource group, Paulinho Chilengueno. Sr. 
Maria Ngueve, Silvestre Mwamulengue, Agusto Ihano. 
May 29, June 15, interview with Pastor Carlos of the Methodist Church. 
May 30, interview with Pastor Carlos and Vitorinho, of the Methodist Church, and 
Joaquim Cassemuka of the Plymouth Brethren. 
May 31, interview with Paulinho Chilengueno, church leader in the Catholic Church. 
June 1, interview with Madalena Calonji, business woman and market trader. 
June 3, June 5, group interview with soba Mwanguvo and community elders, with 
members of resource `group present. 
June 4, group interview with six women from various Dundo churches: Benedita Rosa. 
Ana Hebo, Cristina Malu. Maria Joäo, Maria Rodrigues & Veronica Mujinga. 
June 4, interview with Antonio Cataco, teacher and member of the MPLA. 
June 6, meeting with six women market traders also members of various churches: 
Helena, Maria Matuca. Isabel Mahamba, Suzana Ndala, Suzana Aldina & Muchama. 
June 7. group interview with personnel from OMA, Joana Meta & Helena Clemente. 
June 7, meeting with Alberto Nakatambue, plumber and farmer. 
June 7, June 15. interview with Sr. Maria Ngueve. Angolan missionary. 
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June 7, interview with Helena Vega, government delegate in the Ministry for the Family 
and Women's Development. 
June 7, meeting with soba Santos. 
June 8, group interview with 17 sobas in the village of Camafica. 
June 9, interview with soba Fortuna in his ondjango. 
June 9, interview with Tomas Makela, Catholic priest resident in Dundo, now deceased. 
June 13, group interview with youth in Dundo: Barros Satula, Eduardo Mateus & 
Alberto. 
June 15, interview with Antonio Upeme, trade union representative. 
June 15, interview with Agusto Ihano, catechist in Catholic church. 
June 18, interview with Alberto Ihalo, state journalist, (in Nzaji). 
June 18, interview with Jodo Maluca, trade union representative (in Nzaji). 
June 19, interview with Pastor Manuel Mbunge, Methodist Church (Nzaji). 
June 19, interview with Rev. Lourenco, Italian Missionary (Nzaji). 
June 20, interview with Alberto Mwamwene & Antonio Mwassua, retired catechists 
(Nzaji). 
June 21, interview with soba Sacajange in bairro Icongula (Nzaji). 
June 21, interview with soba Francisco Agostinho in bairro Xico-Carreiro (Nzaji). 
June 22, group interview with Pedro Bwalle (president) and other members of ANACA, 
(Associaräo dos Naturais e Amigos do Cambulo, Association of friends and those from 
Cambulo). Pedro stated that ANACA was the second Angolan organisation to be 
legalised (February 13,1993) after the introduction of multiparty democracy. 
June 23, interview with Francisco Catonde, church leader in Catholic Church (Nzaji). 
June 27, interview with Manuel Domingos, church leader in Catholic Church (Nzaji). 
June 27, group interview with catechist Luciano Camanhine and members of the church 
community in Cassanguidi (25kms from Nzaji). 
2. Luanda Fieldwork 2000. 
May 12, informal meeting with Mary Daly (then of Development Workshop). Cathy 
Bond-Stewart (Africa Community Publishing and Development Trust). Bob van der 
Winden, (author of van der Winden 1996). 
May 17, interview with Paul Robson of Development Workshop, (author of Robson 
2001). 
June 30, July 12, August 9, interviews with Manuel Quintino of the Tröcaire, and 
presently director of OIKOS, a Portuguese NGO. 
July 1, July 6, meeting with Lara Pawson. former BBC correspondent in Angola. 
July 3& 20, interview with Manuel Teixeira, Angolan Catholic missionary. 
July 5, interview with Carlos Goncaly es. former Radio Ecclesia journalist 
in Dundo. 
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July 5, interview with Gustavo Silva, Radio Ecclesia journalist. 
July 6, meeting with Dona Nanda, retired widow internally displaced in Luanda. 
July 6, meeting with a captain in the national police force. 
July 9, and July 16, group interview in bairro Prenda with six catechists internally 
displaced in Luanda: George da Costa, Ernesto Kanda, Jose Mota Soares, Cocuuna 
Kange, Manuel Koieza, Silva Antonio. 
July 10, interview with Benjamin Castello, director CAA, Church Action in Angola. 
Former minister of Agriculture. 
July 10, meeting with Herculano Coroado (freelance journalist), Joao Faria (lawyer and 
freelance journalist), Gilberto Neto (Folha 8 journalist) & Mario Vaz (Radio Ecclesia 
journalist). 
July 11, interview with Gilberto Neto of Folha 8. 
July 11, interview with Herculano Coroado (freelance journalist). 
July 11, group interview with sobas displaced from various Angolan provinces: 
Vincente Muta Kambu, Ndala Muta Fergäo Kalunga all from Malange. and Manuel 
Goveia Dala from Uige. 
July 14, interview with Rev. Paulo Roberto Palaoro (Brazilian missionary) from bairro 
Golfo. 
July 14, interview with Fernando Pacheco, director of ADRA, Angolan NGO. 
July 14, interview with Bernardo Bongo, Angolan Catholic missionary. 
July 15, meeting with Rev. Andre Cangovi Eurico of the IECA church. 
July 19, meeting with Eugenio Dal Corso, Catholic bishop of Saurimo. 
July 20, meeting with Jeremias Praia, Belmiro Chissengueti, Bernardo Bongo and 
Bernard Duchene, Catholic missionaries in Angola. 
July 24, interview with Daniel Ntony Nzinga, secretary general of COIEPA. 
July 27, interview with Revs. Zeca and Mario Rui of Mosaiko. 
July 27, meeting with Benedict Schubert, Luanda, author of Schubert (2000). 
July 27, meeting with Ana Maria M. Bastos do Nascimento of MPD, Angolan NGO. 
July 27, group interview with four Angolan missionary Spiritan sisters. 
July 28, interview with Rev. Alvaro Rodrigues, rector of the Baptist seminary in 
Luanda. 
July 29, interview with two catechists Maxima e Rafael in the bairro of Realojamento 
Luanda. 
August 1. group interview with Florbela Catarina Malaquias and Margarida 
Sebastiäo 
N'guida of Semente para o Desenvolvimento de Angola. Angola NGO. 
August 2. interview with Rev. Manuel Sabino. retired Angolan missionary. 
August ?. interview with Rev. Jaka, director of Rädio Ecciesia. 
August 3, visit to the Women's Prison in Viana, Luanda, with Search 
for Common 
Ground personnel. 
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August 4, group interview with Paulo Antonio Joäo, Ana & Quintas, Caritas team for 
Promaica, and training of Caritas Personnel. 
August 4, interview with Miguel Filho of the independent trade union SINPROF. 
August 4, interview with UNITA parliamentary deputy Jaka Jamba. 
August 8, interview with Manuel Maria Difuila, secretary general of CGSILA, an 
independent trade union. 
3. Dundo Fieldwork 2001. 
October 1-5, workshop on `Peace Initiatives within Angolan Society'. 
October 2, interview with Miguel Jose, journalist at the Provincial radio station. 
October 3, interview with Antonio Mussumari, editor of Noticias. Dundo based 
newspaper (no longer published). 
October 4, interview with Agusto Calonji, church leader in Catholic Church. 
October 4, interview with Dr. Carolina, member of Maos Livres, Angolan NGO. 
October 6. interview with John Coleman, Catholic priest. 
October 8, interview with Pastor Eliseu Vitor of the Seven Day Adventist Church. 
October 10, interview with Dr. Milton Kilandamoko, Angolan lawyer and presidential 
candidate in 1992. 
October 10, interview with Paulino Chilengueno, church leader in Catholic Church. 
4. Luanda Fieldwork 2001. 
September 25, interview in Viana, Luanda, with Revs. Zeca and Mario Rui, of the 
Catholic NGO Mosaiko. 
September 25, meeting with Rev. Jodo Domingos, member of Mosaico, and director of 
second level social science institute in Luanda (ICRA). 
September 25, group interview with three Angolan kings, Viana: king Ekuikui IV of 
Bailundo, king Muana-Uti of Mbanza Congo, king Muatchissengue of Lunda-Choke. 
September 26, December 3, interview with Manuel Quintino of OIKOS, a Portuguese 
NGO. 
September 28, interview with Steve Utterwulghe, director of US NGO Search for 
Common Ground. 
October 15, meeting with Ian Dolan, field director in Tröcaire Angola. 
October 19, interview with David Mendes, director of Maos Livres, Angolan NGO 
October 22. December 4, interviews with Daniel Ntony Nzinga, secretary general of 
COIEPA. 
October 22. interview with Benjamin Castello of CAA. 
October 25. interview with Aristides Neiva, former director of Radio Ecclesia, present 
director of 0 Apostolado. internet newspaper associated with Radio 
Eccl6-iu. 
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October 26, visit to the Women's Prison in Viana, Luanda, with Search for Common 
Ground personnel. 
October 26, interview with Eunice Endcio, director of DW peacebuilding programme. 
October 29, November 5, interview with cartoonist Vävä, (Osvaldo Bala). 
October 29, interview with Helena Farinha of ADRA. 
November, various meetings with Professor Carolyn Nordstrom, of Notre Dame 
University, USA. 
November 5, interview with Actual journalist Victor Custodio. 
November 5, interview with Frei Jose Paulo, vice-director of Radio Ecclesia. 
November 7& 16, interview with Bishop Gabriel Mbilingi in Luanda, Catholic Bishop 
of Luena. 
November 8& 28, interview with Justino Pinto de Andrade, lecturer at the Catholic 
University, Luanda. 
November 9& 28, interview with Maria da Conceicäo Melo, president of ACA. 
Angolan civic organisation. 
November 11, meeting with Rebecca Veronica, widow and market trader. 
November 11, meeting with Joäo Faria, lawyer and independent journalist. 
November 13, group interview with Cesinanda de Kerlan Xavier & Ana Maria Bastos 
de Nascimento (president and vice-president of MPD). 
November 15 & 23, interview with Francisco Tunga, director of FONGA. 
November 15, interview with Carolina, lawyer working with Maos Livres, Angolan 
NGO. 
November 16, meeting in Luanda with Rev. Manuel Gonsalves, Catholic missionary. 
November 16, present at the honouring of Zacarias Kamwenho, at the Catholic 
Unicersity, for the award of the Zakarov Prize. 
November 16, interview with Paulino Pinto Joao, leader of the political party CNDA. 
November 19, meeting with Maria Chenda (business woman) and Carlos (employed by 
international NGO). 
November 19, interview with Leopoldo Baio, director of private media publication 
Actual. 
November 20,22,24, group interview with members of Promaica in Bairro Prenda. 
November 20, interview in Luanda with Rev Jose Imbamba, lecturer at the Catholic 
University Luanda, and author of Imbamba (1999), doctoral thesis. 
November 20, group interview with members of FAAT. 
November 20, group interview with eight internally displaced women: 
Paula Samuleca. 
Madalena Njia, Cesaltina Saimia, Cristina Waimona, Suzana Mbunge, 
Veronica 
Sachinhingue, Ana Maria Josefina e Kilora Kimuthu. 
November 21, interview in Luanda with Rev. Luis Ngimbi, secretary general of 
CICA. 
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November 21, interview in Luanda with Lourdes Diogo Almeida, director of women's department at CICA. 
November 21 & 29, interview in Luanda with Noe Alberto Jose, co-ordinator of CICA's Department of Justice, Evangelism, Reconciliatin and Co-operation (DJERC). 
November 21, meeting of a bible class, Carmo church, approximately 30 people 
present. 
November 22, interview with Manuel Pembele of AJUDECA (Associacdo Juvenil para 
o Desenvolvimento Comunitärio de Angola). 
Novemer 22, interview with Mateus Joäo Pedro of Mäos Livres. author of Mateus 
(2000). 
November 26, interview William Tonet, editor of Folha 8. 
November 26, interview with Moises Cipriano, vice-governor of province of Lunda 
Norte. 
November 30, interview with Ana Faria, private media journalist. 
November 30, interview with parliamentary deputy Alexandre Andre Sebastido of 
political party PAJOCA. 
November 30, interview with Rui Lopes, Portuguese businessman also involved in 
Angolan drama and theatre. 
November 31, meeting with Mario Rui of M©saiko at national Catholic Justice and 
Peace Commission Conference. 
December, interview with Rev. Otävio Fernando of AEA. 
December, meeting with Moises Nele, MPLA parliamentarian for Lunda Norte. 
December 4, interview with Silva Mateus and Jose Fragoso, president and vice- 
president of Fundacäo 27 de Maio. 
December 4, meeting with Ingrdgia, Search for Common Ground. 
December 5. interview with the Dutch Ambassador, Luanda. 
December 6, interview Dr. Conceigdo Neto, Angolan historian (author of Neto 2001 a: 
2001 b). 
December 7, meeting with Graca Campos, editor of Angolense. Angolan private 
newspaper. 
December 7, group interview with personnel of AJPD, Angolan human rights NGO. 
December 10, interview with Louisa Fonsoni, director of LAC. 
December 10, interview with Dr. Milton Kilandamoko, Angolan lawyer and presidential 
candidate in 1992. 
December 12, interview with Nzakimuena Daniel Ntango. CICA archivist and editor of 
CICA newsletter. 
December 12. interview with Carlinda Monteiro, CCF, Christian Children's Fund. 
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5. Other interviews. 
May 2000, meeting with Colonel Bernard Howard, Dublin, Ireland, worked in Angola 
as part of UNAVBM II mandate. 
April 2000, telephone communication with Dame Margaret Anstee. 
September 2001, interview with Maricio Camuto, Angolan missionary. Dublin Ireland. 
October 2001, group interview with Michael Kilkenny and Brendan Carr. Dublin, 
Ireland, both of whom worked as missionaries in Angola. 
November 13,2002, interview with Fr. Jacinto Pio, at British Angola Forum, London. 
November 13,2002, meeting with Dame Margaret Anstee at BAF (2002). 
December 8,2002, interview with Manuel Teixeira, Angolan Catholic missionary, Lille, 
France. 
March 2003, meetings with Gregörio and Alvaro Rodrigues. Angolan theological 
students, Dublin, Ireland. 
6. National Media Institutions: 
Jornal de Angola, Rua Rainha Ginga, 18-24. Luanda. 
Actual, Rua Albano Machada, N° 6,1° Andar, Bairro Macuusso, Luanda. 
Angolense, Rua Antönio Feliciano de Castilho, N° 103. Luanda. 
Agora, Avenida Comondante Valödia, N°59,2° andar, Apt. 24, Luada 
Folha 8, Rua Conselheiro Jülio de Vilhena. N° 24,5° andar, Apt. 19, Luanda 
0 Independente, Rua C6nego Manuel das Neves, N° 22, Apt. 12, Sao Paulo, Luanda. 
RNA, (Radio Nacional de Angola), Angolan national radio. Broadcasts on FM in 
Luanda and on SW nationally. Repeater stations in most provinces enables FM 
reception locally within a short radius. Other stations in the Luanda area part of RNA 
include: Ngola Yetu, broadcasting in Kimbundu. Radio Luanda, Radio Cinco, sports 
channel; FM Stereo, music channel. 
TPA, (Televisäo Püblica Angolana), Angolan national television. Broadcasting from 
Luanda. Coverage in the provinces depends on the existence of repeater stations boost 
the signal. In 2001 TPA opened a second channel (TPA 2). primarily broadcasting 
music in Luanda and Benguela. 
Radio Ecclesia, CEAST owned private radio station, broadcasting from Luanda. It is 
envisaged that the station will broadcast nationally on short-wave. 
LAC (Luanda Antena Comercial), private radio station. broadcasting from Luanda. 
Vorgan, formerly UNITA's radio station, broadcasting on SW from Jamba. Ceased 
broadcasting in 1999 when FAA troops took the town. 
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7. Archival Material. 
Pertaining to the historical churches: 
AEA.. Address, Caixa Postal, 3715, Luanda. 
CEAST. Address: Rua Comandante Buila, 118, Luanda. 
CICA. Address: Rua 10, Predio NO 76, Bairro Cassenda, Luanda. 
COIEPA. Address: Avenida de Portugal, NO 45,30 Andar, Apartamento F, Bairro dos 
Ingombotas, Luana. 
8. Pertaining to radio broadcasts. 
8.1. Radio Ecclesia material recorded on tape, transcribed from the archives or listened 
to while in Luanda: 
May 26,2001. Debate on 27 de Maio (May 27). 
September 9,2001, Progressos para a paz (Progress towards Peace). 
September 18, morning programme call `Paz com Justica' (Peace With Justice). 
September 24,2001, Terrorismo (terrorism). 
September 27, radio interview with Holden Roberto of the FNLA. 
September 29, morning phone-in programme discussion on the " Campanha contra a 
Guerra' initiative (Campaign Against War), launched by CEAST's : 1Iovimento Pro 
Pace and Open Society Foundation that day. 
October 25, twice weekly human rights programme called `Get up, stand up'. 
November 10,2001,26 Anos de Independencia (26th anniversary of Independence). 
November 12,2001, midday news item evaluating presidential speeches (1999-2001) 
transcribed from archives. 
November 21, Forum Ecclesia, morning phone-in programme on the Lusaka Protocol. 
November 24, `Primeira Pügina', a review of the principal events of the week, a phone- 
in and discussion programme. 
December 4, `Entre V (is - C'onversas na radio, sobre a nossa diäria, ea nossa vivencia. 
e os nossos direitos'. human rights programme prepared by the NGO Mia Coupe. 
December 5, Forum Ecclesia, morning phone-in programme on the Angolan asylum 
seekers in the Netherlands under threat of expulsion. 
December 10, `O cidaddo ea Lei', human rights programme co-ordinated by Maos 
Livres. 
No date, Poder Actual rota de Colis"do com Poder Traditional. (Contemporary Political 
Authority on collision course with Traditional Authority). 
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8.2. Other stations. 
October 6, RNA debate on `O Conselho Nacional de Comunicagdo Social, hoje' (the 
National Council for Social Communication, today). 
November 9, Radio Luanda phone-in on housing conditions in multi-storey building in 
Luanda. 
November 10, Radio LAC, debate on Angolan healthcare. 
November 10, Radio LAC, debate on Angolan educational system. 
December 8, RNA debate on `Terrorismo', (terrorism). 
December 8, Radio LAC, debate on Angolan constitution. 
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Portuguese text - Chapter 3. 
"0 diälogo da reconciliacäo jä iniciado estä na linha da democracia que deve 
continuar a construir ea consolidar a paz no meio de nos", (LEAST 1989: 212). 
" "Necessitamos de uma paz autenitca, que converta Angola num Pais verdadeiramente 
livre, democrätico, onde todos os seus filhos tenham lugar e tenham voz. Esta voz sö 
farä ouvir genuinamente com eleicöes livres. E preciso encontrar caminhos para urna 
paz justa, num pals moderno e fraternal. Pulas para jä irnpöe-se a obrigacäo de um 
cessar-fogo urgente. ... 
Jä e chegada a hora de um diälogo pessoal, directo. franco. De 
Angolano pare angolano" (CEAST 1989: 214). 
"` "... a Paz ea tranquilidade do povo estäo tambem dependentes do compromissio da 
abertura para o multipartidarismo. ... 0 multipartidarismo näo devia ser uma hipötese 
a comprovar, mas um alvo a alcancar num tempo determinado. 0 compromisso do 
multipartidarismo poderä deteminar a paz e esta desenvolverä a democracia- (AEA- 
CICA 1990). 
IV "... os governs de Partido i nico se rnantem ä custa da corrupcao e de um Brande 
aparato militar e de seguranca que defende o regime contra o pröprio povo que 
governa. ... 
Ate agora o governo ea soberania da Nagdo angolana säo confundidos 
corn o Partido. ... A nossa paz, o nosso progresso, a unidade nacional pelos quais 
todos devemos estar empenhados, passam pela democracia" (AEA-CICA 1990). 
"No caso de Angola, 6 necessärio considerar a falta da unidade nacional como factor 
determinante na luta que se trava pela paz, pela justica e pelo desenvolvimento" (CICA 
1984: 5). 
V' "Esse monstro saido dos acordos de `Alvor' trouxe ao Povo Angolano a tragedia 
jamais conhecida, pois que o nosso Povo perdeu mail gente durante as confrontacöes 
de 1975 do que perdeu na primeira guerra de libertacäo nacional" (CICA 1984: 6). 
v" "Ate principios de 1976, os obstäculos da unidade nacional eeram muito mais tribais 
e oportunistas do que ideolögica" (CICA 1984: 6). 
v"' "Temps que acentuar. mais uma vez, que o problema fundamental estä na 'falta da 
unidade' en äo na falta de reconciliaräo politica entre as duas forcas politicas, cujas 
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ideologias politicas säo completamente opostas. ... Acreditamos que a verdadeira 
solugdo estä na nossa capacidade de, como angolanos, preservar a nossa identidade". 
x "0 primeiro problema do nosso Pais, aquilo que tudo condiciona, ea falta da 
unidade. Uma unidade baseada na verdade e na justica, ancorada no amor fraterno.... 
E pois, urgente examinar tudo quanto nos divide, ndo para avivar feridas, mas Para 
erradicar as ervas daninhas e germenes de discördia.... As diferencas tribais, em vez 
de servirem de estimulo para nos completarmos, degeneraram em motivo de rejeicö 
una dos outros, de desprezo uns pelos outros e de divisäo entre tribos supeiores e 
inferiores. Isto e grave. Compromete o futuro e as existencia da pröpria Nacäo ea bre 
as portas aos conquistadores de sempre. ... A 
divisdo eo ödio fratricida constituem a 
maior traicäo da causa da Pdtria". 
" "0 momento que o nosso Pais atravessa com a democracia multipartidäria, um 
verdadeiro patriota e sobretudo cristäo, näo pode deixar de se preocupar e contribuir na 
pacificacäo dos espiritos e reconciliacäo de toda a familia Angolana' (AEA 1991). 
" "Na democracia a linguagem deve estimular a paz eo bem estar de toda a sociedade: 
o aceso ao poder se farä atraves de votos e näo de forca ou violencia. As armas devem 
dar lugar ao dialögo; um dialögo que demonstre sabedoria, um dialögo baseado na 
disputa pelo progresso socio-economico. Um dialögo que oriente o povo para o 
desenvolviniento e respeito a dignidade alheia" (AEA 1992). 
x" "E uma porta para uma nova era que queremos seja de justica, paz e liberdade, para 
a felicidade de todos. Estas eleicöes säo as primeiras e ndo queremos que sejam as 
ültimas" (CICA 1992b). 
""' "Apös o acto eleitoral, e preciso saber ganhar, saber perder, e saber aceitar. 
Chamariamos a isto a sabedoria democrätica" (CEAST 1992: 289). 
xv "Longe de nos a tentagdo de pensar que, na prätica, sö merecem 
direitos politicos 
aqueles que pergaram em armas, marginando aqueles outros que sofrem as 
consequencia dessas armas, bem Como aqueles que, sem violencia, 
lutar pela paz e 
pela democracia. Tao perigosa tentacdo poderia 
levar-nos a novas formas de 
discriminatöria injustiga" (CEAST 1991: 266). 
"Linguagem de intolerdncia nos meios da comunicacdo massiti a: que ao 
roves de 
educar os cidadäos na conc6rdia, alimenta o 
foco de tencöes eo ödio ainda existente- 
(AEA 1991). 
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"v' A linguagem provocadora que os dois grandes Partidos continuam a usar nos seus 
Meios de Comunicacäo Social näo convence os ouvintes de que estäo a procurar a paz. 
Mais uma vez apelamos aos Responsäveis desse örgäos de informacäo que eliminem 
da sua linguagem todo o teor de agressividade e provocacäo. Procurem a unidade do 
povo e näo a sua divisäo" (CEAST 1992: 272). 
"V" "Era exactarnent uma linguagem semelhante a esta que se ouvia antes de rebentar a 
guerra em 1975" (CEAST 1992: 281). 
""' "0 destino deste Pais eo do povo depende do sucesso do processo da 
democtatizagdo em curso onde a pedra angular 6a desmobilizacäo dos exercitos, a 
formacäo do exercito nacional ea realizacäo das eleicöes justas e livres" (CICA 1992). 
""x '&faz pensar que o seu dono pegarä nelas se näo ganhar as eleiröes" (CEAST 
1992: 273). 
" "A democracia näo culmina com simples voto por vezes manobrado ou mesmo 
comprado na pior das hipoteses. Democratizar um Pais e um processo longo e 
exaustivo. Passa necessariamente pela educacäo da populacäo. envolvendo todos os 
sectores da vida nacional" (AEA 1992). 
, xx"'Fata-se muito nas eleicöes democräticas de Setembro, mas o povo näo sabe para 
que sdo elas. E näo pode sabe-lo enquanto the ndo derem a conhecer a Lei Eleitoral e 
os Ideärios ou Programas politicos dos diversos Partidos. A tres meses das eleicoes, 6 
tempo de tudo estar publicado e posto ä disposigdo dos eleitores. Estes precisam de 
saber oportunamente o que devem escolher.... E precisam de saber tambem coma 
6 
que os Partidos pretendem governar. Näo basta a simpatia por este ou aquele 
candidato, e necessärio conhecer as suas ideias politicas a respeito 
de governacäo" 
(CEAST 1992: 283). 
"As pröxims eleigbes sö seräo livres se forem conscientes. 
E sö serao conscientes. 
se os eleitores conhecerem suficentemente os Partidos, seas programas e candidatos, 
por forma a poderem comparar uns com os outros, e escolherem entre eles o que 
Ihes 
parecer melhor" (LEAST 1992: 286). 
`xl" "A non-na geraS Para um candidato ou um Paritdo ser elegi el 
za garantia que nos 
oferece de servico dedicado pelo bem comun e 
de respeito pelos direitos humanos" 
(CEAST 1992: 286). 
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XXIV " pedimos que facarn as conversag6es com os olhos postos näo nos Interesses do 
proprio Partido, mas nos sofrimentos do Povo" (CEAST 1993: 303). 
"XV "Abidjan foi uma esperanga que se converteu em desespero. Confessamos que as 
alegadas razöes do seu fracasso nein corn a melhor das boas vontades cabem na razdo. 
Pelo menos, na razdo do povo. Como este, tambem nos esperävamos que uma seria 
vontade politica inspirasse a imaginagdo dos negociadores no sentido de encontrarem 
uma solugdo Para o impasse. Mas tal ndo aconteceu. Eo povo continua a ser 
condenado a morte, ä fome, ao desterro, ea toda a sorte de torturas que a guerra the 
inflige" (LEAST 1993: 311). 
"""' "A guerra que nos martiriza tomou-se uma violacdo sistemdtica dos mais sagrados 
direitos humanos. Armas de grande alcance e poder destruidor, quer aereas quer 
terrestres, väo devastando indiscriminadamente as nossas vilas e cidades, sem poupar 
sequer os lugares sagrados. Igrejas, Hospitais, Creches, e outros lugares congeneres, 
desde tempos antigos constituem zonas sagradas que ate povos ditos näo civilizados 
respeitavam durante as guerras. ... para atingir os seus 
fins, a guerra näo olha a meios" 
(CEAST 1993: 302). 
""' "Para quem espera ver nos documentos pastorais da CEAST a condenacdo deste 
ou daquele culpado no actual conflito, cumpre-nos informar que para exercer o nosso 
ministerio da reconciliagdo ndo e esse o melhor caminho..... [Mas] näo podemos 
deixar de condenar ... quaisquer situacöes 
de injustica, chamando para elas a atengdo 
dos Nomens, por forma de examinarem diante delas a sua consciencia, verem a 
responsibiidade que Ihes cabe e tonrarem as medidas que devem tomar para Ihes pör 
cobro" (CEAST 1993: 304). 
X" 0 Povo angolano, se näo for manipulado, e capaz de conviver fraternamente sein 
fazer das suas diferenCas etnicas obstäculo algum para a paz. Hä värios anos que tern 
vivido na cidade de Luanda centenas de milhar de cidadäos doutras etnias, sobretudo 
bundos e quicongos, e näo consta que tenha havido recontros tribais, nem entre eles 
nem deles com a etnia local. 0 mesmo se pode afirmar doutras localidades do Pais. Por 
isso, as responsabilidades dos recentes acontecimentos politico-tribais ultrapassam o 
nivel do povo simples" (LEAST 1992: 299). 
x` "Se nos ültimos tempos houve acontecimentos conotados de tribalismo, 
isso deve- 
se a manipulacöes de Responsäveis que, para seus interesses, se aproveitaram 
das 
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rivalidades politicas predominantes em determinados sectores etnicos. Por isso, e 
principalmente aos dirigentes politicos que enderecamos o nosso apelo para darem 
testemunho de maturidade humana, sabendo aceitar os seus irmäos de quaisquer 
divergencias etnicas, num espirito grande de verdadeira unidade nacional, sein 
exclusivismos de especie alguma, e sein especular neles eventuais rivalidades 
politlcas" (CEAST 1993: 320). 
""" "O instrumento mais decisivo na mobilizagdo dos esp ritos para a paz ou para a 
guerra ea communicagdo social - jornal, radio e televisäo. Näo Memos düvida alguma 
acerca da nefasta influencia que ela exerceu sobre os ültimos acontecimentos. Por isso 
reiteramos o nosso veemente apelo a todos os responsäveis da Comunicacao Social. 
quer dum lado quer do outro, no sentido de utilizarem a informacäo para unir e näo 
para dividir os angolanos. ... 
0 fundo ea forma, ate a tonalidade com que se 
transmitem os comunicados, os editorais, e as notas do dia, tanto podem ser urn 
convite ä reconciliaräo eä paz como um acicate ao ödio eä guerra. Acabe-se com a 
comunicacäo maniqueista, que sö ve bem no seu partido, e sö mal no outro" (CEAST 
1992: 300). 
"X' I "E atraves da democracia parlamentar que os problemas etnicos criados pelo 
colonialismo em Africa em geral, e em Angola em particular, podem e devem ser 
debatidos e resolvidos, porque de outra forma as guerras continuaräo a enriquecer os 
produtores de armas e da comida de emergencia do paises jä ricos ä custa do 
sofrimento e da morte dos angolanos" (Chipesse 1995: 9-10). 
"""" "E e entäo entramos num dilema: como a politica vai-se tornando cada vez mais na 
forca mais decisiva na nossa sociedade, e quando mais isso se torna verdade menos 
capazes nos vamos tornando para agir nela, como protestantes e cristäos. Eo que estä a 
acontecer? Forcas crueis estäo a torrar contröle das nossas instituicöes political, e 
como pensamos que esses movimentos säo conträrios aos `principios cristäos' ... 
entäo näo participamos! ... 
Como consequencia desta nossa atitude, o Cristianismo em 
Angola näo irä exercer qualquer influencia forte e positiva na sociedade do futuro" (de 
Carvalho 1995: 2-3). 
XX""' "a nossa falha de algumas vezes näo termos sido apartidäria'* (AEA 1994 
Resolution No. 8). 
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xxx" "Nos ültimos dezoito anos muitas vidas tern silo cefadas por genre que querem 
expandir a sua zona de inuluencia, querendo por este meio se proclamar reis dos 
Angolanos. Cada um deles utiliza as expressöes politicas dos outros parajustificar o 
seu use da cultura de violencia. Enfim e boje certo que sö aqueles que tem armas na 
mao e matarn quanto podem passam por säbios da sociedade Angolana. Quem recuza 
de utilizar a forca das armas de fogo e tido como stüpido. A este e recuzado o direito 
de participar na tomada de decisoes que condicionam hoje a sua vida. ... temos ainda 
de lamentar esta manifestacäo da cultura de violencia que continua de sustentar a 
agenda politica que herdamos do colonialismo a qual nunca serviu o os verdadeiros 
interesses dente nagdo" (Ntoni-Nzinga 1995: 7-8). 
""". "A luta duma nova guerra seria contra quem? Da UNITA contra o MPLA e do 
MPLA contra UNITA? Nada disso. Seria de ambos contra o povo. Este e que ficaria 
sem casa, ... Numa guerra civil säo sempre dois exercitos a luta conta o Povo da sua 
pröpria Nacdo" (CEAST 1992: 298). 
K""V' "o nosso passado deve ser a licäo do futuro. Com efeito, o que foi o nosso 
passado de guerra? Urn cruel genocidio que imolou centenas de milhares de inocentes. 
Um inferno de destruicöes que retirou a nossa Pätria da vanguarda dos paises africanos 
mais avancadas para a retaguarda dos povos mais carenciadas no nosso Continente" 
(CEAST 1996: 363). 
"X"" "Perante o spectro duma nova guerra, ninguem pode ficar indiferente ao pensar 
que 15 milhöes de Angolanos väo ser sacrificados. na sua vida ou nos seus bens, aos 
Interesses pessoais, talvez partiddrios, de un poucos" (CEAST 1998: 386). 
KXXV"' "... ha grupos, se nao paises, interessados em arruinar ainda mais a noss Pätria, 
com as armas destruidoras que para cä enviam em troca de diamantes e pert®leo. A 
esses senhores pedimos simlesmente que näo nos facam a nös o que näo querem para 
si mesmos" (CEAST 1995: 344). 
XXXIX "uma palavra de denüncia contra aqueles que fazem da guerra um negocio 
lucrativo. Somar contas em bancos estrangeiros e enriquecer ä custa da fome, do 
sofrimento, do sangue, e da morte de seus irmäo, e uma infdmia repugnante, que 
jamais deveria ter lugar no coracdo dum angolano nem de homen algum" (CEAST 
1999). 
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XI "... que seja criada pela AEA e CICA uma comissäo eclesiastica permanente , para 
junto do Governo e das entidades do estado, exigir a aplicacdo prärica da lei de 
imprensa vigente no pais ea abolicdo da censura", resolution 6b. 
"L` "Mas näo podemos deixar de ver neste fracasso da paz, duma certa maneira, 
igualmente um fracasso das Igrej as cristds, na medida eng que, reunido estas cerca de 
90% dos angolanos, erann em 1991 a grande £orga civil, a ünica autoridade moral 
nacional possivel. Fracasso, em promeiro lugar, jä que näo puderam evitar o retomar 
das arras - mesmo que ndo se possa, e claro, imputar-lhes a sede de poder de 
qualquer um dos `partidos armados. ' E tambem talvez, um fracasso na sua mensagem 
de paz e reconciliacdo, entre elas pröprias, bem comp no seu seio" (Messiant 2000: 1). 
"'" "Dada a forca do cristianismo neste pais ea falta de meios e de autonomia a clue a 
guerra e os poderes ditatoriais reduziram a "sociedade civil", ndo penso que possa 
haver uma intervencdo eficaz dos angolanos em favor da paz que näo seja a accäo de 
uma ünica confissdo, por mail poderosa e respeitada que seja" (Messiant 2000: 9). 
x"" "Na fase actual do conflito angolano, o COIEPA aceita o Protocolo de Lusaka 
como base essencial para a aproximacdo de todos, e espera que representantes de todas 
as forcas vivas da Nagdo e os assuntos julgados sensiveis sejam trazidos d mesa das 
conversacöes, para se evitarem possiveis pretextos politicos de retorno ä guerra", 
(CICA 2001 a). 
"" "Lusaka e välido porque no ha outro documento para o substituir, mas Lusaka näo 
pode ser a biblia do pals. Lusaka e uma boa base, mas e de 7 anos passados. 0 pals näo 
parou, a politica ndo parou. 0 pals evoluiu, e isto tem que ser incluido" (Rev. Luis 
Nguirni). 
xiv "este Congress pede que no referido didlogo e no processo de reconciliacäo sejarn 
admitidos, alem das pastes em causa, os mais representativos estratos da sociedade 
civil, tais Como Igrejas, Partidos e outras instituticöes" Conclusäo No. 9, Congresso Pro 
Pace. 
"iv" "No exercicio das suas prerrogativas constitucionais, coube ao Governo de Angola 
a dificil decisdo de deter e desarticular a mäquina de guerra de Jonas Savimbi. 
0 
governo näo tinha outra alternativa: ou se fazia a guerra, ou assistia-se, passivamente, 
ao desmoronamento (ruin, crumbling. collapse) de Coda a Nacäo. Se Koje, sectores 
da 
sociedade civil reunem-se em torno de um movimento pela paz, 6 porque a campanha 
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militar das Forcas Armadas Angolanas alteraram positivamente a correlacäo de forcas 
no piano militar. As vozes hoje dedicadas ä pregagdo da Paz dificilmente seriam 
ouvidas no cenario que se desenhava ha pouco mais de um ano.... Mas nao deixa de 
causar mais espanto o facto de as pressöes pela paz näo sejam carreadas na direccäo da 
IJNITA Belicista.... [Foi para] garantir a liberdade ea democracia - que se tomou a 
decisäo de desarmar as forcas ilegais que ameacavam o pais" (Jornal de Angola, July 
18,2000, page 2). 
"lv" "Para o nosso caso especifico, os apologistas do didlogo ten colocado em pd de 
igualdade o agressor ea vitima, fazendo tdbua rasa as eleicöes de 1992'' (Jornal de 
Angola, July 21,2000, page 2). 
xlv"' "abriu o debate sobre os caminihos da paz, e fez a sociedade perder o medo de 
discutir em praca püblica as alternativas para sair do novelo da guerra ' (Espiritanos 
2002). 
x"x "Cientes ainda de que a via militar näo e solucäo" (EDICA 1994). 
"... esta longa guerra de 35 anos, jä deixou suficientemente claro que o problema de 
Angola no tern solugdo militar" (CEAST 1997: 370). 
" "Fago-o porque todo e qualquer momento e bom comunicar, especialmente perante o 
elevado desafio da paz (atraves do diälogo). Tambem o faro para vos incentivar a 
participar vivamente nesta dificil tarefa que o momento nos impöe.... Gostariamos de 
ver as iniciativas da COIEPA e do PRO PACE a andar para frente. Pensamos que 
existe um papel histörico e relevante que podem prestar ao povo angolano, 
incentivando a reconciliaräo" (Savimbi 2001). 
l" "Em nome de Cristo e de todo a povo angolano que sofre, pedimos ao Presidente de 
Angola e ao Lider da'UNITA para se encontrarem num lugar neutral a firn de dialogar 
sobre o firn da guerra eo futuro da Nacäo. A Igreja de born grado oferece a sua ajuda 
para se encontrar um lugar conveniente assim comp tambem uma competente e 
aceitävel facilitacäo para tal diälogo" (CEAST 2001a). 
"' "... emborajulguemos que näo deveriam ser somente o Governo eI NITA a sentar- 
se a mesa das conversacöes. mas tambem representantes de outros 
Partidos Politicos e 
da Sociedade Civil" (CEAST 2001 b). 
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Portuguese Text - Chapter 4. 
"'William Tonet eo seu Folha 8 prosseguem, infatigäveis, a missdo militante e 
espinhosa a que se propuseram, de hä uns tempos a esta pane: convencer-nos de que 
Jonas Savimbi seria um politico sem macula, com um passado irrepreensivel, 
firmemente empenhado em alcangar a Paz para Angola", Jornal de Angola 21.11.2001. 
" "William Tonet, por certo, ndo Jeve ignorar que eu sei de uitas aliancas. algumas 
delas contraproducentes mesmo, que ele fez para criar o F8. William Tonet sabe que 
eu sei que ele tern vindo a cuspir nos pratos em que comeu fartamente", Angolense, 
February 23-March 2,2002, page 7. 
"' "os acordos ate Agora assinados, que privilegiaram os interesses ideolögicos dos 
maiores partidos politicos, em detrimento dos interesses dos värios povos, que 
compoes o tecido angolano", Tonet, Folha 8,1 September 1999. 
'V "Na prätica Lusaka falhou, por näo previlegiar uma verdadeira Reconciliaäo 
Nacional. Lusaka falhou por rejeitar a participacäo dos outros actores politicos 
desarmados, igrejas, sociedade civil e autoridades tradicionais. 0 Protocolo, por outro 
lado, nunca teve programas nem calendarizacäo com etapas e actos concretos corn 
impacto psico-social, capazes de desarmar as mentes dos beligerantes e insufä-las de 
um novo espirito e conceitos de concördia", Folha 8,26 January 2002. 
"A experiencia Bestes sete anos de (näo) vigencia do Protocolo de Lusaka veio 
demonstrar que a bipolarizagdo assente no 'negöcio" a dois conformou apenas, com as 
consequencias que se conhecem, uma visäo redutora, simplista, de como se alcancar a 
täo propalada reconciliagdo nacional. A pröpria lögica de cedencias ou garantias 
mütuas subjacentes ao acordo, näo propiciou a minima possibilidade de coabitagdo 
entre os seus subscritores, muito mais preocupados em ndo deixarem qualquer margem 
de envolvimento de outros segmentos importantes da sociedade, potenciais 
apaziguaradores de decades de ödios, recalcamentos e desconfiancas'". Aguiar dos 
Santos, 2 June, 2001, p. 9. 
v' "Este esparo deveria ser preenchido com a foto que o Angolense esperava fazer na 
cerimönia de assinatura formal do Acordo de Cessar-Fogo, realizada quinta. 
feira. 4 de 
Abril, em Luanda. Como mais uma vez fornos excluidos de uma actividade para a 
aqual ate foram convidadas diversas personalidades ejornalistas estrangeiros. o 
312 
Angolense decidiu näo encontrar uma foto alternativa para este espaco. E com isso, 
expressa o seu mais vivo repüdio a todas as präticas de exclusäo", Angolense April 6- 
13,2002. 
"Lusaka 6 valido, mas ndo basta. Porque 6 sö entre os dois lados. Precisamos abrir 
uma janela para a sociedade civil ea religiäo. Isto e para ver se hä mais um segredo 
que eles podem oferecer. Isto 6 alem da TROIKA ea comunidade internacional. " 
2001.11.21. Forum Ecclesia. 
"' Rui Augusto. "Lusaka ea base de reconciliacdo nacional, porque desde a sua 
implementagdo algo positivo tem sido feito. Quem violou Lusaka foi Savimbi. Neste 
momento que se vai negociar. 0 pals näo e uma bola. Precisamos que Savimbi declara 
um cessar-fogo unilateral, desarmar a sua tropa. " 2001.11.21. Forum Ecclesia. 
" Armando Gaetano. "Lusaka pode servir como base para futuro diälogo. 'ßäo 
podemos insistir num Protocolo que falhou. Falhou porque tern erros. Muita coisa 
mudou em Angola ee preciso actualizä-lo. Falhou na implementacäo da administracäo 
do Estado. Foi um desastre. Eu vi gente a fugir a administracao do Estado porque 
foram cagados pelo estado, e foram buscar refügio em Bailundo. Falhou a 
reconciliagdo, foi por culpa dente governo que näo se aproximou ao povo". 2001.11.21. 
Forum Ecclesia. 
" "Penso que näo houve verdadeiros processos de paz. Houve. sim, o establecimento de 
mecanismos de acomodacäo de personagems, a partir duma leitura precipitada de que 
o que move os Nomens säo pura e simplesmente meras ambicöes materais. ambicöes 
de mando, de protoganismo", Folha 8, November 18,2000, p 11. 
X' "A Comunidade Intemacional, na generalidade. que ' aparentemente' näo entendeu a 
profundidade do processo da Paz e investiu tudo nos resultados formais da eleicöes. 
deixou de ter um papel relevante na busca da paz (näo `entende' a dimensäo do 
movimento social pela Paz, satisfazendo-se como mero gestor de sancöes e 
aprofundando as relagbes militares com o regime), passando meramente o reforco da 
cooperacdo econömica cujos resultados. no actual contexto, para o povo angolano. säo 
claramente duvidosos", Filomeno Vieira Lopes.. -1goru January 13,2000. p 9. 
X" "A Troika de observadores hd muito que deixou de trazer contributos positivos para 
of im do conf(ito. hoffe estä desqualificada para um possivel papel 
de facilitador do 
diälogo entre as partes. 0 problema e que os paises que compöem a Troika tem 
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interesses que os levam a privilegiar um relacionamento estreito com o Governo. E 
isso faz com que muitas vezes funcionem como autenticas caixas de ressondncia das 
posicöes do Governo, ignorando ou silenciando situacöes dramdticas que resultam do 
prolongamento do conflito, ou outras propostas e contribuicöes que tem surgido. 
nomeadamente as emendas da sociedade civil e dos partidos da oposicäo. A1em disso, 
salvo raras e honorosas excepg6es, para a Troika, sö as posicöes do Governo 
interessam e contain para as suas tomadas de posicöes. Ora deste modo, pouco 
contribuem para a paz e concördia entre os angolanos", Simäo Catete, Folha 8, 
December 8,2001, pp. 12-13 
""' "A Igreja mais uma vez expressou, em nome dos angolanos, o desejo da paz que 
Angola necessita. Desafiando a voz da minoria, mas poderosa no pals, que advoga a 
`guerra para acabar com a guerra', os religosos da capital angolana, no ultimo 
Domingo, fizeram ouvir a voz da razäo.... Evidentemente, os religiosos. ültimamente 
criticados püblicamente pelos detentores do poder, vem abrindo espacos para se 
fazerem ouvir na sociedade angolana. ... Os recentes pronunciamentos da Igreja 
contrapöem os discursos, que, vindos do estrangeiro. manifestam a falta de interesse e- 
ou de conhecimento da realidade angolana, jä que animam a opgao armada. como a 
ünica via para a pacificacdo entre os angolanos. 0 aval de Washington. por exemplo, e 
outros provenientes, particularmente dos paises que exploram os principais recursos 
naturais de Angola, evidenciam quäo interessados estdo no fim das hostilidades no 
pals. Näo Ihes interessa, tudo parece indicar, a vida human angolana. ... e neste 
contexto, a via seguida pela Igreja: a paz por via de conversagoes, e quanto a nos. a 
mais realista, ... que os 
filhos desta terra vem tendo ao longo de quase trinta anos, 
incluindo aos da independencia. Portanto, um aplauso bem Brande para a Igreja. " 
Editorial by Daniel Salweio, Actual. June 17,2000, page 2. 
"Em 1975, as grandes forcas politicas do pals, FNLA, MPLA, e UNITA näo tinham 
esgotado todas as possibilidades de entendimento. 0 que se passou foi a lögica da 
forca militar eo desejo de procurar a todo o custo esmagar o outro, eram mais fortes 
em cada um dos partidos. Prova disso, foi a introdugdo no pals de forcas militares 
estrangeiras, jä visiveis em Abril e \, iaio de 1975. muito antes do 11 de Novembro. " 
Jerönimo Wanga. Minister of Education and Culture in the transitional government, 
Angolense 1 1-18 November 2000. page 1'-1 3 
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"V "Porque ideologicamente a UNITA e oa FNLA näo estavarn ä mesma altura do 
MPLA e muito menos sincronizadas com ele. 0 MPLA era um movimento que lutava 
pelo Povo angolano e os outros dois movimentos lutavam pelo poder. Portanto, nao 
havi hipötese absolutamente nenhuma de coabitarmos, " Beto Van-Dunen, Angolense 
November 11-18,2000, page 8. 
"' "Ninguem sabe ao certo o que aconteceu. Todos dizem que ea guerra. Mas porque a 
guerra? ... Porque o MPLA queria todo o protoganismo para si, por representar a 
intelectualidade urbana, mas a FNLA queria-o para si, porque era nele que residiam as 
verdadeiras aspiracöes do povo oprimido. Como se ndo bastasse, depois veio o 
Savimbi a criar a sua UNITA, congregando povos do centro-sul. Esses tres 
movimentos nunca se entenderam desde o principio, cada um tinha a sua maneira de 
ver Angola, cada sonhava o seu tipo de independencia para Angola. As Brandes 
potencias sö se aproveitaram dessas divisöes entre os proprios angolanos para 
implementar a sua guerra de ideologias. Este e guerra feira com armas e dinheiro 
fornecidos pelas duas potencias de entdo, EAU e URSS (hoje Rüssia)..... Os rebeldes 
por vezes falam em «causas profundas», mas supöe-se que sejam as mesmas causas 
que originaram a formagdo da FNLA, no Norte, MPLA na capital do pals e centros 
urbanos adjacentes, e da UNITA no Centro-Sul", Fonseca Bengui, Actual, November 
11,2000, page 7. 
Criou-se aqui um sistema de partido ünico. Logo exlusäo politica e recusa de 
outros e, a intolerdncia politica teve condig6es para crescer. Foi o MPLA que fez isso 
ao proclamar independencia, mas os outros dois movimentos de libertagdo fariam 
precisamante o mesmo, porque a lögica que estava no espirito dos tres movimentos de 
libertacdo na altura da independencia era tomada do poder politico e exercicio deste 
poder duma forma solitäria, ünica. Näo era partilhar o poder politico. näo era respeitar 
o espirito do pröpro Acordo do Alvor", Vincente P. de Andrade, November 10,2001. 
'" "Quern violou os acordos de Alvor foi Portugal por ter permitido a entrada de 
forcas estrangeiras. 0 pröprio poder colonial näo devia permitir que o MPLA tomasse 
o poder. Como subscritor dos acordos, Portugal deveria arranjar meios de reunir os tres 
movimentos para meter o processo sobre os carris..... Isso ea base de tudo. A 
violagdo provocou toda esta confusäo que boje vivemos. Mas Portugal 
deve assumir 
esta grande responsibilidade porque as dificulades comecaram em Alvor", 
Folha 8, 
10.11.2000, page 7-8. Holden Roberto interview. 
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X IX o MFA que constituia o nücleo duro dessa governo apoiava abertamente o 
MPLA por razöes ideolögicas - näo soube levar a cabo com responsibilidade o 
processo de descolonizagdo de Angola". He denies any CIA-FNLA collaboration, 
saying it was an orchestrated MPLA campaign. Ngola Kabangu of FNLA, Angolense 
11-18 November 2000, page 10-11. 
"". declarar a Paz, ndo e um favor a Savimbi, nem por causa dele. mas uma resposta 
ao clamor de milhöes de autocönes, que ao longo destes anos tem morrido de forma 
inglöria, " Foiha 8, November 17,2001, page 3. 
XXI "O futuro comece agora, os Angolanos podem comecar a sonhar, eo futuro jä 
comecou. Assim ficam apontuados os dicursos do Presidente da Republica dos tres 
Ultimos aniversärio da independencia, discursos que tern em comun o facto de criarem 
no seio da polulacdo expectitavas do que a guerra estä mesmo no firn, e que os pals 
caminha passos assegurados para a normalidade. Observadores comentam que o 
discurso de ontem näo trouxe qualquer novidade, mais urna vez o Presidente invoucou 
a guerra como o mau de todos os maus, desculpando assim tantos erros de governagdo, 
nestes 26 anos de independencia de Angola. ... 
Ontern Jose Eduardo dos Santos 
afirmou que näo estä disponivel para negociar com Jonas Savimbi, que considerou ser 
um perdedor crönico. Resaltou que so um milagre pode impedir a derrota da UNITA. 
Jä em 1999, depois da tomada do Andulo pelas tropas do governo, o discurso 
presidential caregava o mesmo tom vitorioso. Nos 25 anos da independencia Jose 
Eduardo dos Santos voltou a dizer que a guerra estä a terminar.... Para algumas 
pessoas a esperanca duma data satisfactoria em breve continue a detem, outras tantas 
defendem que sö com negociacöes entre o governo e UNITA que poderd chegar a paz. 
O receio e justificado pelo facto de, apesar de todas as garantias das vitorias alcancadas 
pelas FAA, näo tem sido posivel acabar coma guerra.... A fome, a doenca ea miseria 
contimuam a ser a realidade da maior parte dos Angolanos. Assim para muitos 
Angolanos o futuro ainda näo comecou", Laurina Tavares, 12-11.2001 Radio Ecclesia. 
"" 'Talar de 27 de Maio de 1977 e, aindo hoje extremamente delicada, ate mesmo 
perigoso neste pals..... Fazer um debate e franco sobre esse questäo näo e fäcil. pois 
muitas feridas continuam abertas. ... 
Somos boje acudados de ser um povo passivo e 
medroso, acabrunhado e introvertido, silencioso e alheio a sua pröpria situacäo. 
fleumätico ou mesmo äpatico, em parse por causas das consequencias deste triste dia", 
Radio Eccle. sia debate, May 26.2001. 
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""` "Se tivessemos discutido o 27 de Maio ate hoje ... eu jä näo seria eta coisa que 
ainda mete medo ... porque a nossa sociedade, toda ela, estd sente, portanto, foi 
condicionada pelo 27 de Maio.... Mas o regime, os que substituiram oA Neto nada 
fizeram para mudar, pelo conträrio, aproveitaram-se deste medo, a continuam a 
aproveitar do medo que impuseram ä populacdo, para continuarem a desgovernar esta 
nagdo. E preciso fazer o proximo passo. Tern que se falar do 27 de Maio ate que ele 
flea desmistificado, para comecarmos a construir uma nova sociedade, jä baseada, 
digamos assim, na lei e nos direitos, porque sendo continuaremos a estar prisoneiros do 
27 de Maio. " 
xxiv "E verdade que existe ainda uma certa apatia no nosso povo de participar em 
manifestacöes, talvez por medo do que aconteceu no '27 de Maio"'. Carlos Leitdo, 
presidente PADPA, Folha 8, March 4,2000, pages 5-6. 
Kxv Title of piece -'V enceram a barreira do medo estrategico'. "Abrimos aqui um breve 
parenteses para recordar que esta barreira tem as suas raizes histöricas mergulhadas na 
sangrente repressäo que ocorreu em 1977 e anos subsequentes, cujo balanco na ordern 
das värias dezenas de milhares de vitimas ainda estä por se fazer", Wilson Dada, Folha 
8, February 26,2000, p. 11. 
"" "Em Angola como igualmente em värias partes do globo, hä uma relacäo intrinsca 
entre a Paz e Democracia. ... 
Acreditou-se que o aprofundamento da democracia seria 
a pedra angular para a consolidacdo da Paz no pals.... Da mesma forma, a guerra 
oferece um pretexto para as forcas antidemocräticas exercerem um controlo estricto 
sobre a sociedade, limitando a intervengdo dos cidadäos. 0 esperado firn da guerra 
criaria entäo as condicöes para a emergencia duma veerdadeira democracia. ... A 
questäo de fundo ea insipiencia da democracia em Angola alimenta a guerra". 
Filomeno Vieira Lopes, Agora, January 13.2000, page 9. 
x'v" "A situagao e preocupante e as decisbes da ültima reuniäo do CC dos camaradas 
demonstra que a democracia, em Angola, corre serios riscos", Tonet Folha 8, March 1. 
2000, p. 2. 
x'v"' "Um poder fortamente presidentialista. um governo e parlamento maioritarios, 
incluindo o controlo dos tribunais. Lim sistema assim alicerado nao 
deixar respirar os 
contra-poderes necessarios ao exercicio de um regime 
democratico", Agora, August 
28,1999, pp. 2-3. 
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Portuguese Text - Chapter 5. 
"'A partir dal a populacäo sabia que tinha que se manter afastada das questöes de poder e 
de responsabilidade politica". 
11 "Seria justo dizer que no presente momento, a posicäo das Nacöes Unidas respeitante ä 
paz em Angola, estä a ser construido e estä a tentar aprender com as suas falhas do 
passado. E claro que as Naröes Unidas agora veem os direitos humanos como pane do 
processo de paz em Angola. De facto, a divisäo dos Direitos Humanos tem sido a 
componente principal da contribuicäo da comunidade internacional para o alcance da paz 
desde de 1999", Howland (2001: 112). 
"' "0 Manifesto pela Paz, declarado em 1999, e assumido solidariamente por um largo 
espectro de figuras, deve ser considerado como tendo sido o verdadeiro "pontape de 
Saida" para uma serie de manifestacöes explicitas e coordenadas no seio da sociedade, em 
prol da Paz e da Reconciliacdo. Em Julho de 2000, teve lugar `Congresso Pro Pace. o 
ponto mais alto das mais diversas manifestacöes a favor da Paz e Reconciliagdo entre 
todos os angolanos". Paper by Justino Pinto De Andrade / Rafael Marques entitled -Uma 
Solugdo Para 0 Conflito Angolano' at Forum Sobre As Mi ltiplas Consegencias Da 
Guerra Conference. 
" "O movimento `Mulheres, Paz e Desenvolvimento' (MPD), e um movimento civico de 
mulheres de defesa da Paz e da Reconciliagdo, Democracia. Direitos Humanos e 
Desenvolvimento da Sociedade Angolana, sem cardcter partiddrio ou religioso, sera 
discriminacdo da rata, cor, origem cultural e politico-social, voluntärio, humanitärio e sem 
caräcter lucrativo". Article 1, page 3 of MPD Statutes. 
"Nös primamos pelo desenvolvimento da nossa sociedade, mas sabemos que näo haverä 
desenvolvimento sein paz. Tambem sabemos que näo haverä paz sein que haja diälogo e 
reconciliacäo. Nas sociedades africanas a que pertencemos, baseadas na oralidade. o 
diälogo surge como um elemento de socializacäo das relacöes entre os homens ee um 
mecanismo eficaz na solucäo do conflito... Por isso, para se alcancar a paz em Angola. a 
ünica via eo diälogo, abragente e inclusivvo. Sö dialogando e que poderemos analisar as 
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causas do conflito angolano e encontrar as saidas e solucöes que se ajustem melhor as 
nossas realiades. Jä se assinaram muitos Acordos, houve muitas negociacöes de paz. Tudo 
esse esforco para paz em Angola pecou por dugs razöes principais: 1. Näo se atacaram as 
causas, mas os seus efeitos e sintomas. 2.0 processo envolveu apenas aqueles que detem 
as armas e fazem a guerra, näo todas as partes interessadas na pacificacäo do pals". 
Cesinanda Xavier. 
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Portuguese Text - Chapter 6. 
... os cidadäos se vejam forcados a fazer justica por mäos pröprias" (AEA 1991). 
"Todo o cidadäo tem o dever de ser embaixador da paz em sua casa, no seu bairro, no 
lugar de trabalho, na cidade em que vive, contribuindo desta forma para que onde impera 
o ödio, reine a afeicäo.... Qualquer projecto, de paz durävel e participatörio eo seu 
sucesso depende da contribuiräo de todos os seus membros ... 0 objectivo final e ter paz 
em casa, paz na rua, paz nas escolas, progresso e prosperidade para todos" (IECA 4). 
"... a presente guerra que consome bastantes vidas. näo tem razäo de ser. e por outro 
lado a paz näo e somente a ausencia de guerra, mas, e um processo que deve caracterizar o 
relacionamento dos seres vivos". 
'V Pais vestese de branco e saüda a paz. "Angola, de Cabinda ao Cunene, vestiu-se ontem 
de branco para saudar o firn definitivo da guerra ea chegada da paz. Milhares de pessoas, 
sobretudo nas capitais de provincia, participaram em longas marchas para saudar a 
assinatura, quinta-feira, do acordo formal de cessar-fogo entre as Forcas Armadas 
Angolanas e as forcas militares da Unita ", from {PRIVATE]Jornal de Angola, April 6, 
2002. 
v "E um encontro onde as mulheres podem falar a vontade. nos todas falamos. ... 
Todas 
querem participar, sö as que estäo a trabalhar näo estäo na reuniäo.... Eu venho traduzir 
em Kimbundo para as que sö falam Kimbundo, tenho comprimisso com elas, näo quero 
faltar". 
" "Os curandeiros Bantu säo psicölogos eo seu poder de sugestäo e sempre eficaz, o que 
em resumo se pode dizer que o curandeiro Bantu e um especialista em remedios naturais, 
pisotearia, e como um verdadeiro sacerdote medianeiro entre o mundo visivel eo doente", 
Pedro Calueyo, Agora, August 12,2000, page 10. 
" "Aplicagdo de präticas locais, de reintegragdo e estabilizacäo social nas comunidades. 
que englobam: a) Recepcäo das pessoas; b) Purificacäo (simbölica); c) Reintegracäo/ 
aceitagdo; d) Inicio de uma nova vida". 
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""' "A Igreja, mais concretamente as suas comunidades religiosas, podem desempenhar um 
papel fundamental na pacificagdo dos espiritos, no restabelecimento da confianca 
reciproca e na aceitacdo e perddo rnütuo entre cidadäos ate agora desavindos. Finalmente a 
Paz", Jornal de Angola, April 9,2002. 
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Portuguese Text - Chapter 7. 
' "As authoridades tradicionais tinham um papel fundamental no Maquis, sobretudo em 
1961, quando inicou a luta armada. Foram os sobas que acolheram os movimentos de 
libertacäo nacional; foram os sobas quern mobilizaram e organizaram as massas 
populares para apoiar esses movimentos na resistencia da primeira e segunda guerras 
de libertagdo nacional contra os portugueses" Angolense February 23-March 2,2002. 
page VII. 
" "No campo da opressäo cultural hä tambem de referir o papel da religiäo. Os agentes 
religiosis cristäos (padres, pastores, missionärios) foram os primeiros a penetrar nas 
sociedade tradicionais. Ao levar-lhes uma nova religiäo, levavam, tambem, a 
civilizagdo do colonizador novas maneiras de viver, de pensar que interessavam ä 
dominacao colonial. A religiao cristä, vinda da Europa ou da America, foi muitas 
vezes imposta pela violencia, ate que foi assimilada por uma boa parte dos africanos" 
(David 1989: 69). 
"Segundo o ministro, os resultados do encontro permitirdo definir claramente o 
relacionamento entre os 6rgäos administrativos modernos ea autoridade tradicional, na 
perspectiva da promocäo do desenvolvimento söcio-comunitdrio ea consolidacäo da 
democracia", Jornal de Angola, March 26,2002, internet edition. 
" "Os sobas, que manifestaram o seu apoio no decurso de uma audiencia que Ihes foi 
concedida, na manhä de segunda-feira, pelo Presidente da Republica, comprometeram- 
se, concretamente, a ajudar os govemos central e provinciais no reassentamento das 
populacöes nas areas rurais, na reconstrugdo de estradas e de tudo o que foi destruido 
pela guerra", Jornal de Angola, March 27,2002, internet edition. 
v "Um terra que tem vindo a ser motivo de crescente interesse em värios meios e de 
abordagens apaixonadas, o papel das autoridades tradicionais no actual sistema de 
poder politico em Angola... ", Jornal de Angola, February 14.2002, editorial. internet 
edition. 
V' "... näo era necessärio jr ao Occidente buscar mediadores ate hoje como temos vindo 
a assistir. 0 conflito 6 interno e näo 6 l6gica trazer aqui mediadores estrangeiros que 
ate cometem erros de palmatöria como por exemplo a missäo da MONUA 
e um 
exemplo vivo. Temos as nossas tradicöes antigas, estäo ai os sobas que podem tambem 
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exercer um papel preponderante na resolugdo de conflitos. As vezes a politica em 
Africa deixa muito a desejar", 0 Independente, March 4,2000, p. 11. 
V" "Apelamos aos Bobas, regedores e seculos que deixem de fazer a preparagdo mägica 
dos militares e dirigentes porque eles matam, estragam e estranham as populacöes. 
Depois vdo nos quimbandas, que säo sobas e seculos para ihes preparar os corpos para 
que näo lhes aconteca nada", Angolense, February 23-March 2,2002. page VII. 
Vl" (Temos alguma coisa para dizer sobre a guerra, estamos mais do que vinte anos 
esperando falar. Isto acabarä com a conversa. Temos maneiras para resolver os nossos 
problemas. Näo queremos estrangeiros para fazer a paz. Os que vem de fora tambem 
estäo a fabricar armas e estäo a ganhar muito dinheiro aqui. 0 povo de fora näo labe 
de nada. Faziamos sentar os dois, nos nascemos aqui, somos da mesma familia. A 
guerra näo nos interesse, säo os estrangeiros que estäo a ganhar bem ea enganar os 
dois". 
"` O "journal de maior tiragem, circulacäo, divulgacäo de Angola, o Mujimbu, que e 
lido e comentado por quase todos os habitantes do pals, ate pelos analfabetos, cegos, 
mudos e doentes. Tem a sua sede principal em Luanda; os correspondentes, repörteres 
e jornalistas espalhados em toda as provincias. ... 
0 Mujimbu eo journal mais barato 
do mundo: gratis. Com uma audiencia de credibilidade sem precedentes. Distribuicäo e 
divulgacdo nas ruas, nos bares, buates, praias, mercados ... em tudo-todo, sem 
excepgao, mujimbu! Eh, mujimbu, vende-se mas näo e gritado. 
Os ardinas no podem 
nem devem gritar a sua publicidade, ea disciplina fundamental 
do jornal Mujimbu. E 
curioso, o estrangeiro que chega pela primeira vez a Angola, a principal novidade que 
o preocupa eo jornal Mujimbu. Este vocabulo de origem 
da lingua nacional que se 
julga ser kikongo e que significou somente: novidade, noticia, conversa. 
demanda. 
maka, problema, queixa, perdeu o seu verdadeiro e original significado para 
BOATO" 
(XITU 1985: 35). 
